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THESIS ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the different ways in which violence is constructed within 
legal discourse. Two specific types of violence are compared – domestic 
violence and terrorism. While on the face of it, these appear to be very different 
types of violence, in the second section of my thesis, I argue that there are 
significant parallels between the two.  
In particular, in Chapter 2.2 I argue that serious domestic violence is often 
committed with a particular ideological motive, that of masculinist ideology. 
Ideological motive is the first element of the legal definition of terrorism. In 
making this argument, I draw upon definitions of domestic violence that point to 
the elements of power and control inherent in some domestic violence, which is 
committed predominantly by men against women. I also argue that this type of 
violence is a manifestation of masculinist ideology in a broader sense, which 
permeates Australian society. 
In Chapter 2.3, I also argue for the reconceptualisation of domestic violence as 
a crime committed against women as a ‘section of the public’. This accords with 
the second aspect of the legal definition of terrorism, as a crime committed with 
the intention of coercing a government, or intimidating the public, or a section of 
the public. This reconceptualisation contrasts with the usual conceptualisation 
of domestic violence as a crime committed in the private sphere, a feature of 
domestic violence which has been the subject of significant feminist critique. 
Having reconstructed domestic violence as fitting within the two key parameters 
of the legal definition of terrorism, in Section 3 I go on to consider some of the 
various ways in which the law differentially treats terrorism and domestic 
violence. In Chapters 3.1 and 3.2, I consider the treatment of preparatory forms 
of violence, and prevention of violence. In Chapter 3.1, I examine the regulation 
of incitement to violence, through the national system for classification of 
publications and films, and also through the regulation of hate speech in 
Australian and various overseas jurisdictions. Chapter 3.2 contains an 
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examination of the civil regimes for the control and prevention of violence, 
specifically terrorism control orders and domestic violence protection orders. 
Chapters 3.3 and 3.4 consist of an examination of the treatment of more serious 
forms of violence. In Chapter 3.3 I compare sentencing decisions in Australian 
terrorism cases with sentences for male-perpetrated homicides against intimate 
partners, exploring the ways in which the concepts of ‘ideology’ and ‘public’ 
interact with the various considerations to be taken account of upon sentence. 
In Chapter 3.4, I examine cases in which female victims of domestic violence 
respond with lethal violence against their abusers, and how they are 
constructed in legal discourse, in comparison with law enforcement agents who 
respond to terrorism and other types of violence that threaten the safety of 
police or the community. I argue that the construction of domestic violence as a 
‘private’ crime devoid of ideological aspects affects the ways in which female 
perpetrators of defensive homicide are treated in the legal system. 
Throughout each of these chapters, I consider how the differential constructions 
of domestic violence and terrorism serve to reflect and reinforce existing power 
relationships within society. In particular, the continued trivialisation of domestic 
violence serves masculinist interests in ways that I explore in each chapter. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, I draw upon some of the themes from these various 
chapters and discuss possibilities for legal reform and further ways in which 
reconceptualising domestic violence as an ideological/public crime may 
influence the way it is dealt with in the legal system. 
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CHAPTER 1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This is the question: when will opposition to terrorism include the daily terrorism 
against women as women that goes on day after day, worldwide? … Why does 
the whole world turn on a dime into a concerted force to face down the one, 
while to address the other squarely and urgently is unthinkable?1  
It is commonly asserted that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the 
United States ‘changed everything’.2 Although we cannot yet know if 9/113 will 
have a lasting impact on Western culture,4 certainly in the decade or so since, 
the political and legal landscape has changed dramatically. Events such as the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the deaths of Saddam Hussein and Osama bin 
Laden, and the controversy of Guantanamo Bay have all been part of the 
ongoing response to 9/11 that shows no sign of ending any time soon. 
Yet as Catharine MacKinnon notes, the number of people killed as a result of 
the attacks of 9/11 is very similar to the number of women killed by men in 
America every year.5 Women killed at the hands of male intimates in the same 
year, she notes, could have filled one whole World Trade Tower.6 As she 
observes, this ‘war against women’ has not generated the kind of immediate 
and sustained legal response that followed 9/11. It is this anomaly, 
encapsulated in MacKinnon’s question quoted at the beginning of this 
introduction, which provides the general context for my thesis. However, while 
MacKinnon makes her comparison with violence against women more broadly, I 
am concerned specifically with the kind of violence commonly referred to as 
‘domestic violence’. It is domestic violence, as I outline below, which shares a 
range of particular similarities with terrorism that provide the basis for a useful 
comparison of the two. 
                                                          
1
 MacKinnon (2002), p 429. 
2
 For an interrogation of this claim see the essays in Nardin and Sherman (2006). 
3
 Throughout my thesis, I will sometimes refer to the events of 11 September 2001 by the common 
American conjunction to ‘9/11’. 
4
 Nardin and Sherman (2006), p 1. 
5
 MacKinnon (2006), p 4. 
6
 MacKinnon (2006), p 4. 
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Reconceptualising domestic violence as terrorism, as MacKinnon does, serves 
as the point of departure for the analysis I conduct in this thesis. Although 
MacKinnon’s question relates to why there exists such opposition to terrorism 
and not domestic violence, my thesis focuses upon how these two types of 
violence are differentially constructed within legal discourse, and how their 
treatment within the legal system occurs within the context of this differential 
construction.  
There are of course multiple experiences that could fairly be described as 
invoking ‘terror’ in their various victims, but the word ‘terrorism’ is reserved in 
political, social and legal discourse for a very specific type of experience, and 
one not associated with the terror experienced by women targeted in the 
intimate sphere. In subsequent chapters, I consider a number of questions that 
follow from this observation, building on two related points. First, the names we 
give to things are not value-free but reflect pre-existing social assumptions and 
understandings about what it is we are describing. That is, when we experience 
terrorism, we do so in a context in which we already understand what terrorism 
is and bring that understanding to our naming of it. Naming is one aspect of the 
processes of discourse, discussed below, by which all concepts are constructed 
and come to be understood. 
Secondly, the ways in which we define concepts within the discursive process 
also serve to influence in a significant way how we react to the events and 
actions to which we attach those labels. In this way, labelling is a dual process: 
calling something ‘terrorism’ reflects how we understand it, but the labelling 
itself also helps to determine what we do about it. 
Further, I explore how this dual process is not value-free but operates in a way 
that privileges certain interests over others. Broadly, the processes described 
above are reflective of what I will describe as ‘masculinist ideology’, that is they 
reflect and reinforce common understandings and assumptions about men and 
women and the relationship between them in a way that serves to privilege the 
former and disadvantage the latter. I describe this masculinist ideology and its 
operation in detail in Chapter 2.2. 
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Feminists have long recognised that the power to name is key to defining a 
problem and taking control of it.7 Marcus writes: ‘Naming and categorizing is not 
a neutral activity; it is a deeply political one. For language exposes as well as 
masks.’8 My hope is that in interrogating the similarities between domestic 
violence and terrorism, and examining their construction in legal discourse, I 
can contribute to the process of exposing some of the ways in which the law 
privileges some forms of violence, and some victims, over others.  
Through an examination of different aspects of the legal treatment of domestic 
violence and terrorism then, I consider how the state differentially constructs 
and responds to these two categories of violence. In the next section, I outline 
my conceptualisation of ‘the state’ in more detail. Although my focus is primarily 
on construction through legal discourse, I consider the law to be an aspect or 
instrument of the state. Where relevant, I consider social and political discourse 
as they interact with legal discourse. 
My analysis focuses primarily on legal and social discourse in Australia, 
however I also draw upon research from other jurisdictions, particularly the 
United States and United Kingdom, for the purpose of drawing comparisons and 
distinctions, where relevant. Although the treatment of domestic violence 
internationally is not my focus, international monitoring has revealed that many 
nations consistently fail to fulfil their obligations to prevent, investigate and 
prosecute such violence.9 Observations as to the construction of domestic 
violence in Australian legal discourse may therefore have a broader relevance 
to legal discourse in other countries. 
Chapter 1.2 sets out my theoretical and methodological framework. In this 
introductory chapter, I first provide a general definition of some of the concepts 
to be discussed, and outline the rationale for my topic. I then go on to consider 
the work of others who have drawn a comparison between domestic violence 
and terrorism and outline my own justification for doing so. 
                                                          
7
 Rich (1980), p 644. 
8
 Marcus (1994), p 25. 
9
 UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (1999). 
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Some Key Concepts 
 
At the outset, it is appropriate to explain what I mean when I refer to concepts 
such as ‘domestic violence’ and ‘terrorism’. In Chapter 2.1, I explore the 
historical process by which these terms came to achieve recognition and use in 
Australia and elsewhere, as well as other considerations regarding the use and 
‘choice’ of these terms to describe different phenomena. In subsequent 
chapters, I also explore their legal definitions. However a general definition at 
the outset will create a useful starting-point. 
 
Domestic Violence 
I use the term ‘domestic violence’ to refer to a broad range of behaviours, both 
physical and non-physical, perpetrated (usually) by a man against a woman 
with whom he is in an intimate relationship, as part of an ongoing pattern of 
behaviour directed at exercising control over her.10 This description reflects a 
‘control-based’ definition of domestic violence, which is not necessarily 
reflective of psychological,11 sociological,12 or legal definitions of the concept.13 
‘Domestic violence’ is also commonly used to refer to violence perpetrated 
within the family more broadly; indeed the term ‘family violence’ is sometimes 
used to reflect this broader interpretation.14 However, I use the term domestic 
violence specifically to refer to violence perpetrated by a man against a woman 
in an intimate relationship. Although aspects of power and control will often be 
present in violence perpetrated within the family context more broadly, I limit the 
                                                          
10
 Pence and Paymar (1993), Chapter 1. See in the US context also Bograd (1988), p 14; Fischer et al 
(1992-3);  Schneider (2000), Chapter 4. 
11
 Psychological research in relation to domestic violence has focused on ‘phases’ in the battering 
relationship, and victim responses, including the controversial ‘learned helplessness’ response outlined by 
Lenore Walker: Walker (1984). 
12
 Johnson describes the ‘family violence approach’, based on sociological research into family violence as 
a type of violence perpetrated within the family and committed by both men and women: Johnson (1995). 
13
 Legal definitions of ‘domestic violence’ in the Australian context are discussed in Chapter 3.2. As 
observed there, most legal definitions lack a recognition of the gendered aspect of domestic violence. 
14
 The Coalition of Australian Governments (COAG) uses this term in contrast to ‘domestic violence’ to 
encompass violence amongst family members having similar features to domestic violence: COAG (2011), 
p 3. ‘Family violence’ is also a term preferred by some Indigenous communities: Graycar and Morgan 
(2002), p 314. 
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use of ‘domestic violence’ as described in order to reflect the specific power 
dynamics inherent in the intimate relationship. These dynamics are underpinned 
by social understandings about the roles of men and women and intimate 
relationships. This is central to the argument advanced in Chapters 2.2 and 2.3 
that this kind of violence is, contrary to popular understandings, both gendered 
and ideological. 
Consistently with ‘control-based’ and feminist definitions of domestic violence,15 
I use the concept to refer to a range of behaviours aside from physical violence 
that serve to establish and reinforce control over a partner’s behaviour, 
including emotional, psychological, economic and social abuse. For particular 
purposes, for example the analysis conducted in Chapters 3.3 and 3.4 in 
relation to lethal domestic violence and self-defence responses, I largely limit 
the discussion to domestic violence in the form of physical violence, though 
other forms of abuse are discussed as relevant. I examine the justification for so 
limiting the analysis in more detail in those chapters. 
In writing of domestic violence, I generally refer to the victims of domestic 
violence by the female pronoun and perpetrators by the male pronoun, to reflect 
the gendered dimension of this type of violence as referred to above.16 
 
Terrorism 
As discussed in Chapter 2.1, there is no universally agreed legal or political 
definition of terrorism. In particular, there continues to be political debate in 
relation to whether states, as opposed to non-state actors, can themselves be 
responsible for acts of terrorism.17 However, elements upon which there is 
some agreement amongst political and legal scholars are that it refers to an act 
of violence directed against the civilian population for political or ideological 
                                                          
15
 Although there is not of course a unitary feminist perspective on domestic violence, Johnson 
distinguishes the ‘feminist approach’ as one focused on power dynamics inherent in the male/female 
intimate relationship from the ‘family violence approach’, which focuses on violence perpetrated within the 
family more broadly: Johnson (1995). 
16
 Johnson (1995) (unlike ‘common couple violence’, serious domestic violence is committed 
predominantly by men against women); Miller (2005), pp 14-37; Australian Government (March 2009), p 
27. 
17
 Abi-Saab (2004), pp xix-xx. 
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ends,18 that the act instils fear in the population,19 and that it is intended to 
influence a government or intimidate or coerce a section of the public.20 
For the most part, when referring to terrorism in this work, I am referring to it as 
it is commonly understood in contemporary Western political, social and legal 
discourse. In other words, I refer to terrorism as an act (or planned act) of 
violence, that will result in harm to persons or property, perpetrated by unofficial 
non-state actors,21 carried out for political or ideological purposes, and intended 
to influence a government directly, or indirectly through the impact the act has 
on the civilian population. 
The concept of terrorism, as outlined in Chapter 2.1, has a lengthy history and 
has been associated with a wide and diverse range of acts and actors. These 
include the hijackings of the 1960s and 1970s carried out by Palestinian 
liberation groups, the anti-capitalist activities of the Italian Red-Army Brigade 
and the German Baader-Meinhof group, and of the Irish Republican Army in 
Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
Although the history and definitions of terrorism are broad, terrorism in 
contemporary political and legal discourse is commonly associated with Islamic 
extremism.22 Although there is certainly nothing in the legal definition of 
terrorism that would restrict the concept in such a fashion, the aforementioned 
association provides the context for analysing contemporary discourse about 
terrorism.  Because my analysis focuses on legal constructions of terrorism and 
domestic violence post-9/11, most of my discussion of terrorism will be of 
Islamic extremism as it features in contemporary discourse. In focusing my 
analysis in such a way, I do not of course overlook the lengthy and varied 
history of terrorism, which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.1. 
                                                          
18
 Hancock (2002); Dupuy (2004), pp 4-5.  
19
 Frey and Morris (1991), p 2. 
20
 Hancock (2002). 
21
 Carr (2006), p 4. 
22
 Carr (2006), p 239; Chaliand and Blin (2007), p 253; Robert McClelland, ‘Untitled’ (speech delivered at 
3
rd
 Annual Counter-Terrorism Summit), Hilton on the Park East Melbourne, 28 October 2008, 
<http://www.tamilsydney.com/content/view/1506/37/>. It should be noted, however, that the situation of 
Muslims in Australia is very different to that of Muslims in Britain, where particular cultural factors have 
contributed to the rise of extremism in some quarters: Bergin (2009), pp 4-5. 
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The State 
As indicated above, my thesis addresses the various ways in which the state 
differentially treats terrorism and domestic violence. I consider this treatment 
largely through a focus on the legal system, and also on legal discourse. 
However I do, where relevant, consider political and social discourse, and how 
they interact with legal discourse in differentially constructing violence. 
In referring to ‘the state’, I refer to the various mechanisms of government – the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary, as well as the broad variety of 
structures, policies and practices through which the objectives of the state are 
implemented.23 While individual decision-makers and bodies play a role in the 
functioning of the state, I accept Smart’s observation in relation to the law that 
the whole is more than the sum of its parts.24 In other words, those individuals 
and organisations who make decisions do so in the context of pre-existing 
social and institutional structures and practices. 
I also accept the feminist observation that the state is a ‘powerful masculinist 
force that is also raced, hetero-sexed, able-bodied and classed’.25 
Although I do at times refer to the legal system and ‘the state’ interchangeably, 
the legal system, while part of the state apparatus, is more than simply an arm 
of the state.26 Importantly, the law has its own practices, procedures, rules and 
discourse which, while often reflecting the interests of the state, are at the same 
time separate to it. The law is not simply reflective of social norms; it acts in a 
‘constitutive’ way by actively altering discourse to find new means of justifying 
existing power inequalities.27 
                                                          
23
 This is broadly consistent with radical feminist and liberal/Marxist definitions of the state: Watson (1990), 
pp 26-9. Watson herself notes that influences that impact on regulation in women’s lives do extend beyond 
the state. See also Lacey (1993), p 95 regarding the influence of non-state ‘public’ organisations. 
24
 Smart (1995), pp 140-1. McLaren (2002), p 38 notes that decision-makers act with certain intentions but 
cannot necessarily control what the outcome of their decisions will be. 
25
 Thornton (2006), p 152. 
26
 Smart notes that to use the terms ‘law’ and ‘state’ interchangeably is to cede too much power to the law: 
Smart (1989), pp 80-2. 
27
 Siegel (1995), pp 2183-7. 
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Rationale 
 
At the outset, a project to compare the treatment afforded to two types of 
violence commonly understood to be very different demands explanation. 
Although, as discussed in Chapter 2.1, naming is itself an exercise of power, to 
attempt to reframe domestic violence as terrorism without justification is to risk 
that the exercise will be dismissed as ‘metaphorical, hyperbolic, and/or 
rhetorical’.28 There are, I suggest, a number of similarities between domestic 
violence and terrorism that justify a comparison in the terms I undertake here. 
Underpinning the Western liberal legal tradition is the so-called ‘harm principle’ 
– the idea that people’s conduct should only be regulated to the extent 
necessary to prevent harm to others.29 Both terrorism and domestic violence, at 
the most basic level, are manifestations of harm. Each, in its most serious form, 
results in the loss of human life, and each is also capable of generating more 
and less serious forms of injury, as well as property damage.  
Of course, there are also differences in the type and nature of harm generated. 
A first apparent point of distinction is the scale and actuality versus potentiality 
of violence.30 While 60 women on average die every year in Australia as a result 
of domestic violence,31 Australia has not witnessed an actual terrorist attack on 
its soil since the 1978 Hilton Hotel bombing.32 The risk of an Australian citizen 
being a victim of a terrorist attack has been described as ‘miniscule’.33 However, 
as evidenced by events such as the Bali and London bombings and 9/11, the 
scale of a terrorist attack, when it does occur, is potentially massive in terms of 
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 MacKinnon notes that this argument is made in relation to the use of the phrase ‘war against women’: 
MacKinnon (2006), p 5. 
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 Originally expressed in Mill (1974), p 68. For discussion of the influence of the harm principle see Bronitt 
and McSherry (2010), pp 57-9. 
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 For an attempt to use factors such as the extent and likelihood of harm in calculating offence 
seriousness see Von Hirsch and Jareborg (1991). 
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 Mouzos and Rushforth (2003), p 2. Summers (2003), p 79 gives a higher estimate of 77 women per 
year. 
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 Morgan notes that in cost-benefit analysis terms terrorism is ‘low probability’ but with high impact 
consequences: Morgan (1989), p 47. 
33
 Leithner (2003), p 36. 
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the loss of life and damage caused.34 More recently, members of an alleged 
conspiracy to commit terrorist acts in Sydney discussed the possibility of there 
being 500 victims of their plot.35 Taking MacKinnon’s 9/11 example above as 
illustrative, the issue is perhaps not a disparity in the numbers of victims so 
much as a difference in the number and scale of attacks.36  
Of course, a quantitative comparison in and of itself is not useful, given that 
there is a range of violent acts, such as stranger assault and negligent driving, 
that result in fatalities each year. Some similarities between domestic violence 
and terrorism also apply to other types of violence. For example, domestic 
violence and terrorism are acts perpetrated overwhelmingly by men, the former 
by men against women, and the latter by men against both men and women.37 
However, this is true of most types of violent crime. 
However, domestic violence and terrorism also share a psychological aspect to 
the harm caused that distinguishes them from other types of violence. An 
important part of the debilitating effect of domestic violence, aside from the 
harm caused by the violence itself, is the psychological impact on the victim of 
constantly waiting for and anticipating the next attack.38 This psychological 
effect has received most attention in the context of the controversial ‘battered 
woman’s syndrome’, which hinges on the ‘learned helplessness’ women are 
said to develop due to their experiences of repeated cycles of battering by their 
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 The estimated number of victims of the Bali bombings in 2002 is 202: ‘Bali death toll set at 202’, BBC 
News Online, 19 February 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2778923.stm>; the death toll from 
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by men: Johnson (1995). 
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 In writing of his own and his mother’s experiences, Ian Leader-Elliott notes: ‘In this relationship, as in 
many others, the essence of terrorism was to be found in the unpredictability of violent attack’: Leader-
Elliott (1993), p 430. Note however that a proposal to include psychological harm in the definition of 
‘terrorism’ was rejected by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (December 
2006), pp 60-2. A subsequent proposal to include psychological harm in the definition was not taken up: 
Attorney-General’s Department (July 2009), pp 45-7. 
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partners.39 Similarly, terrorism, even in the absence of a terrorist act, uses 
psychological impact on the public as a key strategy,40 which in turn has 
significant consequences in terms of how people live their lives as well as on 
government policy. Both have the effect of undermining security and stability; 
domestic violence in the home/family context and terrorism in the general 
community. 
Further, both frequently involve the suicide of the perpetrator as part of the 
violent act; terrorist ‘suicide-bombings’ are notorious,41 and suicide of the 
perpetrator is also a common feature of domestic homicides.42 The willingness 
of perpetrators to give their lives in pursuit of their cause can be interpreted as 
an extreme form of ideological commitment, to which more consideration is 
given in Chapter 2.2. 
Most importantly for my purposes, domestic violence and terrorism share 
aspects in common which might initially be perceived as points of difference. 
The defining features of terrorism, which are examined in Chapters 2.2 and 2.3, 
are the ideological motivation of its perpetrators, and its characterisation as a 
crime directed against the public, either randomly through the targeting of 
individuals in public places, or more directly in the form of its government or 
state representatives.  
At first blush, these characteristics would seem to clearly distinguish terrorism 
and domestic violence as different phenomena. Terrorists, as we know them in 
the post-9/11 context, are motivated by a wish to advance the cause of Islam, or 
by a desire to end the involvement of Western forces in wars such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq.43 These objectives are pursued through attacks on public 
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 The concept of ‘learned helplessness’ was developed by Lenore Walker (1984). It has been the subject 
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targets such as the Twin Towers in New York, the Sari Nightclub in Bali, and 
public transport networks in London and Madrid.44  
Domestic violence, on the other hand, is commonly conceptualised as 
something caused by the ordinary frustrations and problems of personal 
relationships, the antithesis of ideological crime. However, perpetrators of 
domestic violence, I will argue in Chapter 2.2 by building on the control-based 
definition of domestic violence, are also motivated by ideology. Although the law 
frequently constructs acts of physical violence in the domestic context as 
random acts committed in the heat of passion, domestic violence scholarship 
demonstrates that violence used in the intimate sphere is indeed tactical, 
strategic, and perpetrated with the aim of establishing and reinforcing men’s 
control within the family context.45 This differentiates both terrorism and 
domestic violence from other acts of violence, such as nightclub brawls, or 
violence inflicted for personal gain or retribution.46  
In Section 2.3, I argue that the gendered aspect of domestic violence is 
overlooked within legal discourse and its construction of the public and the 
private. Domestic violence, despite its conceptualisation as something that 
takes place in the private sphere, also has a public dimension, in the sense that 
victims are predominantly members of a particular social group.47 Modern 
terrorist acts tend to be executed upon the public at random,48 and upon people 
whom the perpetrators have not met, while domestic violence is inflicted against 
a person with whom the offender is in an intimate relationship. However, just as 
the victims of ‘random’ terrorism are in some way symbolic of the terrorists’ 
target, individual victims of domestic violence also represent the victimisation of 
women as a group defined by gender. The fact that as victims they are also 
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known to their perpetrators does not change this gendered aspect of domestic 
violence. Women victimised by domestic violence are only victims because they 
are women. This is particularly illustrated by the fact that perpetrators of 
domestic violence frequently inflict violence upon victims in subsequent 
relationships.49  
It has also been suggested that some of the aspects of terrorism, namely that it 
is premeditated, politically-motivated violence against non-combatants, are 
shared by a range of crimes beyond domestic violence, including rape, child 
abuse, sexual harassment, economic exploitation, homophobic violence, 
educational discrimination and religious manipulation.50 To the extent that is 
correct, to observe that similarities with other crimes may exist does not detract 
from the strength of the argument I make here. However, while other crimes 
may also constitute a manifestation of certain belief structures and a sense of 
entitlement to use violence, domestic violence shares with terrorism an aspect 
of instrumentality. In other words, the ideological aspect of domestic violence, 
drawing on control-based definitions, is not only that perpetrators believe 
themselves entitled to use violence, but that they use violence strategically and 
on an ongoing basis to achieve their objectives, namely control and obedience 
within the intimate relationship.  
Hate crimes and sexual violence may also be said to constitute instrumental 
uses of violence. Hate crimes are considered further in Chapter 3.1, although as 
discussed there, hate crimes based on gender are rarely recognised as such. 
Domestic violence provides such an interesting contrast with terrorism from a 
feminist viewpoint because gender is at the core of its ideological nature. 
Sexual assault, which might similarly be characterised as ideological and 
instrumental, would provide another interesting comparison, however the 
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 For a discussion of cases involving domestic violence inflicted upon multiple victims see the cases cited 
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ongoing nature of domestic violence, which also includes sexual violence, 
makes it a better vehicle for comparison with terrorism.51  
None of this is to suggest that terrorism and domestic violence are one and the 
same thing, or that they should be treated identically. However, as outlined 
above, there are a number of similarities between them that constitute a basis 
for questioning their differential treatment in political, social and legal discourse. 
In particular, in the chapters that follow, I will argue that the criteria of 
ideological motivation and public crime mark terrorism out as especially serious 
in the catalogue of crimes. If one accepts the premise outlined above, and 
developed further in Chapters 2.2 and 2.3, that these criteria in fact can also be 
applied to domestic violence, then this raises questions as to the differential 
treatment of the two types of crime under the law. 
Previous Comparisons of Domestic Violence and Terrorism 
 
I do not purport to be breaking new ground in drawing a comparison between 
domestic violence and terrorism. Most recently, Catharine MacKinnon has 
argued that violence against women is ‘women’s September 11’.52 According to 
MacKinnon, violence against women and terrorism share in common a 
horizontal legal architecture, large number of victims and masculinist ideology – 
both are ‘dispersed forms of armed conflict’.53 Both are premeditated rather than 
spontaneous, ideologically and politically rather than criminally motivated, and 
involve civilian victims and sub-national agents as perpetrators. 
Isabel Marcus makes an argument similar to the point I develop in Chapter 2.2, 
that perpetrators of both domestic violence and terrorism utilise strategies of 
control and domination in order to achieve their goals.54 Marcus argues that 
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domestic violence should be reconceptualised as ‘terrorism in the home’ for the 
purpose of applying an international human rights framework to the problem.55  
Michael Johnson refers to ‘patriarchal terrorism’ in his study of domestic 
violence in addressing the argument that domestic violence is perpetrated by 
women against men as much as by men against women.56 He distinguishes 
‘common couple violence’ – more trivial forms of violence inflicted by both men 
and women in intimate settings, from ‘patriarchal terrorism’ – violence 
commonly resulting in serious injury, which is perpetrated predominantly by 
men against women. He defines patriarchal terrorism as: 
 ... a product of patriarchal traditions of men's right to control “their” women ... a 
form of terroristic control of wives by their husbands that involves the systematic 
use of not only violence, but economic subordination, threats, isolation, and 
other control tactics.57 
In the case of at least MacKinnon and Marcus, the choice of ‘terrorism’ as a 
substitute term for domestic violence is strategic; both use it to question why 
international legal frameworks should not be utilised to address the problem of 
violence perpetrated against women. In a similar vein, I hope to challenge the 
common assumptions about domestic violence and terrorism that are generated 
by the words used to describe them.  
However, unlike MacKinnon and Marcus, I do not investigate the potential of 
utilising international law to improve responses to domestic violence. My aim is 
to delve further into these two concepts, and to examine the ways in which legal 
discourse actively constructs terrorism as opposed to domestic violence in ways 
that provide a basis for their differential treatment in the criminal justice system. 
My attempt to reconstruct domestic violence as a form of terrorism is not merely 
strategic; it is an exercise in exploration of legal discourse and how it operates 
to perpetuate existing power relations and social inequalities. 
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Justification 
 
 The approach I take in this thesis is one that inevitably asks more questions 
than it answers. Such an approach creates a need to justify the asking of 
questions as a valuable process in and of itself. Adrian Howe talks about the 
strategy of ‘problematisation’ – calling into question common assumptions and 
deconstructing them to reveal new possibilities.58 I adopt Howe’s view that 
problematisation is an important strategy in terms of encouraging people to 
question common assumptions and taken-for-granted phenomena. Doing so 
has the potential to create new opportunities to re-examine perceptions about 
domestic violence and terrorism, and generate fresh ideas about how we should 
deal with them, both inside and outside the legal system. 
In the sense that equality before the law is one of the tenets of Western legal 
systems, an analysis that calls into question perceived differences in criminality 
is also of importance. If two things are in fact alike, yet are treated differently, 
this calls into question whether their differential treatment is in fact conducive to 
the achievement of justice. If one class of perpetrators is the beneficiary of more 
lenient treatment according to law, this begs the question whether such leniency 
is at the expense of a particular class of victims.59 
The problematisation approach is therefore at the forefront of my research. My 
thesis is not a normative one, in that I am not concerned to make 
recommendations about how domestic violence and terrorism should be 
properly dealt with within the criminal justice system. My goal in contributing to 
the vast body of research in relation to domestic violence is to open up new 
possibilities for examining both terrorism and domestic violence, particularly 
within the legal context. 
In undertaking this examination, I consider four different aspects of the law’s 
disparate treatment of terrorism and domestic violence: 
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 In Chapter 3.1, I consider the regulation of material that incites violence. 
While material perceived as inciting or encouraging terrorist activity is 
criminalised under Australian laws, material that can be said to 
encourage or incite violence against women is regulated by discourses 
of ‘morality’ that leave a significant amount of such material unregulated.  
 Chapter 3.2 concerns police prevention of violence, and the different 
mechanisms available to individuals and government agencies to control 
the violence of those who are suspected of, but not charged with, 
planning acts of violence.  
 Sentencing for those convicted of violent offences is the subject of 
Chapter 3.3. Although to date there has only been a small number of 
prosecutions for terrorism offences in Australia, they provide an 
interesting source of analysis and comparison with domestic homicide 
cases, in terms of both patterns of sentencing and the construction of 
violence within legal judgments.  
 Finally, in Chapter 3.4, legal responses to those who defend themselves 
and others against violence are considered, with a particular focus on 
the treatment of women who act in self-defence against their abusers. 
In these four chapters that constitute Section 3, I aim to demonstrate that the 
differential construction of terrorism and domestic violence is not of mere 
rhetorical significance; it has real and practical implications for how such 
violence is dealt with at law. In each case, I also explore how the ‘way things 
are’ is a product of, and also reinforces, masculinist interests. In exploring a 
possible reconstruction of domestic violence as terrorism, I also hope to open 
up new ways of conceptualising and treating domestic violence, which I 
examine in the conclusion in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 1.2 THEORY AND METHOD 
 
In Chapter 1.1, I outlined the purpose and rationale for my thesis. In this 
chapter, I outline the theoretical and methodological framework of my research.  
My method falls into three main categories: literature review, legislation and 
case identification and selection, and discourse analysis. I examine each of 
these in turn. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Empirical Research and Background Reading 
 
Literature review has constituted an important part of my research as, in 
conducting the discursive analysis contained in Sections 2 and 3, I needed to 
draw upon critiques and research in a number of areas. Most importantly, my 
analysis needed to be informed by the large body of research in relation to 
violence against women from Australia and also from the United States and 
United Kingdom.1 I also reviewed a vast amount of literature relating to 
terrorism, predominantly from these three different jurisdictions, but from other 
international writers where relevant or pertinent. 
The literature I reviewed in relation to domestic violence fell into the following 
main categories: 
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 I have focused upon these countries as they share a legal tradition with Australia, however I have also 
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1. Official documents, often in the form of government reports, documenting 
the occurrence and extent of domestic violence in different jurisdictions, 
as well as government approaches to addressing violence; 
2. Empirical research into domestic violence, including studies of 
perpetrator behaviour and victim characteristics, as well as investigation 
of effectiveness of different perpetrator programs and  treatments; 
3. Feminist literature on domestic violence, generally providing an overview 
of feminist constructions of violence against women and the failures of 
the state in addressing the problem; 
4. Psychological and sociological literature on domestic violence, to provide 
background understanding to different approaches to addressing 
domestic violence, and to provide a contrast with feminist or ‘control-
based’ approaches. 
In relation to the first of these categories, it was necessary to locate and review 
a large body of government reports that have been commissioned in Australia in 
relation to domestic violence. As domestic violence is generally addressed at a 
state/territory rather than a national level, this necessitated examining reports 
available in a range of Australian jurisdictions. 
In relation to terrorism, literature reviewed can be categorised as follows: 
1. Australian, United Kingdom and United States government 
documentation in relation to terrorism, particularly background or 
explanatory material to counter-terrorism legislation; 
2. Psychological and political works on terrorism, in particular outlining the 
characteristics, history and evolution of terrorism; 
3. Empirical research in relation to terrorism, in particular studies involving 
perpetrators and their characteristics and beliefs, and the impact of 
terrorism on the general public. 
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In relation to each of the parts of Section 3, I reviewed sources associated with 
specific aspects of the law’s engagement with domestic violence and terrorism, 
as follows: 
 Chapter 3.1 – literature in relation to incitement of violence against 
women, particularly radical feminist texts on pornography as a form of 
violence against women and Dworkin and MacKinnon’s Anti-
Pornography Ordinance, and pro-pornography and postmodern feminist 
perspectives on pornography. I also reviewed a range of legal and 
academic research in relation to hate speech and  hate crimes; 
 Chapter 3.2 – research and critique on the engagement of police with 
domestic violence victims and perpetrators, primarily in Australia but also 
some United Kingdom and United States research in this area, as well as 
scholarly articles outlining and critiquing aspects of terrorism control 
orders legislation; 
 Chapter 3.3 – general critiques of criminal law and sentencing practices, 
and in particular mainstream and scholarly writings on the operation of 
the law of provocation in domestic homicides, and analysis of sentencing 
decisions in domestic homicide cases; 
 Chapter 3.4 – the large body of research conducted in relation to women 
who kill in response to violence against them, critiques of Australian self-
defence law, critiques of women’s treatment within the criminal justice 
system, Lenore Walker’s seminal work on ‘battered woman syndrome’ 
and the critiques that it has generated, history of police shootings in 
Australia, and documentation regarding the shootings in the United 
States and United Kingdom of suspected terrorists Rigoberto Alpizar and 
Jean-Charles de Menezes. 
 
Theoretical Perspectives 
 
In writing this thesis, I have been informed by a number of different theoretical 
perspectives, which I outline here. In reading and applying theoretical 
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perspectives, I have been mindful of one of the problems of theory that Anne 
Bottomley has described.2 This problem is that in their quest to ‘do theory’, 
feminists will adhere to traditional modes of practising theory and impose it from 
outside and above the thing that they are studying. Rather than simply reading 
or analysing theory, Bottomley suggests, feminists should explore theory. The 
strategy Bottomley describes herself as using is to take those aspects of theory 
she finds to be useful and implement those in her work while leaving behind 
other aspects, rather than ‘adopting’ a theory wholesale and applying it in a 
totalising way.  
I have tried to adopt Bottomley’s approach in my research. Doing so also 
hopefully avoids the problems associated with what Carol Smart refers to as 
‘grand master theory’, by which she refers to theory that attempts to explain all 
means of oppression by reference to one mode of explanation. In doing so, I 
hope to avoid the problem she identifies, of promoting a classless, white 
feminist perspective on the law.3  
 
Feminist Perspectives on Foucault 
 
My thesis in large part focuses on the ways in which violence is constructed in 
legal discourse. Theories of discourse, based on postmodern feminist 
interpretations of Michel Foucault’s work, are therefore a key theoretical 
underpinning of my research.4 While feminist engagement with Foucault is by 
no means unproblematic,5 his critiques of power and its relationship with 
discourse have provided fertile ground for postmodern feminist critiques.  
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By discourse, Foucault refers not only to language, but to social rules and 
practices that create meaning. Hall writes that discourse means:6 
... a group of statements which provide a language for talking about – i.e. a way 
of representing – a particular kind of knowledge about a topic. When statements 
about a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it 
possible to construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in 
which the topic can be constructed. ... Discourse is about the production of 
knowledge through language. ... Since all social practices entail meaning, all 
practices have a discursive aspect. So discourse enters into and influences all 
social practices. 
Postmodernism poses a significant dilemma for feminist theory. A central tenet 
of postmodernism is that it is not possible to ‘know’ something independently of 
the way it is constructed, and the position of the knower. All knowledge is 
therefore subject to challenge. However, feminism is rooted in the desire for 
change and improvement in the position of women, therefore the concept of 
‘woman’ is central to feminist theory.7 If it is not possible to ‘objectively’ and 
reliably describe women’s position in general terms, this begs the question how 
it is possible to lobby for changes that would improve that position.8  
Postmodern critique therefore carries the risk of fracturing the feminist 
movement to the extent that it is not practically possible to formulate any 
strategies for change. It has certainly contributed to divisions between those 
who see the perspectives of ‘women’ and their experiences as integral to the 
feminist cause, and those who wish to explore the possibilities that 
postmodernism opens up for challenging essentialism and creating new 
meanings for categories such as ‘woman’. 
However, concerns about postmodernism’s destabilising capacities do not 
diminish the value of discourse analysis as a tool for disturbing and displacing 
common assumptions and understandings about violence within law and the 
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community. Although it remains important to acknowledge women’s real and 
lived experiences,9 adopting discourse analysis as a tool means recognising 
that all things are constructed through discourse, and through deconstructing 
discursive processes, new possibilities for rethinking and reconstructing things 
can be imagined. 
Foucault, and those feminists who have engaged with his work, focus upon 
discourse and the ways in which it constructs social reality.10 Foucault 
described his goal as: 
... wearing away certain self-evidences and commonplaces about madness, 
normality, illness, crime and punishment; to bring it about together with many 
others, that certain phrases can no longer be spoken about so lightly, certain 
acts no longer, or at least no longer so unhesitatingly performed, to contribute 
to changing certain things in people’s ways of perceiving and doing things, to 
participate in this difficult displacement of forms and sensibility and thresholds 
of tolerance.11  
Following in these footsteps, Foucauldian feminists seek to challenge the 
meaning of certain commonly-accepted terms, such as ‘woman’, ‘feminine’ and 
‘masculinity’. A concept with which I am particularly concerned in this thesis is 
‘ideology’, and in the same vein as Foucault, I seek to bring about a change in 
thinking such that the distinction drawn in legal and social discourse between 
ideological and non-ideological motivation ceases to be so clearly drawn, and 
new possibilities for the meaning of ideology are opened up. 
Drawing on Foucault’s concept of genealogies, some feminists restrict these 
analyses to the local and specific, while others attempt to link discursive 
analysis to broader social and structural phenomena.12 Foucault’s work on the 
relationship between discourse and power is also important;13 while Foucault 
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himself saw power as a ‘relationship’ and not belonging to any particular person 
or group,14 those who have used his work as a springboard have developed the 
idea of the discourse/power relationship to incorporate patriarchal and other 
influences on discourse.15 In expanding the scope of analysis to include not only 
written and spoken language but other rules and practices that generate 
meaning, Foucault provided a rich basis for combining the examination of 
discursive practices with structures and relationships of power. 
Foucault’s analysis of the relationship between power and discourse is 
important in the context of my research. Although I am not focusing on the 
question of why particular constructions of terrorism and domestic violence 
have emerged, I am interested in examining how different phenomena are 
constructed, and how that in turn reflects existing power relationships within law 
and society. In this way, my research reflects the second post-Foucauldian 
approach described above, of attempting to relate discourse to broader social 
and structural phenomena.  
Foucault also discussed the concept of ‘games of truth’ – a process of 
subjugated discourses creating challenges for dominant discourse, and creating 
potential for new meanings.16 This is important in the context of my research, as 
it acknowledges that, despite the power relations underlying discourse, these 
are not fixed and immovable, and possibilities for change and resistance do 
exist. 
Case Construction Theory 
 
A theoretical domain that links usefully with postmodern feminist theory is that 
of ‘case construction’ formulated by the so-called ‘Warwick school’.17 The theory 
of case construction is not concerned with discourse analysis but with the 
practical ways in which investigators, prosecutors and other players in the 
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criminal justice system operate within the parameters set by the law. In doing 
so, those players actively participate in the construction of cases by asking 
questions, and selecting and discarding evidence, within the confines of their 
understandings of the law. Case construction theory is a broadly structural 
approach which also takes into consideration micro-approaches to the way 
cases are developed within the criminal justice system. 
The work of the Warwick school interacts usefully with techniques of discourse 
analysis, because it demonstrates how the practical work involved in the 
investigation and prosecution of cases before courts follows from, and 
reinforces, the work done by legal discourse. Legislation and case law construct 
the meaning of legal concepts, and these meanings are perpetuated and given 
life through the work of the criminal justice agencies which operate within the 
parameters of legal discourse. 
In examining the ways in which terrorism and domestic violence are constructed 
within legal discourse, I am therefore also concerned with the ways in which this 
discursive process influences the process of case construction. In other words, 
the way these concepts are defined in law determines what evidence is brought 
before the court and the way in which cases are presented. In turn, I am 
interested to examine how the process of case construction also reinforces and 
perpetuates the discursive construction of domestic violence and terrorism, so 
that the two processes work in tandem to construct the different types of 
violence. 
 
Theories of the Public and Private 
 
As explored in more detail in Chapter 2.3, the differentiation between public and 
private is a key aspect of the way in which terrorism and domestic violence are 
constructed in legal discourse. Traditionally, the law has treated domestic 
violence as a ‘private’ issue and one best addressed within the confines of the 
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home.18 In the case of State v Oliver,19 a North Carolina court stated, ‘If no 
permanent injury has been inflicted, nor malice, cruelty nor dangerous violence 
shown by the husband, it is better to draw the curtain, shut out the public gaze, 
and leave the parties to forget and forgive’.20 This line of thinking historically 
resulted in an absence of legal regulation of domestic violence or, where 
regulation existed, a reluctance to enforce the law.21  
By contrast, the targeting of the government or sections of the public for violent 
attacks is a key aspect of legal definitions of terrorism in Western and other 
legal systems,22 and in that sense it is by definition a ‘public’ crime. 
The public/private dichotomy, and its historical and continuing role in privileging 
masculinist interests, has also constituted a rich source of critique for feminist 
scholars. In my research, therefore, it is inevitable that critiques of the ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ will be of importance.  
In its simplest conception, the public sphere incorporates those aspects of the 
world in which people engage in public life, including the world of work, politics 
and the economy.23 The private sphere, on the other hand, denotes home and 
family – aspects of life normally lived away from the public gaze.  
Despite the appeal of this simple conception of the public/private dichotomy, the 
boundaries between the two spheres are permeable and constantly in a state of 
flux.24 The meanings of the terms ‘public’ and ‘private’ are always changing, 
contested and subject to context.25 Susan Gal describes the spheres as ‘co-
constitutive cultural categories’ and also ‘indexical signs that are always 
relative, dependent for part of their referential meaning on the interactional 
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context in which they are used.’26 Even when conceived purely in terms of 
physical space, an example utilised by Gal illustrates this point, using the 
terminology ‘fractal distinctions’ to describe the way in which a single pattern (in 
this case the public and the private) recurs inside itself:27 
A familiar, everyday example of how this works is the common 
conceptualization of American bourgeois domestic space. At a first look, the 
privacy of the house itself contrasts with the public character of the street 
around it. If we focus, however, on the inside of the house, then the living room 
becomes the public, that is, the public part of a domestic private space. Thus 
the public/private distinction is reapplied and now divides into public and private 
what was, from another perspective, entirely “private” space. But even the 
relatively public living room can be recalibrated – using this same distinction – 
by momentary gestures or utterances, voicings that are iconic of privacy and 
thus create less institutionalized and more spontaneous spatial divisions during 
interaction (Goffman). The whispered aside, the confidential turn of bodies 
toward each other at a company party, come to mind as familiar examples of 
privacy fleetingly created. 
From this example, it is apparent that any one thing may be ‘private’ in one 
sense and simultaneously ‘public’ in another; an object or space, institution or 
practice can be viewed from multiple perspectives and conceptualised in varied 
ways in terms of its publicness or privateness. This recognition of malleability is 
significant, because it follows from this that ‘public’ and ‘private’, like other 
phenomena, do not pre-exist the discourse that constructs them. This also 
means that the public/private dichotomy can be used as ‘an ideological device’ 
with the state invoking the notion of ‘public’ in relation to those areas of social 
life where it wishes to intervene.28 
A number of feminist critiques have focused on the difference between the 
spheres in terms of legal regulation.29 It has been suggested that while the 
public sphere is characterised by legal regulation, the private sphere remains, 
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with the support and encouragement of liberal theorists, a realm largely free of 
regulation – a bastion of privacy and unchecked abuse.30 Thornton argues that 
keeping the private sphere immune from regulation is a ‘central project of the 
masculinist state’ as the private sphere therefore remains a site where male 
citizens are largely free from equality requirements.31 Because women (in 
comparison to men) spend a significant proportion of their lives in the private 
sphere, the lack of legal regulation in this area equates to a lack of legal 
protection for women.  
Others have pointed out that the separation between public and private spheres 
cannot be described simply in terms of regulation or absence thereof. 
Regulation of the family and the private sphere does occur, for example in the 
form of legislation dealing with marriage, divorce, custody, taxation, social 
security and abortion, all of which make their impact on the family felt.32 Equally, 
an absence of regulation can constitute regulation in itself (albeit the means and 
methods of regulation are left to somebody else, who may be a private actor).33 
Administrative and judicial decisions are also ‘public’ in the sense that they take 
place in the open and using formal, state-sanctioned procedures and protocols. 
Where a decision is made by a police officer not to investigate a matter, by a 
prosecutor not to prosecute, or by a judge to dismiss a case, these instances of 
‘non-regulation’ take place in the public sphere, although they may have 
significant private consequences.34 
The concept of ‘public’ also has significance within the context of what is said to 
constitute the ‘public interest’. This can mean different things in different 
contexts: it may constitute the interests of the general public in contradistinction 
to the privateness of the interests of specified individuals, or it may be 
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construed as the interest of the ‘collective whole’ as against the interests of 
particular social groups.35  
This in turn leads to the question of what or who decides what is in the public 
interest. Feminist legal theorists have pointed to the ability to delineate what is 
public and what is private as a form of power.36 It has been suggested that the 
public interest in any society is determined by the patriarchal state, whether that 
be defined as a group of white, middle-class, heterosexual men who hold the 
vast bulk of power in our society, or more ethereally as an entity in and of 
itself.37 The state categorises what it is in the public interest to treat as public 
and what is not.38 Judges play an important role in determining what constitutes 
the ‘public interest’, for example in the context of determining the scope of 
criminal law defences to particular offences of violence. As Smart has pointed 
out, the legal system does not simply decide what is in the ‘public interest’; it 
actively contributes to the production of consensus around issues of law and 
order.39 
Margaret Thornton notes that there is a hierarchy between the private and 
public spheres, in which the public is elevated above the private.40 The public 
sphere is associated with those characteristics normally classified as 
‘masculine’ – rationality, logic, culture – while the private sphere is typically 
associated with the ‘feminine’ – emotion, empathy and nature.41 The public 
sphere has historically been regarded as a sphere of universal rationality, while 
matters of the specific and particular are relegated to the private sphere. For 
Rousseau and Hegel, for example, the civic public was a place where people’s 
particular desires were placed second to participation in the general will of the 
community.42 Because women have traditionally been associated with nature 
and thus with the human body, and the body is a site of the specific rather than 
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the universal, this has been another reason for women’s traditional exclusion 
from the public sphere.43 As the male-gendered subject takes his place within 
the public sphere as a ‘universal’, issues such as childcare and domestic 
violence, associated with women, are relegated to the specifically-gendered 
private sphere.44 
Just as the masculine has no meaning without the ‘other’ of the feminine to 
reflect off,45 the public sphere is given meaning by the private sphere.46 It is the 
malleability of the public/private concept, and its inter-referential nature as 
referred to by Thornton, that I am interested in for the purposes of my research. 
As illustrated by some of the critiques referred to above, it is overly simplistic to 
state that the private sphere is demarcated by an absence of regulation. In the 
sense of physical space, domestic violence occurs largely in ‘private’ but is 
regulated both by criminal law and also civil law in the capacity of parties to a 
relationship to seek protection orders, which may impose significant restraints 
upon the behaviour of the violent perpetrator. However, the argument that I 
explore in Chapter 2.3, and further in Section 3, is that domestic violence is 
regulated as a private harm in contradistinction to the public harm that terrorism 
is constructed as. Regulation and criminalisation of terrorism is constructed as 
serving the public interest in a way that regulation and criminalisation of 
domestic violence is not. 
This construction of domestic violence as a private harm in comparison to the 
public harm of terrorism has consequences in terms of the seriousness with 
which domestic violence is regarded, and the legal consequences that flow for 
perpetrators and victims, which I explore in Chapters 3.3 and 3.4. 
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Carol Smart 
 
In undertaking my analysis, I have drawn substantially upon the work of Carol 
Smart. Although Smart does not refer to herself as a ‘materialist feminist’, her 
work resonates with Hennessy’s definition of materialist feminism as ‘a way of 
reading that need not shrink from naming social totalities in order to address the 
complex ways in which subjectivities are differentiated’.47 While others have 
explored the ways in which legal processes exclude or distort the experiences 
of women, it is Smart who has particularly drawn attention to the power of the 
law to construct the ‘truth’ of things.48  
Smart employs the concept of ‘phallocentrism’ as a means of explaining the 
ways in which law continues to serve patriarchal interests, notwithstanding the 
absence of an identifiable body of decision-makers or power-brokers guiding its 
development.49 Within this paradigm, law does not create patriarchal relations 
but reproduces the material and ideological conditions under which they 
survive.50 Smart writes: 
Precisely because law is powerful and is, arguably, able to continue to extend 
its influence, it cannot go unchallenged. However, it is law’s power to define and 
disqualify which should become the focus of feminist strategy rather than law 
reform as such. It is in its ability to redefine the truth of events that feminism 
offers political gains. Hence feminism can (re)define harmless flirtation into 
sexual harassment, misplaced paternal affection into child sexual abuse, 
enthusiastic seduction into rape, foetal rights into enforced reproduction, and so 
on. Moreover the legal forum provides an excellent place to engage this 
process of redefinition. At the point at which law asserts its definition, feminism 
can assert its alternative.51  
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Thus, Smart’s work resonates with my research project not only for its focus 
upon law’s power to define the truth of events, but also in its focus on the ways 
in which legal discourse reflects masculinist influences within the law. In the 
same way, my project aims to explore the power relationships inherent in 
differential constructions of violence. 
 
Radical Feminism 
 
The so-called ‘radical feminism’ of the 1970s and 1980s, which was particularly 
influential in the United States, has largely fallen out of favour in the postmodern 
era. Its structural approaches, focused on gender as the primary means of 
explaining the oppression of women, are largely inconsistent with the vast array 
of contemporary feminist analyses, which have roundly criticised the essentialist 
and totalising nature of radical feminism.52 
Notwithstanding these critiques, the work of radical feminists such as Catharine 
MacKinnon, Adrienne Rich, Andrea Dworkin and Mary Daly continues to have 
significant implications within the Foucauldian project of problematising 
commonly accepted concepts and assumptions.53 In many ways, postmodern 
approaches, with their focus on the importance of discourse, intersect usefully 
with radical feminist critiques of language, and their explorations into using 
language in ways that disrupt dominant discourse. 
For example, Mary Daly in her ground-breaking book Gyn/Ecology sought to 
reclaim words associated with derogatory depictions of women, such as 
‘Crone’, ‘Spinster’, ‘Harp’ and ‘Fury’ and recreate them in ways that evoke 
positive female traits – a practice she describes as ‘pirating’.54 Indeed, the very 
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title of her book represents her chosen strategy of using language and 
particularly naming in a transformative way. 
Daly also engaged in a critique of ‘writing that erases itself’ – a process of 
describing atrocities against women in such a way that they gloss over the 
horrific acts they describe, creating a form of ‘partially-suppressed truth’.55 This 
‘glossing over’ of harm strikes a useful parallel with my focus on the 
privatisation of domestic violence – effectively downgrading it to a string of 
isolated instances of harm against individual women. Adrienne Rich’s work, 
also, is concerned with investigating alternative meanings for words, however 
she is more focused on the problem of ‘language in use’ and on the particular 
context in which language is used.56 
Similarly, aspects of MacKinnon’s work have centred on reworking and 
redefining legal terms for harms against women. She argues for the redefinition 
of ‘rape’, for example, on the basis of women’s experiences of violation.57 She 
also argues for use of the term ‘violence against women’ as an umbrella term 
for physical abuse, rape, sexual harassment and pornography, to counter the 
law’s tendency to separately define and fragment them as harms.58 
Meaghan Morris distinguishes between radical feminism as ‘politics’ that works 
on the basis of what women have in common, and as ‘theory’ of the determining 
role played by sex in the oppression of women.59 It is the former aspect of 
radical feminism – the focus on the use of language and the creative 
possibilities for reworking and reconstructing meaning – that I am interested to 
exploit in relation to my research, rather than the totalising or essentialising 
aspects of its structural approaches to women’s oppression, which have been 
substantively critiqued by postmodern feminists. 
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Combining the Theoretical Perspectives 
 
Although I do at points in this thesis canvass possibilities for legislative change, 
I adopt the second-wave feminist scepticism of the potential for law reform, 
given the role played by law in the legitimation and perpetuation of women’s 
oppression.60 What is offered here is a broader ideological framework for 
understanding how violence against women is constructed and treated in 
society and in the legal system. 
Legal discourse, like other discourses, does not passively represent 
phenomena that exist independently of that discourse. Discourse actively 
constructs the phenomena it seeks to describe. In doing so, it both reflects and 
perpetuates relations of power that exist within society. It is important in 
examining these power relations to focus on particular historical contexts rather 
than attempt broad over-arching structural explanations, as power relations are 
constantly changing and are not static over time. However, this does not mean 
that it is not possible to link discursive phenomena to structural forces in a 
particular context. 
The active work that legal discourse does has practical implications, in that 
players within the criminal justice system work within the constraints of that 
discourse. Investigators, prosecutors, defence lawyers and judges all work 
within the framework created by legal discourse so that facts and evidence are 
collected and presented in a way that makes sense within the parameters of 
discourse. This works to perpetuate the construction of violence in different 
ways. The concepts of ‘public’ and ‘private’, which have been the subject of so 
much feminist critique, play an integral role in the way domestic violence and 
terrorism are constructed within legal discourse. 
So-called ‘radical feminism’, as a structural critique of society with gender as the 
primary tool of analysis, is at odds in many ways with post-modern feminist 
analysis. However, some of the radical feminist critique of language intersects 
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with the possibilities that discourse analysis presents for rethinking and 
disrupting accepted ways of thinking and speaking about violence. For example, 
Margaret Davies has referred to the argument that women are constructed 
‘according to masculine images, because men have the power to define 
reality’61 as a central tenet of both MacKinnon’s radical feminism and of post-
modernist critiques of femininity. 
 
Discourse Analysis 
 
The theory of discourse, as outlined above, is largely associated with the work 
of Foucault and those inspired by him, however discourse analysis is itself a 
method of analysis. As a method, it takes different forms, for example it may 
involve a quantitative analysis of how many times a particular word appears in a 
text. It may also involve a study of the particular structural or grammatical 
patterning of a text or other media. Smart has also pointed out the importance 
of analysing ‘talk’ including the significance of non-verbal communication, 
feelings and emotions.62 
I draw upon some of these techniques in the analyses I conduct in Section 3. 
For example, in Chapter 3.3, in which I compare judicial decision-making in 
sentencing for terrorism and domestic homicide, I consider the extent to which 
written reasons for sentence contain references to particular sentencing criteria 
such as ‘prospects for rehabilitation’ and ‘risks of reoffending’. 
However, the method of discourse analysis I predominantly utilise is best 
represented by the work of Adrian Howe. In analysing the various cases 
selected through the methods described above, I have sought to ‘problematise’ 
the way that particular forms of violence are constructed in legal discourse.63 
This is performed by examining the texts for information or ‘facts’ that are used 
to justify particular constructions within the texts. It also involves identifying 
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other ‘facts’ within the texts that point to possible alternative reconstructions of 
the truth.  
One of the limitations of such an analysis is that it relies upon the construction 
given to particular information within the text that is the focus of study – these 
facts are therefore subject to the same discursive practices that are being 
critiqued. However, adopting this approach reflects a recognition that (a) it is not 
possible to ‘objectively’ discern facts outside of the discourse that constructs 
them and (b) within the kind of analysis envisaged here, the practical 
impossibility of attempting to obtain evidence external to the texts themselves is 
obvious.  
Utilising facts that are embedded in the texts themselves also has the 
advantage of reinforcing that alternative interpretations are available to 
decision-makers without necessarily having recourse to sources outside those 
traditionally available to a court of law. 
Howe also utilises Hillary Allen’s concept of ‘discursive manoeuvres’ in 
examining criminological texts to deconstruct the ‘truth’ presented therein.64 She 
uses this technique to reveal practices of victim-blaming and also ‘strategies of 
recuperation’ i.e. making resistant discourses harmless through labelling them 
as ‘hysteria’ or something similar. In a similar vein, I am concerned to 
deconstruct the ‘discursive manoeuvres’ through which victim-blaming occurs, 
particularly in the context of Chapter 3.3 (examining sentencing processes in 
domestic homicides and terrorism cases). Howe’s ‘strategies of recuperation’ 
are of relevance particularly in Chapter 3.4, where I examine the law’s 
construction of battered women who kill as suffering from mental illness, 
therefore providing merciful outcomes while simultaneously defusing the 
potential for resistance that women’s self-defence violence poses. 
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Legislation and case identification and selection 
 
My analysis in Chapter 3 involves the examination and analysis of a range of 
primary source material, primarily legislation and legal decisions. The sources 
for my analysis of the differential treatment of domestic violence and terrorism 
were selected as follows. 
 
Chapter 3.1 
 
Chapter 3.1 considers the laws applicable to incitement of violence against 
women and the incitement of violence in the terrorist context. This involved a 
search of the Commonwealth Criminal Code65 and Crimes Act66 for laws 
potentially applicable to the incitement of violence in a terrorist context, as well 
as a review of all terrorism protection order and sentencing cases in Australia 
and relevant cases in the United Kingdom to date for convictions in relation to 
incitement of violence.  
I also conducted a review of the criminal provisions of all states and territories, 
to identify laws potentially applicable to the incitement of violence against 
women. Each state and territory has laws against vilification based on certain 
characteristics of the victim, and I reviewed each of these laws, as well as laws 
(where applicable) creating particular offences or creating an aggravating factor 
where a crime was motivated by hatred based on particular characteristics. I 
created a table of these various provisions, which is appended as Annexure A. 
I also examined the Australian Classification Review Board website, and 
associated resources, including legislation and Guidelines for the Classification 
of particular media, and classification decisions made by the Australian 
Classification Board, in order to compare the rules for classification of materials 
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inciting terrorist violence with the rules for classifying material depicting or 
encouraging violence against women. Corresponding legislation in all states 
and territories was searched for the purpose of determining whether possession 
of offending material, or only publication or sale of such material, was 
prohibited. 
 
Chapter 3.2 
 
Chapter 3.2 compares the civil legal mechanisms available for controlling 
violence with or without a criminal conviction. This is constituted by a scheme of 
‘protection orders’ (known by various names) available in all Australian state 
and territory jurisdictions, and a federal scheme of ‘control orders’ available in 
relation to those considered to constitute a risk of planning terrorist acts. I 
reviewed the most current legislation in each Australian jurisdiction relating to 
protection orders, and summarised the relevant provisions in a table that is 
appended at Annexure B. I also reviewed the provisions of the Criminal Code67 
relating to the making of terrorism control orders. 
To examine the way in which these laws have been applied by courts, I 
reviewed the Attorney-General’s website, which (by legislative mandate) 
records all control orders made in Australia.68 I considered the only two cases to 
date in relation to control orders, the Federal Magistrate’s Court decision in 
relation to a control order for David Hicks, and Jack Thomas’s constitutional 
challenge to the control order scheme.69 
In relation to protection orders, I conducted a search on the legal database 
‘Casebase’ for Australian and New Zealand cases using the search terms 
[‘protection orders’ and domestic], which yielded 39 results, of which 17 were 
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relevant.70 I also searched for [‘domestic violence order’ and breach], which 
yielded 51 hits, of which 31 were relevant (not including cases that had also 
appeared in the results list from the previous search).71 I restricted my search to 
cases from 2000 onwards. Where additional cases falling within the relevant 
time period that had not appeared in the previously-mentioned search results 
were referred to within these cases, those were also reviewed. 
In total, this resulted in 55 cases concerning breaches of protection orders in 
Australian and New Zealand jurisdictions since 2000. I analysed and 
summarised each of these cases: a list of them is included at Annexure C. 
 
Chapter 3.3 
 
In Chapter 3.3, I analyse and compare the reasons for sentence in domestic 
homicide (male offenders/female victims) and terrorism cases. I chose to focus 
upon domestic homicides as opposed to other forms of domestic violence 
sentencing (such as assault, causing grievous bodily harm, etc) because, as the 
ultimate manifestation of ‘harm’, the domestic homicide cases provide a useful 
comparison with the terrorism sentencing decisions. Particularly given that most 
of the terrorism sentences in Australia to date have been passed in relation to 
fairly preparatory conduct, I felt that the juxtaposition of these sentences against 
those imposed for the taking of human life would enable an interesting 
comparison to be made between the way the two forms of violence are judicially 
treated during the punishment phase. 
In relation to terrorism sentences, I reviewed all decisions passed since the 
introduction of the first counter-terrorism legislation in 2002 until the end of 
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2010. As most cases have been reasonably high profile, it was not difficult to 
ensure that I had considered all relevant decisions. The Australian 
Parliamentary Library website also refers to a number of terrorism decisions to 
date.72 A list of terrorism sentencing decisions is included at Annexure D. 
In searching for domestic homicides, I searched for cases involving the use of 
lethal force by a man against his intimate partner. I used the following search 
terms in a search of the legal database ‘Casebase’, yielding results as follows: 
 [Manslaughter and partner]: 54 hits of which eight were relevant;73 
 [Manslaughter and wife]: 187 hits of which 37 were relevant and 36 not 
yielded by previous search (the 187 hits included a number of cases that 
appeared multiple times as well as cases involving female 
perpetrators);74 
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73
 DPP v Egan [2007] VSC 485 (Unreported, Teague J, 26 November 2007); R v Verdins; R v Buckley; R v 
Vo (2007) 16 VR 269; Tyne v Tasmania (2005) 15 Tas R 221; R v Walkington [2003] NSWSC 517 
(Unreported, Newman AJ, 6 June 2003); R v Tran [2003] NSWSC 373 (Unreported, Greg James J, 2 May 
2003); R v Sievers [2002] NSWSC 1257 (Unreported, Sully J, 18 December 2002); R v Hurley [2001] 
NSWSC 1007 (Unreported, David Levine J, 2 November 2001); R v Smith [2000] QCA 169 (Unreported, 
McPherson JA, Davies JA and Mackenzie J, 9 May 2000). Where a sentence was the subject of appeal, 
the appeal decision was not counted in case numbers. 
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 R v Mills [2008] QCA 146 (Unreported, Keane, Holmes and Fraser JJA, 28 May 2008); R v Frost [2008] 
NSWSC 220 (Unreported, Barr J, 17 March 2008); R v Jagroop [2008] VSC 25 (Unreported, Teague J, 13 
February 2008); R v Ferguson [2007] NSWSC 949 (Unreported, Michael Grove J, 27 August 2007); Vella 
v WA (2007) 33 WAR 411; DPP v Rhodes [2007] VSC 55 (Unreported, Curtain J, 8 March 2007); R v 
Massei [2005] NSWSC 1030 (Unreported, Adams J, 2 September 2005) and R v Massei [2006] NSWSC 
1298 (Unreported, Adams J, 2 November 2006); R v Lem [2005] SASC 405 (Unreported, Doyle CJ, Bleby 
and Gray JJ, 28 October 2005); R v Nicol [2005] NSWSC 547 (Unreported, Hulme J, 27 May 2005); 
Spencer v R [2005] NTCA 3 (Unreported, Martin CJ, Thomas and Riley JJ, 29 April 2005); R v Williams 
[2004] NSWSC 189 (Unreported, O’Keefe J, 22 March 2004) and R v Williams [2005] NSWCCA 99 
(Unreported, Tobias JA, Buddin and Hall JJ, 24 March 2005); R v Grieef [2005] VSC 60 (Unreported, 
Teague J, 10 March 2005); R v Newling [2005] VSC 54 (Unreported, Teague J, 8 March 2005); R v 
Daniels [2004] NSWSC 1201 (Unreported, Hidden J, 14 December 2004); R v Ramage [2004] VSC 508 
(Unreported, Osborn J, 9 December 2004); R v Schubring; Ex parte AG [2005] 1 Qd R 515; DPP v Sypott 
[2003] VSC 537 (Unreported, Redlich J, 5 September 2003) and DPP v Sypott [2004] VSCA 9 
(Unreported, Vincent JA, Smith and O’Brien AJJA, 13 February 2004); R v Huynh [2003] NSWSC 1066 
(Unreported, Kirby J, 21 November 2003); R v Laures [2003] NSWSC 785 (Unreported, Studdert J, 27 
August 2003); R v Mehmet [2002] NSWSC 1154 (Unreported, Bell J, 12 December 2002); Jacovic v R 
[2002] WASCA 149 (Unreported, Murray, Parker and Miller JJ, 7 June 2002); R v Hunter [2002] VSC 162 
(Unreported, Teague J, 14 May 2002); R v Goodwin [2001] VSC 519 (Unreported, Coldrey J, 21 
December 2001); R v Lever [2001] NSWSC 1131 (Unreported, Bell J, 13 December 2001); R v Butay 
[2001] VSC 417 (Unreported, Flatman J, 2 November 2001); R v Raccanello [2001] VSC 258 (Unreported, 
Teague J, 25 July 2001); R v Hawkins [2001] NSWSC 420 (Unreported, O’Keefe J, 24 May 2001); R v 
Matheson [2006] NSWSC 332 (Unreported, Mathews AJ, 28 April 2006); R v Jones [2001] VSC 186 
(Unreported, Teague J, 20 February 2001); R v Olig [2000] NSWSC 1246 (Unreported, Adams J, 21 
December 2000); R v Gordon [2000] WASCA 401 (Unreported, Kennedy, Anderson and Wheeler JJ, 15 
December 2000); R v Culleton [2000] VSC 559 (Unreported, Vincent J, 27 November 2000); R v Tjami 
(2000) 210 LSJS 309; R v Bateman [2000] NSWSC 867 (Unreported, Barr J, 30 August 2000); R v Jans 
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 [‘Domestic violence’ and manslaughter]: 8 relevant results (of which 2 
were results that had not been yielded by earlier searches) – restricted to 
2001 onwards;75 
 [‘Domestic violence’ and murder]: 16 relevant results (of which 12 were 
results that had not been yielded by earlier searches) – restricted to 2003 
onwards.76 
All searches were restricted to cases from 2000 onwards (except as noted 
above) up to and including the Victorian Supreme Court decision in Robinson 
delivered on 29 January 2010.77 I also reviewed the NSW Public Defenders’ 
website, which includes lists of cases in particular categories and obtained 
additional references to murder and manslaughter cases listed involving male 
perpetrators and female victims in domestic scenarios since 2000.78 I limited my 
search in this way to ensure that cases were roughly contemporaneous with 
terrorism sentencing decisions. 
Where cases reviewed as a result of these searches referred to other cases 
from 2000 onwards that had not been yielded by the searches, or where I came 
across references to relevant cases in my general reading, I included these 
also. In total, 113 cases were reviewed and analysed.79 
A complete list of domestic homicide cases analysed is included at Annexure E. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
[2000] NSWSC 525 (Unreported, Groves J, 14 June 2000); R v Baggott [2000] QCA 153 (Unreported, 
McMurdo P, McPherson JA, Mackenzie J, 3 May 2000). 
75
 R v Andrew [2008] VSC 138 (Unreported, Forrest J, 1 May 2008); R v Zammit [2008] NSWSC 317 
(Unreported, Howie J, 9 April 2008). 
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 R v Robinson [2007] NSWSC 460 (Unreported, Hall J, 11 May 2007); R v Conway [2005] VSC 205 
(Unreported, Bell J, 10 June 2005); R v Vu [2005] NSWSC 271 (Unreported, Barr J, 1 April 2005); R v 
Yasso [2005] VSC 75 (Unreported, Hollingworth J, 21 March 2005); R v Johnson [2005] SASC 1 
(Unreported, Perry J, 13 January 2005); R v Keir [2000] NSWSC 111 (Unreported, Adams J, 29 February 
2000) and R v Keir [2004] NSWSC 1164 (Unreported, MW Campbell AJ, 13 December 2004); R v 
Badanjak [2004] NSWCCA 395 (Unreported, Wood CJ, McClellan AJA and Smart AJ, 25 October 2004); R 
v Brown [2004] NSWSC 194 (Unreported, Hulme J, 6 February 2004); R v Joseph [2003] NSWSC 1080 
(Unreported, Greg James J, 21 November 2003); R v Doherty (2003) 6 VR 393; R v Cao [2003] NSWSC 
715 (Unreported, 8 August 2003, Kirby J); R v Andrews [2003] NSWCCA 7 (Unreported, Heydon, Hulme 
and Hidden JJ, 6 February 2003). 
77
 R v Robinson [2010] VSC 10 (Unreported, Whelan J, 29 January 2010). 
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 NSW Public Defenders’ Office, ‘Murder – Wife/Girlfriend Killings’ and ‘Manslaughter-Provocation’, 
located at <http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/pd>  (viewed 14 October 2008). 
79
 Where a case proceeded to appeal, the sentencing decision and appeal decision together count for one 
case. 
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Chapter 3.4 
 
In the final chapter of Section 3, I consider the legal treatment of women who kill 
abusive partners in cases where the circumstances of the killing suggest that 
actions were taken in self-defence. 
Between July and October 2008, I conducted a search for cases involving 
murder/manslaughter by female accused against male partners where the facts 
indicated previous abuse by the victim. A search of the database ‘Casebase’ 
using the search term [‘Battered woman syndrome’] and restricted to 2000 
onwards yielded one result only across both reported and unreported 
decisions.80 The search terms referred to in Chapter 3.3 also yielded some 
results relating to domestic homicides with female perpetrators and male victims 
as follows: 
 [Manslaughter and partner]: 2 relevant hits;81 
 [Manslaughter and wife]: 4 hits (of which two relevant and not yielded by 
earlier search);82 
 [‘Domestic violence’ and manslaughter]: 4 relevant hits;83 
 [‘Domestic violence’ and murder]: 1 relevant result.84 
In the course of reading generally I came across some other decisions that fell 
into the category of cases outlined above, and fell within the timeframe between 
2000 and October 2008. I also included these in my analysis.85 A list of those 
cases examined is included at Annexure I. 
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 R v McKenzie (2000) 113 A Crim R 534 (date of search 2 October 2008). 
81
 DPP v Felsbourg [2008] VSC 20 (Unreported, Teague J, 12 February 2008); R v Cavanough [2007] 
NSWSC 561 (Unreported, Whealy J, 7 June 2007) (date of search 22 July 2008). 
82
 R v Gazdovic [2002] VSC 588 (Unreported, Teague J, 20 December 2002); R v Denney (Unreported, 
Supreme Court of Victoria, Coldrey J, 4 August 2000) (date of search 22 July 2008). 
83
 R v Russell [2006] NSWSC 722 (Unreported, Newman AJ, 21 July 2006); R v Trevenna [2003] NSWSC 
463 (Unreported, Buddin J, 29 May 2003); R v Yeoman [2003] NSWSC 194 (Unreported, Buddin J, 21 
March 2003); R v Melrose [2001] NSWSC 847 (Unreported, McClellan J, 31 August 2001) (date of search 
2 October 2008). 
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 R v Evans [2004] QCA 458 (Unreported, McPherson and Davies JJA, Fryberg J, 26 November 2004) 
(date of search 2 October 2008). 
85
 R v Ferguson [2008] NSWSC 761 (Unreported, Barr J, 25 July 2008); R v Kennedy [2000] NSWSC 109 
(Unreported, Barr J, 1 March 2000); R v Ko [2000] NSWSC 1130 (Unreported, Kirby J, 12 December 
2000); R v Vandersee [2000] NSWSC 916 (Unreported, James J, 18 September 2000); R v Weatherall 
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I also drew on observations made by Rebecca Bradfield in her doctoral thesis 
for the University of Tasmania, in which she conducted an analysis of 76 
decisions involving women who killed intimate partners in Australia between 
1980 and 2000, and which I refer to extensively in Chapter 3.4.86 
My original goal was to undertake an assessment of the law’s treatment of 
female victims of abuse who kill in self-defence with those who respond to terror 
in an official capacity. However, there was insufficient terrorism-related material 
for me to undertake such a comparison, as there has been only one terrorism-
related operational shooting in Australia to date and I was unable to find any 
material in relation to this other than general media reporting.87 
I therefore compiled a body of material to use as a basis for comparison with 
the self-defence cases in the form of legal treatment of lethal police shootings 
carried out ‘in the line of duty’ on the basis that similar (if not more favourable) 
treatment would be afforded to those who responded to a terrorist threat with 
lethal force. I examined the coroners’ websites for each Australian state and 
territory and reviewed all reported coronial decisions in relation to domestic 
homicides (where available) and police shootings from 2000 to June 2009. 
Coronial reports for all jurisdictions were available with the exception of Victoria 
(reports only published since 1 November 2009) and Western Australia (reports 
available by request only).88 In relation to Victoria, however, I did happen upon 
                                                                                                                                                                          
[2006] NSWSC 486 (Unreported, Patten AJ, 18 May 2006). Some of these cases were located on the 
NSW Public Defenders’ website, ‘Manslaughter-Provocation’: <http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au> (viewed 14 
October 2008). 
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 Bradfield (2002). 
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 Suspected terrorist Omar Baladjam was shot in Sydney in November 2005 after disobeying an order to 
stop, however he was not killed: Les Kennedy and Andrew Clark, ‘Shot man appeared on Home and 
Away’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 9 Nov 2005, <http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/shot-man-
appeared-on-home-and-away/2005/11/08/1131407637642.html>. 
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 Websites visited containing coronial cases are as follows:  
<http://www.courts.act.gov.au/magistrates/page/view/597/title/selected-findings> (ACT - reviewed all cases 
on ‘Selected findings’ page);  
<http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/coroners_court/ll_coroners.nsf/pages/coroners_deathsincustody>  
(NSW – reviewed all cases referred to in annual reports);  
<http://www.nt.gov.au/justice/courtsupp/coroner/inquestlist.shtml>  (NT – reviewed all ‘Inquest findings’); 
<http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/1680.htm>  (Qld – reviewed all cases on ‘Findings’ page); 
<http://www.courts.sa.gov.au/courts/coroner/findings/index.html> (SA - searched all coronial findings for 
‘shot’ – 5 of 38 hits related to police shootings); 
 <http://www.magistratescourt.tas.gov.au/divisions/coronial/findings_alpha_listing>  (Tas – reviewed all 
‘Decisions’); 
<http://www.coronerscourt.vic.gov.au/wps/wcm/connect/justlib/Coroners+Court/Home/Case+Findings/>  
(Vic – reports now published on current website);  
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a small number of coronial judgments in the course of general reading, which I 
included in my analysis.89  
I also located a useful body of material from overseas in relation to two 
infamous counter-terrorism shootings: 
1. The shooting of Brazilian citizen Jean-Charles de Menezes in London in 
July 2005 by special forces (de Menezes was suspected of being a 
terrorist carrying an explosive device); 
2. The shooting of Rigoberto Alpizar in the US in 2006 by air marshals after 
Alpizar (who had a mental illness) departed the aircraft he had just 
boarded while making a reference to having a bomb in his bag. 
An outline of the facts of these two shootings is contained at Annexure H. 
Although the exercise conducted in Chapter 3.4 is therefore not a direct 
comparison of ‘like against like’, the body of material chosen by way of a 
comparison provides a useful contrast for the purpose of investigating the 
construction in legal discourse of women’s self-defence responses in situations 
of abuse. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have outlined the theoretical and methodological basis for my 
research. In Section 2, I consider the three key concepts that are used in the 
legal system to construct terrorism – terror, ideology and the public. Drawing 
upon some of the jurisprudence that I consider in more detail in Section 3, I 
examine how these three concepts are used to construct ‘terrorism’ as a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.coronerscourt.wa.gov.au/I/inquest_findings.aspx?uid=9349-4756-3915-2531> (WA- findings 
available by written request). 
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 A list of coronial cases is included at Annexure J. In total, including cases reported in the NSW State 
Coroner’s Annual Report, the findings from 25 coronial inquiries into police shootings were analysed 
(multiple victims in the one coronial report counted as one case only). See also Police Integrity 
Commission (June 2001). 
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phenomenon and by contrast, how domestic violence is constructed as a 
concept that is in many ways the legal antithesis of terrorism. I also draw upon 
some of the social research in relation to domestic violence and feminist 
critiques of the public/private dichotomy to call into question the law’s 
construction of violence in the ways described. I consider possible alternative 
reconstructions that form the basis for a problematisation of the law’s differential 
treatment of violence in Section 3. 
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CHAPTER 2.1 LAW’S DIFFERENTIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VIOLENCE 
 
Here is the question: what will it take for violence against women, this daily war, 
this terrorism against women as women that goes on every day world-wide, this 
everyday, group-based, systematic threat to and crime against the peace, to 
receive a response in the structure and practice of international law anything 
approximate to the level of focus and determination inspired by the September 
11th attacks?1 
The process of applying labels to different phenomena is not politically-neutral. 
This is the case in law as it is in other areas of social activity. In fact, in law, the 
politics of naming takes on extra significance. The labels that we give to things 
influence how we conceptualise and discuss them, but in law labels also 
determine rights and responsibilities. What the law labels a ‘crime’ will be 
treated differently to what is not labelled a crime. Phenomena, social or legal, 
do not pre-exist the names that are given to them; language ‘is a dynamic 
medium that both represents, and actively constitutes, that reality’.2  
The process by which those names are given is a political one that reflects 
relationships of power. Feminists such as Andrea Dworkin have particularly 
focused on the ability to use language to determine how things are described as 
an aspect of male power.3 In a postmodernist vein, Carol Smart uses the term 
‘phallocentrism’ to describe the way in which naming occurs in the context of 
masculinist power, and this is explored in further detail below.4 
The question at the beginning of this chapter, posed by Catharine MacKinnon, 
brings into focus the political process of naming in the context of violence 
against women. MacKinnon refers to this violence as ‘war’ and ‘terrorism’. 
These are not words that the law in Australia (or elsewhere) uses to describe 
gendered violence. As I will argue in this chapter, and the two that follow, that is 
                                                          
1
 MacKinnon (2002), p 19. 
2
 Mason (2002), p 5. 
3
 Kelly and Radford (1988), p 199. For naming as a form of power see Dworkin (1981), pp 17-8 and 
Spender (1990), especially Chapter 6. 
4
 Smart (1995), p 78. 
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not because violence against women does not share features in common with 
terrorism that would warrant it being given the name ‘terrorism’ – it is because 
the law constructs violence in different ways, and it constructs terrorism very 
differently to domestic violence. 
Once something is defined as criminal activity by the legal system, the political 
process of labelling continues.5 Legal discourse encompasses a process within 
which different crimes are constructed,6 reinforced by investigative and 
prosecutorial processes in which various facts are selected or discarded as part 
of the case construction process.7 The names given to different types of 
violence, which are reflected in the names used in other discourses, are an 
important aspect of how the law constructs violence.8 
The labels given to offences are important for two reasons. First, they determine 
how phenomena to which a particular label is applied will proceed through the 
criminal justice process. Violence labelled as ‘terrorism’ will travel a different 
route to violence labelled as ‘domestic violence’. The penalties applicable to 
terrorism offences are different to those available for a crime such as 
manslaughter.9 The investigation of terrorism also involves the exercise of 
police powers of arrest and detention not applicable to other (ordinary) crimes.10  
Secondly, the labels applied both reflect and recreate the differential treatment 
of violence in social and other discourses.11 Labelling conduct as ‘terrorism’ 
constructs the conduct in such a way that it is understood in the context of other 
discourses about ‘terrorism’. It channels and directs debate and discussion 
about the conduct in a particular way. That is, when something is labelled as 
                                                          
5
 Lacey discusses ‘labelling’ as a means by which law differentiates between different offence types, for 
example various labels are attached to different homicide offences: Lacey (2000), pp 109-11. 
6
 For an examination of how rape is constructed through legal discourse see Marcus (1992). 
7
 McConville et al (1991). 
8
 For a discussion of the importance of naming the problem of domestic violence see Genovese (1998), pp 
11-3. 
9
 See the tables of murder/manslaughter and terrorism offences at Annexure F. 
10
 The Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth) introduced a scheme of preventative detention orders 
applicable to terrorist offences. The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) provides for different powers of detention and 
investigation for terrorism and non-terrorism offences: e.g. see ss 23D and 23DA. This reflects 
developments in other national legal codes from the 1970s onwards expanding police powers in relation to 
terrorism: Chaliand and Blin (2007), pp 246-7. 
11
 Lacey notes that legal discourse cannot be considered independently of constructions in broader social 
discourse: Lacey (1998), p 203; see also Heathcote (2010), pp 281-2. 
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‘terrorism’, it creates a context for understanding and discussing that conduct 
that is different to the context for understanding and discussing conduct labelled 
as ‘domestic violence’, and that different context applies to both legal and non-
legal discourse.12 
In examining how these discursive processes work in practice, it is necessary to 
examine them in their specific historical contexts.13 The evolution of the 
processes by which particular labels come to apply to different phenomena 
allows us to better understand them.  
In this chapter, I investigate the means by which ‘domestic violence’ and 
‘terrorism’ acquired their names in Australian legal discourse, which are bound 
up with, though not identical to, the processes by which these terms acquire 
meaning in political, social and other discourses.14 This will hopefully facilitate a 
deeper understanding of how the law differentially constructs violence in 
different contexts. 
Development of ‘Terrorism’ as a Legal Concept 
 
The Historical Development of Terrorism as a Concept 
Internationally 
 
Given that Australia’s exposure to terrorism is relatively recent, it is useful to 
consider the evolution of the word ‘terrorism’ in Australian legal discourse in the 
context of its development internationally. The term is said to have originated as 
a reference to the period of ‘Terror’ accompanying the French Revolution 
between 1793 and 1794.15 Since then, it has been used in reference to a wide 
range of violent acts, whether perpetrated by states, groups of non-state actors 
                                                          
12
 Barnett (1998), pp 36-8 notes that the law has an impact on conduct and attitudes, therefore there is 
scope for the law to shape public opinion. 
13
 For discussion of this aspect of Foucault’s work see Hennessy (1993), pp 40-2. 
14
 Collier (1995), pp 67-72. 
15
 Hancock (2002); Carr (2006), pp 4-5; Chaliand and Blin (2007), p 95 (although as noted at pp 268-70 
militant Islamism traces its roots to the 11
th
-13
th
 century Assassins of the Middle East). 
66 
 
seeking control of the state, or individuals with aspirations other than state 
control.  
The historical origins of the word ‘terrorism’ are significant given ongoing 
political debate as to whether states can themselves be responsible for 
terrorism.16 The usage of the word in the context of the French revolution 
reflected the fact that the ‘terror’ generated by the revolutionaries was directed 
squarely at the state in the form of the aristocracy. The ongoing reluctance of 
some states to accept that states can themselves be responsible for terrorism 
reflects in part the perception that terrorism is any form of harm that constitutes 
a threat to the state.17 
Although there has to date been no international consensus on a legal 
definition,18 this has not prevented the development of a body of international 
instruments and resolutions requiring states to take action to suppress and 
punish terrorism.19 
The fact that international instruments relating to terrorism have proliferated 
while nation states fail to reach agreement on a legal definition of terrorism is 
illustrative of how legal discourse actively constructs rather than simply labels 
pre-existing phenomena. As this continuing international debate demonstrates, 
the naming of terrorism is itself a political process in which differences between 
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 Abi-Saab (2004), pp xix-xx. 
17
 Carr (2006), p 5. Coleman (2010), p 92 writes: ‘(T)he naming of ‘terrorism’ provides an alien other 
against and through which the shape and substance of the state is clarified and subsequently barricaded, 
thereby targeting a clearly defined enemy rather than the state’s complicity in creating the conditions for 
violent nonstate global politicking in the first place.’ 
18
 Some of the key problems that have arisen include the desire of smaller states to include state-
sponsored terrorism in the definition, and a view on the part of some states that ‘freedom fighters’ should 
be excluded from the definition: Abi-Saab (2004), pp xix-xx. 
19
 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, opened for signature 10 
January 2000, 2178 UNTS 197 (entered into force 10 April 2002); International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, opened for signature 12 January 1998, 2149 UNTS 256 (entered into 
force 23 May 2001); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Marine 
Navigation, opened for signature 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 222 (entry into force 1 March 1992); 
SC/RES 1269, UN SCOR, 54th sess, 4053
rd
 meeting, UN Doc S/Res/1269 (19 October 1999), para. 4; 
SC/RES 1368, UN SCOR, 56th sess, 4370
th
 meeting, UN Doc S/Res/1368 (12 September 2001), para. 3; 
SC/RES 1373, UN SCOR, 57th sess, 4385
th
 meeting, UN Doc S/Res/1373 (28 September 2001), paras 1-
2; Condemnation of Terrorist Attacks in the United States of America, GA Res 56/1, UN GAOR, 56
th
 sess, 
1
st
 plenary mtg, Agenda Item 8, UN Doc A/RES/56/1 (12 September 2001).  
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nations in terms of their history and social constitution determine their position 
in relation to what they do and do not call ‘terrorism’.20 
Despite the lack of an agreed definition, there are elements of terrorism upon 
which there is some agreement amongst political and legal scholars. These are: 
an act of violence directed against the civilian population for political or 
ideological ends,21 that the act instils fear in the population,22 and that it is 
intended to influence a government or intimidate or coerce a section of the 
public.23 This is consistent with the definition adopted by the United Nations.24  
The absence of an agreed legal definition of terrorism has also not prevented its 
widespread adoption in political and social discourse. Since the 1960s, 
international terrorism has been associated with hijackings, embassy sieges 
and assassinations, which, thanks to advances in communications technology, 
have been broadcast to an ever-growing audience.25 In fact, the media plays a 
pivotal role in the psychological warfare that constitutes an important part of 
terrorist activity.26 From the 1960s onward, the Western media increasingly 
used the term ‘terrorism’ to describe acts that would previously have been 
labelled as ‘bombs and bomb plots’, ‘kidnapping’ or ‘guerilla actions’.27 The 
concept of terrorism also became associated with acts of violence by separatist 
or nationalist movements such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland,28 
and the ETA in Spain.29  
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 Hancock (2002). 
21
 Frey and Morris (1991), p 2; Dupuy (2004), pp 4-5. Note that the Attorney-General and Commonwealth 
Director of Public Prosecutions both argued in support of removing this element from the Australian 
definition following the prosecution of Zaky Mallah: Saul (2007), p 33. This element is not accepted by all 
legal scholars or organisations: Saul (2007), p 29. The motive element was struck down as being in 
violation of constitutional rights in Canada in Khawaja (2006) 214 CCC (3d) 399, however this was 
overturned in Khawaja (2010) 2010 ONCA 862 (Unreported, Doherty, Moldaver and Cronk JJA, 17 
December 2010). It is an element of the terrorism offences in New Zealand, Canada and South Africa: 
Security Legislation Review Committee (2006), pp 54-5. 
22
 Frey and Morris (1991), p 2; cf Held (1991), p 65. 
23
 Hancock (2002). 
24
 Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, GA Res 51/210, UN GAOR, 52
nd
 sess, 88
th
 plen mtg, UN 
Doc 51/210 (17 December 1996). 
25
 Carr (2006), pp 197-206. 
26
 Bianchi (2004),  p 249. 
27
 Carr (2006), pp 206-8, citing Crelinsten (1989). 
28
 For example, the Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act 1939 (UK) was re-enacted as the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 (UK). 
29
 ETA stands for Euskadi ta Askatasuna, meaning ‘Basque Fatherland and Liberty’. For an overview of 
the history of the ETA see Hamilton (2007). 
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From the mid-1970s onwards, books and articles about terrorism proliferated, 
‘terrorology’ became a subject for research and discussion, and ‘terrorism as 
entertainment’ in the form of Hollywood movies flourished.30 Increasingly, from 
this period, the conception of terrorism moved away from one specific to 
individual conflicts, and towards an idea of international terrorism as a threat to 
world order.31 
Since the term first came into use, terrorism has taken a variety of forms, largely 
dependent upon the social and political context in which it is used as a strategy. 
Acts that have been described as terrorism range from economic sabotage 
against the South African apartheid regime by the African National Congress in 
the early 1960s, to the detonation of bombs by the IRA against British targets, 
to the urban guerrilla warfare of the Baader-Meinhof gang in Germany in the 
1970s. 
In the 1980s suicide bombings emerged as a key terrorist strategy, and 
between 1980 and 2003 it accounted for more than a quarter of all deaths 
caused by international terrorism.32 Suicide bombings have a particularly 
significant impact on the public psyche, reinforcing the fear that attacks can 
happen anywhere at any time, and that terrorists will stop at nothing to advance 
their goals. 
By the end of the Cold War, terrorist groups claiming religious motivations had 
emerged, and these have been associated in Western consciousness with 
fundamentalist Islam more than any other religion.33 ‘Islamist terrorism’ refers to 
the use of violence (either indiscriminate or targeted) to impose Islamist views 
on a group of people.34 Within this conception of terrorism, ‘bombs, kidnappings 
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 Carr (2006), pp 215-19. Examples include Under Siege (1992) Directed by Andrew Davis, Warner Bros 
Pictures; Under Siege 2 (1995) Directed by Geoff Murphy, Warner Bros Pictures; Die Hard (1988) Directed 
by John McTiernan, 20
th
 Century Fox Film Productions; Die Hard 2 (1992) Directed by Renny Harlin, 
Gordon Company; Die Hard With A Vengeance (1995) Directed by John McTiernan, Cinergi Pictures 
Entertainment; Live Free or Die Hard (2007) Directed by Len Wiseman, 20
th
 Century Fox Film Productions; 
Raid on Entebbe (1976) Directed by Irvin Kirshner, Edgar J Scherick Associates and Delta Force (1986) 
Directed by Menahem Golan, Golan-Globus Productions. 
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 Carr (2006), p 197. 
32
 Carr (2006), pp 259-60. 
33
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and hijackings were increasingly seen as the contemporary instruments of an 
aggressive Islamic holy war whose ultimate aim was global religious 
domination’.35 It has been suggested that this form of terrorism differs from 
previous types in the sense that perpetrators are more loosely organised, there 
is a tendency to maximise rather than minimise civilian casualties, and there is 
an international rather than a localised focus to modern terrorism.36 However, 
despite the changing nature of terrorism, the nomenclature remains consistent. 
In the 1990s, despite the number of terrorist attacks declining, there emerged 
an increasing consensus in the United States that terrorism was becoming more 
dangerous and unpredictable.37 Terrorism has also retained its association with 
fundamentalist Islam, cemented by the first attack on the World Trade Centre in 
1993.38 The word ‘terrorism’ acquired ‘such dreadful potency that its semantic 
application appeared to be limitless, even if its actual meaning became 
increasingly difficult to determine’.39 This semantic malleability allows for the 
word ‘terrorism’ to be used for political purposes – as a label to describe and 
categorise acts of violence the state deems a threat to its interests, and to 
justify broad-ranging government intervention. Indeed, in more recent years, 
counter-terrorism powers in the United States have been used to justify 
surveillance in relation to so-called ‘Domestic Advocacy Groups’, a 
development made possible by the broad definition of terrorism under American 
law.40 
By the time the events of 11 September 2001 occurred, there had already been 
intense speculation about the prospects of biological or chemical attacks in the 
United States on a vast scale. US President George Bush and other 
commentators repeated the message that the US had been attacked by 
‘enemies of human freedom’ and that this was a ‘new kind of evil’.41 This is a 
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message that continues to be reinforced to the public by Western governments 
into the first two decades of the 21st century. 
In post-9/11 America, the use of the term ‘terrorist’ has arguably been expanded 
to encompass those involved in mainstream political activity of a non-violent 
nature.42 This illustrates the malleability of the term and the way in which the 
meaning of the concept can be varied to suit political interests. 
Despite the long and diverse history of the evolution of terrorism, summarised 
only very briefly here, Australia’s association with the phenomenon is relatively 
recent. The events of 9/11 were the first terrorist acts that really impacted on 
Australians in the sense of both the involvement of a small number of 
Australians as victims,43 and Australia’s sense of affiliation with the US. These 
were followed by the Bali bombings in 2002 and 2005, which involved a number 
of Australian victims, and the July 2005 London bombings. It is these terrorist 
attacks, associated with fundamentalist Islam, that have most directly impacted 
on the development of terrorism in social and legal discourse in Australia. 
 
The Evolution of Terrorism in Australia 
 
The recognition of terrorism as a legal concept in Western countries has largely 
followed specific acts of violence impacting on particular nations. Terrorism 
certainly existed as a concept in public discourse in Australia prior to 9/11, and 
the Hilton Hotel bombing in 1978 was used to justify a range of increased 
surveillance and intelligence measures, including the formation of the AFP and 
domestic Special Air Service (SAS) units.44 However, it was only in the 
                                                          
42
 US Department of Justice (2010), pp 23, 88, 188-90, noting that although classification of activities of 
such groups as ‘domestic terrorism’ did not violate definitions contained in legislation, Attorney-General’s 
guidelines and FBI policies, the term was used in relation to activities not commonly regarded as terrorism. 
43
 There were an estimated 10 Australian victims of the 9/11 attacks: ‘The Australians who Perished’, 
Sydney Morning Herald (online), 21 Aug 2002, 
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/08/22/1029114157312.html>.   
44
 Head (2008). 
71 
 
aftermath of 9/11 that specific anti-terrorism legislation was enacted.45 By 
contrast, the United Kingdom had passed anti-terrorism legislation (though not 
expressed as such) as early as 1939 in response to the continuing violence 
from the IRA.46 In Northern Ireland, emergency legislation allowing for the 
detention without trial of suspected terrorists was in operation from 1921.47 The 
United States had specific anti-terrorism legislation dating back to 1984, and 
also passed further legislation in response to the Oklahoma City Bombing in 
1995.48  
Prior to 9/11, ‘terrorism’ had been mentioned in a number of Australian statutes, 
and had been defined in relation to ‘security’ in the Australian Security and 
Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 but removed and merged with the definition 
of subversion in 1986.49 In a 1979 Protective Security Review, it was defined as 
‘acts of small groups of persons who use criminal violence to obtain publicity for 
their political views, or to achieve or to break down resistance to their political 
aims, by the intimidation of governments or of people’.50 ‘Terrorism’, defined as 
‘an extreme form of politically motivated violence’, was also incorporated into 
the National Anti Terrorist Plan of 1993.51 However, it was not the subject of 
specific criminal offences until the raft of legislation enacted in the aftermath of 
9/11. 
Within two weeks of 9/11, which impacted dramatically upon the Australian 
psyche, the federal government had established an inter-departmental 
committee to review the need for counter-terrorism laws.52 Over the next two or 
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three years, a significant amount of legislation specifically addressing the 
prevention, investigation, financing and suppression of terrorism was enacted.53  
Following the bombings that occurred in London in 2005, the federal 
government announced further terrorism laws. Legislation passed subsequently 
included the Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 and the Anti-Terrorism Act (no 2) 2005, 
which introduced control orders (discussed in Chapter 3.2), provided for 
suspects to be held in preventative detention and created offences for inciting 
hostility (discussed in Chapter 3.1). 
It appears that a significant part of the justification for enacting separate 
terrorism offences post-9/11 was the need to address the perceived public view 
that a terrorist act was an attack on society, and therefore terrorist violence was 
more serious than ordinary violence.54 The new legislation was enacted despite 
legal opinion to the effect that terrorism could effectively be prosecuted under 
existing legislation.55 As further terrorism legislation has been introduced over 
time, terrorist attacks in the US and other countries, and the risk of such attack 
occurring in Australia, have been a recurring theme in political discussion of the 
statutory measures.56 
In turn, the enactment of legislation containing specific terrorism offences sends 
a message to the public that terrorist violence is particularly serious and cannot 
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be accommodated within existing laws. This illustrates the way in which legal 
and other forms of discourse reflect and reinforce each other. 
The word ‘terrorism’ itself is illustrative of the fear it evokes in the general public, 
and the seriousness with which it is regarded as a crime. This sense of fear 
connects terrorism with its historical roots, and the horror of random slaughter 
associated with the French Revolution. Mary Zournazi writes:57  
Terror has become one of the most ominous words in English. ... Terror is the 
name of an experience evoked by dread or fear of something. From its early 
usage, it has been associated with the terrible and hence describes a feeling or 
reaction to that which provokes fear of a person, object or thing. When terror is 
moved from the individual to the cultural sphere, where culture is understood as 
a state of shared understandings, symbols and relationships, then its current 
meaning in contemporary politics and the media becomes clear.  
Terrorism has, particularly since the events of 9/11, more specifically become 
associated with concepts of ‘the foreign’ and with ‘evil’:58  
In this scenario, the enemy is everywhere at all times, a situation that produces 
a pervasive and omnipotent fear. ... what we witness is an upsurge of hostility 
and a general abhorrence for other cultures, religions, and traditions that are 
seen as morally deficient and lacking the social and political values of Western 
modernity. 
As an inherently political process however, discourse does not simply reflect 
existing conceptions of phenomena; it actively creates them. While the label 
‘terrorism’ might be said to reflect the public fear that surrounds the threat of 
terrorist attack, the use of the word ‘terrorism’ and terror discourse also serves 
to create and perpetuate the fear. While alternative discourse about terrorism, 
aimed at conceptualising terrorism as a product of broader social and structural 
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inequalities, does exist,59 it is peripheral to official representations of terrorism 
as a manifestation of evil and threat to humanity.60 
In the Australian context, therefore, the evolution of special counter-terrorism 
legislation in the wake of the shocking events of 9/11 both reflected and 
perpetuated a public conception that terrorism was a particularly serious form of 
violence that could not be effectively managed within an existing legal 
framework. This is in contrast to the development of a discourse of ‘domestic 
violence’, discussed below. 
It is worth noting at this point that the term ‘domestic violence’ in Australia 
historically referred to conduct that posed a threat to the security of the nation.  
Section 119 of the Australian Constitution provides that ‘the Commonwealth 
shall protect every State against invasion and, on the application of the 
Executive Government of the State, against domestic violence.’61 More recently, 
the amendments to the Defence Act 1903 (Cth), contained in Part IIIAAA 
introduced in anticipation of possible terrorist attacks at the 2000 Sydney 
Olympics, pertain to utilisation of the defence force to protect Commonwealth 
interests and states and self-governing territories, against domestic violence.62 
‘Domestic violence’ in this context is given the same meaning as in section 119, 
which, it is suggested, means that there must be a significant danger to the 
polity beyond the resources of the police (be they Commonwealth, state or 
territory) to meet.  
There is, therefore, strong legal precedent for using the term ‘domestic violence’ 
to refer to activities of renegade groups that threaten the security of the nation. 
Notwithstanding that legal precedent, the raft of counter-terrorism legislation 
passed in Australia in response to the attacks of 9/11 has used the word 
‘terrorism’ in relation to new offences and powers. The use of terrorism in 
preference to ‘domestic violence’ reflects the terminology of the international 
conventions on terrorism, and also the increasingly international aspect of 
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terrorism that is not encompassed by the terminology of ‘domestic violence’.  
However, it also reflects the construction of terrorism within legal and popular 
discourse as the most serious of crimes, a purpose for which ‘domestic 
violence’ is, in the present era, discursively unsuitable.  
Development of ‘Domestic Violence’ as a Legal Concept 
 
The 1970s in Australia saw the beginning of a concerted campaign by feminists 
to highlight the problem of male violence against women, including both rape 
and domestic violence.63 The naming of the problem of ‘domestic violence’ in 
Australia was significant in giving a label to what had essentially been a 
‘problem with no name’ following its identification as an issue by feminists in the 
late nineteenth century.64 Since it was first coined, the use of the term has been 
a point of contention amongst feminists. A key aspect of the concern some 
feminists have with the label is that the use of the word ‘domestic’ trivialises the 
violence and obscures the serious harm associated with it.65  ‘Domestic’ implies 
a private issue, a problem pertaining to the parties involved, rather than 
something that affects society more broadly and enlivens the responsibility of 
the state.66 Serious crimes, such as rape and murder, are often not reported as 
‘domestic violence’, even though they are (when committed against an intimate 
partner) simply the most serious forms of that kind of violence.67  
In considering these concerns, it is important to understand that the term 
‘domestic violence’ was deliberately chosen by Australian feminists who were 
keen to agitate for the recognition of the issue and realised the necessity of 
doing so in a way that would secure the support of male-dominated 
governments.68 The focus of refuge workers and feminist groups was on the 
need to obtain funding for refuges and other forms of practical support for 
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victims. ‘Domestic violence’ was chosen in preference to ‘violence against 
women’ and other terms that were perceived as too confrontational and likely to 
be counter-productive in achieving political support required to achieve these 
aims.69 In this respect, the Australian experience differs somewhat from that in 
the United States, where ‘wife-battering’ has generally been the term of choice 
to describe the problem of male violence against women in the intimate 
sphere,70 although Miller notes that some US refuges were forced to obscure 
their feminist orientations in order to obtain funding.71  
During the same period that feminists were active in Australia in relation to 
domestic violence, women’s groups were drawing attention to the problem in 
the United Kingdom and the United States.72 Refuges were established in 
Sydney and elsewhere and public funding was obtained to support women who 
were victims of intimate violence.73 The very act of giving a name to something 
that had hitherto been hidden from public view was significant in allowing for the 
recognition of women’s shared experiences of violence rather than its 
perception as an individual problem.74 
The efforts by the women’s refuge movement to obtain government funding 
were followed by a series of government-commissioned reports in the 1980s. 
These inquiries led to legal reforms in dealing with domestic violence, including 
the introduction of new offences, expanded police powers for investigating 
domestic violence, changes to the compellability of spouses in domestic 
violence proceedings, and the introduction of civil protection orders for the 
protection of women.75 The use of the term ‘domestic violence’ in legal 
terminology followed on from the work of the women’s refuge movement in 
raising awareness of the problem. The concept of ‘domestic violence’ in legal 
                                                          
69
 Genovese (1998), p 147-9. 
70
 For examples see Walker (1984); Ptacek (1999). However, the term ‘domestic violence’ is also used in 
the US: see, for example, Felder and Victor (1996). 
71
 Miller (2005), pp 6-13. 
72
 Belknap (1996), pp 171-2; Ptacek (1999), pp 42-6 (noting that the 1970s was the third wave of public 
attention after the 17
th
 and 19
th
 centuries); Walklate (2008), pp 39-40. 
73
 Genovese (1998), Chapter 4. 
74
 Genovese (1998), p 11. 
75
 Laing (2000), pp 1-16; Stubbs and Wallace (1988). 
77 
 
discourse therefore reflects the origins of the term in Australian social and 
political discourse. 
The tactical decision to frame intimate violence as ‘domestic violence’, however, 
has had the effect of obscuring its political and ideological aspects. While some 
feminists have highlighted the systemic nature of male violence against women, 
the liberal state has generally been resistant to the recognition of structural or 
systemic discrimination.76 For pragmatic reasons, therefore, the focus of 
women’s groups in the 1970s was on the plight of victims of violence, rather 
than the behaviour of the perpetrators. As Otto von Bismarck famously 
remarked, ‘Politics is the art of the possible’, and emphasising male 
responsibility for violence may well have been counter-productive in the political 
struggle to obtain masculinist support for addressing the issue of intimate 
violence against women. This obviously limited the extent to which the 
movement could focus on male responsibility for systemic violence.77  
The ways in which the naming and treatment of domestic violence have been 
constrained as described above effectively illustrate the phallocentric, or 
masculinist, nature of Australian legal and political discourse.78 Smart explains 
the concept of phallocentrism as follows:79 
Phallocentrism is a term which is now familiar in feminist psychoanalytic 
literature and which is becoming widely adopted. It is deployed to refer to a 
culture which is structured to meet the needs of the masculine imperative. 
However, it is a term which is meant to imply far more than the surface 
appearance of male dominance which is all that is captured by concepts like 
inequality and discrimination which, in turn, are the standard (inadequate) terms 
used where law is concerned. The term ‘phallocentrism’ invokes the 
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unconscious and raises profound questions on the part that the psyche and 
subjectivity play in reproducing patriarchal relations. Phallocentrism attempts to 
give some insight into how patriarchy is part of women’s (as well as men’s) 
unconscious, rather than a superficial system imposed from outside and kept in 
place by social institutions, threats or force. It attempts to address the problem 
of the construction of gendered identities and subjectivities. Law must, 
therefore, be understood both to participate in the construction of meanings and 
subjectivities and to do so within the terms of a phallocentric culture. 
The construction of violence against women as domestic violence reflects the 
way in which masculinist influences operate within the law, and within society 
more generally. Although the recognition of domestic violence as a problem has 
benefited women generally, the need for activists to construct their arguments 
and claims for support in a way that would appeal to masculinist interests 
reflects the way in which meaning is constructed ‘within the terms of a 
phallocentric culture’. Smart also uses the term ‘phallogocentric’ to describe the 
combination of phallocentrism and logocentrism, the latter indicating the 
production of knowledge under conditions of patriarchy.80 That domestic 
violence is conceptualised as a problem of individual dysfunctional relationships 
serves patriarchal interests because it obscures the fact that it is a form of 
violence used strategically by men to exercise control over women. It serves 
patriarchal interests that men are not constructed as a ‘class’ of perpetrators in 
the way that, for example, men of Middle Eastern appearance are constructed 
as terrorists through processes such as racial profiling.81 
That it was the women’s movement itself that ‘chose’ the term ‘domestic 
violence’ to refer to men’s systematic violence against women does not 
undermine the argument that social discourse is reflective of masculinist 
interests. Rather, it illustrates the complex and intersecting ways in which 
phallocentrism operates within discourse. In this respect, it is worth 
remembering that discourse is not only about words, but also systems and rules 
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about who is entitled to speak and when.82 Discourse not only describes the 
words chosen, but also the framework within which ‘choices’ about language 
are made. Pervasive phallocentric influences within the political and legal 
spheres in Australia dictated the choice of ‘domestic violence’ as a term that 
would not put political power-brokers off-side.83 However, the legacy of the term 
is one that ensures the gendered nature of such violence remains hidden. 
Public discourse in relation to domestic violence has been marked by 
ambivalence and uncertainty that further reflects the operation of masculinist 
power and the feminist struggles against it. Through the work of feminist 
activists from the 1970s onwards, highlighting the structural nature of domestic 
violence as rooted in the inequality of women, the idea of domestic violence as 
a crime perpetrated by men against women came to influence government 
responses to violence.84 By the mid 1980s there was a degree of public 
recognition of domestic violence as an issue predominantly affecting women.85  
However, under the conservative Howard government, from the mid 1990s the 
focus was actively moved away from the gendered nature of domestic violence, 
consistent with the government’s focus on ‘family values’ and political 
correctness. Official discourse favoured the Intergenerational Transmission of 
Violence theory, which promoted the idea of violence as an ongoing problem 
experienced within dysfunctional families, rather than an issue of gender.86  
In the climate of ambivalence that these changes produced, other terms for 
domestic violence, such as ‘family violence’87 and ‘violence against women’,88 
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came to represent diverging philosophies about the origins and causes of 
violence. These debates have focused on whether or not violence inflicted upon 
women by their partners should be classified with violence against the family 
more broadly, and indeed whether domestic violence as a concept should 
reflect abuse by women of their partners as well as violence by men. Use of the 
term ‘family violence’ represents a move away from the feminist structural 
approach to violence that gained some traction during the 1970s and 1980s, 
and toward the degendered concept favoured by the Howard government.89  
Notwithstanding the recognition of the gendered nature of domestic violence 
produced by feminist activism from the 1970s onwards, contemporary public 
discourse is largely absent recognition of the systemic nature of the violence, 
and how it is tolerated in Australian society.90 This reflects the continuing 
masculinist influence in Australian society, as illustrated by the popular notion 
advanced by former Prime Minister John Howard that Australia is now a ‘post-
feminist’ society.91 
Notably, there has not been any Australian equivalent to the attempts in the 
United States to have violence against women legally recognised as a form of 
terror.92 It is significant that the discourse of radical feminists, which has 
focused upon the systematic and gendered nature of violence against women, 
and may have worked to counteract some of the degendering of domestic 
violence, has been largely absent from political discussion of violence in 
Australia.93 In the United States, radical feminists such as the late Andrea 
Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon have been highly visible and politically 
active in drawing attention to the need for radical legal reform to address the 
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issue of violence against women.94 MacKinnon and Dworkin have strategically 
employed the language of terror in their campaigns and drawn attention to the 
numbers of women harmed by abuse, and the horrific nature of the harm. 
However, an express reframing of violence against women as a form of ‘terror’ 
à la MacKinnon and Dworkin is almost unthinkable within the current Australian 
social and political environment. In the following section, the unavailability of the 
language of terror in describing domestic violence is illustrated through the 
social and legal construction of the perpetrators of violence. 
Construction of the ‘Terrorist’ Versus the Perpetrator of Domestic 
Violence 
 
Legal discourse, as well as popular discourse, constructs not only the 
phenomena of terrorism and domestic violence but also the perpetrators of 
these offences. As Carr notes, ‘Whereas the noun “criminal” may simply be a 
statement of fact, “terrorist” is always a pejorative expression of an attitude 
rather than the depiction of an objective phenomenon’.95 
In contemporary legal and popular discourse, the terrorist is primarily 
represented in the form of the ‘menacing Arab’. Edward Said has written of 
contemporary constructions of the Arab as ‘oriental’ and the ways in which he 
(for it is ‘he’ in these representations) is frequently presented as dishonest, 
menacing and lecherous.96 Said writes, ‘Lurking behind all of these images is 
the menace of jihad. Consequence: a fear that the Muslims (or Arabs) will take 
over the world.’97  
Since 9/11, Western media has actively participated in this construction of the 
terrorist as the ‘Arab other’ – a dangerous amalgam of fundamentalist Islamic 
belief, dislike of Western values, and failure to assimilate into the Australian 
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community.98 Using the ‘us and them’ metaphor of war, this ‘Other’ is always 
constructed in opposition to a nationalised ‘us’.99 This both reflects and 
reinforces fear within the Australian community about the threat to society 
posed by outsiders who are perceived not to share our cultural values. 
The construction of the perpetrator of terrorism as ‘other’ is also reflected in 
legal discourse in a way that highlights offenders’ affiliation to an ideologically-
motivated group and juxtaposes the shared values of that group against those 
of mainstream Australian society.100 In their analysis of legal and media reports 
of convicted terrorism offenders, Porter and Kebbell note that one theme of the 
reports was a sense of identity perpetrators had with Muslims generally and a 
feeling that this group was being persecuted or mistreated.101 In sentencing the 
offenders in Benbrika, the court made note of intercepted telephone calls in 
which Benbrika had promoted jihad against the ‘kuffar’ (unbelievers) who 
resisted the expansion of Islam and rule of Shariah law in Australia. It was 
noted that the group referred to themselves as ‘brothers’, ‘mujahedeen 
(warriors)’ and ‘doing something’ for the cause, and that members of the group 
praised those responsible for earlier terrorist attacks.102 In the Melbourne trial of 
those accused of conspiring to attack the Holsworthy Army Barracks, two of the 
accused were said to have referred to Australians as ‘spiteful’ and ‘enemies’ 
who were targeting Muslims.103 Membership of, and loyalty to, a central group 
are emphasised, even though some members of the ‘group’ may never have 
met. Although sentencing judgments pay regard to individual backgrounds and 
characteristics, they are a secondary feature to the focus on group identity. 
In contrast with the perpetrator of domestic violence, a terrorist is the ‘enemy’, 
the ‘other’, the personification of evil – he is not someone’s brother, father, 
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husband or neighbour.104 No doubt much of the evidence of the ‘otherness’ of 
offenders in terrorism cases is available to the court due to the use of covert 
surveillance, which is much more likely to be used in relation to terrorist 
offences than domestic violence.  
However, in domestic violence settings, verbal abuse is a common feature,105 
including the use of language by which the abuser (as male) constructs himself 
in opposition to his victim (as female) by use of gendered terms such as ‘slut’, 
‘bitch’ and ‘whore’.106 The use of such language would potentially mark the 
perpetrator as a hater of women and therefore imbue his actions with a 
discriminatory aspect. However, the common usage of these terms effectively 
obscures their gendered nature, and ensures that where present, they will not 
be given the interpretation that is offered here, as terms illustrative of gender 
bias or hatred.107 The law, consistent with its masculinist nature, treats the use 
of these terms as politically-neutral, failing to recognise the gendered 
dimensions to the use of misogynist language. The neutralisation of gendered 
hate speech is considered in more detail in Chapter 3.1. 
In this respect, the law de-genders domestic violence in a similar fashion to the 
de-gendering process that takes place in the media. Howe has noted that the 
media largely shies away from laying blame at the feet of domestic violence 
perpetrators, obscuring the gendered nature of the problem. Domestic violence 
is constructed as a genderless crime;108 research in South Australia found that 
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gender was rarely mentioned as a factor in news reports of domestic 
violence.109  
The absence of gender from the construction of domestic violence is not merely 
an oversight; it is the product of a deliberate strategy to ‘de-gender’ the problem 
of domestic violence. The ‘Australia Says No’ campaign against domestic 
violence was reconfigured from its initial focus on the responsibility of 
perpetrators to a focus on victims, because it was perceived to blame men for 
domestic violence.110 Berns has described the way in which violence against 
women is de-gendered in the media through strategies that include running 
stories about women’s violence against men, blaming victims for the abuse 
inflicted upon them, and using female writers to pen stories minimising the 
impacts of domestic violence.111 In relation to sexual assault specifically, the 
media constructs the perpetrator as a deviant, individual figure, despite the fact 
that approximately 40 percent of sexual assault is perpetrated by men against 
their partners and children.112  
To the extent that a face is given to perpetrators of violence against women, it is 
characterised as a problem associated with ‘minority ethnic culture’, sweeping 
aside the fact that mainstream culture is also associated with the perpetration of 
violence against women.113 Rarely do we see the face of domestic violence 
perpetrators splashed across the newspaper or television screen like the faces 
of terrorism perpetrators; on the rare occasion this occurs it is usually because 
of the high profile of the perpetrator or victim and is treated akin to a celebrity 
scandal.114 
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The consequence of how perpetrators of terrorism are constructed is that an 
identifiable target is created for state and public scrutiny – a class of persons 
towards whom fears and concerns about terrorism can be directed. The use of 
the term ‘terrorist’ to describe a group serves a political purpose: it effectively 
allows all activities of that group to be opposed regardless of political 
motivation.115 By contrast, the result of the de-gendering of domestic violence is 
that there is no identifiable class of perpetrators to focus upon. This is not 
surprising, as the kind of ‘moral panics’ that circulate in relation to ethnic gang 
crime are, as Howe notes, not possible when the perpetrators include members 
of the dominant group.116 
The construction of an identifiable perpetrator group in relation to terrorism also 
makes it much easier to characterise acts carried out by that group as being 
ideological in nature, as ideology is associated with belief systems that are 
considered unusual or outside the mainstream. This is explored in more detail in 
Chapter 2.2.  
Conclusion 
 
While MacKinnon’s question cited at the beginning of this chapter is focused 
upon international law responses to violence against women, the question is 
apposite in relation to domestic legal responses also. I have argued that the 
names given to the two phenomena I am here concerned with – domestic 
violence and terrorism – are an important part of understanding the different 
structural and practical responses to them.  
In this chapter, I have examined the ways in which the concepts of ‘domestic 
violence’ and ‘terrorism’ have evolved in legal discourse in specific contexts: the 
former as a result of a deliberate and strategic choice by feminist activists in the 
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1970s to obtain support for women victims of domestic abuse, and the latter as 
a result of international events, particularly the terrorist attacks of 9/11.  
As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, the process by which names are 
ascribed to social and legal phenomena is not a neutral one. The fact that 
domestic violence is socially and legally defined as such and not as terrorism 
reflects a process whereby violence committed against women in the private 
sphere is separated off from other violence and designated for different 
treatment. However, as I argue in the following two chapters, domestic violence 
and terrorism, despite their legal constructions, do in fact have significant 
aspects in common.  
The historical developments outlined here provide the context for exploring the 
ways in which the key concepts that distinguish terrorism and domestic violence 
– the ideological and the public – have acquired the meanings that they bear 
today in legal discourse. In the following two sections, I examine these concepts 
and their construction in legal discourse in detail. 
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CHAPTER 2.2 LAW’S CONSTRUCTION OF IDEOLOGY AND OF THE 
‘OTHER’  
 
However muted its present appearance may be, sexual dominion obtains 
nevertheless as perhaps the most pervasive ideology of our culture and 
provides its most fundamental concept of power.1  
In the previous chapter, I noted the importance of labels in determining how 
different phenomena are treated both within and outside the law. Labelling 
occurs within the law both in terms of what acts are defined as criminal, and 
how elements of particular offences are defined and constructed. Concepts that 
are integral to the determination of legal rights and responsibilities – such as 
‘reasonable’ and ‘justifiable’ – are not capable of definition outside of the legal 
discourse that constructs them. The same relationships of power that determine 
what is considered reasonable or justifiable outside the law also operate to 
determine what is so defined under the law. 
In this chapter, I explore the concept of ideology and the significant role that it 
plays in the construction of terrorism and the terrorist. As an element of 
terrorism offences, ideology plays a crucial part in distinguishing terrorism from 
other forms of violence (including domestic violence) and creating for it a 
special place in the catalogue of crimes.2 
I first consider the peripheral role played by motive within the law generally, 
noting that the inclusion of a specific motivation as a requirement of terrorism 
offences is exceptional. I then consider the meaning/s of ideology to provide a 
context for discussion of how the term is constructed in legal discourse. I 
proceed to consider various ‘indicia’ of ideology as extrapolated from Australian 
terrorism sentencing decisions (where ideology must be found to exist as it is an 
element of the terrorism offences) and how ideological motivation is constructed 
in these cases.  
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In relation to each of these indicia, I argue that an alternative (feminist) 
construction of serious domestic violence cases is that its perpetrators are also 
ideologically motivated, although this is not recognised by the courts. As Millett 
notes in the opening quotation to this chapter, the ideology of sexual dominion 
is pervasive, but it is also ‘muted’. I am therefore also concerned to de-construct 
domestic homicide sentences to examine how these indicia of ideological 
motivation, where present, are ignored or obscured. 
The Role of Motive in the Law Generally 
 
Within the criminal law, motive generally refers to the emotion prompting an act, 
as distinct from the mens rea, which is the state of mind necessary to establish 
criminal responsibility.3 Crimes of domestic violence, which comprise ‘ordinary’ 
crimes such as assault, wounding and manslaughter, do not require the 
prosecution to establish any particular motive on the part of the perpetrator. 
While intention (or other requisite fault element) is usually required to establish 
criminal responsibility, motive is not.4 Rather, motive may help evidentially to 
establish the fault element by providing a reason for the conduct, and explaining 
how a particular state of mind came about.5 Motive can also be relevant to the 
existence of a legal defence, such as self-defence, necessity or provocation. It 
is also considered in terms of mitigation or aggravation at the sentencing 
stage.6 However, motive is rarely included as a necessary element of a criminal 
offence.7 
The irrelevance of motive to criminal liability is consistent with the traditional 
positivist view of law, pursuant to which law is a system of rules created by 
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humans that is divorced from considerations of politics and morality.8 Within the 
positivist conception of law, murder is defined independently of the perpetrator’s 
reason for committing the act. The use of morally neutral terms to denote fault, 
rather than terms such as ‘malice’, occurred in the context of changes in the 
common law precipitated by the influence of liberal theory in the nineteenth 
century.9 
The terrorism offences in the Criminal Code are an exception to this general 
rule. ‘Terrorist act’ is defined in the Code as ‘[a particular act] perpetrated or 
threat made with the intention of advancing a political, religious or ideological 
cause and with the intention of coercing or influencing by intimidation a 
government, or intimidating the public or a section thereof’ (emphasis added).10 
In this way, the law expressly makes motive a component of terrorist offences, 
even though the ideological purpose may be that of someone other than the 
accused.11 It also reflects the public perception that ideological motivation is an 
ingredient of terrorism.12 
With regard to the inclusion of the motivation element, Australian anti-terrorism 
laws, like the laws of Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, follow the British 
Terrorism Act 2000.13 The British definition was based on a working definition of 
terrorism used by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United 
States.14 By contrast, the definition of terrorism in United States legislation does 
not contain a motivation element.15 In Canada, a motivational element was 
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declared unconstitutional by the Superior Court of Justice, but that decision was 
overturned by the Ontario Court of Appeal.16 
As Alan Norrie notes, courts have generally taken a narrow approach to 
intention, focusing on whether the perpetrator has turned their mind to a 
particular aim, whereas in cases of political violence they have taken a broader 
approach, focusing upon the moral intention or the intention to do wrong.17 
The inclusion of ideological motive as an express element of terrorism 
demonstrates this wider approach of focusing upon the ultimate goal of the 
terrorist in preference to her or his immediate intention. For example, the 
terrorist’s goal in detonating an explosive may be to publicise her or his cause. 
He or she may not actually possess the intention to kill, but simply be indifferent 
as to whether the action results in a loss of life.  
The required motivation in terrorism offences is one of politics, religion or 
ideology. There is scant precedent for the legal interpretation of ideology, which 
has traditionally been a topic for study in philosophy and sociology rather than 
law. The absence of precedent creates a broad scope for judges to give their 
own interpretation to the concept.18 Given that ideological motivation is an 
element of terrorist offences, lawyers and judges must focus upon those 
aspects of the defendant’s conduct said to be ideological. This reflects the way 
in which legal discourse influences how investigators and legal officers gather 
material and present their cases in court. 
Noted feminist sociologist Dorothy Smith, drawing on Marx, argues that people 
learn about social phenomena (such as domestic violence) not through their 
own experiences, but through the media and other social reports.19 In these 
reports, concepts or assumptions are applied in abstraction from their factual 
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context; particular ‘facts’ are then chosen from an example to illustrate or 
support the concept or assumption. She refers to this as the ‘social organisation 
of facticity’ – a process by which the official version of events comes to 
represent ‘what actually happened’, stripped of any reference to how that 
version of events was constructed or created.20 Potentially conflicting or 
contradictory facts are erased from the account that is generated through this 
process.  
Smith’s theory usefully illustrates the process by which courts construct the 
actions of perpetrators in terrorism cases as ideologically motivated – ‘ideology’ 
is the concept set up in abstraction, and particular aspects of conduct are 
chosen from the available evidence to support the existence of ideological 
motivation; this becomes the ‘official’ version of what happened.21 There is no 
longer any question as to whether the perpetrator’s actions were ideologically-
motivated or not in an ‘objective’ sense; the version constructed on the court’s 
record becomes the official version of events that is also presented in the media 
and other reports of ‘what happened’. 
On the other hand, in domestic violence cases (and here I focus particularly 
upon intimate homicides as the most serious manifestation of domestic 
violence), the absence of any ideological component to the offence, and the 
focus in defences upon the conduct of the victim and the defendant’s ‘loss of 
self-control’ encourages lawyers and decision-makers to focus upon personal 
motivations of the accused. Ideological motivation is not officially a component 
of domestic violence offences, and therefore it is irrelevant within legal 
discourse. Indicia suggestive of ideological motivation in domestic violence 
cases are thus ignored in the process of generating the official account of 
events.22 
The absence of reference to ideology in cases of domestic violence is both a 
cause and effect of the phenomenon referred to by Millett above, whereby the 
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dominion of men over women remains obscured despite being ‘perhaps the 
most pervasive ideology of our culture’.23 By means of a legally-discursive 
‘Catch 22’, the cultural invisibility of this pervasive ideology (‘masculinist 
ideology’) means that it is absent from discussion in cases of domestic 
homicide; in turn, the absence of ideology from legal discourse reinforces and 
perpetuates the invisibility of masculinist ideology in Australian culture more 
broadly. In the following section, I explore the concept of ideology in more 
detail. 
The Meaning of ‘Ideology’ 
 
Section 100.2 of the Criminal Code24 defines a ‘terrorist act’ to require, inter alia, 
that the perpetrator act with the intention of advancing a political, religious or 
ideological cause.  ‘Ideological’ is not defined in the Criminal Code. ‘Political’ 
and ‘religious’ are not defined either, but as politics and religion are both forms 
of ideology,25 ‘ideological’ serves as a broader category of which the other two 
are subsets.26 The Macquarie Dictionary defines ‘ideology’ as ‘the body of 
doctrine, myth, and symbols of a social movement, institution, class or large 
group’.27 On this definition, ideology would appear to require both a group of 
people (whether large or small) and a set of beliefs and understandings shared 
by members of the group.  
Andrew Vincent, in his treatise on ideologies, writes:28 
The present position of ideology still remains profoundly contested and open to 
broad interpretation. ... Ideology is, however, still used pejoratively or 
negatively, indicating a limited perspective, a subjective value bias, a linguistic 
distortion, a symbolic phantasy, or most commonly, an illusory view of the 
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world. Furthermore, ideology can simply denote an individual’s political 
perspective, a conceptual map which helps groups to navigate the political 
world, a specific set of hegemonic views which tries to legitimate power (as in 
the belief structures of a particularly [sic] social class), or indeed all political 
views. Ideology can also signify the generic ideas of a political party, a total 
world-view, or indeed human consciousness in general, encompassing all 
beliefs, including art and science. The latter might imply the politicization of all 
ideas or simply that interpretative concerns permeate all our claims to 
knowledge [emphasis added]. 
I suggest that ‘ideological’, in the sense in which it is used by the law, takes the 
more specific form referred to, that is as representing a ‘subjective value bias’ 
and an ‘illusory view of the world’. I explore this in more detail below. 
Vincent also notes that central to the modern conception of ideology is the 
distinction between ideology and ‘truth’, with many who discuss ideology 
claiming a ‘neutral’ or ‘truth’ basis for their claims (to distinguish themselves 
from the ‘ideology’ that they critique).29 In law, what qualifies as ‘ideological’ is 
determined from the perspective of the decision-maker who, although basing 
decisions on her or his own experience of the world, is imbued by law with the 
mantle of objectivity.30 
From this position of objectivity, the law constructs terrorism offenders as 
possessing a ‘particular perspective’. Within contemporary legal discourse, as in 
the media,31 ‘ideology’ comes to be associated with the ‘Arab other’32 – with the 
angry fundamentalist Muslim seeking to wage jihad33 on the Western world.34  
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Western liberal legal states are not, within the purview of their own systems, 
based upon ideology, although critical scholarship sets out to reveal and critique 
the assumptions and values underlying such systems.35 This process of 
construction fits within the historical development of terrorism in Australia as 
outlined in Chapter 2.1, and the modern conception of terrorism both in 
Australia and internationally as associated with the threat of fundamentalist 
Islam.36 
By contrast, perpetrators of ‘ordinary’ crimes (including domestic violence) are 
not recognised as possessing any particular ideology; rather, their behaviour is 
constructed as a problem of individual, dysfunctional relationships.37 It is 
unthinkable within the Australian legal system that its white, Anglo-Celtic, 
heterosexual ‘benchmark man’38 might be characterised as having a ‘subjective 
value bias’ – thus he can never be constructed in law as the ‘Other’. As the 
patriarchal influences in the law mean that the masculinist perspective is 
constructed as the ‘norm’,39 behaviour rooted in masculinist ideology is 
rendered ‘normal’ rather than ideological through discourse. This process of 
normalisation is facilitated by the construction of ‘domestic violence’ as 
something private and mundane – an aberrant (though understandable) feature 
of relationships. 
However, when one deconstructs the process by which the meaning of ideology 
is constructed, the masculinist perspective is revealed as ideological in the 
same way as any fundamentalist belief system. This perspective is, as Millett 
refers to it (above), the ‘most pervasive ideology of our culture’.40 It is 
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constituted by the same features of ‘ideology’ outlined above – a group of 
people with a shared set of beliefs and understandings. Of course, not all men 
subscribe to masculinist ideology, in the same way that fundamental Islamist 
beliefs are not held by all Muslims. Nor is it necessary to the concept of 
ideology that the members of the group know each other and participate in 
collective activity, just as persons who share a particular political ideology may 
never meet. 
The shared set of beliefs and understandings that form the basis of masculinist 
ideology include a belief in male superiority and entitlement to control over 
families, including partners.41 Indeed, the association of maleness with 
domination, and femaleness with subordination underlies the social construction 
of sexual relations.42 The ‘ideology of sexism’, which accepts and promotes the 
idea that differential treatment on the basis of sex is justified because of 
biological difference, is so successful in part because both men and women 
accept its premise.43 
Like any ideology, masculinist ideology has its own doctrine, myth and symbols. 
These include pornography,44 objectification of women, glorification of war45 and 
violent sport,46 and laudation of physical superiority.47 It is this belief system, 
and its supporting propaganda, that underlies much of the violence against 
women perpetrated in Australian society.48 The law, replete with the same 
masculinist influences as general society, reflects this same world-view. 
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Sherry Ortner argues that in every society women are subordinated to men by 
elements of cultural ideology that explicitly devalue women, symbolic devices 
that implicitly do the same, and social-structural arrangements that exclude 
women from participation in some forms of power.49 I argue here that the 
actions of domestic violence perpetrators, reconstructed through a feminist lens, 
reflect masculinist ideology. Although their actions are not conceptualised as 
such by the courts, perpetrators of domestic violence often act in the pursuit of 
a cause – namely a desire to establish or reinstate control over their partners 
(and women generally) and a belief that they are entitled to exercise that control 
forcibly if necessary.50 In fact, domestic violence perpetrators are arguably more 
successful than terrorists in using violence to achieve their ends.51 It is not just 
the instrumental use of force, but its use in the context of the belief structures 
referred to above, that warrants its redefinition as ‘ideological’. In other words, 
the violence is not simply rooted in ideological belief, but is perpetrated to 
advance it. 
Possibly because the Australian terrorism cases to date have involved religious 
motivation, judges have apparently not considered it necessary to expressly 
define ideology.52 However, it is possible to extrapolate various indicia of 
‘ideological’ motivation by examining the sentencing judgments in which (aside 
from pleas of guilty) the jury’s verdict reflects the existence of ideological 
motivation. These indicia are as follows: 
1. Commitment to a cause; 
2. A belief that violence is justified or legitimate in the pursuit of the chosen 
cause; 
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3. A degree of planning and premeditation of activities carried out in the 
interests of the cause; 
4. Denigration or blame of the victims of terrorist activity justifying their 
victimisation. 
In the following parts of this chapter, I use these indicia to examine the ways in 
which legal discourse constructs terrorist violence as ‘ideological’ and other 
violence as generated by a spontaneous outburst of emotion, while also offering 
possible alternative reconstructions of domestic violence as ideologically-
motivated. Through ‘discursive manoeuvres’ it is possible to extrapolate 
alternative versions of the ‘truth’ from the official record of what occurred in 
domestic violence cases.53  
The Indicia of Ideology 
 
Commitment to a Chosen Cause 
 
It is a feature of the terrorism sentencing judgments to date that offenders are 
constructed as possessing a commitment to their cause, and the intention to 
achieve a result of some kind for that cause. By contrast, domestic homicide 
offenders are usually constructed as motivated by personal feeling or emotion 
antithetical to the concept of ideology.54  
Although some terrorist acts are carried out with a specific tactical or political 
objective – for example the removal of Western troops from Iraq or the release 
of hostages – many terrorist acts are much less clearly in pursuit of a particular 
goal. In some cases, terrorism is carried out with the objective simply of 
expressing support for the cause,55 or gaining publicity,56 rather than achieving 
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a specific end. Equally, it has been noted that modern terrorism appears to 
represent a shift from motivations associated with changing government policy 
to a focus on strategic objectives, or even motivations based on punishment or 
revenge.57 Terrorism is thus not necessarily associated with the achievement of 
a particular concrete objective; rather it may be simply an expression of support 
for a cause more broadly, or of animosity towards a group perceived as non-
sympathetic towards the cause. 
Generally, the chosen cause of defendants in Australian terrorism cases to date 
has been fundamentalist Islam.58 Courts have drawn particularly on spoken and 
written propaganda as evidence of perpetrators’ ideological motivation.59 In 
2006, Faheem Lodhi was sentenced in the NSW Supreme Court for a range of 
terrorism offences. There was no evidence that Lodhi had even in a preliminary 
sense decided on a course of action in respect of any terrorist attack, in terms 
of target, plan or who would carry it out.60 However, the sentencing judge found 
that Lodhi intended to use maps of the electricity supply grid in his possession 
in connection with a proposal to bomb the supply system, and any bombing 
would be done to advance the cause of violent jihad and be carried out so as to 
intimidate the government of Australia and the Australian public; likewise his 
actions in enquiring as to the supply of certain chemicals and possessing a 
document that contained instructions on the making of explosives.61 Given the 
entirely preparatory nature of Lodhi’s conduct, the possession of ideological 
motive was key to his criminality. 
Important evidence establishing Lodhi’s ideological motivation was a ‘jihadi CD’ 
located at his house glorifying martyrdom. The judge found that the ‘truth is that 
all this material makes it clear that the offender is a person who has, in recent 
years, been essentially informed by the concept of violent jihad and the 
glorification of Muslim heroes who have fought and died for jihad, either in a 
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local or broader context.’62 He held that the material found in Lodhi’s possession 
reflected the ideas and emotions that must have been foremost in his mind 
throughout October 2003 and at least until he was arrested:63  
[These intentions] were, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt, intentions he 
held with great vigour and firmness. They were the consequence of a deeply 
fanatical, but sincerely held, religious and worldview based on his faith and his 
attitude to the extreme dictates of fundamentalist Islamic propositions.  
Terrorists are often identified by overt statements of justification for their actions 
– for example by exhortations to violent jihad and denigration of ‘Western 
excesses’.64 In line with the construction of terrorists as ‘ideological’ in the 
sense of having a ‘subjective value bias’ or ‘illusory view of the world’, the 
beliefs held by terrorists are always constructed in the judgments as outrageous 
and incomprehensible.65  
It is possible that overt statements indicative of ideological belief are also made 
in domestic homicide cases, however this evidence is rarely available as the 
only witness is usually no longer alive to tell the tale.66 Rarely is evidence cited 
of the kinds of overt expressions found in Copland, where the offender told 
police, ‘You watch, I’ll be on the front page of The Age’, and chanted, ‘Die, die, 
die’ after slitting the throat of his estranged partner’s mother.67 However, 
misogynist language is a common feature in domestic violence,68 therefore it is 
likely that this extends to fatal instances of it, notwithstanding the absence of a 
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surviving victim to verify the assumption. The use of misogynist language such 
as ‘bitch’ and ‘slut’ in speaking about the target of violence serves a similar 
purpose to the use of references such as ‘infidels’ – it establishes the victim (in 
the perpetrator’s mind) as located outside of the ideological paradigm he 
identifies with.69 
Nor do domestic homicide cases usually tell us whether offenders are found in 
possession of material that would indicate the existence of an ideological 
commitment.70 It is unlikely that investigators would think to gather material 
expressive of misogynist views, such as violent pornography or films or 
literature depicting violence against women, as part of a domestic homicide 
investigation, given the absence of a motivational element of such offences. 
However, Australian culture is saturated with propaganda that excuses, 
normalises or encourages violence against women, including pornography,71 
misogynist language,72 violence against women in print,73 television and film,74 
sporting rituals,75 and other media.76 The ready availability and commonality of 
use of misogynist propaganda contributes to its ideological nature being 
effectively ‘muted’ within legal and popular discourse. 
It might be suggested that men who subscribe to masculinist ideology do not do 
so consciously in the same way that terrorists choose to follow a particular 
belief system. To some extent, this may be true; a man who possesses a 
masculinist ideology will not necessarily be making a conscious choice to be 
part of a group sharing common ideals and beliefs. However, there are 
examples illustrative of men making conscious decisions to band together in 
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groups that at best exclude and at worst denigrate women, for example male-
bonding rituals in sport,77 and men-only clubs.78 
Research in relation to the behaviour of perpetrators of domestic violence is 
also indicative of an ideological commitment to the use of violence as a strategy 
for maintaining male control and power within an intimate relationship.79 Serious 
and systematic domestic violence – what is referred to by Johnson as 
‘patriarchal terrorism’80 – reflects the relationship of power and control that 
exists between men and women in many intimate relationships, the 
maintenance of which domestic violence is directed at.81 Far from being a series 
of isolated instances of violence, abusive relationships are characterised by a 
system of rule-making imposed by the perpetrator, which may be express or 
imposed by a series of gestures and non-verbal communications; control is 
reinforced by social isolation and physical punishment, and in some cases, the 
means of control is internalised by the victim.82 
So pervasive is this power and control that it takes on what Millett refers to as a 
‘muted’ appearance.83 It is further muted or obscured by the discourse of 
equality within Australian society generally.84 If (as we are all assumed to know 
and accept) men and women have achieved equality, how can it be the case 
that some men exercise control over women in intimate relationships, let alone 
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feel a sense of entitlement to do so?85 Notwithstanding this discourse of 
equality, Australian culture is embedded with attitudes of gender inequality.86 
Moreover, the state, while perpetuating the myth that it is committed to the 
principle of equality, actually privileges masculinist ideology over equality by its 
acceptance of religious belief as an exemption from the operation of the Sex 
Discrimination Act.87 The exemption is called into play where an act or practice 
conforms to the tenet of a particular religion or is ‘necessary to avoid injury to 
the religious susceptibilities of adherents of that religion’.88 By implication, 
through this legislation, the legislature acknowledges that there may be some 
instances in which adhering to the tenets of one’s religion requires 
discrimination against women, which is clearly inconsistent with the principle of 
equality. As Thornton notes, ‘Benchmark men’, against whom equality is 
measured, are white, heterosexual, able-bodied, middle-class, conservative 
leaning, and at least nominal adherents of Christianity.89 Given that most 
leading religions, including Christianity, are patriarchal,90 it is not surprising that 
the state reflects the interests of ‘Benchmark men’ by accepting a measure of 
discrimination against women as an acceptable part of the practice of religion. 
The state’s simultaneous maintenance of the fiction of equality before the law 
serves to further obscure the masculinist ideology underlying the exemption. 
The manifestation of ideological commitment is reflected in the significant 
numbers of male-perpetrated domestic homicides connected with 
possessiveness or jealousy,91 or retaliation.92 These types of killing embody the 
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principle that ‘If I can’t have you nobody will’. In popular discourse, 
possessiveness and violence are often equated with love.93 However, 
expressions of love are, in legal discourse, the antithesis of expressions of 
ideological commitment. To love someone so much that you have to kill them if 
you can’t have them is not perceived as ideological; it is portrayed as 
romance.94 Therefore the ideological motivations of domestic homicide 
perpetrators remain obscured as they are embedded in cultural understandings 
about the proper conduct of men and women in sexual and romantic 
relationships. 
Equally, familial suicide-killings, in which the (usually male) perpetrator kills his 
children and sometimes himself, is largely treated as a tragic example of a 
family situation gone bad, or the manifestation of psychological harm to the 
perpetrator.95 This contrasts with the construction of the suicide-bomber as 
fanatic, representing a continuing danger to the community.96 Yet the man who 
portrays a willingness to take the lives of his own children is not constructed as 
a ‘fanatic’ or ‘extremist’ but often as someone deserving of compassion, who 
has been pushed ‘over the edge’ by a traumatic family or custody dispute.97 
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The domestic homicide sentencing decisions examined in my research reflect 
the discourse of perpetrators as ordinary men who break under extraordinary 
pressure.98 One can discern in the cases expressions of sympathy or empathy 
for some perpetrators,99 or at the least, a failure to recognise aspects of their 
conduct that would otherwise mark it as ideologically-motivated and therefore 
worthy of more severe condemnation.100 As Smart notes, although 
phallocentrism is not simply the result of the collective bias of decision-makers, 
it is likely to resonate with the experiences of many (especially male) judges,101 
who are therefore more likely to empathise with the perpetrator of intimate 
violence. 
 
A Belief that Violence is Justified 
 
It has been referred to as a defining feature of terrorism that the terrorist 
considers her or his cause to be morally just.102 In the Australian terrorism 
cases, an underlying theme is the belief of the terrorist in the right to use 
violence in pursuit of his cause.103  
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To that end, the concept of jihad and the adherence of perpetrators to its pursuit 
is a key focus in the terrorism sentences. In the 2009 sentencing of multiple 
terrorism offenders in the Victorian Supreme Court, Bongiorno J noted that the 
group believed that violent jihad was part of their commitment to Islam.104 Zaky 
Mallah, sentenced in NSW in 2005, was found to have at his home a printed 
document entitled ‘How can I prepare myself for Jihad’, a handwritten letter that 
was apparently a message to ASIO, and a typed manifesto setting out his 
grievances and identifying ASIO as his target.105 
However, it is not only terrorism perpetrators who consider that their use of 
violence is justified.106 It has been observed that the use of violence to achieve 
ends that are perceived as legitimate is a principle that is embedded in 
Australian culture.107 In a number of domestic violence cases I examined, 
references in the judgments suggest that the perpetrators acted with a sense of 
entitlement to use violence to achieve their ends.108 However, this sense of 
entitlement is not treated as such, giving preference to a construction of the 
domestic homicide perpetrator as acting on the spur of the moment. The 
domestic homicide perpetrator, unlike the terrorist, is also commonly 
constructed as having acted in a way that is objectively justifiable, or at least 
comprehensible, based on the behaviour of the victim.109  
Historically, the law has not only turned a blind eye to violence against women, 
but actively condoned it. The best illustration of this is the principle whereby a 
man was legally entitled to physically discipline his wife, provided that he abided 
by the ‘rule of thumb’ that the rod used to administer the beating be no thicker 
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than that appendage.110 The principle of reasonable chastisement was 
associated with Christianity and the teachings of the church that the man is the 
head of the household and has a right to chastise his wife.111 Although the right 
was no longer operative by the late nineteenth century in the United States,112 
and was being doubted by Blackstone in the late eighteenth century in 
England,113 it lives on in the reluctance of the law and law enforcement 
agencies to punish men who inflict physical violence upon their partners.114  
Until quite recently, the law also condoned the sexual abuse by men of their 
wives through the marital rape exemption. The terms of the exemption, which 
operated until the early 1990s in Australia, provided that a man could not be 
prosecuted for raping his wife.115 The basis for the exemption was that by 
marrying, a woman gave continuing consent to her husband to access her body 
if and when he chose.116 Although the exemption has been abolished,117 the 
significant under-reporting of marital rape and the low rate of successful 
prosecution,118 mean that an effective entitlement by men to women’s bodies 
remains condoned, indirectly at least, by the law.119  
A supporting arm to the ideology of masculine dominance is the state’s 
endorsement of the institutions of marriage and the family, which remains in 
place even in situations where violence occurs.120 This is evidenced, for 
example, in the mandated provision of information to separating parties about 
reconciliation, for which there is no stated exception where family violence has 
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occurred.121 Prior to amendments proposed in 2011,122 the Family Law Act 
contained provisions that operated to privilege the rights of children to a 
‘relationship with both parties’ over the rights of a victim of family violence and 
her family to safety.123  
The law of provocation, which represents a concession to male violence as a 
response to certain behaviour by women, is also imbued with masculinist 
ideology. The law uses concepts such as ‘reason’ to carve out a space where 
violence can be perpetrated legitimately.124 What the law of provocation 
represents is the idea that violence is legitimate in certain circumstances, those 
most commonly experienced by men rather than women.125 The sentiment is 
never expressed in these terms. On the contrary, overt expression is always 
given in murder and manslaughter cases to the principle that the taking of a 
human life is wrong and must be punished.126 This serves to make identification 
of ideology more difficult – because it is always possible to point to words 
clearly expressing the contrary proposition. 
This is the key to the distinction the law makes between ideology and non-
ideology; ideology makes an express claim to justification and non-ideology 
does not. If people who were ‘provoked’ into perpetrating violence said, ‘I 
thought I was entitled to’ it would be much easier to characterise their actions as 
motivated by ideology. But because that claim to justification is obscured by 
express statements to the contrary and rhetoric about ‘sudden loss of self-
control’ the actions are not deemed to be ideological. Legal discourse operates 
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in subtle and complex ways; the challenge is to interpret the hidden meanings 
and assumptions within the text.127 
The idea that perpetrators of domestic violence feel that they are justified in 
inflicting violence against women is supported by the views of abusers 
themselves. Research indicates that male abusers feel justified in meting out 
violence to their partners as a means of control,128 or as payback for ‘talking 
back’ or other behaviour deemed inappropriate or provocative.129 Research also 
shows that being male and having conservative gender-role attitudes are 
associated with victim-blame in domestic assault scenarios.130 This indicates 
that a violent response is often not just something that occurs in the heat of the 
moment – there is a pre-existing view that violence is legitimate in some 
circumstances.  
Despite the indications that men’s violence against their intimate partners is a 
manifestation of ideological belief, courts in Australia have in the past and 
continue to conceptualise domestic violence as something that occurs on the 
spur of the moment as an aspect of normal human conduct. 
I use the Victorian Supreme Court case of Tran131 to illustrate how masculinist 
violence is rendered non-ideological through legal discourse. The accused 
pleaded guilty to the stabbing murder of his daughter and to intentionally 
causing serious injury to his wife and to his daughter’s partner. Between 2000 
and 2002 Tran, who was from Vietnam, had been excluded from the family after 
his wife obtained an intervention order against him. She allowed him to return to 
the family home but he had little say in the running of the household; his wife 
and daughter worked and provided the income while he was unemployed and 
his wife controlled the finances. His daughter’s partner (Luan Tran) had come to 
stay and was sleeping in the lounge room, which troubled Tran as ‘according to 
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Vietnamese tradition’ there would have been an arrangement made between 
himself and Luan’s father. 
On the day that the killing and assaults occurred, Tran’s wife accused him of 
stealing money from her purse and called him a ‘water buffalo’.132 In sentencing 
Tran to 21 years’ imprisonment (18 in relation to the murder) with a non-parole 
period of 16 years, Teague J said:133 
… there cannot be the highest level of seriousness attaching where the acts 
were impulsive rather than pre-meditated. While I readily accept that the legal 
requirements of provocation would not have been satisfied, you were subjected 
by your wife to considerable provocation at a time of considerable vulnerability. 
Against a background of circumstances creating low self-esteem, you were 
subjected to significant emotional stress. A number of factors had contributed to 
you being at the critical time in a state of low self-esteem. You had no job. Your 
wife and daughter were working. You were at your wife’s call as to living with 
the family. You had no say in any of the arrangements as to Luan Tran. I must 
too, and do, allow for the added impact of Vietnamese cultural factors 
amplifying the effect of matters going to loss of face and respect. Further, there 
was more than low self-esteem. I accept the evidence of your having suffered 
symptoms of depression warranting medical attention prior to your committing 
these offences. A sensible moderation of the allowance for general deterrence 
is thus warranted [emphasis added].  
This passage illustrates the sentencing judge’s focus upon ‘personal’ 
considerations to the exclusion of ideological motivations. Tran’s actions were 
‘impulsive’; he was suffering ‘low self-esteem’ and ‘significant emotional stress’. 
The offender’s personal living arrangements are referred to as part of the 
provocation. This ignores the fact that underlying Tran’s violent attack was a 
strong opposition to what he perceived as an affront to his masculine 
sovereignty over the family. ‘Vietnamese cultural factors’ said to amplify the 
effect of these factors are emphasised; while this leans more to pointing out an 
ideological motivation for the offending, it also has the effect of obscuring the 
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fact that violence as a form of control is a common feature of a phallocentric 
Australian culture.134  
A pattern of violent behaviour by a perpetrator towards a victim might indicate a 
commitment to the use of violence to achieve objectives. Research suggests 
that in intimate homicides, a history of violence is a contributing factor in 
approximately one quarter of cases, and there is evidence of physical battering 
in approximately 80 percent of cases.135 However, in some of the domestic 
murder and manslaughter cases I studied, evidence of past violence that might 
otherwise suggest a pattern of behaviour based on a belief as to entitlement is 
minimised or downplayed,136 or rates only a passing mention.137 A history of 
violence by the perpetrator also does not preclude successful reliance upon a 
defence of provocation.138 Even where taken into consideration in the 
sentencing process, a previous pattern of violence is not treated as amounting 
to a sense of entitlement, or even contributing to establishing the intent to kill or 
cause grievous bodily harm.139 The minimisation of the significance of previous 
violence is consistent with the personalisation of offenders’ motivations in 
domestic homicide cases, as illustrated by the following case examples. 
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In Mills, the fact that police had been called in response to domestic violence 
incidents on three separate occasions might have been treated as indicative of 
a pattern of the offender using violence, culminating in the offender killing his 
wife by strangling her with electrical cord, squeezing her mouth and sticking his 
fingers up her nostrils until she stopped breathing.140 Yet Keane JA, in granting 
the offender’s application to appeal against sentence, and reducing it from ten 
to nine years, referred to the offender’s ‘good character’ and to there being 
‘room for considerable doubt as to the practical efficacy of heavy sentences in 
deterring the kind of crime of passion with which we are presently 
concerned.’141 The offender is even described by a psychologist as ‘an 
unassertive and submissive individual who clung onto his wife when she was 
making it clear she wanted to leave him’.142 
In Toki, the sentencing judge found that the killing by the offender of his partner 
was the ‘culmination of a pattern of violent behaviour towards the deceased’, 
yet he still accepted that ‘there was a loss of self-control on his part, such that 
the level of violence which he inflicted upon her was greater than he had ever 
exhibited towards her before’.143 In this way, the court interprets the violence as 
partly a result of loss of self-control due to the fact it was more serious than 
previous incidents; this completely overlooks evidence that perpetrators of 
domestic violence engage in escalating levels of violence in an attempt to 
control their partners.144 
Forensic science also plays a role in minimising the degree to which domestic 
violence perpetrators are held responsible for their beliefs. Psychological and 
psychiatric evidence often serves to reinterpret broader social and structural 
problems as personal characteristics of the accused,145 having a mitigating 
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effect on sentence,146 or occasionally resulting in a complete acquittal.147 For 
example, in Barrett, the offender, who bludgeoned his partner to death following 
a history of violence spanning some 12 years, was diagnosed by a forensic 
psychiatrist with ‘morbid jealousy’.148 In this way, what might otherwise be 
perceived as a commitment to the use of violence as a strategy for ensuring 
maintenance of control over an intimate partner is reconceptualised as a 
symptom of mental illness, making it a mitigating rather than an aggravating 
factor in sentencing.149 The medicalisation of the offender effectively transforms 
him from a responsible agent to someone whose actions are a product of 
individual psychopathological disorder.150 
The use of psychological evidence plays a particularly significant role in the 
construction of behaviour, as it draws attention away from what might otherwise 
be perceived as commitment to shared beliefs within a masculinist ideology, 
and reconstructs that as the individual pathology of the perpetrator.151 
 
A Degree of Planning or Premeditation 
 
Historically, the existence of ‘malice aforethought’ was a prerequisite for a 
murder conviction, and a killing in its absence warranted a conviction for a 
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lesser offence, and a corresponding less severe penalty.152 During the 
nineteenth century, the focus moved from ‘malice’ or ‘wickedness’ to concepts 
such as intention and recklessness.153 However, in terrorism offences, the 
previous focus on motivation re-emerges, and with it an examination of the 
degree of planning and preparation involved in the offence. In Lodhi, the judge 
referred to evidence of planning and the use of false names and details as 
showing a degree of premeditation and deliberation.154 In Benbrika, the 
sentencing judge referred to the evidence that members of the group knew that 
the organisation was fostering and/or preparing a terrorist attack on the basis 
that they were supplying instructions to members about explosives and also 
jihadi literature, including material desensitising members to violence.155  
Because of the intelligence and surveillance that usually accompanies terrorism 
investigations, evidence of planning and premeditation will commonly be 
gathered. By contrast, in domestic homicide cases, evidence of planning and 
premeditation is rarely referred to,156 although elaborate planning is a common 
feature of domestic homicides.157 A review of the sentencing decisions reveals 
a tendency to downplay indications of planning even where the circumstances 
of the killing indicate that the offender had been contemplating violence for 
some time,158 or had a reason to kill aside from a sudden emotional 
response.159 Similarly, offenders have successfully relied on provocation or 
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diminished responsibility, or been allowed to raise defences,160 even though 
there is evidence that their conduct is premeditated, the antithesis of a ‘sudden 
loss of self-control’.161 As Coker notes, the claim of ‘loss of self control’ in 
domestic homicides is belied by the fact that often perpetrators only ever use 
violence against their partner and not other family members or associates, that 
they do in fact commonly control the extent of their violence, and that they make 
statements indicating that the use of violence is purposive.162  
Although premeditation does not in and of itself indicate the existence of 
ideological motivation, it is a feature that is more consistent with behaviour that 
is planned and rationalised, than a spontaneous response to a stressful 
situation. The following case examples illustrate the minimisation of this aspect 
of the conduct of domestic homicide perpetrators. 
In Mehmet,163 the offender was angered by the fact that his wife had left him 
and commenced a relationship with another man. Two days before he killed 
her, he said to her sister, ‘Watch my eyes. If they get big, I am going to kill her’. 
He had also discussed the affair with a friend and sought her advice about what 
he should do, and phoned the deceased’s new boyfriend to seek his help in 
winning his wife back. Despite this evidence of premeditation, and the fact that 
the trial judge rejected his account of the provocative words the deceased 
allegedly said to him, she found that he was under very considerable emotional 
strain and had to some degree lost his self-control. She described the attack as 
‘unpremeditated and an uncharacteristic, violent response flowing from a loss of 
control brought on by “his frustration and distress”’.164 
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In Goebel-McGregor,165 the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, in dismissing the 
offender’s appeal against conviction and refusing leave to appeal against 
sentence, did not expressly refer to the crime as unpremeditated, but equally it 
did not draw upon the available evidence of planning. In sentencing remarks, it 
was noted that Goebel-McGregor had said to the victim on a previous 
occasion:166 
I am going to break you. If you ever win custody of these two boys I will put a 
bullet right between your eyes. I was going to do it the other day when you were 
at my place. I had a loaded rifle there then. You will never see England or your 
family again. I could do the time. I will only get five years for manslaughter. You 
will never see your children grow up. You will never see England again. 
Goebel-McGregor subsequently killed his ex-wife by shooting her in the back of 
the head; he claimed he had only intended to frighten her by pulling the trigger. 
The Court refused leave to appeal against the sentence of 20 years with a non-
parole period of 15 years. However, they also indicated that ‘a lighter sentence 
... might have been imposed’ and that the offence did not fall within the worst 
class of cases.167 
Planning and premeditation are not always features of domestic homicide 
cases. Of the cases I studied, there were many where there was no indication 
of premeditation. However, the consistent minimisation or obscuring of evidence 
of premeditation where it does exist reflects the important role that legal 
discourse plays in constructing the offender and the offending behaviour. 
Planning as part of a domestic homicide is consistent with the existence of 
ideological motivation on the part of offenders. Minimising these aspects 
reinforces the message created through legal and other discourses that male 
violence against women, where it occurs, is an anomaly – it is a question of 
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something dysfunctional about this relationship, or commonly, this victim.168 It is 
not, within this conceptualisation, an example of systemic violence perpetrated 
by men against women. Thus the pervasive ideology of male violence is further 
muted. 
 
Denigration or Blame of the Victim 
 
The final feature of ideological activity as identified in the terrorism cases is the 
denigration or blame of victims by those who seek to justify their ideological 
activity. In the terrorist context, this is illustrated by the targeting of so-called 
‘Western infidels’ and those who represent the ‘excesses of the West’, 
exemplified in the Bali bombings.169  
Porter and Kebbell describe denial of the suffering of the victim as an aspect of 
‘neutralisation’ – a technique designed to indoctrinate followers in relation to 
certain attitudes and beliefs.170 
For example, Jack Roche, in a letter to his son, wrote:171 
As we see today, the disbelievers are now out of control and believe that their 
ways based on inequality, arrogance, et cetera, are right. I hate them for that 
and need to learn more about how to combat them. 
Similarly, Benbrika made phone calls in which he promoted jihad against the 
‘unbelievers’ who resisted the expansion of Islam and the adoption of shariah 
law in Australia. 172 
The victims in many domestic murder and manslaughter killings are also 
perceived by offenders as in some way responsible for their own deaths.173 
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Within the sentence proceedings, victims are sometimes constructed as having 
acted provocatively, by inappropriate behaviour, adultery or criticism of their 
partners, and this theme is then taken up and carried on in the reasons for 
sentence.174 Victim-blaming is sometimes overt, but is also illustrated more 
subtly by the portrayal of violence in the domestic context as ‘marital discord’, 
‘marital disharmony’ or ‘tension between parties’.175 This also occurs through 
the use of phrasing that portrays the offender as a victim of circumstance rather 
than a perpetrator responsible for his actions.176 This has the effect of 
neutralising violence, and sharing the blame for the violence between the 
perpetrator and the victim. It also serves to explain the criminal act as the 
product of individual deficiencies (of the victim),177 rendering invisible the 
pattern of gendered violence underlying many domestic homicides. 
The most obvious examples of victim-blaming conduct occur in the context of 
provocation cases, where claims are made that victims taunted or insulted the 
accused, resulting in a loss of self-control.178 The underlying message behind 
the provocation defence is that the victim ‘got what he or she deserved’.179 Not 
surprisingly, the words alleged to have been spoken by the victim are often 
words that threaten the man’s control or self-esteem, such as taunts relating to 
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his sexual prowess,180 or capabilities as a breadwinner,181 challenges to the 
paternity of his children,182 defiance or failure to behave as the offender thinks 
appropriate,183 or affirmations that the victim does not intend to return to the 
relationship.184 These accusations are usually made in circumstances where the 
only source of evidence as to what was said is the accused and it is not 
possible to verify that the provocation actually occurred. 
The characterisation of the victim’s behaviour in Lynch185 is a good example. In 
the sentencing judgment, the victim is subtly constructed as having effectively 
provoked her ex-husband to attack her by her engagement in a new 
relationship:186 
Elizabeth Lynch regarded herself free to have relationships with other men if 
she wished to do so in the period of time prior to August 2001. From her 
perspective, she and her husband were “in a separation ready for divorce.” 
[emphasis added] 
In assessing that the degree of provocation offered was ‘high’, the judge also 
took into account ‘Elizabeth Lynch’s resolve to have a relationship with other 
men if she so chose notwithstanding that she was still living under the same 
roof as the prisoner’.187  
And further:188 
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It is quite apparent that the behaviour of the deceased and Elizabeth Lynch in 
the bar, no doubt coupled with that which had happened earlier at the 
barbecue, brought the prisoner to a state of anger and resentment [emphasis 
added]. 
Gardner is another example of the way in which legal discourse parallels the 
defendant’s strategy to blame the victim for her own death.189 Brian Gardner 
was convicted of the manslaughter of his ex-partner Sylvana Marino and the 
murder of her friend John Shears. Following their separation initiated by Marino, 
Gardner had told a number of people of his plans to kill her, and he had 
previously produced a knife and threatened to kill her; Marino had the locks 
changed on her house and asked Shears to move in with her to provide 
protection. Gardner called the house and made threats against Shears and 
continued to tell people of his plans to kill Marino. Gardner entered Marino’s 
house and killed both Shears and Marino (Marino’s body was never found).  
Despite the numerous threats made by Gardner and the lengths to which 
Marino had gone to protect herself, the judge found that there was ample 
evidence to show that the killings were carried out in a ‘jealous rage’. The 
finding was based on Gardner’s unsworn evidence that he had gone to the 
house at 4am to collect some tools; Marino had (notwithstanding her obvious 
fears of the defendant and his previous threats) ‘taunted’ him, talking about how 
she had had intercourse with Shears and denigrating his sexual prowess. It was 
therefore open to the jury to find that Gardner had killed Marino in a jealous 
rage, and there was also sufficient proximity between Marino’s provocative 
words and the fact of Shears sleeping in a nearby bedroom for provocation by 
Marino to be applicable in relation to the killing of Shears. 
The discursive technique of ‘victim-blaming’ not only reflects certain attitudes 
about women as victims; it also perpetuates them. It has been noted that where 
news stories about violence against women are written in the passive voice, 
male readers attribute less victim harm and less offender responsibility, and 
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both male and female readers are more accepting of abuse.190 When articles 
imply that women are partly responsible for violence readers express more 
lenient attitudes towards punishment of perpetrators.191 Thus legal discourse 
reinforces the perception that perpetrators of domestic homicide are somehow 
less culpable than perpetrators of crimes such as terrorism where victims are 
randomly-targeted and ‘blameless’.192 
 
Conclusion 
 
As described above, the motivations of domestic violence and terrorism 
perpetrators are constructed very differently in legal discourse, with the latter 
portrayed as ideologically motivated and the former as acting on the basis of 
emotion or passion. However, a reconstruction of the facts of domestic violence 
cases indicates that many domestic violence cases exhibit similar indicia of 
ideological motivation to the terrorism cases. 
In this chapter, I have outlined possible alternative reconstructions of 
perpetrator behaviour as ideologically-motivated – evidence that violence is 
used purposively and with a sense of entitlement, that it is planned and 
premeditated, and that victims are blamed for provoking their own demise in the 
same way that terrorists target ‘infidels’ or unbelievers for attack. From a 
feminist perspective, these attitudes represent the ‘illusory view of the world’193 
that is characteristic of ideological commitment. However, legal discourse 
operates to ignore and obscure these indicia of ideology, thus reinforcing the 
message that domestic violence is anomalous, and not part of a pattern of male 
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violence against women. Thus, as Millett notes, masculinist ideology remains 
obscured, despite its pervasiveness.194 
Domestic violence also shares with terrorism that it constitutes violence 
committed by one group of persons identified by reference to political or 
ideological belief with another group of persons victimised on the basis of their 
membership of a different group. In this sense, I argue that domestic violence, 
like terrorism, is a form of discriminatory violence.  In particular, the victims of 
terrorism are defined collectively in legal discourse; terrorist violence is 
constructed as directed against ‘the public’ in contradistinction to domestic 
violence, which is constructed as a private crime notwithstanding that its victims 
belong to one group defined by a particular characteristic, namely gender. 
In the next section, I examine the ways in which legal discourse also 
differentially constructs violence in terms of the public/private domain before I 
go on to consider the practical consequences of this differential treatment in 
more detail.  
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CHAPTER 2.3 LAW’S CONSTRUCTION OF ‘PUBLIC’ CRIME  
 
If the leading newspapers were to announce tomorrow a new disease that, over 
the past year, had afflicted from 3 to 4 million citizens, few would fail to 
appreciate the seriousness of the illness. Yet, when it comes to the 3 to 4 
million women who are victimized by violence each year, the alarms ring softly.1 
The second aspect of the legal definition of terrorism that sets it apart from 
other crimes, following on from the motivation of the perpetrator discussed in 
the previous chapter, is its ‘public’ element. For an act of violence to constitute 
an act of terrorism, the perpetrator must act with the intention of coercing or 
influencing by intimidation a government, or intimidating the public or a section 
of the public.2  
Acts that the law, as well as popular discourse, constructs as ‘directed against a 
section of the public’ are acts that target victims in the public arena as they go 
about their lives – on planes, on trains, and in public buildings.3 These are acts 
that infringe on the rights of ‘... the people as a whole, the community, the 
common good ...’4 and therefore contribute to a particular sense of social 
vulnerability.5 It is ‘indiscriminate’ violence and therefore in law warrants a more 
severe approach than more specifically targeted violence.6 
Terrorism is by nature a political crime.7 To the extent that terrorism 
incorporates violence inflicted with the intention of advancing a political cause, 
and violence directed towards the seat of government, it possesses a political 
dimension. Acts of violence intended to coerce a government, for example 
kidnapping a head of state, or attacking a government institution, are political by 
virtue of their targets. However, acts intended to intimidate citizens in the public 
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domain also have a political aspect to them, due to the historical association of 
politics with the public sphere.8  
However, the concept of public violence is not a straightforward one by any 
means. The abundance of feminist critique in relation to the so-called ‘public’ 
and ‘private’ spheres has rendered the distinction problematic.9 Far from 
constituting labels that can be attached to pre-existing social phenomena, 
‘public’ and ‘private’ are terms that represent highly malleable constructs,10 and 
do so in a way that reflects masculinist interests.11 In this chapter I bring some 
of this critique to bear on the way in which the public is constructed in relation to 
crimes of terrorism, and by contrast, how crimes of domestic violence (focusing 
on intimate homicide as the most severe form) are constructed as non-public. 
In doing so, one of my aims is to interrogate the conundrum referred to by Joe 
Biden above – the seeming failure on the part of the state to recognise domestic 
violence for the epidemic that it is, constructing it instead as a multiplicity of 
isolated instances. When an act legally recognised as terrorism occurs – for 
example, a bomb is detonated on board a bus – that is easily recognised as a 
public crime because of its location and because the victims are randomly 
targeted, albeit sometimes chosen as representatives of a targeted racial or 
social group.12 However, when a significant number of seemingly unconnected 
acts occur every day – perpetrated by one group (men) against another group 
(women) – it is easier for the state to construct these as a string of isolated 
instances13 – as lots of ‘little murders’14 – ignoring or obscuring the similarities 
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between them that point to the existence of the systemic use of violence in a 
way that is unmistakably gendered.15 
In this chapter, I draw upon feminist critiques of the public and private already 
outlined in Chapter 1.2 in examining the legal constructions of terrorism and 
domestic violence. I then go on to consider how the legal element of intention to 
influence by intimidation the government or a section of the public is 
constructed in legal discourse, and how this reflects the differential 
constructions in social discourse. I examine the relationship between the 
identity of victims and perpetrators of crime and the definition of what is ‘public’ 
crime. Finally, I draw upon critiques of domestic violence and its systemic 
nature to argue that domestic violence can indeed be reconstructed as a crime 
against ‘a section of the public’, and the fact that it is not so constructed in legal 
discourse is reflective of the law’s masculinist influences. 
 
Critiques of the Public and Private and the Law’s Construction of 
Public and Private Violence 
 
It is a feature of the ideological division between the public and the private that 
the former is privileged over the latter.16 The public is also inextricably linked in 
feminist critique with the masculine.17 Drawing upon feminist critiques of the 
public/private, I argue below that the law uses the ‘potent and flexible rhetorical 
instrument’18 of ‘terrorist’ in relation to those who constitute a threat to 
masculinist interests. 
That terrorism is treated in a special way is aptly demonstrated by the 
enactment of new offences to deal with it.19 Even conduct involving very early 
stage planning or preparation for a terrorist attack is subject to significant 
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penalties, with the maximum available sentences for providing training to, or 
supporting, a terrorist organisation equivalent to or more than the maximum 
penalties for manslaughter in four Australian jurisdictions.20 This is consistent 
with one of the central purposes of the anti-terrorism legislation – to criminalise 
acts relating to terrorism at the preparatory stages as a preventative measure.21  
The special place of terrorism in the criminal catalogue is also emphasised by 
judicial pronouncement. In Roche,22 McKechnie J set out a number of principles 
that apply in sentencing terrorism offenders, which have subsequently been 
adopted by other courts. Justice McKechnie stated that offences that threaten 
the democratic government and security of the State, threaten the daily life and 
livelihood of millions of people, or threaten diplomats and others to whom 
Australia owes protection, have a seriousness all their own.23  By implication, 
other ‘ordinary’ offences do not threaten the security of the state, or the daily 
lives and livelihoods of millions of people. Consistently with the critiques 
referred to above, this public/political aspect of terrorism is directly linked to its 
occupying a special place in the criminal catalogue.24 
As noted above, acts of violence constructed as aimed at the government or the 
public are acts that violate masculinist interests. The targeting of public places 
and the people who occupy them constitutes an attack within a masculinist 
context, even though the victims of terrorism are both men and women.25 The 
public realm of work and work-related life remains a masculine domain, despite 
the significant number of women who occupy it. While the polity and the market 
                                                          
20
 These offences carry a maximum penalty of 25 years’ imprisonment. Maximum penalties for 
manslaughter are 20 years in the ACT, Victoria and WA, 25 years in NSW, and life imprisonment in the 
Northern Territory, Queensland and South Australia: Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 15; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) 
s 24; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 161; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 310; Criminal Law Consolidation 
Act 1935 (SA) s 13; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 5; Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 280. 
21
 Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee (2002), arguments outlined at [3.12]-[3.18]. 
22
 R v Roche [2005] WASCA 4 (Unreported, Murray ACJ, Templeman and McKechnie JJ, 14 January 
2005). 
23
 R v Roche [2005] WASCA 4 (Unreported, Murray ACJ, Templeman and McKechnie JJ, 14 January 
2005), [114]-[119]. 
24
 In a speech delivered at Manly Pacific Hotel on 21 January 2006, former Commonwealth Attorney-
General Phillip Ruddock stated: ‘Terrorism is arguably the greatest threat this nation has faced in many 
decades, and perhaps the most insidious and complex threat we have ever faced’: Ruddock (2006), para 
93. 
25
 It has been noted that the symbolic players of September 11 for example were almost exclusively male 
– terrorists, commentators and heroes: Peters (2002); see also Charlesworth (1993), p 98. 
127 
 
both constitute different aspects of the public realm, both remain male-
dominated.26  
An examination of the terrorism sentences to date illustrates how the concept of 
the ‘public’ is constructed to refer to groups of people operating in the public 
sphere arena of work or life outside the home. It is not only the intimidation or 
coercing of those members of the public directly subject to attack, but the 
intimidation caused to members of the community more broadly that is seen as 
reflecting the gravamen of the offence:27 
This was intended, in effect, to be a general attack on the community as a 
whole. It carried the obvious consequence that, if carried out, it would instil 
terror into members of the public so that they could, never again, feel free from 
the threat of bombing attacks within Australia.  
Courts have accepted the likelihood of harm being caused to members of the 
public even in circumstances where there has been no agreement as to the 
nature or target of an attack.28 The potential for harm to members of the public 
is directly linked to the perceived need for severe penalties as a deterrent in 
sentencing for terrorism offences.29 A related aspect is the perceived need for 
greater sentences to allow for protection of the community against terrorism 
offences.30 
By contrast, the domestic homicide cases studied in my research contained little 
reference to domestic violence as a social problem. Where there was a 
reference to the broader problem of domestic violence, it was usually to 
demarcate those cases as a category of killings separate from other homicides 
for the purposes of sentencing.31 There was little if any reference to the 
                                                          
26
 Thornton (1995a), pp 6-7. 
27
 R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 364, [52]. 
28
 R v Elomar & Ors (2010) 264 ALR 759, [59]-[60]. 
29
 R v Khazal [2009] NSWSC 1015 (Unreported, Latham J, 25 September 2009), [47]. 
30
 Lodhi v R (2007) 179 A Crim R 470, [89]-[109], [214]. These aspects are considered in more detail in 
Chapter 3.3. 
31
 R v Whiting [1994] QCA 425 (Unreported, Davies and McPherson JJA, Derrington J, 24 October 1994); 
R v Mehmet [2004] NSWCCA 24 (Unreported, Levine, O’Keefe and Whealy JJ, 24 February 2004); R v 
Gojanovic (No 2) [2007] VSCA 153 (Unreported, Ashley and Kellam JJA and Kaye AJA, 14 August 2007), 
[140] (noting the need for general deterrence in killings in the domestic setting). 
128 
 
gendered nature of the violence, or to the gender of perpetrators.32 Even after 
years of feminist campaigning, only New South Wales and Victoria give 
legislative recognition to domestic violence as a gendered phenomenon.33 
Recent proposed amendments to the Family Law Act34 failed to give any 
recognition to the gendered nature of family violence, using the terminology of 
violence ‘against families and children’.35 
By contrast with terrorism, domestic violence has been commonly regarded by 
the law as a phenomenon that takes place within the ‘private’ space.36 While the 
male-gendered subject takes his place within the public sphere as a ‘universal’, 
issues such as childcare and domestic violence, associated with women, have 
traditionally been relegated to the specifically-gendered private sphere.37 The 
effect of this privatisation was, until domestic violence was made a public issue 
by women’s groups, to deprive women of any effective remedy for violence 
inflicted upon them in the intimate arena.38 
Feminist activism of the 1960s and 1970s achieved public recognition of a 
problem that had for many years been hidden from public view.39 But despite 
the best attempts of feminists to drive home the message that ‘the personal is 
the political’, women who die inside their own homes do not, as MacKinnon has 
noted, have the ‘dignity of politics’.40 Domestic violence still remains in many 
senses a phenomenon associated with the private sphere.41 It is private in the 
sense that it often occurs behind closed doors and within the sanctuary of the 
home, where historically the state has feared to tread.42 It is also private in the 
sense that it occurs between two people who are in an intimate relationship, 
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often considered to be a personal matter for the individuals involved.43 Within 
intimate relationships, the law continues to deny women full citizenship 
entitlements, for example through failure to recognise women’s economic rights 
to a full-time wage or to payment for work done in the home.44 This further 
relegates the issue of relationship violence to the private sphere. 
However, the division between the public and the private is not as simple as 
questions of physical space or the relationship between parties. Nor can it any 
longer be said, as early liberal philosophers would have it,45 that the public is 
and should be constituted by the area regulated by the state and the private 
conversely by the absence of state interference.46 The state interferes in a 
range of areas that relate to the ‘private’ lives of individuals, including social 
security, taxation, marriage and custody arrangements following separation.47 
Thus it is not possible to map any pre-existing delineation between the public 
and private spheres. Rather, the meanings of the terms ‘public’ and ‘private’ are 
always changing, contested and subject to context.48 As Thornton notes, the 
liberal conception of private is ‘an elastic concept which can be stretched in 
order to oust intervention when it is politically desirable to do so’.49 
Feminist legal theorists have pointed to the ability to delineate what is public 
and what is private as a form of power.50 Therefore, given the malleability of the 
concepts of public and private, the state, and by extension the law, will 
construct these concepts in ways that serve dominant interests. As Smart 
notes, the law is riddled with inconsistencies, which serves to complicate the 
project of exposing its discriminatory impact on women, because it is always 
possible for others to point to ways in which the law acts for women’s benefit.51 
Thus, the law in all Australian states and territories does recognise domestic 
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violence in one form or another as constituting a range of criminal offences, 
which obviously benefits women as a class as well as individual women, 
however it does so in ways that also reflect particular understandings about 
women and gendered crime that are not necessarily to women’s advantage.52 
One of the ways in which the law operates to women’s detriment is through its 
failure to recognise the public aspect of systemic criminal conduct committed by 
men against women (e.g. domestic violence). Despite evidence of its 
systematically gendered nature, the law continues to construct domestic 
violence as a feature of individual relationships, ignoring recurring patterns in its 
commission that would suggest a reason to treat victims and perpetrators as 
members of groups defined by gender. The Australian legal system recognises 
other group identities for the purposes of hate crime and hate speech 
legislation, but has consistently failed to recognise male and female group 
identity as the basis for characterising acts of violence, in the context of hate 
crimes or otherwise. In the next section, I explore in more detail the law’s 
construction of public and private violence, and the role of group identities in 
that characterisation. 
 
The Role of Gender in the Construction of Public and Private 
Violence 
 
Because the concepts of public and private are malleable, they are susceptible 
to constant construction and reconstruction within legal and social discourse. It 
is important to remember in this regard that discourse is more than simply 
words; it is actions, symbols, silences, context, ways of speaking, and rules 
about who can speak and when.53  These aspects of discourse operate to 
define violence perpetrated against women by their intimate partners as ‘private’ 
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violence. Legal discourse constructs the concept of the ‘public’ in such a way as 
to exclude women as a group from its parameters.54 
The definition of terrorism in the Criminal Code includes acts of violence 
directed against the government and the public generally, as well as acts 
directed against a ‘section of the public’.55 There seems little doubt that a 
terrorist attack directed specifically at certain groups within Australian society 
would constitute an act of violence intended to intimidate a section of the 
public.56 The offence of sedition contained in s 80.2 of the Commonwealth 
Criminal Code recognises that actions urging a group distinguished by race, 
religion, nationality or political opinion to use force or violence against another 
group so distinguished may threaten the peace, order and good government of 
the Commonwealth.57 The fact that gender is not included as a basis for group 
identification in s 80.2 is an indication of the law’s inability to recognise women 
as a group targeted for violence.58 Moreover, s 80.2 is a relatively recent 
enactment, replacing the previous sections 24A to 24E of the Crimes Act, which 
were expressed in more general terms.59 The wording of the sedition offence 
indicates that violence or incitement of violence towards a group identified by 
race, religion, or even political opinion, may constitute a crime that threatens the 
state, but this is not so in relation to violence directed towards a group identified 
by gender. 
The law has traditionally not recognised women as a ‘class’ for the purposes of 
enabling them to take legal action in relation to systemic forms of harm 
committed against them as a group.60 This absence of recognition is reflected in 
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hate crime and hate speech legislation, which exists in some form in all 
Australian states and territories.61 I discuss this in more detail in Chapter 3.1. 
Federally, the Sex Discrimination Act62 does provide some recognition of the 
reality of gender-based discrimination. However, unlike the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),63 the 
legislation is framed in a gender-neutral way,64 which fails to recognise the 
background of female disadvantage behind its inception. Its enactment was also 
attended by strong opposition from a range of conservative groups,65 reflecting 
a continuing antipathy toward the recognition of men’s discrimination against 
women. 
Domestic violence law reflects this same failure to recognise women as a group 
subject to systemic discrimination and violence.66 Earlier strategies of the 1970s 
and 1980s women’s movement focused on consciousness-raising to expose 
violence as the result of a system of oppression. However, Celina Romany 
points out that an increasing awareness of the gendered nature of domestic 
violence in the 1990s took place amidst an increasing general trend towards 
privatisation.67 This heralded a return towards conceptualisation of violence as a 
result of individual choices and problems rather than systemic oppression. 
The privatisation of domestic violence is reflected in various aspects of its 
treatment within the legal system. One is the ‘reprivatisation’ of abuse through 
the tendency of authorities to refer female survivors of abuse and violence for 
treatment that has the effect of making the abuse a facet of the women’s own 
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pathology.68 This trend towards privatisation through treatment is also reflected 
in the Australian family law mechanisms that provide for, and in some cases 
mandate, counselling or mediation between parties even where domestic 
violence has occurred.69 This reinforces the conceptualisation of violence as a 
feature of a dysfunctional relationship, rather than part of a broader pattern of 
violence, and worse still, in some respects treats the victim as complicit in her 
own victimisation and as bearing some responsibility for addressing the 
violence. 
Within the domestic homicide context, the privatisation of violence is reflected in 
findings that the homicidal act arises out of the tensions or frictions present in 
the particular relationship.70 The relationship between findings of this nature and 
sentence is discussed in Chapter 3.3. 
The state and the media also play important roles in constructing the public and 
the private. The federal government’s 2003 ‘Let’s look out for Australia’ anti-
terrorism campaign drew upon a discourse of fear and security.71 The state 
encourages reporting of suspicious activity that may be related to planning for a 
terrorist attack, and has a ‘hotline’ set up specifically for this purpose.72 In the 
United Kingdom, legislation expressly criminalises failing to disclose information 
that a person believes might be of material assistance in preventing an act of 
terrorism, or securing the apprehension or conviction of a person for a terrorist 
offence.73 There is no corresponding indication in any of the federal, state or 
territory government documentation dealing with domestic violence to 
encourage reporting of it by members of the public.74 The implication by 
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omission is that domestic violence, unlike terrorism, is not a matter for public 
concern and vigilance.  
Indeed, in 2003, funding set aside for the Partnerships Against Domestic 
Violence program was transferred to the ‘National Security Public Information 
Campaign’. This reflected the government’s conceptualisation of domestic 
violence as reflective of family dysfunction, and overlooking links between 
domestic violence and gendered power relationships more broadly.75  
Government campaigns have also failed to address the fact that violence 
against women is perpetrated predominantly by men.76 There has been some 
recent indication, via the release of the Australian Law Reform Commission 
report on family violence, that this may change, with a recommendation that 
domestic violence legislation set out the systematic features of such violence, 
including that it is perpetrated predominantly by men.77 
Equally, the media often describes crimes of domestic violence in ways that 
minimise or downplay the sexed nature of the violence.78 In news stories about 
domestic violence, the gendered nature of the violence is rarely mentioned.79 
Similarly, popular media ignores the social context of crimes of domestic 
violence focusing instead on the stories of particular individuals.80 Power and 
Mackenzie found in their analysis of South Australian media reporting of 
domestic violence related deaths between 2005 and 2010 that reporting 
generally did not include gender analysis or discussion of domestic violence as 
part of a broader social problem.81 In the American context, research shows that 
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mass murders in the public setting generate considerably more media coverage 
than mass murders in the domestic context.82 
By failing to draw attention to the shared ideology of domestic homicide 
perpetrators, as identified in Chapter 2.2, the court constructs the perpetrators 
of these crimes very differently to the way it constructs terrorism offenders. 
Terrorism offenders are constructed as possessing a shared set of values – a 
shared ideological commitment – which not only satisfies the ‘ideological’ 
aspect of the definition of terrorism, but also establishes perpetrators as a class 
apart from the general public, against whom the individuals’ actions are then 
perceived as directed. By contrast, the similar beliefs and attitudes of domestic 
homicide perpetrators are ignored, establishing domestic homicides as 
instances of individual criminal conduct, not united by any broader pattern or 
context, and obscuring the highly-gendered pattern of the crime (male 
perpetrator/female victim). This further contributes to the privatisation of 
domestic violence and the absence of any classification of the female victims of 
domestic violence as a ‘section of the public’. 
 
The Relationship Between the Identity of the Victim and the 
Construction of the ‘Public’ 
 
The role of the victim is significant when it comes to comparing treatment of 
these phenomena of violence. Garland suggests that the symbolic victim has 
become a central figure in crime control: this is not necessarily an individual 
victim, but an image that is utilised by the media and by crime control agencies 
as the face that signifies the harm caused by crime.83 In the media realm, the 
use of such images tends to unite public opinion in support of victims, with 
whom readers identify, and whose plight comes to symbolise the suffering of 
the community. 
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The symbolic victim is easily recognisable in the imagery surrounding high-
profile terrorist attacks such as 9/11 in the United States and the ‘Bali bombings’ 
in 2002 and 2005. Many of the photographs from these terrorist attacks conjure 
the spirit of the anonymous victim, lost and bewildered, or hurt and suffering, 
following the infliction of violence against a group of people going about their 
everyday lives.84 By creating a sense of community suffering, symbolic images 
reinforce the notion that the harm caused by terrorism is harm to all. It 
reinforces the fear of indiscriminate violence that is central to terrorism – the 
idea that anyone could be a victim at any time.85 
By contrast, there is a striking absence of a symbolic victim of domestic 
violence in the Australian context. The kinds of shocking images that the public 
is used to seeing in relation to terrorist attacks – people covered in blood or 
soot, lifeless forms in the arms of others, bewildered and crying – are missing 
from media coverage of domestic violence.86 Perhaps the best-known images of 
the domestic violence ‘victim’ in popular Australian culture are the women who 
appear in the advertisements for the ‘Australia Says No’ campaign:87 these are 
ordinary-looking, well-dressed women talking about their experiences of 
domestic violence – they do not bear any physical signs of injury or damage.88  
To draw attention to the absence of a symbolic victim is not to suggest that 
domestic violence victims should all be portrayed as bruised and bloodied. 
However it does mean that in public discussions about domestic violence, there 
is an absence of a figure with the capacity to unite public sympathies against 
domestic violence in the same way that the symbolic victim unites public 
opposition to terrorism. The absence of media coverage of the horrors 
associated with domestic violence also means that there is no trigger for the 
kind of emotive response to images of pain and suffering generated by the 
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images reflected in coverage of 9/11 and other terrorist attacks. This serves to 
reinforce the conceptualisation of domestic violence as a crime that happens to 
‘other people’, reinforced by victim-blaming patterns of representation in the 
media that explain crime as a product of individual (victim) deficiencies.89  
Mason argues that ‘statements’ and ‘interpretive repertoires’ in relation to 
particular events also construct particular types of violence in the public 
imagination.90 When former US President George W Bush said in the wake of 
9/11, ‘You are either with us or against us’,91 this was part of a pattern of 
discourse which constructed terrorism as a crime against all people (or at least 
against all citizens of Western democratic nations), despite the fact that most 
members of that group were not personally affected by the terrorist attack.  
Similarly, the use of the term ‘war’ in relation to terrorism is a response to a 
perceived public mood for a display of military might, rather than connoting a 
legal state of warfare.92 The language of ‘war’ is never used in relation to 
domestic violence because it is not perceived as a crime that affects the 
populace, only select individuals in dysfunctional relationships. As MacKinnon 
notes, the declaration that the US was ‘at war’ following 9/11 was made 
notwithstanding that the attack was in reality one by private citizens against 
private citizens.93 
As Mason notes, violence itself is a discourse that inscribes particular bodies 
with the markings of victimhood.94 This is instructive in terms of the seriousness 
ascribed to terrorism as a crime. There is nothing unusual about the inscription 
of victimhood on women’s bodies; that accords with the association that has 
always been made between women and physical weakness or vulnerability. 
However, terrorism serves to inscribe victimhood upon masculine, public bodies 
not in a manly way (such as one who comes off second-best in a fight or on the 
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football field) but in a way that places that masculine body at the mercy of an 
ideological, foreign attacker.95 That this challenges masculinist ideology directly 
also helps to explain the serious regard in which terrorism is held by the state. 
More graphic portrayals of the violence meted out to women in the domestic 
context are usually reserved for the portrayal of violence against women as 
associated with particular minority racial or ethnic culture.96 An example 
appears in the following extract by Martin Amis from his essay The Age of 
Horrorism:97  
Two years ago I came across a striking photograph in a news magazine: it 
looked like a crudely cross-sectioned watermelon, but you could make out one 
or two humanoid features half-submerged in the crimson pulp. It was in fact the 
bravely circularised photograph of the face of a Saudi newscaster who had 
been beaten by her husband. In an attempted murder, it seems: at the time of 
his arrest he had her in the trunk of his car, and was evidently taking her into 
the desert for interment. What had she done to bring this on herself? In the 
marital home, that night, the telephone rang and the newscaster, a prosperous 
celebrity in her own right, answered it. She had answered the telephone. Male 
Westerners will be struck, here, by a dramatic cultural contrast. I know that I, for 
one, would be far more likely to beat my wife to death if she hadn't answered 
the telephone. But customs and mores vary from country to country, and you 
cannot reasonably claim that one ethos is 'better' than any other. 
Amis’s ‘ironic’ comment at the end of this quotation usefully illustrates a feature 
of Western journalism that Howe has described: that when the gendered nature 
of domestic violence is addressed, it is portrayed as something associated with 
minority culture, ignoring the fact that violence against women is associated 
with majority/mainstream culture also.98 Except where the inferior nature or 
cruelty of ‘other’ cultures is the subject of emphasis, the true horror perpetrated 
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in serious domestic violence cases is not portrayed in legal judgment, or in the 
media. This is illustrated by the increasing preoccupation in Australian media 
with the phenomenon of ‘honour killings’ and the association of violence and 
other oppression against women with Islam,99 further obscuring the endemic 
nature of violence against women in mainstream Australian culture.100  
The construction of the victim in judicial decisions also reflects the 
individualisation of the phenomenon of domestic violence. As discussed in 
Chapter 2.2, courts repeatedly accept perpetrators’ assertions that victims 
provoked the violence against them by adultery, leaving the relationship, or 
failing to conform to proper expectations in terms of being a good partner and 
mother. This victim-blaming further isolates victims of domestic violence and 
portrays the violence as in some way associated with their deficiencies, 
removing any capacity for individual victims to symbolise a broader class of 
victims deserving of public sympathy.101 As Schneider notes, the privatisation of 
domestic violence enables people to deny aspects of power and control present 
in their own relationships.102 
 
The Relationship Between the Identity of the Perpetrator and the 
Construction of the ‘Public’ 
 
It is not only the construction of the victim but also of the perpetrator that is 
integral to the legal and social construction of the ‘public’. For a crime to be 
aimed at coercing the government, or influencing or intimidating a section of the 
public, the perpetrator by implication stands outside of that government or that 
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targeted section of the public.103 This is easy to do when the identity of the 
terrorism perpetrator fits the archetype of the ‘Other’ either in a racial/religious 
sense, or where the perpetrator can in some other way be characterised as 
abnormal.104  
The sentencing judgment in relation to Shane Kent, the only member of the 
Benbrika terrorist organisation without a Middle Eastern background, provides a 
useful illustration of the way in which legal discourse constructs the terrorist as 
outside the ‘norm’.105 As is apparent from the judgment, Kent’s counsel 
attempts to portray Kent’s association with the group leader Benbrika as 
attributable to depression that he suffered at the time. There is then an attempt 
to normalise Kent by indicating his dissociation from the fundamentalist beliefs 
of his co-accused, suggesting that he began to frequent places that served 
alcohol and played Western music, and that he no longer practised Islam.106 
However, the sentencing judgment rejects evidence of Kent’s remorse and 
emphasises his otherness, noting his support for jihad, his possession of jihadi 
material, and the fact that he had undertaken military training in Afghanistan.107 
In this way, despite his majority cultural identity, Kent is constructed as outside 
the model of the ordinary Australian, and therefore in opposition to the ‘public’ at 
whom planned terrorist activity was targeted. 
In relation to domestic violence, although individual perpetrators may fall within 
a particular category of ‘Otherness’, the characteristic common to most 
perpetrators is the fact that they are male.108 To recognise domestic violence as 
an act perpetrated against a ‘section of the public’ is therefore to place men as 
a group outside of the definition of the public, which is of course unthinkable 
within a masculinist worldview. As the public sphere is implicitly masculine, the 
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only men who can stand outside the public domain are those who in some way 
deviate from the ‘norm’.109 
As noted above, on the rare occasions when the perpetrator of domestic 
violence is demonised in the media, it is usually by virtue of an association with 
a minority culture portrayed as unusually oppressive of women.110 For example, 
‘honour killings’ have become increasingly associated with Islam and with a 
perception of ‘backwardness’. This is despite the fact that the concept of honour 
still has currency in many Western countries, and is frequently associated with 
so-called provocation homicides in the intimate setting.111 
This popular association of violence against women and minority culture is also 
reflected in legal discourse. Maher et al have discussed the ways in which 
courts construct men from minority backgrounds who act violently as ‘uncivilised 
outsiders’ by focusing on their cultural differences. Meanwhile, discussions of 
culture are absent from cases in which the perpetrators are from the white 
majority background, implying that Australian men are never violent or 
controlling towards women.112 
These differential constructions of domestic violence perpetrators are relevant 
to the construction of crime targeted against the public. Where the perpetrator is 
from a minority ethnic, racial or religious group (as almost all terrorism 
perpetrators in Australia have been to date) it will be easy to construct him as a 
member of a small outsider group in opposition to Australian society more 
broadly, hence any act of violence he commits will be ‘directed against the 
public’.113  
By contrast, the domestic violence perpetrators who are expressed as having 
no cultural background by virtue of their affiliation with the mainstream are 
themselves part of the ‘public’. Their implicit membership of the public makes it 
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almost impossible to construct their acts of violence as directed against the 
public, because they do not stand outside of the public construct.114  
The recognition of the gendered nature of domestic violence also threatens to 
undermine the ‘familial ideology’ that underpins Australian family law. Pursuant 
to this ideology, the unit of father, mother and child/ren is constructed as the 
‘natural and fundamental group unit of society’.115 In family law, this ideology is 
constructed through both legislation and judicial decision-making.116 To 
recognise the widespread nature of family violence would be to threaten the 
concept of the traditional family unit as the ‘ideal’ microcosm of social life. Thus, 
even in situations where there is strong evidence of family violence, a judicial 
tendency to order contact with the abusive father has been observed in family 
court proceedings.117 
The popular and legal portrayals of domestic violence perpetrators, in 
combination with the absence of a symbolic victim in domestic violence cases, 
means that there are significant discursive impediments to reconceptualising 
domestic violence as perpetrated against a ‘section of the public’. However, it is 
possible to envisage potential alternative reconstructions of domestic violence 
utilising the strategy that Howe refers to as ‘resistant discourse’.118 
Reconstructing Domestic violence as Public Violence 
 
As outlined in the previous section, the law, like the media, constructs domestic 
violence as a series of isolated and unrelated instances – violence in these 
settings is a feature of dysfunctional individuals or relationships, in which victims 
are often constructed as being partly responsible for their own victimisation. 
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However, a focus on the gendered nature of domestic violence119 – a crime 
perpetrated overwhelmingly by men against women,120 and perpetrated by men 
with the aim of achieving control over women – provides the groundwork for 
analysis of domestic violence that reconstructs its female victims as a ‘section 
of the public’. 
The conceptualisation of domestic violence as a systemic form of harm that I 
argue for here is consistent with the framework established by Catharine 
MacKinnon, drawing on her earlier seminal work in Towards a Feminist Theory 
of the State.121 MacKinnon argues that sexual violence (by which she means 
men’s violence against women) is political violence on the basis that sex is one 
way in which power is socially organised; sexual violence is a practice of sexual 
politics with misogyny as its ideology.122 Reconceptualised in this way, domestic 
violence is indeed a political crime; it is committed by men as a politically-
conceived group against women as a similarly-conceptualised group. Within this 
framework, women constitute a group defined by their victimisation on account 
of their gender – in other words, a section of the public. 
Similarly, Susan Brownmiller, in her all-encompassing critique of the history of 
sexual assault, argues that rape is the means by which ‘all men keep all women 
in a state of fear’.123 Brownmiller’s critique reflects a similar framework to 
MacKinnon’s for understanding men’s violence against women as a systemic 
problem rather than a series of isolated occurrences.124 These critiques have 
been the subject of criticism for their obviously essentialist nature,125 premised 
as they are upon the problematic assumption that all members of gendered 
‘groups’ think and act alike. However, they effectively illustrate how gender-
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based crimes such as domestic violence and sexual assault are a means of 
reinforcing existing social inequalities.126 
There is precedent under international instruments for this broader 
understanding of gendered violence. Violence against women is recognised 
under the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women127 as a form of sex discrimination; this includes both violence directed 
against women qua women, and also violence that affects women 
disproportionately.128 Within this framework, domestic violence is understood as 
a form of violence inflicted by men against women, rather than a series of 
commonly-occurring individual episodes of violence. However, recognition of 
the systemic nature of domestic violence does not translate to the Australian 
domestic context due to two inadequacies of anti-discrimination legislation: first, 
that it allows only for individual complaints and not class actions, and secondly, 
that it excludes discrimination that occurs in the private sphere.129 
Reconceptualising domestic violence within the frameworks outlined above 
provides a basis for reconstructing such violence as directed against women as 
a politically-defined group. When one man targets one woman for violence in a 
social context in which he wishes to exert his control, and is enabled by social 
and legal structures to exert that control, and that happens thousands of times 
daily across the world, the effect is the same as though a number of men 
sharing a common belief system attacked a number of women 
simultaneously.130 The result of domestic violence is not simply that intimidation 
or fear is produced in an individual woman; women as a group are kept in a 
state of perpetual fear by gendered violence,131 and in that sense domestic 
                                                          
126
 Coukos (1999-2000), p 36. 
127
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violence is directed against women as a section of the public. When viewed this 
way, domestic violence is fundamentally a problem of gender inequality.132 
The obvious counter-argument to the suggestion that women constitute a 
section of the public is that men who attack their intimate partners do not do so 
because they are women.133 They do so because they are angry or frustrated 
with their partners as individuals. This, an opponent to my argument might 
suggest, is a very different thing to the Bali bombers blowing up scores of 
foreigners in an Indonesian nightclub because they are foreigners and 
represent a perceived evil Western influence.134 An intention to intimidate an 
individual woman does not constitute an intention to intimidate women in 
general. 
If one accepts this argument, then only in situations where groups of women 
qua women are targeted for violence would a terrorist act be committed.135 
However, within the context of acts currently defined in law as terrorism, 
motivations are not as easily pigeon-holed as jurisprudence might suggest. The 
little research that has been done with terrorists and would-be terrorists to date 
demonstrates that they are often motivated by a complex range of factors, 
including the desire to make their families proud, and to achieve personal glory 
through martyrdom.136 However, the existence of these ‘private’ motivations for 
committing terrorist acts does not prevent the conceptualisation of their actions 
within the law as ideological. 
Certainly, the modus operandi of a domestic violence perpetrator is not identical 
to that of a terrorist. However, when victims of domestic violence are 
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constructed not as individual victims but as symbolic of a broader class of 
victim, violence perpetrated against them is aptly described as violence directed 
against a section of the public. The key to understanding this ‘discursive 
manoeuvre’ is to conceptualise the woman who is subjected to violence by her 
intimate partner as representative of any woman who might have, in different 
circumstances, taken her place.137 Being female is an inescapable aspect of 
each victim’s identity as a partner of a perpetrator. In other words, for serious 
perpetrators of control-based violence, the individual identity of the woman is 
not important – any woman standing in that relationship would be subjected to 
the same control-based violence.138 While this may not accord with popular 
notions of romantic love, it is consistent with the significant number of 
perpetrators who commit violence against multiple partners.139 
Because of women’s association with the private sphere, and their complex 
relationship with the public sphere, it is unlikely that the state will of its own 
volition recognise the harm perpetrated by crimes of domestic violence as 
public crime. However, the more significant impediment to the recognition of this 
harm as public crime is the inconsistency that would produce with the principle 
of equality of persons that is fundamental to Australia’s liberal democratic 
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traditions.140 Within this tradition, all persons are equal before the law. To 
acknowledge that one group of persons defined by gender (women) is 
systematically targeted for violence by another group of persons (men) and to 
define that victimised group as a class, would undermine this fundamental 
notion of equality. As Thornton notes, ‘(T)he unqualified acceptance of systemic 
discrimination would ultimately threaten the state itself’.141 The same problem 
does not arise when crimes of domestic violence are conceptualised as 
unrelated instances of violence perpetrated by disconnected individuals. 
Recognition of the pervasive and systematic nature of violence against women 
threatens the legal fiction of equality before the law in a way that violence 
against other social groups (whether based on race, ethnicity, religion, disability 
or sexuality) does not.142 This is due both to the scale of the problem, and also 
the fact that women constitute (slightly more than) 50 percent of the 
population.143 It is possible to recognise Aboriginals (for example) as a group 
targeted for violence on the basis of race without undermining the equality of 
the law, because the numbers of people affected are still comparatively small 
(as against the population as a whole) and the violence therefore does not pose 
a threat to the fiction of equality. When one considers the number of women 
victimised by domestic violence (between one in six and one in three based on 
current estimates)144 against the proportion of population who are women, this 
presents a fundamental challenge to the notion that all persons are equal before 
the law. It is difficult to see how equality can exist when members of a group 
constituted by one half of the population systematically target members of the 
other half of the population by violent acts. 
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By presenting domestic violence as a series of individualised acts (albeit on a 
large scale) the law is able to maintain one of the key bases for its legitimacy – 
that it ensures equality for all. Simultaneously, the individualisation of violence 
against women reflects the phallocentric nature of the law because it obscures 
the reality of male violence against women, and its gendered nature. This 
allows the state to downplay the problem of violence against women in the way 
referred to by Biden at the beginning of this chapter. Despite the fact that 
serious domestic violence is overwhelmingly perpetrated by men against 
women, domestic violence as framed within Australian law remains a 
phenomenon that can just as easily be inflicted by women against men. In this 
way, the law operates as Smart describes – while it does not create patriarchal 
relations, it reproduces the material and ideological conditions under which 
these relations continue to survive.145 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter and the two chapters preceding, I have examined the law’s 
differential construction of crimes of terrorism and domestic violence. It is not 
possible to undertake a comparison of the law’s different treatment of these 
phenomena without an understanding of the important role that the law plays in 
constructing them as legal concepts. The Australian legal system treats 
terrorism as a threat to the state, while simultaneously constructing terrorism 
and its key components in contradistinction to other ‘ordinary’ crimes, including 
domestic violence. 
In Section 3, I consider how these differential constructions of terrorism and 
domestic violence provide the basis for their treatment within the legal system. I 
examine this legal treatment in four key areas: first, the criminalisation of 
preparatory forms of violence such as incitement and possession of ideological 
material; secondly, the steps the law takes to prevent violence through regimes 
for the imposition of civil control orders; thirdly, the punishment of violence 
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through sentencing; and finally, the way in which the legal system treats those 
who act in defence of themselves or others against different types of violence. 
In relation to each of these practical manifestations of differential treatment, the 
dual themes of ideological and public violence are present, reinforcing the role 
of legal discourse in constructing violence in ways that privilege masculinist 
interests. 
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CHAPTER 3.1 INCITING TERROR 
 
He would read from the pornography like a text book. In fact, when he asked 
me to be bound, when he finally convinced me to do it, he read in the magazine 
how to tie the knots, and how to bind me in a way that I couldn't get out. And 
most of the scenes that we - most of the scenes where I had to dress up or go 
through different fantasies - were the exact scenes he had read in the 
magazines.1 
Introduction 
 
Having examined how the law differentially constructs terrorism and domestic 
violence, in this chapter I begin an examination of the consequences that this 
differential construction has for the legal treatment of violence. In Chapters 3.3 
and 3.4 I consider the perpetration of lethal violence and how that is dealt with 
in sentencing and in responses to claims of self-defence. However, in this 
chapter and the next, I am concerned with the state’s treatment of less serious 
forms of conduct. I commence by looking at the law’s treatment of what I will 
call ‘dangerous speech’ – that is, spoken words, written material or some other 
form of speech that has the potential to cause harm. I argue that the law 
consistently treats hate speech as trivial in circumstances where the hatred is 
directed against women as a group. 
Underlying the common law is the so-called ‘harm principle’, that is, the concept 
that only conduct that causes harm should be prohibited.2 While seemingly 
straightforward, the elasticity of the harm principle results in uncertainty as to 
how it applies in any particular factual context. Questions such as whether 
conduct that causes non-physical harm (such as psychological or environmental 
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 MacKinnon and Dworkin (1997), pp 113-4 (testimony of RMM, Minneapolis hearings). 
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 Originally expressed in Mill (1974), p 68. For discussion of the influence of the harm principle, see Bronitt 
and McSherry (2010), pp 57-9. The concept has been developed extensively in the work of Feinberg 
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harm), and whether or not conduct involving potential rather than actual harm, 
should be prohibited, are capable of different applications of the principle.3 
One of the ‘grey’ areas of application of the harm principle is the regulation of 
speech. Attempts to censor speech in Australia have been met with suspicion, 
notwithstanding the absence of a Bill of Rights or express constitutional right to 
free speech.4 Some, albeit limited, protection is provided by virtue of the implied 
freedom of communication that has been found to exist in relation to political 
matters.5 Aside from this limited exception, the questions of when and how 
dangerous speech is prohibited fall to be determined in accordance with 
judgments about private morality.6 These moral judgments, I will argue here, 
reflect masculinist ideology, particularly in what I identify as divergent 
discourses of ‘harm’ and ‘morality’ in this area of law. 
In this chapter I consider three legal limitations to free speech, all of which 
demonstrate the lack of restraints imposed on speech that can be said to incite 
violence against women. First I examine obscenity and classification laws, and 
the divergent discourses in which different materials are regulated for 
possession and publication. Secondly, I consider the offence of sedition under 
the Commonwealth Criminal Code and associated state and territory offences 
prohibiting ‘hate speech’. Finally, I consider so-called ‘hate crimes’ that operate 
to aggravate penalties for ordinary crimes in some states and territories. 
The laws restricting ‘dangerous speech’ represent the first part of what I 
suggest is a pattern of the state’s trivialisation of domestic violence and violence 
against women more generally. Pornography, and other forms of speech that 
potentially incite violence against women, are not prohibited in the same way as 
other forms of dangerous speech. Consistent with the law’s characterisation of 
terrorism as a public crime of ideology, its treatment of dangerous speech in the 
                                                          
3
 Bronitt and McSherry (2010), pp 57-9. Bronitt and McSherry note that the harm principle is capable of 
recognising harm to individuals more easily than harm to groups or communities. 
4
 McNamara (2002), p 304. 
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terrorism context is more restrictive than its treatment of speech that might be 
said to incite or encourage violence against women. 
My argument is not premised on the assumption that particular speech forms do 
or do not in reality incite violence, either in a domestic violence or a terrorism 
context. I am not attempting to describe the ‘real facts’ in the types of violence I 
consider in this paper, but to conceptualise the violence in terms of ‘linguistic 
facts’ – that is, as violence that is produced within a context of cultural 
productions and references.7  In other words, the language and conventions 
that frame the way a particular phenomenon is described act to construct that 
phenomenon as ‘the truth’ and deconstructing something to its linguistic facts 
allows us to examine that process. 
Obscenity/Censorship Law 
 
Despite the fact that speech does merit some constitutional protection in 
Australia, there is not the kind of rigorous free speech debate that exists in the 
United Kingdom, Canada or the United States.8 Particularly in the United 
States, from the middle of the twentieth century, a ‘hyper-inflated rights 
consciousness’9 has ensured that government attempts to regulate free speech 
are monitored very closely. Moreover, laws regarding the restriction for 
publication or sale of particular materials deemed to be unsuitable for public 
consumption, for the most part, do not seem to be the subject of significant 
controversy in Australia.10 The law recognises, and the public for the most part 
accepts, the need to restrict free speech in the public interest in relation to 
particular material.11  
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However, a closer investigation of the kinds of material that are restricted for 
publication and possession provides a useful indication of what limitations on 
free speech the state deems to be justified in the public interest. The current 
Australian statutory regimes for regulation of printed and other material 
represent an amalgam of two different discourses: first, material considered to 
offend against community standards of morality, and secondly, prohibition of 
speech that infringes the harm principle by creating the potential for violence.  
In relation to material that depicts sexual activity, including sexual violence, 
Australian legal discourse reflects the historical regulation of material 
considered to be ‘obscene’ or ‘indecent’. It adopts the language of morality in 
relation to whether such material should be prohibited.  
On the other hand, in relation to material that incites terrorism, the law adopts 
the discourse of ‘harm’. As noted above, the content of what is regulated 
pursuant to the harm principle reflects moral judgments about what is and is not 
harm, however, legal discourse in relation to the incitement of terrorist violence 
does not reflect the discourse of morality as does the regulation of pornography, 
for example. In the following sections, I examine these different discursive 
strands and how they create the basis for differential treatment of dangerous 
speech that has the potential to incite violence. 
 
Statutory Regimes for Regulating Printed and other Material 
 
Australia has a national system of classification for materials to be publicly sold 
or distributed.12 Under an agreement between the Commonwealth and the 
states and territories, the Commonwealth makes classification decisions, and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
27 May 2008, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/regional-gallery-removes-hensons-art/story-
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 Note that in March 2011 the Attorney-General referred the National Classification Scheme to the 
Australian Law Reform Commission for review: ‘National Classification Scheme Review’,  
<http://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/national-classification-review> (viewed 18 July 2011). 
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the states and territories enforce them.13 The website for the Australian 
Classification Board lists ways in which compliance can be achieved in relation 
to a range of public activities such as for cinemas and public exhibitors, and 
sale or hire of films, computer games and publications. The Board follows the 
Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 199514 in 
reviewing material submitted for classification, and is also guided by the 
Guidelines for the Classification of Films and Computer Games and the 
Guidelines for Publications in categorising material according to the National 
Classification Code (‘the Code’).15 
Under the Code, materials are ‘Refused Classification’ (RC) if they:16 
(a) depict, express or otherwise deal with matters of sex, drug misuse or 
addiction, crime, cruelty, violence or revolting or abhorrent phenomena in 
such a way that they offend against the standards of morality, decency 
and propriety generally accepted by reasonable adults to the extent that 
they should not be classified; or 
(b) describe or depict in a way that is likely to cause offence to a 
reasonable adult, a person who is, or appears to be, a child under 18 
(whether the person is engaged in sexual activity or not); or 
(c) promote, incite or instruct in matters of crime or violence [emphasis 
added]. 
 
Films that are not Refused Classification are classified on a scale ranging from 
categories restricted to adult viewing (X18+ and R18+) down to the rating G (for 
General viewing). In relation to publications other than films and computer 
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 Office of Legislative Drafting and Publishing, Attorney-General’s Department, Guidelines for the 
Classification of Films and Computer Games (at 19 March 2008). 
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 Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth). 
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 Office of Legislative Drafting and Publishing, Attorney-General’s Department, Guidelines for the 
Classification of Films and Computer Games (at 19 March 2008); Office of Legislative Drafting and 
Publishing, Attorney-General’s Department, Guidelines for the Classification of Publications 2005 (at 19 
March 2008); National Classification Code (May 2005) (Cth). 
16
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games, material is classified as Unrestricted, Refused Classification, Restricted 
Category 1 and Restricted Category 2.17 
Classification decisions are to give effect, as far as possible, to the following 
guiding principles:18 
(a) adults should be able to read, hear and see what they want; 
(b) minors should be protected from material likely to harm or disturb 
them; 
(c) everyone should be protected from exposure to unsolicited material 
that they find offensive; 
(d) the need to take account of community concerns about: 
(i) depictions that condone or incite violence, particularly sexual 
violence; and 
(ii) the portrayal of persons in a demeaning manner. 
The regulation of dangerous speech occurs in the context of this legislative 
framework in which judgments about certain materials are based on community 
standards of morality, decency and propriety. In the next section, I consider the 
application of this framework particularly to materials that might be said to incite 
violence, and how the incitement of violence against women is treated 
differently from incitement of terrorist violence. 
 
The Differential Regulation of Material Inciting Violence against 
Women and Material Promoting Terrorist Violence 
 
Morality versus the Harm-based Approach 
 
Although there is obviously scope for interpretation within the descriptions of 
‘RC’ material, it seems likely that some pornography, and particularly violent 
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pornography, potentially falls within the description ‘materials that depict, 
express or otherwise deal with matters of sex ... or violence ... in such a way 
that they offend against the standards of morality, decency and propriety 
generally accepted by reasonable adults’. However, the imposition of such a 
standard makes the decision as to classification subject to interpretation 
according to masculinist standards that claim to be objective. Keeping in mind 
the definition of phallocentrism as a ‘culture which is structured to meet the 
needs of the masculine imperative’,19 it is unlikely that the application of these 
standards of reasonableness will result in any substantial restrictions on the 
availability of pornography that is harmful to women.20 This is especially the 
case when one notes that for material to be refused classification it must violate 
standards of morality ‘to the extent it should be refused classification’. 
Indeed, a vast array of movies depicting sexual violence against women, 
pornographic and otherwise, remains available for sale or distribution under the 
existing system of classification. Studies of pornographic videos have 
consistently found that a significant proportion contain scenes of violence, and 
even where sex is portrayed as consensual, violence is used to add a level of 
‘eroticism’.21 Non-pornographic movies depicting violence against women, 
including sexual violence, are likely not to be refused classification due to the 
need to consider the literary, artistic or educational merit of the material.22 
Material that might otherwise offend against community standards of morality 
may not do so if it is considered to have some intrinsic literary or artistic worth. 
As noted above, classification laws incorporate dual discourses: one based on 
prohibiting speech that creates a risk of harm through incitement or promotion 
of violence, and the other on regulating material that violates community 
standards of morality. In relation to real-life sexual practices, the law’s approach 
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 Smart (1989), p 27. 
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 MacKinnon notes that debates about obscenity are ultimately about one group of men not wanting to 
restrict what other men can watch, for fear of the tables being turned: MacKinnon (1997), pp 2-32. See 
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in Australia and the United Kingdom is reflective of the harm principle, at least 
insofar as sexual practices that are deemed beyond the capacity of adults to 
consent. Consent is no defence in relation to sadomasochistic sexual practices 
that result in serious harm, and this applies to heterosexual as well as 
homosexual practices.23 What is defined as harm is defined by masculinist 
standards, however, and there is an inconsistency between the law’s prohibition 
of consensual sado-masochistic sex and its willingness to imply consent to 
violence inflicted in traditional masculine settings such as sport.24  
However, when it comes to speech or images that depict sexual violence, the 
harm-based approach is abandoned for one based on morality.25 The law may 
set boundaries as to what sexual conduct consenting adults may engage in, 
however when it comes to the regulation of speech, a guiding principle is that 
‘adults should be able to read, hear and see what they want’.26 Where physical 
violence or extreme sexual practices are depicted, but portrayed as 
‘consensual’, they are less likely to offend against ‘accepted’ standards of 
morality, and therefore less likely to be refused classification. This is significant, 
given the vast amount of pornographic material that depicts women as 
‘consenting’ to all manner of painful and degrading sexual activities.27 As 
MacKinnon notes, what makes pornography ‘sexy’ is the sexual inequality that 
is achieved by the portrayal of women ‘enjoying’ their sexual subordination and 
humiliation.28 
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The regulation of pornography is an area of significant dispute among 
feminists.29 ‘Pro-pornography’ feminists make a claim for pornography as a 
manifestation of women’s sexual liberation,30 and denounce attempts to cast 
moral judgments as to what women should and should not consent to. This 
perspective mirrors the law’s approach, which is that the depiction of 
consensual sexual activity, regardless of its nature, will not violate ordinary 
standards of morality.  
Anti-pornography feminists, on the other hand, have moved away from the idea 
of obscenity, and have conceptualised pornography as a harmful social practice 
responsible for causing injury to women.31 This injury takes the form of direct 
harm to women used in the production of pornography,32 harm to victims of men 
who have been incited to violence by viewing pornography,33 and less directly, 
as a form of sex discrimination.34 In particular, anti-pornography feminists have 
documented links between pornographic materials and instruction in violence; 
many women, such as the woman whose testimony is quoted at the beginning 
of this chapter, have outlined the role played by pornography as an ‘instruction 
manual’ used by partners and family members in their abuse. Moreover, harm 
to women does not simply flow from violent pornography but from the nature of 
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 Smart broadly describes the differing approaches as ‘pornography-as-violence’ and ‘pornography-as-
representation’: Smart (1989), pp 116-7. For a useful discussion of the debate in the UK context see Luff 
(2000). 
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 For example McElroy (1995) and Lumby (1997). For critique of so-called ‘pro-sex feminism’ see Levy 
(2005). 
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Evans (2006b), including reference to State v Herberg 324 NW 2d 346 (Minn, 1982), which documented 
the relationship between pornography and the horrific sexual and physical abuse of the offender’s victim. 
Comprehensive analysis of the link between viewing of pornography and the risk of violence to women can 
be found in Russell (1998). This analysis was extended to gay male pornography in Kendall (2004), see 
especially Chapter 5. See also Caputi and Russell (1992), pp 19-20. 
34
 MacKinnon (1987), Chapter 14. This approach has been opposed by other feminists on the basis that it 
is not possible to describe pornography and harm to women in a simple cause-and-effect model: see for 
example Cornell (1995), p 101. For a postmodern critique of the MacKinnon/Dworkin approach see Smart 
(1995), Chapter 6. 
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much ‘mainstream’ pornography itself, which sexualises and objectifies women, 
as well as silencing them.35 Adrienne Rich writes:36 
The most pernicious message relayed by pornography is that women are 
natural sexual prey to men and love it; that sexuality and violence are 
congruent; and that for women sex is essentially masochistic, humiliation 
pleasurable, physical abuse erotic. 
This conceptualisation of pornography was utilised as a platform for legislative 
action by Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon in their Model Anti-
Pornography Civil Rights Ordinance:37 
Pornography is a systematic practice of exploitation and subordination based 
on sex that differentially harms and disadvantages women. The harm of 
pornography includes dehumanization, psychic assault, sexual exploitation, 
forced sex, forced prostitution, physical injury, and social and sexual terrorism 
and inferiority presented as entertainment. The bigotry and contempt 
pornography promotes, with the acts of aggression it fosters, diminish 
opportunities for equality of rights in employment, education, property, public 
accommodations, and public services; create public and private harassment, 
persecution, and denigration; promote injury and degradation such as rape, 
battery, sexual abuse of children, and prostitution, and inhibit just enforcement 
of laws against these acts; expose individuals who appear in pornography 
against their will to contempt, ridicule, hatred, humiliation, and embarrassment 
and target such women in particular for abuse and physical aggression; 
demean the reputations and diminish the occupational opportunities of 
individuals and groups on the basis of sex; contribute significantly to restricting 
women in particular from full exercise of citizenship and participation in the life 
of the community; lower the human dignity, worth, and civil status of women 
and damage mutual respect between the sexes; and undermine women’s equal 
exercise of rights to speech and action ...38 
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 McLellan (2009). 
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 Rich (1980), p 641. 
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 A version of the ordinance was legislated into effect in Indianapolis but subsequently struck down as 
violating the First Amendment to the US Constitution in American Bookseller Association Inc v Hudnut, 
Mayor, City of Indianapolis 771 F 2d 323 (7
th
 Cir, 1985). 
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 Ordinance to amend Minneapolis Code of Ordinances 7, chs. 139, 141 (1982) (passed 30 December 
1983; vetoed 5 January 1984) s 1(2): Dworkin and MacKinnon (1988), 138. 
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The capacity of pornography to generate harm has been recognised in Canada, 
where the Supreme Court has upheld legislation criminalising the publication of 
obscene material, which extended to the portrayal of sexual violence as well as 
some explicit sex which is degrading or dehumanising.39 Within this 
conceptualisation of pornography, the regular depiction of women as objects of 
sexual degradation can be interpreted as a discursive practice that normalises 
and legitimises violence against women and constructs even sexual violence as 
acceptable and consensual.40 
The anti-pornography feminist interpretation of pornography is consistent with 
the argument proffered in Chapter 2.2, that much violence against women, 
particularly domestic violence, is ideologically-motivated. In that chapter I 
referred to pornography as part of the ‘doctrine, myth and symbols’ of 
masculinist ideology.41 Pornographic material that objectifies and degrades 
women is reflective of a discourse in which men occupy positions of power and 
control over women, who rightly occupy a subordinate position, reinforced and 
perpetuated through sexual degradation.42 When reconceptualised in this way, 
pornography is more readily identifiable as material that promotes, encourages 
or incites violence and therefore warrants prohibition under the classification 
scheme.  
Postmodern feminists, too, have drawn attention to the way in which popular 
media portray violence against women in ways that reinforce common myths 
that women enjoy the use of force in a sexual context, and that create a link 
between violence and seduction or sensuality.43 Cameron and Frazer note that 
from the eighteenth century onwards, there evolved a form of horror fiction that 
painted the serial killer as ‘hero’ rather than ‘beast’ and focused on the 
‘aesthetics’ of killing as linked with sadistic or necrophiliac eroticism.44 This type 
of media need not be overtly violent such that it would attract the prohibitions on 
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 R v Butler [1992] 1 SCR 452, especially per Sopinka J at 479, 484-5. 
40
 Though Cossman and Bell have argued that it is not possible to give one unequivocal meaning to 
pornographic images and they may have a variety of interpretations: Cossman and Bell (1997), p 25. 
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 The Macquarie Dictionary and Thesaurus (1991), p 200. 
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 Thornton (1989), pp 142-3. This public discourse of pornography as the ideology of sexual violence 
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 A Young (1998); Caputi (1992). 
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 Cameron and Frazer (1987), pp 53-5. 
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sale or publication in the Classifications Act; rather it often passes for 
mainstream literature and film through such genres as the psychological thriller 
film and true crime fiction. Thus media indirectly supporting or encouraging 
violence against women is not only not prohibited by the state, but in some 
cases features on prime-time television and on best-selling booklists. 
The benefit of the harm-based approach to the regulation of pornography is that 
it is consistent with the harm principle that underpins the common law; thus it 
does not bring into play the controversy that accompanies the regulation of 
private morality in the absence of harm.45 However, the reliance upon notions of 
morality as the yardstick for prohibition is consistent with the historical 
regulation of pornography in Australia through obscenity laws which relied upon 
community standards of morality.46 Interpretatively, the express inclusion of 
sexual violence in category (a) of ‘RC’ material means it is less likely to be 
considered for prohibition under category (c) – material that promotes, incites or 
instructs in matters of violence. Nor is material depicting non-sexualised 
violence against women likely to be considered for inclusion in category (c), 
particularly where the material in question is a work of fiction.  
Although one of the guidelines for classifying material is the need to take into 
account community concerns about the incitement of violence, particularly 
sexual violence, Australia’s legal system does not incorporate the radical 
feminist critique of pornography as material that potentially incites sexual 
violence. 
The Classification Act specifically provides that material that advocates the 
doing of a terrorist act must be refused classification. This includes material that 
directly or indirectly counsels or urges the doing of a terrorist act, directly or 
indirectly instructs in doing a terrorist act, or directly praises the doing of a 
terrorist act in circumstances where there is a risk such praise might have the 
effect of leading a person to engage in a terrorist act.47 Terrorist propaganda in 
the nature of celebration of violent acts against Western troops, or depiction of 
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 Bronitt and McSherry (2010), p 695. 
46
 Crowe v Graham (1968) 121 CLR 375 and for discussion see Bronitt and McSherry (2010), pp 689-99. 
47
 Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth) s 9A. 
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executions of hostages etc might well fall within the scope of ‘Refused 
Classification’.48 Material that does not urge or incite terrorist violence directly, 
but portrays acts of terrorist violence in a positive light may well be said to 
‘indirectly’ counsel or urge the doing of a terrorist act. Notably, for material that 
matches these descriptions there is no additional requirement that it offend 
against community standards of morality. Material supporting terrorism is likely 
to be identified easily as ideological in the sense described in Chapter 2.2, that 
is as possessing a ‘subjective value bias’ and manifesting an ‘illusory view of 
the world’.49 
To reconceptualise pornography as material promoting, inciting or urging 
violence against women is not to unequivocally accept that there is an 
established link between pornography and the perpetration of violence itself, 
despite such a link being emphasised particularly by radical feminists such as 
Dworkin and MacKinnon.50 It is, rather, to draw attention to the inconsistency in 
the state’s treatment of material that may be said to incite terrorism and material 
that may be said to incite violence against women. The classification scheme 
prohibits the publication of material that incites, encourages or promotes 
violence: in that description it includes material that incites a terrorist act, even if 
indirectly. It does so on the unquestioned assumption that such material is likely 
to promote or provoke a terrorist act. On the other hand, despite a significant 
body of research demonstrating a link between consumption of pornography 
and violence to women, pornographic material will only be refused classification 
if it offends community standards of morality, ensuring that most purportedly 
‘consensual’ pornography remains available. Within phallocentric discourse, this 
kind of material is not labelled as ideological, but is normalised and becomes 
mainstream. 
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 Two Islamic publications have been prohibited on the basis that they incite terrorism and violence 
against ‘disbelievers’: ‘Classification Review Board determines 2 Islamic books are refused classification’, 
Media Release, Classification Review Board, 10 July 2006,  
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/cob/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(3A6790B96C927794AF1031D9395C5C20)~879.pdf/
$file/879.pdf>. 
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 Vincent (2009), p 17. 
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 And see the research cited at note 33. 
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The Prohibition of Possession of Material 
 
The Classification Act is focused upon the sale and supply of material and does 
not generally prohibit the possession of proscribed material in and of itself. The 
exception is Part 10 of the Act, which was introduced in 2007 as part of the 
Howard government’s Northern Territory Emergency Response. Part 10 
prohibits possession as well as supply of prohibited material in prescribed 
areas,51 and allows for seizure of prohibited material found within those areas.52 
Prohibited material includes material that has been refused classification, but 
also material that is or would be classified as Category 1 Restricted, Category 2 
Restricted, or X18+.53 
The ‘prescribed area’ in which these restrictions apply is that area subject to the 
Commonwealth government’s emergency response.54 The rationale for these 
offences that apply only in the Northern Territory is that the availability of 
pornography in Aboriginal communities has been linked to sexual abuse of 
children, through using the material to groom them and normalise sexualised 
behaviour.55 Although the link between child sexual abuse and pornography 
was explicit in the Explanatory Memorandum, some participants in the 
Parliamentary debates drew a connection between the availability of 
pornography and domestic violence more generally.56 
The federal government has also recently proposed the introduction of a system 
of internet filtering, which would potentially have the effect of restricting access 
to internet sites containing material instructing on criminal activity, and extreme 
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 Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth) ss 101-105. 
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 Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth) s 106. 
53
 Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth) s 99 (definition of ‘Level 1 
prohibited material’ and ‘Level 2 prohibited material’). 
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 Classification (Publications, Films and Computer Games) Act 1995 (Cth) s 99 (definition of ‘prescribed 
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or graphic material, including pornography.57 The proposed program would 
require internet service providers to block all overseas-hosted internet content 
that is ‘Refused Classification’ material.58 Past legislative attempts to block 
internet content have focused on protection of viewers from moral harm, rather 
than the role pornography plays in encouraging violence against women.59 
With the exception of the emergency response provisions and proposed internet 
filtering, prohibitions relating to restricted materials are contained in state and 
territory legislation, which almost uniformly restrict sale and publication of 
unclassified materials but not possession.60 These statutory provisions 
circumscribe the common law offence of ‘obscene libel’, which originally 
prohibited the publication of material having the tendency to deprave or corrupt 
those who were susceptible to immoral influences.61 Although rare, it is also still 
possible to be prosecuted for the publication of indecent material, judged 
according to whether it offends the modesty of the average man or woman in 
sexual matters.62 Notably, the United Kingdom prohibits the possession of 
‘extreme’ pornographic images, defined as material that is produced solely or 
principally for the purposes of sexual arousal, that is grossly offensive, 
disgusting or of an obscene character, and falls within a number of proscribed 
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 Quentin McDermott, ‘Access Denied’, 4 Corners, ABC, 10 May 2010,  
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categories.63 A number of prosecutions have been brought under this 
legislation, with varying degrees of success.64 
As noted above, the Guidelines give effect to the principle that adults should be 
able to read, hear and see what they want. There is a longstanding tradition in 
Australia, as in other Western societies, of protecting privacy within the 
domestic domain. However, privacy is not absolute and the law curtails this 
freedom when considered necessary for the preservation of public morals, as in 
the case of the prohibition of sexual activity between consenting gay men.65 The 
regulation of otherwise ‘private’ conduct changes over time and is subject to 
political considerations.66 The standard of obscenity by reference to ‘current 
community standards’ leaves a broad scope for interpretation of what is and is 
not obscene, and does so in a way that creates the possibility for interpretations 
that pay little attention to the interests of women (and other groups).67 As 
MacKinnon notes, the legal standard of obscenity is based on the ‘male 
standpoint’.68 
Further illustration of the state’s selective practice in prohibiting dangerous 
speech is found in the regulation of private possession of materials said to be 
related to terrorism. As was noted in Chapter 2.2, the possession of ‘extremist’ 
material such as terrorism manuals, material encouraging violent jihad, 
celebration of violence against Western forces in Islamic countries, and videos 
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 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (UK) ss 63-7. The proscribed categories are (a) an act which 
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<http://www.thisisstaffordshire.co.uk/Jury-acquits-landmark-porn-prosecution/story-12524952-
detail/story.html>; ‘Man had “grossly offensive and disgusting” porn images on computer’, St Helen’s Star 
(online), 18 June 2009,  
<http://www.sthelensstar.co.uk/news/4445020.Man_had__grossly_offensive_and_disgusting__porn_imag
es_on_computer/>. It has been noted that this legislation is based on paternalistic standards of morality 
rather than a recognition of the harm extreme pornography causes to women: McGlynn and Rackley 
(2009). 
65
 R v Brown [1993] 2 WLR 556. 
66
 For example, sexual conduct involving consenting adults (whether gay or straight) acting in private 
cannot now be subject to arbitrary interference with privacy: Sexual Conduct (Human Rights) Act 1994 
(Cth) s 4. However, the EM to the Act notes that ‘sexual conduct’ does not extend to abortion or the 
production and distribution of pornographic material. 
67
 Bronitt and McSherry (2010), pp 697-8. 
68
 MacKinnon (1989), p 197. 
169 
 
depicting torture of hostages have been used as evidence establishing the 
ideological motivation of terrorism offenders in a range of cases.  
Possession of such material can also constitute an offence in and of itself, when 
the possession is considered to be in connection with a terrorist act, even where 
the material is of a general nature and bears no relation to a specific act of 
terrorism.69  In the United Kingdom, the Court of Appeal has held that a person 
can be convicted of an offence on the basis of possessing documents with the 
intention of inciting an act of terrorism.70 The Victorian Court of Appeal has 
followed the English Court of Appeal in finding that the thing possessed must be 
being used, or must be intended to be used, in aid of an activity preparatory to a 
terrorist act, whether underway, or proposed or contemplated.71 
The fact that possession of terrorist propaganda material is itself an offence 
indicates that the state regards possession of this material as preliminary to the 
perpetration of violence. That the state does not similarly criminalise the 
possession of material that could be said to incite violence against women is 
indicative of the lesser status of violence against women as a crime. There is a 
huge volume of material available, particularly via the internet, that depicts 
women being raped, tortured, mutilated, force-fed and even killed.72 Possession 
of such material is generally not prohibited, notwithstanding a body of evidence 
suggesting that it undermines internal and social inhibitions to sexual violence, 
and is often used to undermine women’s resistance or refusal to sexual acts.73 
It perhaps also demonstrates that the state benefits from allowing a legitimate 
market for pornography to flourish (e.g. through the collection of taxes and 
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 In Benbrika’s case it was possession of a CD containing jihadi material that was the subject of a charge 
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minimisation of organised crime and corruption) that it would not obtain from 
allowing access to materials inciting terrorist violence.74 
Through enacting prohibition on the possession of pornography in restricted 
zones in the Northern Territory, the government has itself accepted that a link 
does exist between sexual violence and pornography. Yet it fails to prohibit 
possession of pornographic material that incites or promotes violence against 
women in the same way that it prohibits possession of terrorist materials. It 
does not even do so where there is an established link between the possession 
or use of pornographic material and crimes of violence.75 Again, my argument is 
not premised on an acceptance of a link between pornography and violence 
against women. The point is made to demonstrate that the state fails to regulate 
the possession of material that it acknowledges has a link to violence against 
women, while simultaneously regulating material assumed to promote terrorist 
violence. 
Many feminists have drawn attention to the fact that the state’s ‘hands-off’ policy 
in relation to the private sphere has often allowed abuse and oppression against 
women within that sphere to go unchecked.76 This observation is apposite in 
relation to the lack of regulation of possession of material that may be said to 
incite violence against women. The state protects the making of pornography as 
an aspect of public freedom of expression, and the possession of it as an 
aspect of privacy.77 Where the state does make prohibition in relation to 
material that portrays sexual or sexualised violence, it relates to the sale or 
publication of that material, not the possession of it within the home, 
notwithstanding evidence that possession in the intimate sphere is just as likely 
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to promote or encourage violence against women as the publication or sale of 
the material.78 
It is a matter of debate, not for resolution here, whether ‘dangerous speech’ 
does in fact promote or incite violence in any context. The state treats 
dangerous speech inconsistently by criminalising it in one form on the basis of 
an assumed link with terrorist acts, and on the other hand failing to regulate it, 
notwithstanding the existence of evidence drawing a link between pornography 
and violence against women. If the law criminalises possession of terrorist 
propaganda even where that is unrelated to any specific terrorism plan, then it 
is inconsistent for the law not to criminalise the possession of violent 
pornography and other material that may be said to incite or encourage violence 
against women. That it does not do so is indicative of the lesser status accorded 
to women as victims within the law. 
Sedition  
 
In certain circumstances, the law prohibits speech that has the effect or the 
intention of inciting others to violence, or of fostering hatred. Despite the 
absence of a Bill of Rights or a constitutionally-entrenched right to free speech 
in Australia,79 the government has traditionally taken a cautious approach to its 
regulation.80 Legislation prohibiting public acts of vilification has been 
contentious because it is seen as interfering with free speech.81  
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Notwithstanding this level of caution, Australian law does prohibit speech that 
incites violence or hatred.82 However, not all such speech is prohibited; when 
incitement to violence is prohibited generally, it is incitement targeted at 
particular groups, defined primarily on the basis of race, ethnicity or religion. A 
noteworthy aspect of these laws is the almost total absence of reference to sex 
or gender in the prohibitions. 
The offence of sedition, found in s 80.2 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, 
was introduced by the Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth). Subsection (1) 
provides that a person commits an offence if the person urges another person 
to overthrow the Constitution, a government, or the lawful authority of the 
Commonwealth government, by force or violence.83 The offence carries a 
maximum penalty of seven years’ imprisonment. Subject to the same penalty is 
the offence created by subsection (5), which applies where a person urges a 
group or groups (whether distinguished by race, religion, nationality or political 
opinion) to use force or violence against another group or other groups (as so 
distinguished); and (b) the use of the force or violence would threaten the 
peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth.84 
Section 80.2 replaced the previous sections 24A to 24E of the Crimes Act, and 
simultaneously amended the definition of ‘seditious intention’ in the Crimes Act 
to include ‘an intention to promote feelings of ill-will or hostility between different 
groups’ including groups of all types, races, religions, political interests and 
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nationalities.85 The laws as reframed serve mixed objectives of protecting 
security and human rights; however the purpose of s 80.2(5) was not to 
strengthen the protection of racial minorities, but to expand the scope of 
prohibition of the incitement of terrorism.86 
The new sedition provisions were clearly designed to catch speech inciting 
terrorist violence against the government or particular groups within society, 
although Saul notes that this wrongly conflates group-based violence and 
terrorism and ‘can only reinforce the stereotyping of certain religions or 
ethnicities as terrorists’.87 However, police have in the past determined that 
speech promoting suicide bombings and anti-Australian conspiracies did not 
violate the provisions.88 The government considered enacting stronger sedition 
provisions but eventually referred the offending books to the Classification 
Review Board for review.89 
Notably, the sedition offence does not prohibit urging a group to use force 
against another group distinguished by sex or gender.90  It is unclear what the 
reason for this omission was. It may be that the incitement of violence between 
gendered groups was not envisaged as a possibility, an oversight that would be 
consistent with the historical oversight of crimes against women.91 It might be 
that sex/gender is not included in Article 20 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights,92 suggested by the Gibbs Committee to be the basis 
for the new sedition provisions, although the absence of political opinion from 
Article 20 did not preclude its inclusion in subsection (5) of s 80.2.93 It could also 
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be because such violence was not conceptualised as having the capacity to 
threaten the peace, order and good government of Australia, and therefore not 
meeting the constitutional requirement of a sufficient Commonwealth 
connection.94 Given the absence of reference to sex or gender in the reports 
and debates relating to sedition,95 it would appear that little consideration has 
been given to the issue at all.  
One might argue that there is no need for the inclusion of gender in the sedition 
provision because gender-based incitement to violence is uncommon. As Saul 
notes however, it is beside the point that a particular type of vilification may not 
be commonplace; criminalisation is necessary not because of the prevalence of 
this type of crime but because of the serious social consequences when it does 
occur.96 There are examples of conduct that might well fall within the category 
of sedition on the basis of gender. Recently a Facebook page was set up by 
some University of Sydney students entitled ‘Define Statutory’ and defined as 
‘pro-rape’. The page, subsequently removed from Facebook, was variously 
described as ‘inciting people to sexual violence’ and ‘grooming perpetrators of 
sexual violence’.97 
If gender were included as one of the categories within s 80.2, it is arguable that 
the development of such a site could be said to constitute the urging by one 
group (defined by gender) to use force against another group (defined by 
gender) in a way that would threaten the peace, order and good government of 
the Commonwealth. This limb of s 80.2(5) requires the Prosecution to 
demonstrate that in its scale and effect, the violence urged would impinge upon 
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the security of the Commonwealth.98 To the extent that such a site could be said 
to promote sexual violence by men against women en masse, if that violence 
were carried out, the harm caused and the resulting drain upon government 
resources in terms of law enforcement, investigation and prosecution, would 
potentially threaten the order and good government of the state.99 Arguably, the 
scale and extent of violence inflicted by men against women in Australia already 
represents a threat to the peace, order and good government of the 
Commonwealth, despite the fact that much of it goes unreported.100 When one 
considers the cost of domestic violence to the Australian economy each year,101 
the scale of the impact of such violence on the resources of the state becomes 
clearer. 
Pornography, as outlined in the first section of this chapter, has also been linked 
with the perpetration of violence against women.102 Although there is 
disagreement as to whether this link is established on the empirical research,103 
the fact that such links have been drawn suggests that gender should have 
been included in the categories of groups within the sedition provision.  
Further, the identification of dangerous speech as ideological propaganda is 
central to perceptions of its capacity to threaten peace, order and good 
government. Incitement to violence on the basis of race and religion are 
conceptualised as posing such a threat because they are seen to involve a 
deliberate and premeditated choice by one group of people to target another 
group, necessitating a state response and thus posing a threat to the state. On 
the other hand, male violence against women, as discussed in Section 2, is 
constructed within legal and social discourse as spontaneous and not 
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ideologically-motivated, with the result that even given its widespread and 
systematic occurrence, it is conceived as readily containable within the 
parameters of an ordinary criminal justice response. 
That gender was not included as a category or group that might be the target of 
incitement to violence illustrates the state’s practice of overlooking the systemic, 
gender-based aspect of such violence. It is also inconsistent with the Australian 
government’s responsibilities as a signatory to the Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,104 and to its Optional 
Protocol.105 To the extent that the sedition provision functions as protection of 
human rights, it does not afford the same protection to gender as it does to race 
and political views. 
The state’s role in obscuring the problem of violence against women is further 
perpetuated by state and territory legislation in relation to so-called ‘hate 
speech’, which consistently fails to recognise gender-based vilification. 
 
Hate Speech 
 
Hate speech laws are not terrorism laws, however I have included them here as 
a continuation of the discussion of the federal sedition provision, as both types 
of provision target vilification on the basis of recognised group identity. As noted 
above, s80.2(5) of the Crimes Act serves conflicting purposes of protecting 
national security, and also operating as an anti-discrimination measure, and this 
same blurring of boundaries exists in relation to vilification laws. The incitement 
of terrorist violence against a particular group may well involve the use of 
language that denigrates and vilifies members of that group, and thus invoke 
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‘hate speech’ laws.106 Conversely, some hate crimes may fit within the definition 
of terrorism.107 It is therefore useful to consider the various state and territory 
anti-vilification provisions, and the differential protections afforded particularly to 
racial and ethnic groups and to groups defined on the basis of gender. 
Federally, civil racial vilification prohibition is contained in the Racial 
Discrimination Act,108 which enacts Australia’s obligations under the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.109 Notably, Australia 
reserved in relation to Article 4(a), which requires states to criminalise the 
dissemination of racist ideas, and incitement to racial discrimination and racial 
violence.110 Most states and territories have enacted hate speech legislation, 
although the form varies across jurisdictions. Tasmania provides for civil 
remedies only, not criminal penalties; the Northern Territory only has general 
anti-discrimination laws, not specific hate speech provisions.111 Western 
Australia has criminal provisions only, and all other jurisdictions provide for both 
criminal and civil remedies.112 Legislation in all jurisdictions prohibits hate 
speech based on race. Religious hate speech is prohibited in Queensland, 
Tasmania and Victoria, and hate speech on the basis of sexuality and gender 
identity in the ACT, NSW, Queensland and Tasmania.113 
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With the exception of Western Australia, criminal hate speech legislation 
generally prohibits a public act inciting hatred, serious contempt or ridicule of a 
person based on a specific ground, generally by means which threaten physical 
harm to person or property.114 Civil hate speech laws tend to have the first two 
requirements, without the need to identify a threat to person or property.115 
Western Australia has enacted a broader set of provisions, including offences 
such as conduct likely to incite racial animosity or racist harassment, and 
conduct likely to racially harass.116  Only Western Australia has successfully 
prosecuted someone under the anti-vilification laws: for possession of racist 
material following a graffiti attack in which swastikas and racist slogans were 
posted.117 
Tasmania also prohibits engaging in any conduct which offends, humiliates, 
intimidates, insults or ridicules another person on the basis of a range of 
characteristics, in circumstances in which a reasonable person, having regard 
to all the circumstances, would have anticipated that it would have that effect on 
the other person.118  
The only jurisdiction in which hate speech is prohibited on the basis of gender is 
Tasmania, however there is no criminal prohibition of gendered hate speech.119 
The vast majority of Australian states and territories, like the federal legislature, 
do not prohibit hate speech grounded in gender. This is a further manifestation 
of the state’s failure to recognise women as a section of the public, discussed in 
Chapter 2.3. Hate speech legislation targets acts directed at individuals but on 
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the basis of their identity as members of a group. As the state fails to recognise 
the systematic nature of harm committed against women, it does not make 
provision for hate speech that targets women as women. 
The failure to recognise gendered hate speech in legislation is not because it 
does not exist. As noted in the first section of this chapter, violent pornography 
and material that depicts women in ways that are humiliating or degrading are 
readily available, particularly via the internet.120 Derogatory language used to 
describe women and the acts being done to them are a common feature of 
pornographic materials.121 Since pornography produced for public consumption 
should satisfy the requirement of a ‘public act’, it would appear to meet the legal 
criteria for hate speech where it incites hatred, contempt or humiliation of 
women.122 MacKinnon notes that pornography hurts not just individual women 
but women as a ‘whole’ and that gender inequality is central to what 
pornography is.123  However, I was unable to find any instance in Australia of 
civil or criminal action taken against producers of pornography for hate 
speech.124 
Pornography aside, speech inciting hatred against women is so commonplace 
as to be almost invisible. On the street, in film and on television, in public and in 
private, words associated with female hatred such as ‘bitch’, ‘slut’, ‘tramp’, 
‘slurry’, ‘skank’ and ‘cunt’ and other words that associate women with animals or 
body parts, are used with such regularity that they are rarely the subject of 
comment.125 Similarly, Spender has identified a range of words used to describe 
and discredit women’s speech, such as ‘nag’, ‘prattle’ and ‘whine’.126 Domestic 
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and sexual assaults are frequently accompanied by the use of words that 
denigrate women on the basis of their gender.127 
Unlike words such as ‘coon’ or ‘Paki’ which automatically trigger an adverse 
response in the public domain and are often recognised as racial slurs, words 
used to and about women are not recognised as gendered epithets.128 Yet, as 
Gelber notes, both types of hate speech have the effect of making a ‘truth claim’ 
about the inferiority of the recipient, which reinforces and recreates the victim’s 
position of inequality.129 
It is perhaps the very pervasiveness of gendered hate speech that contributes 
to its invisibility and its insidiousness. The use of derogatory terms based on 
gender is widespread, and their identification as gendered terms is made more 
problematic by their diversified use, for example the word ‘cunt’ is commonly 
used as a generally derogatory term by men about other men.130 The term only 
becomes the subject of controversy when prefaced by a word that transforms it 
into a racial epithet, for example ‘black cunt’.131 The liberal underpinnings of the 
law also direct focus onto the subjective intention of the speaker rather than the 
effect of the speech; as gendered language is routinely used in a flippant or 
throwaway fashion, it is difficult to establish the requisite intention for a criminal 
prosecution.132 
Gendered hate speech, like other forms of hate speech, is a phenomenon that 
affects not only the individuals targeted but all members of the group, through 
                                                          
127
 Ptacek (1999), p 82; Coukos (1999-2000), pp 33 ff. I have also observed this phenomenon personally 
through my work as a criminal prosecutor. 
128
 Cf Gelber (2002), p 71 (who does give recognition to gendered epithets). 
129
 Gelber (2002), pp 71-2. 
130
 Note that online dictionary tools almost without exception include ‘female genitalia’ and ‘disparaging 
term for a woman’ amongst the meanings of the term: see <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/cunt> , 
<http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=cunt&page=2> , 
<http://onlineslangdictionary.com/definition+of/cunt>, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cunt>, 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cunt> (all viewed 14 June 2010). 
131
 Howe (2010), p 216. 
132
 This applies in relation to offensive language laws: see Bronitt and McSherry (2010), pp 843-5. 
181 
 
increasing the sense of vulnerability and victimisation of members.133 Talking 
about hate crime generally, the New York State legislature has noted that:134 
Hate crimes do more than threaten the safety and welfare of all citizens. They 
inflict on victims incalculable physical and emotional damage and tear at the 
very fabric of free society. Crimes motivated by invidious hatred toward 
particular groups not only harm individual victims but send a powerful message 
of intolerance and discrimination to all members of the group to which the victim 
belongs. Hate crimes can and do intimidate and disrupt entire communities and 
vitiate the civility that is essential to healthy democratic processes. 
This comment by the New York legislature illustrates the point that conduct that 
is generally perceived as a private or individual harm may in fact have a public 
dimension, as acts against particular individuals may have broader 
repercussions for the group or groups to which those individuals belong. Hate 
speech directed towards an individual woman, for example, impacts on women 
in general by degrading them and instilling fear in women as a group, and this is 
particularly so when the speech is used regularly and systematically. 
It might be argued that gendered hate speech has not attracted the same 
legislative attention as other forms of hate speech because it is not as easily 
recognisable as hate speech, and legal prohibition would therefore be too 
difficult to enforce.135  
However, race-based hate speech is often not easily recognisable. Indeed, it is 
sometimes framed in ‘positive’ terms such as an affirmation of love for one’s 
own culture/race or a ‘discourse of care’ overtly expressing concern for the 
maligned group.136  
Australian research suggests that ‘everyday’ forms of racism such as 
disrespectful treatment and name-calling encountered on the street, in shops 
and public places, are more common than institutional forms of racism 
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experienced in schools and places of employment.137 Subtle forms of vilification, 
it has been suggested, may be even more harmful than overt forms because 
they are more likely to be accepted as legitimate forms of expression.138 
The subtle nature of much of the racism expressed in Australian society has not 
prevented the enactment of laws specifically prohibiting race-based hate 
speech. Perhaps, then, the absence of gender as a category of hate speech is 
due to the failure to recognise much of it as gender-based discrimination at all, 
subtle or not. Gendered hate speech, like other forms of sex discrimination, is 
largely perceived in Australia to be a problem associated with other countries, 
and this impression is reinforced by the ad hoc nature of sex discrimination 
complaints that is necessitated by the system of individualised complaints that 
is enshrined in Australian legislation.139 Gender-based slurs are perceived as 
targeting only the individual women to whom they are directed rather than 
women as a group or as a class. 
Thus, when a racial epithet is used, that is associated by the listener directly 
and exclusively with race. Many gender-based epithets, however, apparently 
relate to a particular aspect of gender, usually sexuality. Many derogatory terms 
used to and about women – ‘slut’, ‘whore’, ‘hoe’, ‘tart’, ‘skank’ and ‘slurry’ to 
name a few – appear to label the recipient not simply as a woman, but as a 
sexually promiscuous woman. It is therefore possible to dismiss them not as 
forms of gender-based discrimination but as insults based on perceived 
characteristics or traits of the particular women to whom they are targeted. 
However, to understand gendered vilification in this way is to misunderstand the 
gendered basis for, and consequences of, such terms. To begin with, terms 
such as those described above are not used only in situations where the 
speaker actually has a perception that the recipient is sexually promiscuous. 
Terms such as ‘slut’ and ‘hoe’ are commonly used against women in all sorts of 
settings, including where there can be no possible perception of sexual 
promiscuity, and sexual history or experience bears no relevance in the context. 
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Secondly, if these terms denoted simply sexual promiscuity, they would be used 
also in relation to men, but they are not. 
Thirdly and most importantly, to pretend that the kinds of words used regularly 
to and against women are about sex (the act) and not gender, is to ignore the 
relationship between the two that has been described by, in particular, 
Catharine MacKinnon.140 In MacKinnon’s view, sex can be used to oppress 
women,141 and that goes for sex speech as it does for sex act. Sex is written on 
women’s bodies, and that has nothing to do with what they wear or how they 
present themselves. In masculinist ideology, women are sex, and that is why 
they are called the names they are.  
Gendered hate speech satisfies the legal criteria for hate speech, and yet in 
most Australian jurisdictions it is not recognised as such. This is further 
demonstration of the state’s tendency to privatise harm committed against 
women, and to overlook the systematic nature of the harm caused to women by 
dangerous speech as well as domestic violence. In the next section, I consider 
Australian ‘hate crime’ provisions, which suffer from the same absence of 
reference to sex or gender as hate speech provisions. 
Hate Crimes 
 
Like hate speech provisions, laws relating to hate crimes are not terrorism laws. 
However, as discussed above, terrorism will often involve violence directed by 
one self-identified group against another group identified in opposition to them. 
Violent crimes that bear the hallmark of principled opposition to a particular 
group of people therefore cross the boundary between terrorism and crime 
motivated by hatred. For that reason, I conclude this chapter with a discussion 
of so-called ‘hate crimes’ under state and territory law and the differential 
protection that is provided to women as a group as opposed to groups identified 
by racial, religious or political identity. 
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 ‘Hate crimes’ are crimes ‘wholly or partly motivated by, grounded in, or 
aggravated by, bias or prejudice towards particular groups of people’.142 There 
are three major models. The first is the ‘penalty enhancement model’, which 
provides for an additional penalty where a crime is motivated by hatred, 
adopted only in WA (and the US) for hate-based crime.143 The second, the 
sentence aggravation model, which provides that motivation by hatred is an 
aggravating factor on sentence, exists in New South Wales, Victoria, the 
Northern Territory and the United Kingdom.144  This model, rather than 
stipulating an increase in penalty, simply provides for hate motivation to be 
taken into account as potentially one of a number of aggravating factors, and is 
therefore more flexible in terms of the impact it has on sentence. 
The third model is the substantive offence model, creating specific crimes that 
apply where the perpetrator is motivated by prejudice. Although there are no 
substantive ‘hate crime’ laws in Australia, in some overseas jurisdictions there is 
provision for substantive crimes motivated by hatred or prejudice. For example, 
California, Massachusetts and Canada all criminalise certain types of conduct 
motivated by prejudice.145 Although many states in the US have gender 
included in hate crime statutes, prosecutions for gender-based hate crimes are 
rare.146 Federally in the US, gender was originally omitted from both hate crime 
offences and statistical reporting of hate crime, but was included in 
amendments made in 2009.147 Feminist advocates in the US have also been 
successful in arguing for the inclusion of gender in various civil bias crime 
statutes, which allow victims of hate crime to bring civil suits against 
perpetrators.148  
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included ‘gender’. For example Violence Against Women Act 1994, Pub L No 103-322, 108 Stat 1902 
185 
 
Notably, in relation to Australian hate crime provisions, gender is not included 
as a relevant factor. Of the sentence aggravation models, Northern Territory 
and Victoria refer to group identity without specifying what kind of groups, while 
Western Australia refers only to race and New South Wales to a range of 
categories but gender is not specifically mentioned.149 The omission of gender 
from the categories of motivation in hate crimes reinforces the construction of 
domestic violence as a crime committed in the private domain, rather than a 
species of offence directed against ‘a section of the public’, as outlined in 
Chapter 2.3. 
In relation to the more general provisions that do not specify particular 
categories, the test used to identify an act as a hate crime may determine 
whether or not gender-based hatred is recognised. The first, the ‘motivation’ 
test, makes it a requirement of hate crime that the defendant be motivated by 
group hatred, prejudice or hostility. Prosecution on the basis of this test requires 
evidence not only that the offender possessed a particular prejudice, but also 
that her or his actions were motivated by that prejudice.  
The second is the ‘group selection’ test, whereby a victim is chosen due to her 
or his membership of a particular group, notwithstanding that the offender may 
not be motivated by hatred or prejudice against that group. The third test is the 
‘demonstration of hostility’ test, whereby an act will qualify as a hate crime if 
accompanied by words that demonstrate hostility for a particular group. While 
Victoria and Western Australia incorporate a combination of tests, the New 
South Wales and Northern Territory provisions adopt only the motivation test.150 
Where the narrow motivation test applies, gender is unlikely to be recognised as 
a category of hate crime even where the list of categories is not exhaustive. For 
example in Aslett v The Queen,151 a robbery targeting victims of Asian 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(US), which was invalidated by the US Supreme Court in United States v Morrison 529 US 598 (2000): for 
discussion see Graycar and Morgan (2002), pp 435-7. 
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 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(2)(h); Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 6A(e); 
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 Aslett v R [2006] NSWCCA 49 (Unreported, Spigelman CJ, Barr and Howie JJ, 24 March 2006). 
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background was found not to constitute a hate crime on the basis that the 
victims were targeted because the offenders believed Asian people to be more 
wealthy, not because they were motivated by racial hatred or prejudice. While 
this act would have fallen within the category of the ‘group selection’ test-based 
hate crime, it failed the ‘motivation’ test. 
If one takes the same approach to gendered hate crime, it seems likely that 
either of the ‘group selection’ or ‘demonstration of hostility’ test will encompass 
more gendered hate crime than the ‘motivation test’. A sexual offender or 
domestic violence perpetrator may well be considered to have chosen his victim 
on the basis of her gender (or at least as one of the factors for that choice) or to 
have demonstrated hostility towards women through his choice of language. 
The motivation test focuses more on the subjective intention of the perpetrator 
and is therefore less likely to encompass the gendered nature of domestic 
violence because, as outlined in Chapter 2.2, perpetrators’ actions are not 
constructed as ideological within the law. 
In particular, the adoption of the demonstration of hostility test would support a 
construction of domestic violence, which is frequently accompanied by 
derogatory gendered language,152 as a gendered crime, committed by members 
of one group (men) against another group (women) and motivated by prejudice 
towards that group. This would further support the construction of domestic 
violence as a ‘public crime’ as outlined in Chapter 2.3. 
Indeed, there have been cases documented of violent crimes against individual 
women where the offender has expressly been motivated by a hatred of 
women.153 However, rather than treating misogyny as an aggravating factor, the 
courts have expressed sympathy for the offenders, or treated their misogyny as 
a ‘psychological condition’, thereby pathologising the offender and denying what 
might otherwise be considered an ideological motivation.154 As Caputi and 
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Russell write: ‘Fixation on the pathology of perpetrators of violence against 
women only obscures the social control function of these acts.’155 In this 
respect, the legal system reflects a social perception of men who commit harm 
in the domestic sphere as motivated by emotion rather than ideology.156 
A number of writers, through their recognition of the gendered nature of harms 
committed systematically by men against women, have laid the theoretical 
foundation for recognition of violence against women as hate crime.157 Carney 
argues that gender-based hate crime shares the same characteristics as other 
hate crimes, namely victims are selected (in part) because they are female; 
victims feel they cannot control their own safety because they cannot change 
the fact that they are female; all women realise that they are vulnerable to 
attack; perpetrators see each woman as a potential victim; gender-based 
crimes generate communal fear; there is increased psychological trauma for 
victims; crimes are under-reported; victims tend to be re-victimised and 
perpetrators tend to re-offend; and crimes involve heightened violence.158 
Although Carney applies this argument specifically to rape, a number of these 
features apply equally to domestic violence as a gender-based hate crime. 
Angelari notes that women are not considered to be ‘interchangeable’ in the 
same way as victims of racially or ethnically motivated crime, that is, harm 
committed against an individual woman is not considered to impact on other 
women in the same way that crime committed against a member of an ethnic 
group might be seen as a harm to all members of that group.159 In other words, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
January 2007). The judgement also makes reference to the use by one offender of pornography to learn 
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crimes committed against women are a series of ‘private’ crimes, not evidence 
of a form of harm perpetrated systematically against women as a group. 
However, the view that women are not ‘interchangeable’ overlooks the impact 
that violence against individual women has upon all women, and the ways in 
which women moderate and alter their behaviour in response to violence and its 
perceived threat.160 Just as some victims of violence experience that violence 
as a member of a particular racial or ethnic group, women also experience 
violence as women.161 Instances of sexual assault are an excellent example – 
reports of rape are often accompanied by media and police exhortations to 
women to alter their behaviour by not walking alone, avoiding certain areas at 
night, and locking their doors;162 women who read or hear these messages 
understand that they could be the ‘next victim’ and that the last victim was 
targeted because she was a woman.   
Moreover, the exclusion of gender/sex from grounds of hatred in hate crime 
laws reinforces the message that gendered crime such as sexual assault and 
domestic violence is ‘just part of life’ rather than being an aggravated form of 
violence.163 
The laws in Australia relating to hate crimes are a further example of the state’s 
failure to recognise the systematic nature of harms committed against women. 
Hate crimes stand as recognition that certain types of harm do not affect merely 
the individual targeted, but also the group to which that individual belongs (or is 
perceived by the offender as belonging). There is no reason why gendered hate 
crime should be treated any differently in this respect to other forms of hate 
crime, however it remains largely unrecognised in Australia either through 
express inclusion in legislation, or through prosecution. The omission of gender 
from these provisions reflects the same failure to recognise women as a section 
of the public that excludes gender-based violence from inclusion within the 
parameters of terrorism offences. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have commenced my examination of the ways in which the 
differential understandings of domestic violence and terrorism that are 
constructed both within the law and society generally underpin their different 
legal treatment. Although providing a measure of protection to free speech, 
Australian law does prohibit speech and speech acts that violate the harm 
principle, by creating the potential for violence against others.  
However, the regulation of dangerous speech reflects the existence of two 
divergent discourses: the discourse of harm or potential harm, and the 
discourse of morality. Material that can be said to encourage or promote 
terrorist violence, even indirectly, is prohibited on the basis of the potential for 
harm inherent in such material, which is not reliant on standards of morality; this 
extends to the mere possession of such material where it is interpreted as 
‘connected to’ a terrorist act. On the other hand, material depicting violence 
against women is interpreted in the context of ‘generally accepted standards of 
morality’, resulting in the widespread depiction and acceptance of violence 
against women in various media, even where that might be said to indirectly 
incite or encourage violence against women. In this respect, the law is at odds 
with radical feminist discourse that focuses upon the harm and potential harm 
caused by pornographic material. 
Further, federal sedition law and state-based hate speech laws prohibit race 
and religion-based violent speech but generally ignore gender-based hate 
speech. This can be attributed to the exclusion of women from the public realm, 
as discussed in Chapter 2.3, but also to the failure to recognise gendered hate 
speech as gendered hate speech, rather than derogatory comments applied to 
individual women. This is further evidence of the personalisation of violence 
against women that renders it non-ideological, as examined in Chapter 2.2. 
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In Chapter 3.2 I continue this discussion in the context of how violence is 
controlled pre-emptively, through the different systems of civil orders available 
for those with a propensity to commit violence, terrorist or domestic. 
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CHAPTER 3.2 CONTROLLING TERROR: CIVIL MECHANISMS FOR THE 
PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE 
 
Of all the tasks of government the most basic is to protect its citizens against 
violence.1 
In Chapter 3.1, I examined the law’s differential treatment of the incitement of 
violence through its regulation of ‘dangerous speech’. In this chapter, I continue 
the exploration of how the state manages the risk of commission of violence, 
focusing upon the civil mechanisms available for the pre-emptive control of 
terror. 
The statement by former United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, 
above, emphasises the state’s role in recognising threats of harm to its citizens, 
and protecting against those threats. In relation to both terrorism and domestic 
violence, there are legislative schemes in place for the issuance of 
(respectively) control orders and protection orders, which both have the goal of 
preventing violence through restrictions imposed upon respondents.  
However, the mechanisms by which the state pursues its objective of 
preventing harm differ according to the type of violence sought to be regulated. 
These differences are reflective of the distinction already identified in Chapter 
2.3 between the public conceptualisation of harm in relation to terrorism, and 
the private in relation to domestic and family violence. They also, in certain 
respects, reflect and reinforce the notion of terrorism as a form of ideological 
violence compared to domestic violence as a problem related to individual 
persons or relationships discussed in Chapter 2.2. 
In the first section of this chapter, I outline the legislative schemes for issuance 
of control orders in relation to terrorism,2 and protection orders in relation to 
domestic violence. I argue that the concept of national security that underlies 
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 Dulles (1957), p 715. 
2
 I do not consider here ‘preventative detention orders’, which allow for periods of detention without charge 
of those suspected of involvement in terrorist activity for the purpose of preventing an imminent terrorist 
attack. For commentary on preventative detention see for example McInnis (2006); Lynch and Reilly 
(2007); Rose and Nestorovska (2007). 
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the control order legislation is a gendered one that constructs a certain type of 
harm as constituting a ‘threat to the state’. Associated with this is the discourse 
of ‘risk’ that surrounds discussions of controlling terror, but not control of 
domestic violence. 
In the second section, I compare the different schemes both in terms of the 
legislation itself, and how it is applied. In the course of this examination, I draw 
upon the analysis from Chapters 2.2 and 2.3 and further examine the different 
discursive mechanisms used in legislation and by courts to describe domestic 
violence and terrorism. The different civil order responses available both reflect 
and perpetuate these different constructions of violence. 
Throughout this chapter, I further explore the ways in which the law’s 
phallocentrism is reflected in the differential constructions of terrorism and 
domestic violence.3 As in the previous chapter, I am concerned to examine the 
ways in which these constructions of violence reflect power relationships that 
are manifested within the law and within society more broadly. 
Legislative Regimes for Terrorism Control Orders and Domestic 
Violence Protection Orders and the Gendered Concept of ‘National 
Security’ 
 
As set out above, Australian legislation applies two different regimes in relation 
to what might generally be described as ‘control orders’ – that is, orders that 
restrict people’s movements, on the civil standard of proof, resulting in a 
criminal offence if violated. The purpose of the different regimes is essentially 
the same: to protect against the risk of harm occurring. In the case of domestic 
violence ‘protection orders’, the risk protected against is the risk of an act of 
domestic violence being perpetrated by the respondent against a partner or 
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 Smart (1989), pp 27ff. 
193 
 
family member.4 In the case of terrorism ‘control orders’ it is to protect against 
the risk of an act of terrorism.5  
In Thomas v Mowbray,6 the High Court by majority found that federal control 
order provisions were constitutionally valid and supported by the defence 
power. However, as a precautionary measure, all states and territories had 
agreed to delegate their legislative power to the Commonwealth.7 This form of 
delegation is permissible pursuant to section 51(xxxvii) of the Constitution, but 
is exercised rarely, and only in situations where the problem is perceived as 
important enough to warrant joint cooperation across all states and territories.8  
By contrast, despite the publication of Model Domestic Violence Laws in 1999,9 
intended as a template for state and territory laws, each jurisdiction continues to 
maintain a separate regime in relation to the granting of protection orders in 
domestic violence matters.10 The Australian government has ratified the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,11 
and as a member of the United Nations, has obligations to ‘pursue by all 
appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating violence against 
women’ pursuant to the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against 
Women.12 These international obligations arguably enliven the external affairs 
power, such that international obligations to suppress and eliminate violence 
against women could form the basis of federal legislation.13  
The fact that Australia has not enacted federal legislation to suppress domestic 
violence suggests that violence against women is not conceptualised as a 
                                                          
4
 For examples see Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s 9; Domestic and Family 
Violence Act 2007 (NT) s 3; Domestic and Family Violence Act 1989 (Qld) s 3A; Family Violence 
Protection Act 2008 (Vic) preamble; Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas). 
5
 Explanatory Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth), pp 1, 15. 
6
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 These instruments have supported the enactment of offences of sexual trafficking and child sex tourism: 
Bronitt and McSherry (2010), p 149. 
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threat to national security in the way that terrorism is conceived.14 National 
security is, I suggest, a gendered construct in the same way that the concept of 
‘public’ in the context of terrorism legislation is a gendered construct.15 What is 
defined as a threat to national security will, within the phallocentric context of 
the law, be what constitutes a threat to masculinist interests.16 The concept of 
national security is based on the protection of the state from threats exterior to 
it.17 Acts of violence that threaten public places and buildings, and potentially 
the government itself, will, within this paradigm, constitute a threat to national 
security.18  
Threats to national security, associated with ‘moral panics’ about sudden 
epidemics of crime, have also been used to justify national laws in a range of 
other areas, including people smuggling, organised crime, sexual slavery and 
cybercrime.19 In the case of people smuggling laws, the trend towards tougher 
immigration policy was accompanied (and facilitated) by a discursive transition 
from discussion of immigration policy towards ‘national security’.20 This 
rhetorical shift in government policy illustrates that the concept of ‘national 
security’ does not pre-exist the discourse in which it is constructed. The state 
determines and constructs threats to national security in the context of political 
expediency and the relations of power that operate both in the political and legal 
spheres. 
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 ‘National security’ is defined as ‘Australia’s defence, security, international relations or law enforcement 
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On the other hand, violence that impacts almost exclusively on women, within a 
domestic context, is not conceptualised as a threat to national security, even 
though the infliction of such violence is widespread and systematic. The 
different legislative regimes in relation to civil orders are outlined below. 
 
Terrorism Control Orders 
 
The federal scheme for issuing control orders is contained in Division 104 of the 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), which was introduced by the Anti-Terrorism Act 
(No 2) 2005 (Cth). One of the principal features of the Anti-Terrorism (No 2) Act 
was said to be ‘ ... a new regime to allow for ‘control orders’ that will allow for 
the overt close monitoring of terrorist suspects who pose a risk to the 
community’.21 
A senior AFP member may make an application to an issuing court for an 
interim control order.22 The Attorney-General’s consent is required for such an 
application, unless it is urgent, in which case consent must be obtained after the 
event.23 The applicant must subsequently elect whether to confirm the control 
order, and if such an election is made, must serve the respondent with the facts 
provided to the court as to why the order should be made and the explanation of 
the reasons for each of the conditions. There is an exception, however, where 
compliance would require the disclosure of information that would prejudice 
national security, or put at risk law enforcement operations or public safety.24  
The respondent is entitled to be heard at the confirmation hearing, and the court 
may then declare the order void, revoke the order, or confirm the order with or 
without variation.25 A person in respect of whom a confirmed order is made may 
apply at any time to revoke or vary it.26 The Commissioner of the AFP must 
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 Explanatory Memorandum, Anti-Terrorism (No 2) Act 2005 (Cth). 
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 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 104.2, 104.3. 
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 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 104.8, 104.9. 
24
 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 104.12A. 
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 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 104.14. 
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 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 104.18. 
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apply to the court to revoke the order, or vary conditions, if either the order itself 
or any condition is no longer necessary.27 The Commissioner may also apply to 
have conditions added to an existing control order if he or she considers on 
reasonable grounds that it would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist 
act.28 
The test for the granting of a control order is whether the order would 
substantially assist in preventing a terrorist attack, or whether the subject of the 
order provided training to, or received training from, a terrorist organisation. The 
court is required to be satisfied in relation to one of these on the balance of 
probabilities at the time of making an interim control order, at the time of 
determining whether the order should be confirmed, and at the time of any 
application for revocation or variation of the order.29 Each of the obligations, 
prohibitions and restrictions to be placed on the subject must be reasonably 
necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of 
protecting the public from a terrorist act.30 The same applies to any additional 
conditions the Commissioner applies to have added to an existing control 
order.31 
 
Domestic Violence Protection Orders 
 
Each state and territory has a legislative scheme in place for the granting of civil 
orders variously referred to as ‘domestic violence orders’, ‘family violence 
orders’, ‘intervention orders’ and ‘family violence intervention orders’.32 The 
legislative schemes vary across jurisdictions, and some of these variations are 
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 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 104.19. 
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 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 104.23(1). 
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 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 104.4(1)(c), 104.14, 104.20. 
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 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 104.4(1)(d) (interim control orders). 
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 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 104.24(1)(b). 
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 These legislative schemes are contained in Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2008 (ACT); 
Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW); Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT); 
Domestic and Family Violence Act 1989 (Qld); Domestic Violence Act 1994 (SA) replaced by Intervention 
Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA); Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas); Family Violence Protection 
Act 2008 (Vic); Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA). For an overview of the various provisions see Annexure 
B. 
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outlined in more detail below. The various provisions are outlined in Annexure 
B. Orders can be obtained in most jurisdictions on the application of police, or of 
the person seeking an order.33 Orders can be obtained in all jurisdictions for the 
protection of family members, including domestic partners and former partners, 
and in some jurisdictions extends to persons outside the family and domestic 
relationship.34 
Before making an order, a court must usually be satisfied that there is a 
likelihood of an act of violence occurring absent the making of an order,35 and 
some jurisdictions have an additional requirement that an act of violence has 
occurred in the past.36 A protection order may include a number of conditions, 
including restrictions on contacting the applicant and other specified persons, 
‘ouster conditions’ removing a person from her or his place of residence, and 
restrictions on attending certain places associated with the applicant.37  
In late 2009, the Australian Government Solicitor prepared a report reviewing all 
Australian and New Zealand legislation relating to the making of protection 
orders. The report, prepared a decade after the publication of the Model 
Domestic Violence Laws report, found that there was general consistency 
across jurisdictions in terms of the types of conduct that may constitute 
domestic violence, and the grounds on which protection orders may be made; 
the types of orders and the kinds of prohibitions, restraints and conditions that 
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 Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2008 (ACT) s 18; Crimes (Domestic and Personal 
Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s 48; Domestic and Family Violence Act 2007 (NT) s 28; Domestic and Family 
Violence Act 1989 (Qld) s 14; Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) s 20; Family 
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2007 (NT) s 18; Domestic and Family Violence Act 1989 (Qld) s 20; Domestic Violence Act 1994 (SA) s 4 
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 For available conditions see Domestic Violence and Protection Orders Act 2008 (ACT) ss 35, 40, 48, 54, 
76; Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) ss 35; Domestic and Family Violence Act 
2007 (NT) ss 21, 22, 24; Domestic and Family Violence Act 1989 (Qld) ss 17 and 25; Intervention Orders 
(Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) ss 5 and 10; Family Violence Act 2004 (Tas) ss 16, 106B; Family 
Violence Protection Act 2008 (Vic) ss 81, 93, 95; Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) ss 13, 14, 36. 
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an order may impose on the person against whom it is made; the capacity for 
temporary orders to be made or obtained quickly by police in emergency 
situations; and the (criminal) effect of contravening a domestic violence 
protection order.38  
The report also found differences across jurisdictions, specifically variations in 
the maximum penalties for breaching protection orders, in requirements on 
police to investigate if a reasonable suspicion exists of domestic violence, and 
in the approaches to counselling and rehabilitation, with some, but not all, 
jurisdictions allowing counselling as a condition of a protection order for the 
perpetrator.39 
In the following section, I examine particular differences between the protection 
order and control order regimes. I argue that these differences broadly reflect 
the differential constructions of violence outlined in Chapters 2.2 and 2.3 – of 
terrorism as ideologically-motivated violence directed against the public, and of 
domestic violence as a form of private violence motivated by human emotion. I 
also explore the ways in which some of the differences between the civil order 
regimes further operate to differentially construct these types of violence and in 
particular terrorism as an especially serious form of crime. I am also concerned 
with the power relations underlying these discursive mechanisms, and the 
interests represented by the differential constructions. 
Differences Between the Civil Order Regimes 
 
Evaluating the Goals of Control Orders and Protection Orders 
 
A key point of distinction between state approaches to controlling terror in 
different contexts is the concept of risk. Risk management, and associated 
processes for identifying and managing suspect populations, represents a 
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central plank in the management of terrorism.40 This is driven by media-fed 
perceptions of the risk of terrorism, along with the need for the state to protect 
its own interests by being seen to manage the risks of harm to national 
security.41 Consistently with the conceptualisation of terrorism as an ideological 
crime that threatens the general public, the enunciated purpose of terrorism 
control orders is to protect the community against the risk of terrorist violence.42  
By contrast, domestic violence, as discussed in Chapter 2.3, is constructed as a 
crime that occurs within the context of individual relationships – a ‘private harm’. 
Consistently with that construction, the purpose of protection orders is 
expressed to be the protection and safety of individuals within ‘family 
relationships’ or ‘domestic relationships’, and the reduction of the incidence of 
violence within such relationships.43 Protection order legislation in the ACT goes 
so far as to describe domestic violence as ‘ ... a particular form of interpersonal 
violence that needs a greater level of protective response’,44 emphasising the 
perception that domestic violence has its origin not in the perpetrator but in the 
relationship. 
The discourse of risk that surrounds the treatment of terrorism is largely absent 
from legal and policy documentation relating to domestic violence. This may be 
about to change, with the recent ALRC Family Violence Report recommending 
that risk assessment frameworks and tools be promoted in relation to family 
dispute resolution in federal family courts.45 The report also made note of the 
risk assessment framework implemented by the Victorian government for use 
                                                          
40
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by all relevant stakeholders in family violence matters, and recommended that 
other jurisdictions adopt a similar framework.46  
Despite the use of some risk assessment processes in other jurisdictions,47 
Victoria appears to be the only state or territory where a full risk assessment 
process has been adopted in relation to family violence.48 The identification and 
management of risk of harm does not appear to be a feature of the treatment of 
domestic violence in Australia, although there has been a move towards a risk-
based model in various parts of the United Kingdom.49 A number of factors have 
been identified in domestic violence research as associated with risk of 
domestic homicide. These include women’s predictions of future risk and its 
likely severity; evidence of stalking; recent termination of a relationship by the 
woman; access to or ownership of guns; threats to kill; serious injury in a prior 
abusive incident; threats of suicide by the male partner; drug and alcohol abuse 
by the male partner; forced sex; obsessiveness/extensive jealousy and 
extensive dominance.50 
The absence of ‘risk discourse’ in relation to domestic violence effectively 
means that there is limited ability on the part of police, courts and other 
professionals to assess the risk of violence to a perpetrator’s current or future 
partner/s. Although there is little research currently available into repeat 
offending/victimisation in domestic violence cases,51 research demonstrating 
that the use of domestic violence is functional and a means of maintaining 
control within a relationship52 suggests that perpetrators are likely to constitute a 
risk of violence in successive domestic relationships. Indeed, there have been 
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many reported instances where perpetrators of lethal domestic violence have 
been noted as having previous histories of violence against other partners.53 
One of the consequences of characterising domestic violence as a feature of 
individual relationships is that the law fails to acknowledge the risk of violence 
posed by the perpetrator and carried with him from one relationship to the next. 
A system of protection orders that focuses on protection of a particular 
individual, who at a point in time is in a specified relationship with a perpetrator, 
obscures the risk inherent in the perpetrator himself and his ideological 
predisposition to violence. A civil orders regime designed to protect other 
women from this kind of violence might, for example, require convicted 
domestic violence perpetrators to report to police upon entering into a new 
domestic partnership, or require notification of the new partner, features absent 
from any scheme of protection orders currently in existence. It might also 
include an obligation on police and other professionals to report suspected 
instances or risk of abuse.54 It might also include the ability to issue an order 
restraining the defendant from committing violence against any woman, rather 
than just an individual.55 
Despite the existence of criminal laws in all Australian jurisdictions that allow the 
prosecution of domestic violence, the law’s response to feminist agitation about 
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domestic violence from the 1970s onwards took the form of a focus on civil 
orders rather than criminalisation.56 There is evidence to suggest that domestic 
violence protection orders are used as a substitute for, or alternative to, criminal 
justice intervention,57 and that it is usually incidents involving the infliction of 
highly visible injuries that are prosecuted.58  Some state and territory protection 
order legislation makes reference to holding the perpetrator responsible and 
accountable for his actions, suggesting that the civil scheme of protection 
orders potentially operates as an alternative to criminal prosecution.59 
The decriminalisation of domestic violence is consistent with legal discourse’s 
construction of domestic violence as a ‘problem’ both of the relationship and of 
individual pathology, which is best dealt with by separation of the parties, or 
‘treatment’ of the individual.60 Legislation in the ACT, Northern Territory, Victoria 
and Western Australia provides for counselling or treatment of the respondent 
as one of the possible conditions of a protection order, further suggestive of an 
avenue of ‘reform’ for perpetrators external to the criminal justice system.61 This 
pathologisation of offenders in domestic violence is part of a trend towards 
therapeutic jurisprudence evidenced, for example, by the growth of specialist 
drug courts and family violence courts.62 By contrast, this rehabilitative focus is 
absent from most official documentation in relation to terrorism; the focus is 
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clearly on improved intelligence and prosecution as a means of dealing with the 
problem, consistent with the characterisation of the terrorist as an ideologue.63  
One possible explanation for the emphasis on the civil regime is that police and 
prosecutors may be reluctant to proceed with criminal charges where the victim 
of the violence is reluctant to do so.64 However, this is at odds with legislatively-
mandated police investigation where a reasonable suspicion of domestic 
violence exists.65 Police reluctance to bring charges for domestic violence 
contrary to legislative mandate illustrates the way in which crime is constructed 
not only through law itself, but also the way it is implemented by police and 
prosecutors.66 
The law’s construction of domestic violence is paralleled in the language of 
government initiatives at both federal, and state and territory, levels. At the 
federal level, the Attorney-General’s Department, within the previous Australian 
government in 2006, instituted a range of reforms to family law proceedings. 
These reforms included the development of Family Relationship Centres, 
Specialised Family Violence Services and a Family Law Violence Strategy 
2006, focused upon the achievement and sustenance of ‘positive family 
relationships’.67 The reforms focused upon enhancing capacity within families 
for dealing with domestic violence as an alternative to criminal justice 
responses. Despite ostensibly addressing issues of family violence, the 
legislation sent ‘mixed messages’, with a continuing emphasis in family violence 
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cases on the importance of any child maintaining a meaningful relationship with 
both parents.68 The subsequent federal government took a different approach, 
focused on a broader definition of ‘family violence’ and strengthening the 
capacity of courts to vary the shared parenting approach where there is a 
history of family violence.69 
The Attorney-General’s Department also incorporates Family Violence 
Prevention Legal Services for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
communities, with a focus on provision of assistance to victims-survivors of 
domestic violence, in particular in obtaining restraining orders and victim’s 
compensation, or in family law proceedings.70 The principles underlying the 
program (not exclusive) are that all individuals have the right to be free from 
violence, that family violence is unacceptable, and that the community has a 
responsibility to work towards the prevention of family violence. While the 
Operational Framework does indicate that officers may assist with referrals to 
police, references to family violence as a crime and to criminal justice 
responses generally are notably absent. 
By contrast, it appears, from their scarce use to date, that control orders in 
terrorism cases will be used primarily in situations where criminal justice options 
have been exhausted, or are not available because there is insufficient 
evidence to prosecute. In Australia, only two control orders have been applied 
for and made to date.71 The first was an interim control order against Jack 
Thomas made on 27 August 2007, nine days after the Victorian Court of Appeal 
quashed criminal convictions against him.72 In his dissenting judgment in the 
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unsuccessful constitutional challenge Thomas made to Division 104 of the 
Criminal Code, Justice Kirby stated: 73 
This sequence of events inevitably gave rise to an appearance, in the plaintiff's 
case, of action by the Commonwealth designed to thwart the ordinary operation 
of the criminal law and to deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of the liberty he 
temporarily enjoyed pursuant to the Court of Appeal's orders.  
The second was an order in relation to David Hicks, made as an interim control 
order on 21 December 2007 and confirmed on 19 February 2008.74 The order 
was made in advance of Hicks’ release from prison on 29 December 2007, after 
serving a nine-month sentence imposed by the US Military Commission in 
Guantanamo Bay and served in Adelaide’s Yatala Prison.75 No control orders 
have been applied for subsequently.76  
The different concepts of risk and usages underlying these legislative regimes, I 
suggest, reflect the masculinist undercurrent of the law. How are masculinist 
interests served by the differences outlined above? Some might argue that a 
control order regime that places tight restrictions on potential terrorists benefits 
everybody in the community, and that no issues of gender are therefore 
involved. However, as MacKinnon notes, events such as September 11 are 
treated so seriously because men just as much as women are victims of such 
‘public’ attacks.77 As discussed in Chapter 2.3, an attack in the public domain 
constitutes an attack on masculinist interests.78 By contrast, domestic violence 
affects women predominantly, and therefore is not constructed as a threat to the 
‘public interest’ in the same way as terrorism. 
However, the law’s masculinist influence goes deeper than the gender identity 
of individual victims. Terrorism is a crime that directly, and sometimes 
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expressly, challenges the authority of the state,79 which has always been 
associated with the masculine.80 By contrast, violence by an individual man 
against an individual woman within the home does not threaten the authority of 
the state; on the contrary, it reinforces the natural order within the marital 
relationship.81 This is by way of contrast with a wife’s violence against her 
husband, which in its lethal form was at common law deemed ‘petit treason’ and 
punishable by burning at the stake.82 Although petit treason no longer exists, a 
woman’s violence against her partner is still conceptualised as a threat to the 
established order and treated accordingly.83 
That is not to say that all men are violent towards all women they are intimately 
involved with – far from it – however when such violence perpetuates power 
differentials between men and women, masculinist interests benefit. The focus 
on risk, and in particular the risk to national security, represented by terrorism 
legitimises restrictive measures for dealing with those risks, potentially at the 
expense of civil liberties.84 It is noted that despite criticism from a civil liberties 
perspective,85 the test for the granting of control orders remains as indicated 
above, absent a requirement to demonstrate an imminent act, threat or plan of 
violence. The absence of risk as a focus in domestic violence means that 
measures applied are likely to be less restrictive of perpetrator behaviour. 
In the following section, I develop this theme through an examination of more 
specific aspects of the civil order schemes. 
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General Rules Relating to Application and Making of Orders 
 
The Grounds for Making an Order 
 
One of the key differences between the requirements for issuing control orders 
and protection orders is the necessity of showing that an act of violence has 
been committed or is likely to be committed.86 There is no such requirement in 
relation to an application for a terrorism control order: the court must be 
satisfied either that the respondent has trained with or provided training to, a 
terrorist organisation, or that the making of an order would substantially assist in 
preventing a terrorist act.87 Thus a control order can be imposed upon someone 
who has never committed or threatened an act of violence. The ‘substantially 
assist’ test for control orders may imply some kind of assessment as to the 
likelihood of a terrorist attack occurring.88 However even if the possibility of an 
attack is remote, control orders may still ‘substantially assist’ in averting that 
threat.  
The test for making of control orders is to be contrasted with the tests applicable 
in relation to protection orders, which variously require some demonstration of 
likelihood or a reasonable apprehension that the defendant will commit an act of 
domestic violence.89 In addition, provisions in the ACT, Tasmania and Victoria 
all require that an act of domestic violence (or a threat) has already occurred.90 
Even where not expressed in the legislation, a requirement of repetition of 
conduct has also been interpreted as a requirement.91 The ALRC has 
recommended that it be a ground for obtaining an order if there is a reasonable 
fear of violence (not a subjective fear) without the requirement of a past act of 
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violence.92 While a purely objective test has the advantage of dispensing with 
the need for proof of actual fear, the imposition of an objective test has also 
been criticised for failing to recognise the psychological impact of violence, 
particularly where there has been a history of control.93 A purely objective test 
also overlooks the fact that an accepted measure of the risk of future violence is 
the victim’s perception of the threat and its severity.94 
In recent years, legislative definitions of family violence have expanded to 
encompass broader aspects of controlling behaviour than simply physical 
abuse.95 However, protection order legislation in two jurisdictions limits the 
definition of ‘domestic violence’ or ‘family violence’ to acts of physical abuse or 
property damage.96 This effectively eliminates from the court’s jurisdiction acts 
of social and economic abuse that are frequently associated with acts of 
violence,97 as well as psychological abuse which under English law actually 
constitutes bodily harm.98 If the philosophy of restricting behaviour perceived as 
leading to a risk of violence were applied, as it is in relation to terrorism control 
orders, one would expect to see a more expanded definition of family violence 
incorporated in the legislation.99 
Why should the test for making a domestic violence protection order not be 
whether such an order would ‘substantially assist in preventing an act of 
domestic violence’, similar to the test for control orders? That would effectively 
remove the necessity for an applicant to establish either that an act of domestic 
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violence had occurred previously, or the likelihood that it would occur again. It 
would mean that protection orders could be granted in circumstances where, for 
example, a new partner had a history of violence against a former partner; 
following a first act of violence against an applicant, where it was not possible to 
establish a likelihood of it happening again; or where non-physical forms of 
abuse were occurring. Alternatively, legislation could contain a presumption that 
where an act of domestic violence has occurred in the past, it is likely to happen 
again (with the onus on the respondent to demonstrate otherwise). 
The different requirements for the granting of civil orders for domestic violence 
and terrorism reflect the phallocentric culture underlying the law.100 As outlined 
in Chapter 2.2, terrorism is constructed within legal discourse as the ideological 
violence of the ‘other’, therefore control orders are only ever likely to apply to 
those who are identified as being outside the ‘mainstream’. By contrast, 
domestic violence is a form of violence inflicted by men across a range of 
cultural, religious and socioeconomic backgrounds. To cast the net for granting 
of protection orders too wide would have the potential of subjecting a wider 
range of persons to possible protection order applications, including those who 
simply ‘lost their temper’ and ‘went too far’ on one occasion. Within this ‘non-
feminist narrative’ of domestic violence,101 the imposition of control orders would 
represent an impermissible restriction on the liberties of those whose violence is 
characterised as an ‘ordinary human response’ to the tensions of a domestic 
relationship. 
It might be counter-argued that if the law were reflective of masculinist interests, 
it would not provide for protection orders at all because male violence would be 
condoned. However, the law’s apparent protection of the interests of women 
through the granting of control orders is part of the pattern of inconsistencies 
within the law that Smart identifies.102 In providing for protection orders (and in 
other legal responses to domestic violence) the law reflects society’s rhetorical 
commitment to cooperating with its international obligations to eliminate 
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violence against women. However, the limitations on criteria for granting of 
protection orders are simultaneously reflective of an underlying minimisation of 
harm in domestic violence, as outlined in Chapters 2.2 and 2.3. In this way, the 
legal system overtly condemns violence while ensuring that those whose 
violence resonates within the dominant paradigm are not unduly punished. 
 
Practice in Relation to Applying for Orders 
 
As noted above, control orders can only be sought by AFP members, with the 
approval of the Attorney-General. By contrast, protection orders in domestic 
violence matters can generally be sought either by the police or by an 
‘aggrieved person’, which is defined differently across states and territories, with 
some jurisdictions allowing a broad range of applicants and others restricting it 
to spouses and particular family members.103  
There is a diversity of police practice across states and territories in relation to 
seeking protection orders. Some states and territories follow the model laws 
regime in requiring officers to seek a protection order unless the applicant is 
seeking one herself, or unless there is reason not to, which must be 
recorded.104 In South Australia and New South Wales, police make the 
application for the vast majority of protection orders.105 However, in other 
jurisdictions, police make the application in a much smaller percentage of 
cases, reflecting characterisation of domestic violence by some police as a 
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private matter for the applicant to take action on. In those jurisdictions, 
applicants are often left to make application by themselves, with or without legal 
assistance.106 
Although it is certainly understandable that some facility for individuals to make 
application for their own protection is included in legislation, the absence of a 
uniform requirement for police to apply for protection orders also reflects the 
characterisation of domestic violence as a ‘private’ harm rather than a public 
danger from which the police are responsible for protecting the community.107 
Similarly, the absence in most jurisdictions of any obligation on police to 
investigate where an act of domestic violence is suspected reinforces the 
conceptualisation of domestic violence as a private harm.108 
As indicated previously, it is not my aim in this forum to make normative 
arguments about how the law should deal with domestic violence or terrorism. 
There has been feminist criticism of pro-arrest and pro-prosecution policies in 
relation to domestic violence on the basis that such policies disempower 
women, and remove from their hands decisions about how to deal with 
violence.109 While the non-enforcement of protection order applications in some 
jurisdictions may therefore please some, it also reflects the construction of 
domestic violence as a private harm that is best left in the hands of the victim. 
 
Who the Order Protects 
 
In some jurisdictions, the definition of ‘aggrieved person’ or ‘protected person’ is 
broad, and extends to a range of persons in family or carer relationships with 
the perpetrator. In Tasmania the definition is limited to people who are married 
                                                          
106
 Alexander (2002), pp 87-91, 100, 118-9, 125-6, 140-1, 164, 173. This may also be a feature of the post-
9/11 diversion of resources away from ‘low policing’ of community matters and towards ‘high policing’ of 
terrorism and organised crime: Bayley and Weisburd (2011). 
107
 Conversely, when the police are involved, the State is seen to be acting to stop the violence: Alexander 
(2002), p 90. 
108
 Qld, NSW and WA are the only jurisdictions where police have an obligation to investigate on 
reasonable suspicion: National Council to Reduce Violence against Women and Children (June 2009). 
109
 Douglas (2007),  pp 221-2. For an overview of the conflicting arguments see Schneider (2000), pp 74-
86. 
212 
 
or in a significant relationship with the perpetrator.110 In South Australia orders 
were previously limited to partners, former partners and children residing with 
the perpetrator.111 However new legislation provides for orders for the protection 
of any person against whom it is suspected an act of abuse will be 
committed.112  
The extension of the range of relationships covered by protection orders has 
been criticised for ignoring the particular nature of violence perpetrated by men 
against their partners, and also for diluting the seriousness with which such 
orders are perceived.113 Consistent with the theoretical construct of this thesis, it 
is not the form of the orders themselves so much as the understandings behind 
them that I am concerned with. The extension of categories of ‘aggrieved’ or 
‘protected’ persons to include relatives,114 those in carer relationships,115 and 
other residential arrangements,116 while no doubt intended to extend the 
classes of vulnerable persons entitled to protection, does have the effect of 
obscuring any possible focus on the control dynamics particular to intimate 
relationships. The absence of specialised treatment of domestic or intimate 
relationships removes the possibility of characterising intimate partner violence 
as ideological or carried out for a particular purpose. 
The minimisation of the harm involved in domestic violence is further reflected 
in the relationship between the protection order regimes of the various states 
and territories and the provisions of the Family Law Act 1975.117 If a protection 
order is in place and the Family Court makes an order in the nature of a contact 
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order118 that is inconsistent with the protection order, the protection order 
(referred to in the Family Law Act as a ‘family violence order’) is invalid to the 
extent of the inconsistency.119 A court making a new protection order or varying 
an existing protection order is empowered to vary or suspend a contact order, 
however it must have before it material that was not before the court that made 
the contact order. It is also bound by the principles set out in the Family Law 
Act, which include the principle that a child’s best interests are met by having 
the benefit of both parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives.120 
Thus for women with children, the relationship between the Family Law Act and 
the state and territory protection orders regimes effectively means that the 
‘paramount consideration’ of their personal safety under the state and territory 
legislation is made subordinate to the ‘best interests of the child’, which includes 
presumptions relating to access to both parents.121 
Significantly, the Family Law Act itself also contains provisions for dealing with 
violence within family relationships. However, the regime contained within the 
Family Law Act is of limited utility, as police only have powers of arrest in very 
limited circumstances, and in other cases the applicant will be required to take 
action herself to enforce an injunction against violence.122 It was largely this 
inadequacy within the family legislation that led to the enactment of protection 
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order regimes by states and territories. However, the fact that the protection 
orders are, as indicated above, largely subordinated to family law contact orders 
creates a serious impediment to the implementation of effective measures for 
protection of women and their children. 
 
Conditions of Orders that Can be Imposed 
 
There are some similarities in terms of the conditions that may be imposed in 
respect of the different types of orders. For example, there may be restrictions 
on a person’s movement as to where they can go and when under both 
protection orders and control orders. However, protection orders in most states 
and territories focus on restricting contact with particular persons,123 rather than 
general restrictions on liberty, consistent with their objective of protecting 
particular individuals rather than the community at large.124  
It is worth noting that the restrictions that may be imposed under protection 
orders are usually expressed in legislation on an inclusive basis, leaving courts 
with discretion as to special orders that may be appropriate in an individual 
case. By contrast, the conditions that can be imposed under control orders are 
listed on an exclusive basis. However there are particular conditions that are 
expressly authorised as conditions of control orders that are not enumerated in 
the protection order legislation. These include requirements for persons to 
report at certain times and places, to wear a tracking device, and to subject 
themselves to the taking of photographs and fingerprints.125 To the extent that 
these conditions are appropriate options for control orders, it is not apparent 
why they might not also be utilised where appropriate in protection orders. The 
wearing of tracking devices, for example, might well be useful in terms of 
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monitoring the location of a defendant, especially where there had previously 
been repeated breaches of a condition not to approach the aggrieved person 
and police have in the past been unable to ascertain the respondent’s 
whereabouts.126  
Certainly, the requirement to wear a tracking device imposes a restriction on a 
person’s liberty that should not be imposed without good cause, and the control 
order legislation gives effect to that by requiring that each individual condition 
be reasonably necessary and appropriate having regard to the person’s 
circumstances.127 However, where there is a real risk of harm to a person in a 
domestic violence context, a tracking device may well constitute an effective 
preventative measure.  
In relation to the various protection order regimes, a near uniform stipulation is 
that the protection of persons from acts of domestic violence is paramount, 
along with the welfare of any children who may be affected by the behaviour of 
the defendant.128 However, jurisdictions are also close to uniform in their 
specification of hardship to the defendant (especially in relation to 
accommodation needs) as a relevant factor.129 This will often be important in 
the context of protection orders, as the protection of an aggrieved person may 
require an ‘ouster order’, which is likely to result in hardship where the 
defendant has no other accommodation available to him. There is evidence to 
suggest that despite the fact that legislation expressly authorises the making of 
ouster orders, courts are often reluctant to do so.130 
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The requirement that a respondent attend counselling is available as a condition 
of a terrorism control order,131 and also of most protection orders.132 
Counselling was not imposed as a condition of either of the two control orders 
that have been issued in Australia to date. The government’s recent Time for 
Action report placed emphasis on the importance of counselling as a strategy 
for reducing domestic violence, noting that accountability of perpetrators 
through formal justice needs to be combined with changing social and 
perpetrator attitudes through programs.133 However, a reference to the need to 
change attitudes or behaviour was absent from the Explanatory Memorandum 
to the legislation introducing the regime for control orders. It is also absent from 
the Australian government’s National Counter-Terrorism Plan.134 
An emphasis on counselling as a treatment for dealing with domestic violence 
offenders is consistent with the construction of domestic violence as ‘non-
ideological’. This is particularly significant in light of the fact that there is no clear 
evidence that domestic violence counselling is effective in preventing the 
recurrence of violence.135 Indeed, the assumption that counselling will have an 
effect on the perpetration of violence implies that it is an aspect of the 
perpetrator’s behaviour or psyche that can be ‘unlearned’, as opposed to an 
aspect of the perpetrator’s ideology that is entrenched through common 
assumptions and trenchant phallocentrism within Australian society.  
This is not to say that ideological belief may not be susceptible to change 
through participation in counselling, discussion and educational programs. The 
point I make here is that the construction of certain beliefs as ideological has 
the effect of channelling the persons who hold those beliefs away from 
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‘reformative’ options within the law and towards more punitive ones. Equally, 
the construction of motivation as non-ideological (as in the case of domestic 
violence perpetrators) has the effect of making available rehabilitative options 
for the ‘reform’ of perpetrators. This not only benefits individual perpetrators of 
domestic violence, but also reinforces the phallocentric myth that violence 
against women is not an ingrained aspect of Australian culture. 
 
Penalties for Breach and Prosecution 
 
A further distinction is the seriousness with which the legislature treats breach 
of a protection order or a control order. An offence of breaching a terrorism 
control order is punishable by a maximum of five years’ imprisonment.136  In 
relation to domestic violence protection orders, only the ACT imposes a penalty 
of five years’ imprisonment; all other jurisdictions provide for a maximum 
penalty of no more than two years’ imprisonment for breach.137 New South 
Wales alone provides that where a breach involves violence against a person, a 
sentence of imprisonment must be imposed unless the court so orders and 
gives reasons.138 
The Model Domestic Violence Laws recommended an offence of breaching a 
protection order, punishable by $24,000 or one year’s imprisonment in the case 
of a first offence, and two years’ imprisonment in the case of a second.139 The 
Working Group reduced the penalties applicable for breach in line with the 
majority of submissions to their inquiry, though the $24,000 penalty was noted 
as being higher than in Australian jurisdictions.140 Taking into account that the 
maximum penalty imposed by a legislature in relation to an offence is indicative 
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of the seriousness with which the legislature regards the offending,141 the 
different penalties applicable to breaches would appear to reflect the 
construction of terrorism as a more serious offence than domestic violence. 
In practice, it appears that police are reluctant to prosecute breaches of 
protection orders unless there has been a physical assault or property 
damage.142 Where prosecution does occur, Victorian statistics show that 
breaches result in a non-custodial sentence in more than 80 percent of 
cases.143 In a Queensland study, the majority of offenders were dealt with by 
means of a fine.144 Western Australian and Victorian reviews noted concerns 
that breaches of protection orders are dealt with leniently.145  
There have been no prosecutions brought in Australia for breach in relation to 
either of the two control orders imposed. As indicated above, protection orders 
are frequently applied for in circumstances indicating that criminal charges 
could have been laid.146 In my review of online sentences and appeals, more 
serious charges were generally laid where appropriate, however there were a 
few instances where it appears that more serious criminal offences would have 
been appropriate and were not charged.147  
Some jurisdictions have taken steps to recognise the seriousness of domestic 
violence by the introduction of specialised offences. The ACT, New South 
Wales and Tasmania all make provision for ‘domestic violence’ offences, which 
are ordinary personal violence offences committed against a person in a 
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relevant relationship.148 In New South Wales, characterising an offence in this 
way has the consequence that the offence can be recorded as a domestic 
violence offence on the offender’s criminal history, and in all three jurisdictions, 
also has implications in terms of the granting of bail. Tasmanian legislation 
actually criminalises economic and emotional abuse, making reference to 
control or intimidation of a partner.149 
Notwithstanding these developments in some jurisdictions, the pattern of 
decriminalisation of domestic violence, and the lower threshold penalties 
available for protection order breaches, reinforce the low status of domestic 
violence. By contrast, the majority of terrorism prosecutions in Australia to date 
have been for offences involving conduct at very preliminary stages of planning. 
Although research suggests that low-level violence in the domestic setting often 
leads to more serious abuse,150 there is no discernible trend towards 
criminalisation of preliminary or low-level domestic violence offending. This 
reflects the law’s conceptualisation of preliminary domestic violence offending 
as ‘trivial’ and not out of the ordinary. 
 
Criminalisation of the Conduct of ‘Aggrieved Persons’ 
 
Although an individual can apply for a protection order in most states and 
territories, this does not mean that the same person also has the right to 
consent to a breach of the order.151 The Working Group that drafted the Model 
Domestic Violence Laws considered a previous provision in Western Australia, 
which provided a defence to a respondent where the protected person had 
consented to the breach.152 They decided against such a provision on the basis 
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that it failed to recognise that a protection order is an order of the court and not 
an agreement between two people.153 In this respect, the Model Domestic 
Violence laws move towards recognising the perpetrator, rather than the 
relationship, as the cause of violence. This approach was also taken by the 
Australian Law Reform Commission in its recent Family Violence Report.154 
In the ACT, legislation expressly provides for prosecution of a person who aids 
and abets a breach of a protection order, including by initiating contact that 
would make the respondent in breach of such an order.155 In New Zealand, the 
standard non-contact condition of a protection order can be overridden by the 
express consent of the applicant.156 In Victoria, it is reported that ‘mutual 
intervention orders’ are routinely made by consent, requiring both parties to 
refrain from violence, even where there is little evidence to support violence on 
the part of the aggrieved person.157 However, Victorian legislation now provides 
that a protected person who encourages or allows a person to contravene a 
protection order does not aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of an 
offence.158 A provision with similar effect has been recommended in Western 
Australia.159 
The Court of Appeal in South Australia previously held that the Domestic 
Violence Act 1994 (SA) permitted of accessorial liability for protected persons 
who consented to a breach.160 However, South Australian legislation passed 
subsequently expressly excludes accessorial liability,161 and accessorial liability 
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is precluded in New South Wales.162 Similarly, the UK and US do not criminalise 
victims for complicity in protection order breaches.163  
Holding women criminally responsible for aiding and abetting breaches of 
protection orders reflects the law’s assumption that violence is a feature of the 
relationship, and that violating a court order invokes the responsibility of both 
parties. 
The difficulties faced by women in leaving abusive relationships are well-
documented and include financial and social impediments to leaving.164 There 
has also been increasing recognition of the fact that separation is a time of 
particular danger to women in abusive relationships and in that sense, 
remaining in the relationship is often a strategy of least resistance, given past 
experiences of the abuser ‘hunting down’ the complainant, and threats to kill or 
seriously injure the complainant if she leaves.165 However, this pattern of violent 
behaviour that underlies much domestic violence is obscured by the law’s 
approach to domestic violence. If it were recognised, the responsibility for 
complying with protection orders would rest squarely with the perpetrator of 
violence and no liability would accrue to an intimate partner for aiding and 
abetting breaches. 
Laying blame at the door of the victim for the perpetrator’s breaches of domestic 
violence is also consistent with the narrative of victim-blaming in domestic 
violence cases referred to in Chapter 2.2.166 In my case reviews, a practice of 
victim-blaming was identified other than in ‘aid and abet’ situations. For 
example, the complainant is constructed as the person engaged in coercion or 
intimidation without any consideration of the background to the granting of the 
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protection order or previous violence in the relationship,167 or both parties are 
blamed for the violence.168 The responsibility of the state to protect its citizens 
against violence169 is therefore diluted by victim-blaming discourse that sheets 
home responsibility to the victim for violence perpetrated against her. 
Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, I have examined a number of different aspects of the civil order 
regimes in relation to domestic violence and terrorism. Despite a number of 
similarities, there are also numerous differences between the schemes that I 
argue are attributable to the different constructions of violence as outlined in 
Chapters 2.2 and 2.3. 
The federal regime for terrorism control orders is aimed at protecting the public 
from the risk of terrorism, premised on the conceptualisation of terrorism as 
ideological violence directed against the public. Accordingly, such orders can be 
granted notwithstanding that no act of violence has taken place or is planned. 
Only police can apply for such an order (with the consent of the Attorney-
General) and the restrictions that can be imposed on the respondent include 
reporting, the taking of identifying material, and the wearing of a tracking device. 
Breach of such an order attracts a maximum penalty of five years’ 
imprisonment, higher than the penalties applicable for breaches of domestic 
violence protection orders in almost all Australian jurisdictions. 
By contrast, the protection order regimes are geared towards the protection of 
individuals who stand in particular relations to the perpetrator. Although police in 
most jurisdictions are able to apply for such orders, practice varies across 
jurisdictions, and applications are frequently left to the responsibility of the 
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individuals seeking protection. Unlike terrorism control orders, an applicant will 
usually need to demonstrate the likelihood of an act of violence taking place, 
and in some cases also that an act of violence has already occurred. The 
conditions imposed in relation to protection orders are usually focused on 
prohibiting the respondent from associating with the protected person, or 
attending places associated with her, rather than preventing violence by the 
perpetrator more generally. 
As well as reflecting the differential constructions of violence referred to in 
Chapters 2.2 and 2.3, the differences enumerated above also play their own 
part in constructing terrorism as a crime of utmost seriousness. In Chapter 3.3, I 
further explore the dimensions of these arguments in the context of sentencing 
of offenders for acts of terrorism and acts of domestic violence. 
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CHAPTER 3.3 PUNISHING TERROR: SENTENCING IN TERRORISM AND 
DOMESTIC HOMICIDE CASES 
 
Men (sic) are rewarded or punished not for what they do but rather for how their 
acts are defined. That is why men (sic) are more interested in better justifying 
themselves than in better behaving themselves.1 
In this chapter, I consider how sentencing decisions in terrorism and domestic 
homicide cases reflect the differential construction of violence identified in 
Chapters 2.1 to 2.3. The dual discourses of ideology/non-ideology, and 
public/private violence, described in those chapters are further explored here in 
their relationship to the various considerations relevant to the sentencing 
exercise.  This chapter follows on from Chapters 3.1 and 3.2, in which I 
examined how these discursive mechanisms operate in relation to other 
measures for the regulation of violence. 
In Chapter 2.2, I argued that despite the ideological nature of much violence 
against women, these motivations are consistently constructed within the law as 
based on emotion or passion. In this chapter, I build on the deconstructive 
process described there, and argue that the focus upon motives personal to the 
accused in domestic homicides has the effect of reducing sentences, because 
of the relationship between offenders’ motivations and the factors relevant to 
sentence. In the first section of this chapter, I examine general trends in 
sentencing, and identify a disparity in general terms between the sentences 
imposed for domestic homicide and those meted out to offenders convicted of 
terrorism-related offences. 
In the second section of this chapter, I examine a range of factors relevant to 
the sentencing exercise – deterrence, punishment, denunciation, accountability 
of the offender, recognition of harm, rehabilitation and the need for protection of 
the community. The interplay between ideology and each of these factors, I will 
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 Szasz (1973), p 686. 
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suggest, leads to a more severe approach to sentence in cases where the 
existence of ideological motivation is recognised. 
In this chapter, I compare the reasons for sentence in the relatively small 
number of cases where people have been sentenced in Australia for terrorism-
related offences, with sentencing of male offenders who have killed their 
intimate partners.2 I focus upon sentencing for domestic homicides, rather than 
domestic violence more generally, because homicide constitutes the ‘ultimate’ 
in criminal activity – the taking of a human life – and could therefore be 
expected to merit penalties at the higher end of the sentencing spectrum.3 
These sentences provide a useful point of comparison with sentencing for 
terrorism offences, which have to date all involved conduct at relatively 
preliminary stages of planning or preparation.  
I do not hypothesise that there is any consistent pattern in quantitative terms in 
sentencing offenders of either type of violence. The sentencing process is 
purported to be one of ‘instinctive synthesis’,4 a philosophy that provides an 
incredibly broad scope for judges to place more weight on particular factors to 
justify the penalties they wish to impose in an individual case. Within the 
inherently inconsistent framework of the legal system,5 there will always be the 
‘exceptions that prove the rule’ – the severe sentence meted out to a man who 
kills his partner, or a terrorism offender who benefits from a favourable 
assessment of his character. However, it is possible to identify patterns in 
sentencing decisions that indicate that the ideological and public nature of 
terrorist offending is associated with harsher approaches to sentence. 
Throughout this chapter, I also reflect, as in previous chapters, upon the ways in 
which the differential constructions of terrorism and domestic violence reflect 
                                                          
2
 The means by which these cases were selected is outlined in Chapter 1.2. 
3
 The fact that the taking of a human life is the starting point in sentences for murder and manslaughter is 
consistently emphasised in sentencing decisions – for example see R v Blacklidge (Unreported, NSW 
Court of Criminal Appeal, 12 December 1995); R v Foster [2009] VSC 124 (Unreported, Osborn J, 2 April 
2009), [39]-[40]; R v Williams [2004] NSWSC 189 (Unreported, O’Keefe J, 22 March 2004), [8]. 
4
 Veen (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465. 
5
 Smart notes that the law is often conflicting, and can both benefit and disadvantage women at the same 
time: Smart (1995), pp 156-7. 
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the phallocentric underpinnings of the law.6 As discussed previously, the law’s 
consistent oversight of the ideological nature of much lethal domestic violence 
obscures patterns of inequality and the pervasiveness of masculinist ideology in 
society more generally.  
 
Disparity in Sentencing Between Terrorism and Intimate Homicide 
Offenders 
 
The criminal justice system in Australia reflects the country’s identity as a 
federation. The Australian government has the power to legislate only with 
respect to matters falling within Constitutional heads of Commonwealth power, 
with residual legislative power falling to the states and territories.7 Offences 
having a connection with a Commonwealth head of power are created by 
federal legislation,8 while all other offences are created under state and territory 
law, whether at common law or more commonly, through legislation. Federal 
jurisdiction in relation to Commonwealth crimes is exercised by state and 
territory courts,9 albeit applying sentencing principles set out in federal 
legislation.10 
Terrorism offences are created by Commonwealth legislation, by virtue of a 
referral of legislative power to the Commonwealth by all states and territories.11  
By contrast, ‘ordinary’ offences through which domestic violence is prosecuted 
(e.g. assault, damage to property, manslaughter) are created through state and 
territory legislation. The most serious of personal violence offences are the 
                                                          
6
 Smart (1989), pp 27ff; Smart (1995), pp 140-1. 
7
 Heads of power in relation to which the Commonwealth can legislate are found in s 51, Constitution of 
the Commonwealth of Australia 1901 (Cth). 
8
 Most importantly the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) and the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). 
9
 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 68. 
10
 Commonwealth sentencing principles are found in Part 1B of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). 
11
 Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 (NSW); Terrorism (Northern Territory Request) Act 2003 
(NT); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 (Qld); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 
(SA); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 (Tas); Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2003 
(Vic); and Terrorism (Commonwealth Powers) Act 2002 (WA). Federal terrorism legislation is also 
supported by the defence power: Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 307. 
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crimes of murder and manslaughter. A table of these provisions is found at 
Annexure F. 
As at the beginning of 2011, there have been only 29 individuals sentenced for 
terrorism-related offending in Australia. A list of terrorism sentencing decisions 
in Australia to date is located at Annexure D.12 
The first successful prosecution under specialised terrorism laws was Lodhi,13 
convicted of intentionally doing an act in preparation for a terrorist act, and 
possessing items in connection with preparation for a terrorist act. Perhaps the 
most well-known of the terrorism offenders, Jack Thomas, was convicted of 
intentionally receiving funds from a terrorist organisation,14 however that 
conviction was overturned on appeal;15 the Victorian Court of Appeal rejected 
an application to stay a retrial on the basis of fresh evidence.16 Thomas was 
subsequently retried and convicted of possessing a falsified passport.17  
Joint prosecutions involving multiple accused acting in groups have taken place 
in Melbourne and Sydney. In September 2008, a Victorian jury convicted seven 
of an original twelve accused of terrorism offences in the ‘Benbrika’ trial; two 
others, Izzydeen Atik and Shane Kent, pleaded guilty to terrorism offences 
arising out of the same circumstances.18 In 2009, five men were sentenced in 
Sydney for a range of terrorism offences, following their conviction by jury; four 
others – Mazen Touma, Mirsad Mulahalilovic, Khaled Sharrouf and one 
unnamed person, pleaded guilty to lesser charges and were separately 
                                                          
12
 The figure includes those sentenced for terrorism-related activity prosecuted under the ordinary criminal 
law. Note that some judgments referenced at Annexure F contain sentencing remarks in relation to 
multiple defendants. As at July 2011, three persons had been convicted of terrorism offences arising out of 
the ‘Holsworthy barracks’ plot but had not yet been sentenced: Saney Aweys, Wissam Fattel and Nayef el 
Sayed. 
13
  R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 364 and the subsequent appeal Lodhi v R (2007) 179 A Crim R 470. 
14
 R v Thomas [2006] VSC 120 (Unreported, Cummins J, 31 March 2006). 
15
 Thomas (2006) 14 VR 475. 
16
 R v Thomas (no 4) [2008] VSCA 107 (Unreported, Maxwell ACJ, Buchanan and Vincent JJA, 16 June 
2008). 
17
 R v Thomas [2008] VSC 620 (Unreported, Curtain J, 29 October 2008). 
18
 The sentencing judgment is R v Benbrika & Ors (2009) 222 FLR 433. The seven convicted were Abdul 
Benbrika, Aman Joud, Fadl Sayadi, Abdullah Merhi, Ahmed Raad, Ezzit Raad, and Amer Haddara. Four of 
the original twelve were acquitted, and the jury could not reach a conclusion in respect of Shane Kent, who 
subsequently pleaded guilty to reduced charges: Kent [2009] VSC 375 (Unreported, Bongiorno J, 2 
September 2009). A thirteenth man, Izzydeen Attik, pleaded guilty prior to trial: Atik [2007] VSC 299 
(Unreported, Bongiorno J, 23 August 2007). 
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sentenced.19 Belal Khazal was convicted by a jury and sentenced in September 
2009 for making a document connected with assistance for a terrorist act.20 
Another eight terrorism-related prosecutions have proceeded under other 
criminal law provisions rather than the specific anti-terrorism provisions.21 There 
have also been a small number of matters where terrorism charges were 
subsequently withdrawn, or where the accused were found not guilty after 
trial.22 
Notwithstanding the small number of sentences to date, it is still possible to 
make comment about the severity of these sentences in comparison to 
domestic homicide sentencing. The arguably disproportionate penalties 
attaching to preparatory terrorism offences compared to penalties for murder 
were the subject of comment when the Lodhi sentence was handed down in 
2006.23 Despite the fact that no actual attack was carried out or planned by 
Lodhi, his sentence was higher than the average New South Wales sentence 
for murder, and approximately six times the average sentence for manslaughter 
and dangerous driving causing death.24 
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 The primary sentencing judgment is R v Elomar & Ors (2010) 264 ALR 759. The other sentencing 
judgments are: R v Touma [2008] NSWSC 1475 (Unreported, Whealy J, 24 October 2008), R v 
Mulahalilovic [2009] NSWSC 1010 (Unreported, Whealy J, 30 January 2009), R v Sharrouf [2009] NSWSC 
1002 (Unreported, Whealy J, 24 September 2009) and another man ‘unnamed’ who pleaded guilty on 3 
November 2008 but whose name has been suppressed: Gilbert and Tobin Centre of Public Law,  
<http://www.gtcentre.unsw.edu.au/content/mazen-touma-mirsad-mulahalilovic-khalid-sharrouf-and-one-
other-man-cannot-be-named> (viewed 1 November 2011). 
20
 R v Khazal [2009] NSWSC 1015 (Unreported, Latham J, 25 September 2009). 
21
 These eight cases are Roche (Unreported, Healy DCJ, 1 June 2004) and the subsequent appeal R v 
Roche [2005] WASCA 4 (Unreported, Murray ACJ, Templeman and McKechnie JJ, 14 January 2005); 
Howells (pleaded guilty on 10 January 2006 to one count each of threatening to destroy by explosives and 
by fire the premises of an internationally protected person: Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence 
and Security (2006), para 2.38); R v Mallah [2005] NSWSC 317 (Unreported, Wood CJ, 21 April 2005); 
Della-Vedova v R [2009] NSWCA 107 (Unreported, McClellan CJ at CL, Simpson J, Buddin J, 21 April 
2009) and R v Vinayagamoorthy [2010] VSC 148 (Unreported, Coghlan J, 31 March 2010) (involving 
accused Vinayagamoorthy, Yathavan and Rajeevan). An older case involving a conspiracy to bomb the 
Turkish Embassy is Demirian (1988) 33 A Crim R 441; one of the co-conspirators was accidentally killed 
and the other was originally convicted of his murder, that conviction being overturned on appeal. The 
conviction for conspiracy to cause an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious injury was upheld. 
22
 Matters of Izhar Ul-Haque and John Howard Amundsen: see Australian Parliamentary Library, ‘Law 
Internet Resources: Terrorism Law’, <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/intguide/law/terrorism.htm#court> 
(viewed 23 October 2011). In 2007, Mohammed Haneef was charged with recklessly providing support to 
a terrorist organisation, however the charges were subsequently dropped: Rix (2009). Defendants 
acquitted after trial include Yacqub Khayre, Abdirahmen Ahmed (Holsworthy terrorism case); Hany Taha, 
Bassam Raad, Shoue Hammoud and Majed Raad (Benbrika terrorism case). 
23
 Kenneth Nguyen and Lisa Allen, ‘Bomb plot man gets 20 years’, The Age (online), 24 August 2006,  
<http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/bomb-plot-man-gets-20-
years/2006/08/23/1156012609641.html>. 
24
 NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, 
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Jack Roche, whose activities were also preparatory, received a sentence of 
nine years with a non-parole period of four and a half years, taking into account 
a reduction in head sentence of three years to allow for past and future 
cooperation, notwithstanding that he had voluntarily withdrawn from a 
conspiracy to attack Israeli targets in Australia and provided assistance to the 
police.25 Although the appeals of both Roche and the Crown against sentence 
were dismissed, McKechnie J in dissent would have increased the sentence to 
15 years with a non-parole period of nine years, slightly less than the average 
sentence for murder in NSW.26 
One of the primary reasons why the terrorism sentences that have been passed 
to date provide such an interesting comparison with domestic homicide cases is 
that they deal with conduct that occurs at a very early stage of preparation.27 To 
date, there has not been, since the 1978 Hilton Hotel bombing, any fatal 
terrorist attack on Australian soil.28 This places the terrorism offences in stark 
relief to domestic homicides, in which the gravest type of harm – the death of a 
human being – has been brought about by the offender, and which collectively 
result in the deaths of around 60 Australian women each year.29 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 <http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/bocsar/ll_bocsar.nsf/pages/bocsar_hc_mean0206> (accessed 3 
April 2008). It was reported in the media that the sentence was on par with the average Victorian sentence 
for murder, and roughly three times that of the average sentence for rape: Kenneth Nguyen and Lisa Allan, 
‘Bomb Plot Man gets 20 years’ The Age, 24 August 2006. NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research 
records that in 2006, the average period of imprisonment by principal offence for murder was around 16 
years and nine months and for manslaughter and driving causing death around three years and three 
months. Statistics for manslaughter alone (rather than manslaughter combined with dangerous driving) 
were not available. 
25
 Roche (Unreported, Healy DCJ, 1 June 2004). 
26
 R v Roche [2005] WASCA 4 (Unreported, Murray ACJ, Templeman and McKechnie JJ, 14 January 
2005). 
27
 It has been suggested that anti-terrorism legislation reflects the application of the ‘precautionary 
principle’ i.e. the principle that action is justified where the risk of harm is uncertain but the harm would be 
irreversible: Bronitt (2008). Porter and Kebbell (2010), p 10 found that none of the 21 convicted terrorists in 
their study was found to have been particularly advanced in planning for a terrorist attack. 
28
 A bomb planted in a garbage bin outside the Hilton Hotel, the venue for CHOGM, killed two garbage 
collectors and a police officer. A member of the Ananda Marga sect was subsequently prosecuted, 
however his conviction was overturned on appeal: R v Anderson (1991) 53 A Crim R 421. For a discussion 
of the legal aspects of the Hilton Hotel bombing see Beddie and Moss (1982) and for an overview of the 
events and aftermath see Head (2008). In the course of the 1986 attack on the Turkish embassy in 
Melbourne, one of the co-conspirators was accidentally killed but no civilians: Demirian (1988) 33 A Crim R 
441. The number of Australians killed in overseas attacks was 11 per year in the decade leading to 2003, 
and 55 per year in the two years prior to 2003: Leithner (2003), p 35. 
29
 Mouzos and Rushforth (2003), p 2. The most recent available figures record 62 female victims of 
intimate partner homicide in 2007-08: Virueda and Payne (2010), p 20. See also Summers (2003), p 79. 
Summers notes that such figures provide at best a guesstimate and notes ‘... basically, no one has a clue 
how many women are having the shit beaten out of them night after night in their homes in this country’. 
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In terms of preparatory types of offending, there is a continuum of conduct, 
beginning at carrying out pre-planning or planning activity in relation to a crime, 
right through to the completed offence. Some offences criminalise conduct at 
such a preliminary stage that they fall into the category of what Jeremy 
Bentham describes as ‘evidentiary offences’ or ‘presumed offences’.30 These 
offences criminalise conduct that is not inherently wrongful, but is often 
associated with criminal behaviour. The question in relation to these preparatory 
types of conduct is how the culpability of the offender should be assessed, 
based on factors such as proximity to the completed offence and whether or not 
the plan, if put into place, was likely to have succeeded, and what harm it would 
have caused.31  
In relation to attempts to commit a crime, for example, the law in some 
instances applies the same penalties as for a substantive offence.32 However, 
there has also been historical recognition that although one who attempts a 
crime is liable in the same way as a person who commits the substantive 
offence, he or she is also deserving of lesser punishment.33 In relation to 
conspiracy, it is accepted principle that a participant should be sentenced for 
her or his actions, rather than what he or she intended or planned but did not 
do.34 Involvement in a conspiracy is generally less serious than involvement in 
an attempt, particularly where the attempt is by a viable method.35  On that 
basis, one would anticipate that lower penalties would normally be applied in 
                                                          
30
 Schauer and Zeckhauser (2007). 
31
 The proper basis for sentencing in such cases has recently been the subject of discussion in sentencing 
the three offenders convicted of conspiring to plan to kill people at Holsworthy Barracks: Liz Hobday, 
‘Sentencing debate prompts fresh criticism of terror laws, PM, ABC, 24 May 2011,  
<http://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2011/s3225823.htm?site=melbourne>. 
32
 See for example the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 11.1(1). 
33
 For example, see Jowett (1892) Vol 9, pp 876-7 citing Plato: ‘Still having respect to the fortune which 
has in a manner favoured him, and to the providence which in pity to him and to the wounded man saved 
the one from a fatal blow, and the other from an accursed fate and calamity - as a thank-offering to this 
deity, and in order not to oppose his will - in such a case the law will remit the punishment of death, and 
only compel the offender to emigrate to a neighbouring city for the rest of his life, where he shall remain in 
the enjoyment of all his possessions.’ See also Bentham (1871), p 426. 
34
 Savvas v The Queen (1995) 183 CLR 1, cited in R v Roche [2005] WASCA 4 (Unreported, Murray ACJ, 
Templeman and McKechnie JJ, 14 January 2005), [32] per Templeman J and McKechnie J at [96]. 
35
 In Barot [2007] EWCA 1119 the English Court of Appeal held that a life sentence with a minimum term 
of 40 years should be reserved for a person who commits a serious attempt at mass murder by a viable 
method but is unsuccessful. Where the offence is of conspiracy and the act falls short of attempt the 
sentence should be lower: [60]. 
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circumstances where the substantive offence was not close to being carried 
out.36  
A proportionality between the proximity of preparatory activity to complete 
offence and sentence is not borne out, however, by the penalties applicable to 
terrorism offences that relate to conduct at quite preparatory stages even 
preceding the ‘planning’ stage.37 Consistent with one of the central purposes of 
the anti-terrorism legislation – to criminalise acts relating to terrorism at the 
preparatory stages as a preventative measure38 – even conduct that involves 
very early stage planning or preparation for a terrorist attack is subject to 
significant penalties.39 The lowest maximum penalties for terrorism offences, 
with the exception of associating with a terrorist organisation, are for offences of 
possessing a document connected with a terrorist act, collecting or making 
documents likely to facilitate terrorist acts (being reckless as to the connection), 
and being a member of a terrorist organisation, all of which carry a maximum 
penalty of ten years’ imprisonment.40 A number of offences, such as receiving 
or providing training to a terrorist organisation, directing the activities of a 
terrorist organisation, recruiting for a terrorist organisation, and providing 
support to a terrorist organisation (with knowledge as to the terrorist 
organisation) carry a maximum penalty of 25 years imprisonment,41 equivalent 
to or more than the maximum penalty for manslaughter in four Australian 
                                                          
36
 There is also some indication of public support for lower penalties in cases of attempt than where an 
offence has been completed: Robinson and Darley (1995), p 23. Where a risk of physical harm was 
involved, the degree of liability attached by respondents increased in proportion to the severity of harm and 
the probability of the harm occurring: 32. 
37
 An overview of the terrorism offences and maximum penalties is set out at Annexure G. McSherry 
(2004b), p 366 notes that the offence of doing an act in preparation for a terrorist act is very vague, and 
does not even require that the act be more than ‘merely preparatory’. 
38
 AG Dept’s submission to Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee re Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 (No 2) (Submission 383A, 1-3) cited in Gani (2008), p 272. 
39
 In Lodhi (2006) 191 FLR 303 at 318 the court noted that, ‘The particular nature of terrorism has resulted 
in a special, and in many ways unique, legislative regime. It was ... the clear intention of Parliament to 
create offences where an offender has not decided precisely what he or she intends to do. A policy 
judgment has been made that the prevention of terrorism requires criminal responsibility to arise at an 
earlier stage than is usually the case for other kinds of criminal conduct’. These principles were found to 
apply to offences in Division 102 of the Code in R v Ul Haque [2006] NSWCCA 241 (Unreported, 
McClellan CJ at CL, Kirby and Hoeben JJ, 9 August 2006). 
40
 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 101.4(2), 101.5(2) and 102.3(1). A recommendation by the PJCIS to 
replace the offence of being a member of a terrorist organisation with participation in a terrorist 
organisation was rejected: Government Response to Recommendations, Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Intelligence and Security, Review of Security and Counter Terrorism Legislation, tabled 4 December 
2006. 
41
 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) ss 102.5, 102.2(1), 102.4(1), 102.7(1). 
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jurisdictions.42 In the United Kingdom, legislation provides for a ‘whole life’ tariff 
in certain categories of murder considered particularly serious, including 
terrorist murders.43 In the United States, federal sentencing guidelines provide 
for increased penalties for those convicted of offences involving, or intended to 
promote, terrorism.44 
While there is no doubt a link between at least some of these types of activity 
and the carrying out of a terrorist attack, most of the activities fall far short of an 
attempt or conspiracy to commit a terrorist offence. The high maximum 
penalties applicable for these very preliminary types of conduct both reflect and 
reinforce the perception that terrorism is the most serious in the catalogue of 
criminal offences. By contrast, non-physical forms of violence that are often 
associated with the perpetration of domestic violence, such as emotional or 
financial abuse,45 are not criminalised in most jurisdictions, with the exception of 
Tasmania.46 Even offences involving the threat or infliction of physical force, 
such as assault, do not carry penalties as severe as the maximum applicable 
penalties for preparatory terrorism offences.47 In relation to ideologically-
motivated domestic violence, there is therefore no equivalent to the serious 
preparatory terrorism offences that offenders can be prosecuted for. 
It is not only in the applicable maximum penalties but in the actual penalties 
imposed that the effects of the differential constructions of violence are 
manifest. In her doctoral study of spousal homicides between 1980 and 2000, 
Rebecca Bradfield found that the median sentence for male spousal homicide 
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 Maximum penalties for manslaughter are 20 years in the ACT, Victoria and WA, 25 years in NSW, and 
life imprisonment in the Northern Territory, Queensland and South Australia: Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 15; 
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 24; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 161; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 310; 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 13; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 5; Criminal Code Act Compilation 
Act 1913 (WA) s 280. 
43
 Criminal Justice Act 2003 (UK); for discussion see Lacey et al (2003), pp 729-31. 
44
 Federal Sentencing Guidelines 2011 (US) § 3A1.4.  
45
 Pence and Paymar (1993), pp 2-3; Hunter (2006b), p 740. 
46
 Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) ss 8 and 9. Legislative definitions of 
‘domestic violence’ have expanded to incorporate non-physical violence: Fehlberg and Behrens (2008), p 
203. However, these definitions relate to the making of protection orders, not the criminalisation of 
conduct. Thus a type of non-physical abuse may constitute a crime if it is prohibited under a protection 
order, but not in and of itself. 
47
 For assault penalties applicable in states and territories see Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 26 (2 yrs); Crimes 
Act 1900 (NSW) s 61 (2 yrs); Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) s 188 (1 yr); Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 
335 (3 yrs); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 20 (2 yrs); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 182; 
Criminal Code Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 313 (18 months). 
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offenders was 18 years and 10 months for murder, and seven years and three 
months for manslaughter.48 The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal has 
noted that in relation to intimate homicides, sentences of twenty years or more 
have generally been reserved for those matters where the killing was 
premeditated or particularly brutal.49 
By comparison, the head sentences of between 23 and 28 years handed out to 
the offenders in Elomar for conspiracy to commit terrorist acts appear quite 
severe, taking into consideration that no decision had been made by the 
conspirators in relation to the nature of any attack, its target, or who would carry 
it out.50 Of the terrorism offenders who have been sentenced to less than 
Bradfield’s median sentence for male spousal manslaughter offenders, all 
involved fairly minor conduct far removed from the commission of an actual 
terrorist attack.51  
It is because of their application at a very early stage of criminal conduct that 
the terrorism cases provide an interesting comparison with murder and 
manslaughter cases where there is undeniably harm caused in the form of the 
killing of another person (for whatever reason), resulting in not only the loss of 
human life, but also the associated loss and suffering of friends and family 
members. The human, social and financial costs of a completed terrorist attack 
would likely be enormous, depending of course on its scale and success. 
However, in this analysis, that potential harm is measured against actual harm – 
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 Bradfield (2002), pp 334-6. 
49
 R v Toki [2003] NSWCCA 125 (Unreported, Levine J, Hidden J, Smart AJ, 13 May 2003), [31]. Warner 
(2002), pp 270-1 found that angry or jealous domestic confrontations attracted median sentences in 
comparison to the higher sentences imposed for premeditated murder in a domestic setting. 
50
 R v Elomar & Ors (2010) 264 ALR 759. A pattern of severe sentencing for terrorism offenders has been 
noted in the US: Zabel and Benjamin (2009), pp 41-5. 
51
 R v Atik [2007] VSC 299 (Bongiorno J, 23 Aug 2007) (five-and-a-half years for membership of a terrorist 
organisation and intentionally providing resources to a terrorist organisation); Benbrika v R (2010) 247 FLR 
1 (Abdullah Merhi and Amer Haddara) (six years with a non-parole period of four and a half for 
membership of a terrorist organisation; resentenced on appeal to four and a half years with a non-parole 
period of three years); R v Kent [2009] VSC 375 (Unreported, Bongiorno JA, 2 September 2009) (four and 
a half years and two and a half years concurrently for membership of a terrorist organisation and assisting 
to prepare a propaganda video for use on a terrorism website); R v Mallah [2005] NSWSC 317 
(Unreported, Wood CJ, 21 April 2005) (two and a half years for making a threat to cause harm to a 
Commonwealth public official); R v Mulahalilovic [2009] NSWSC 1010 (Unreported, Whealy J, 30 January 
2009) (four years eight months for possession of ammunition connected with preparation for a terrorist 
act); R v Sharrouf [2009] NSWSC 1002 (Unreported, Whealy J, 24 September 2009)  (five years three 
months for possession of a thing connected with a terrorist act); R v Thomas [2008] VSC 620 (Unreported, 
Curtain J, 29 October 2008) (nine months for possession of a falsified passport). 
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the death of an individual – which would appear to ‘even up the balance’ 
somewhat; the potential for huge loss of life (but none in actuality) versus the 
actual loss of life, albeit on a small scale.52 
The relatively severe penalties imposed upon terrorism offenders are no doubt 
reflective of a number of considerations, not least of which is the potential for 
harm on a massive scale inherent in such conduct. However, taking into 
account the very preparatory nature of much of the conduct being considered in 
the cases, I suggest that the penalties also reflect the court’s construction of the 
offending via the dual discourses of ideology and public violence. These 
discourses interplay with a variety of factors that courts take into consideration 
as part of the sentencing process, that relate to both the objective seriousness 
of the offence and the subjective characteristics of the offender. In particular, 
the construction of domestic violence as non-ideological contributes to more 
favourable treatment of offenders than might otherwise be expected.53 
From a comparison of the terrorism and domestic homicide sentencing cases, I 
have identified five aspects that illustrate the link between the dual discourses 
and factors relevant to sentencing: 
1. The presence of ideological motive in terrorism offending is perceived by 
courts as an aggravating feature, marking the violence as the product of 
a deliberate choice, and calling for strong deterrence, both specific and 
general. 
2. The possession of ideological motivation is linked with a construction of 
terrorist violence as planned and therefore intentional, while the 
association of lethal domestic violence with a spontaneous outburst of 
emotion means that it is frequently constructed as reckless or 
unintended. The culpability of the offender is directly related to the 
perceived need for punishment and denunciation in sentencing. 
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 See Turner (1975) 61 Cr App R 67, cited in R v Roche [2005] WASCA 4 (Unreported, Murray ACJ, 
Templeman and McKechnie JJ, 14 January 2005) at [103] per McKechnie J: ‘It seems to us that it is not in 
the public interest that even for grave crimes, sentences should be passed which do not correlate sensibly 
and fairly with the time in prison which is likely to be served by somebody who has committed murder in 
circumstances in which there were no mitigating circumstances.’ 
53
 Spatz (1991) draws upon research from a number of countries in arguing that there is widespread 
leniency afforded to men who kill their wives, both in terms of legal defences and sentencing. 
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3. Where offending is not perceived as ideological, and the victim is 
characterised as in some way responsible for her or his victimisation, the 
need to hold the offender accountable, and to recognise harm done to 
the victim and the community, is reduced. This is particularly relevant in 
cases where the partial defence of provocation is accepted. 
4. The presence of ideological motive is associated with strong commitment 
to violence and therefore poor prospects of rehabilitation, while the 
absence of ideological motive in domestic homicides is often associated 
with reasonable prospects of rehabilitation. 
5. Unlike the terrorism offender, whose violence is indiscriminate, the 
domestic homicide perpetrator, whose violence is targeted at a particular 
victim, is not perceived as a threat to the broader public, but only to the 
individual victim, meaning that protection of the community is a factor to 
be given less weight. 
 
In the following section, I consider each of these aspects in turn. 
The Relationship Between Offence Construction and Sentencing 
 
Analysing reasons for sentence in both types of case involves looking at one 
stage of the process of case construction,54 in which facts are variously chosen, 
ignored, obscured or emphasised in ways that result in differential constructions 
of terrorism and domestic violence. What common features may exist between 
the two are, through the construction process, obscured or obliterated so that 
the two offence types are made to seem completely different. As described by 
McConville, Sanders and Leng:55 
It must be emphasized that at each point of the criminal justice process ‘what 
happened’ is the subject of interpretation, addition, subtraction, selection and 
reformulation. This process is a continuous process, so that the meaning and 
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 McConville et al (1991). 
55
 McConville et al (1991), p 12. 
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status of ‘a case’ are to be understood in terms of the particular time and 
context in which it is viewed, a meaning and status that it may not have 
possessed earlier or continue to possess thereafter. The construction of a case 
is not confined to one aspect of the process, such as the creation of an internal 
record or the compilation of evidence, but infuses every action and activity of 
official actors from the initial selection of the suspect to final case disposition. 
Case construction implicates the actors in a discourse with legal rules and 
guidelines and involves them in using rules, manipulating rules and interpreting 
rules. It involves not simply the selection and interpretation of evidence but its 
creation. 
Thus depiction of the players in terrorism and domestic violence sentencing, as 
in all cases, is a process of construction. Although the ‘official actors’ I am 
concerned with here are members of the judiciary,56 it is important to remember 
that the process of case construction engaged in by judges occurs at a point in 
the process when a case has passed through the hands of other official actors, 
and been subject to those actors’ own ‘interpretation, addition, subtraction, 
selection and reformulation’. Decisions by police about which matters to 
investigate, and by prosecutors about when to proceed with prosecution, and 
what charge is appropriate, while not the subject of examination here,57 also 
play a critical role in the construction of cases.58 In the case of a sentence 
following a plea of guilty, the Statement of Facts agreed between prosecution 
and defence serves to construct the ‘facts’ of the case. For example, the 
presence of ideological motivation as relevant to a terrorism offence will be 
accepted on the basis of the Statement of Facts and any other additional 
material before the court, rather than the prosecution needing to call evidence 
to prove that element of the offence. 
In the Roche appeal, McKechnie J set out a number of principles applicable in 
sentencing for terrorism cases, which include the principle that terrorism is an 
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 In judicial decision-making, stories are told based on questions such as ‘Did it happen that way?’ and 
‘Could it have happened that way?’ that reflect unspoken understandings of how people act in certain 
ways: Lacey et al (2003), p 21. 
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 Although the acceptance by the Crown of a plea to manslaughter on the basis of provocation or the 
acceptance of provocation by a jury are discussed below. Decisions by police to prosecute for breach of 
protection order rather than substantive offences are also discussed in Chapter 3.2. 
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 Lacey et al (2003), pp 80-97. 
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‘abnormal crime’, requiring consideration of a range of penalties that do not 
necessarily correlate with ordinary, though grave, offences.59 The theme of 
terrorism, and the offenders responsible for planning it, as abnormal and 
‘Other’, pervades the discourse of construction in the reasons courts give for 
sentence. Through the possession of ideological motivation, the terrorism 
offender stands apart as part of an unusual class of offender who merits 
condign punishment. 
In the section that follows, I continue to deconstruct concepts in legal discourse 
such as ‘ideology’, ‘public’, ‘jealousy’, ‘anger’ and ‘danger’. I examine how these 
concepts are constructed in domestic homicide and terrorism sentences, and 
how they in turn provide part of the foundation for the exercise of the court’s 
sentencing discretion.60 Through ‘discursive manoeuvres’61 involving these and 
other terms, serious male violence against women is minimised in the 
sentencing process.  
These differential constructions interact with the purposes of sentencing, which 
are set out in legislation in some Australian states and territories, but generally 
reflect well-established principles of common law. They are deterrence, 
punishment, denunciation, accountability of the offender, recognition of harm, 
rehabilitation and protection of the community.62 
 
Ideological Motive and Deterrence 
 
One of the key purposes of sentencing is deterrence: both specific (meaning 
deterrence of the offender) and general (deterrence of the public at large).63 In 
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 R v Roche [2005] WASCA 4 (Unreported, Murray ACJ, Templeman and McKechnie JJ, 14 January 
2005), [115]. 
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 The way a defendant is treated is ‘closely linked to the stories he (tells) and the stories that (are) made 
of him, his victim, and the crime’: Strange (2003), p 313. 
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 Howe (2008), pp 54-6 referencing Allen (1987b). 
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 See for example Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 3A; Sentencing Act (NT) s 5; 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10; Sentencing 
Act 1991 (Vic) s 5. 
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 Sentencing Act (NT) s 5(1)(c); Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(1)(c); Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 10(1)(j); Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(1)(b). 
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legal discourse, the existence of ideological motivation points to a greater need 
for deterrence of both types: both those individuals who have indicated a 
willingness to act on their ideological motivations, and those who might be 
tempted to follow them, need to be deterred in order to protect the community. 
Within the law, ideological motivation is, as noted in Chapter 2.2, reflective of a 
‘subjective value bias ... an illusory view of the world’;64 it is thus not only an 
element of terrorism offences, but also an aggravating feature.65 The 
possession of ideological motivation places the offender outside the scope of 
normal offending and renders her or him ‘Other’.66 This is reflected by the use of 
words such as ‘fanatical’ (Lodhi), ‘extreme’ (Lodhi), ‘extremist’ (Raad in 
Benbrika) and ‘abnormal’ (Roche).67 An illustration is provided by the 
sentencing remarks of Whealy J in the New South Wales Supreme Court 
decision in Elomar:68 
The mindset evinced by all this material may be summarised as follows: First, a 
hatred of the “KUFR”, that is those Muslims and non-Muslims who did not share 
their extremist views. Secondly, an intolerance towards the democratic 
Australian Government and its policies. Thirdly, a conviction that Muslims are 
obligated by their religion to pursue violent jihad for the purposes of 
overthrowing liberal democratic societies and to replace them with Islamic rule 
and Shariah law. This criminal enterprise was not in any sense motivated, as 
criminal activities so often are, by a need for financial gain or simply private 
revenge. Rather, an intolerant and inflexible fundamentalist religious conviction 
was the principal motivation for the commission of the offence. This is the most 
startling and intransigent feature of the crime. It sets it apart from other criminal 
enterprises motivated by financial gain, by passion, anger or revenge [emphasis 
added]. 
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 Vincent (2009), p 17. 
65
 I do not use the word ‘aggravating’ here in a technical legal sense, as for the court to treat ideology as 
an aggravating factor in that sense in a terrorism case would infringe the legal principle that an element of 
an offence cannot be considered an aggravating feature. I use it in the dictionary sense of ‘to make worse 
or more severe’ than other (ordinary) crimes. In R v Mulahalilovic [2009] NSWSC 1010 (Unreported, 
Whealy J, 30 January 2009), [27] Whealy J noted that the offender was not being punished for having 
extremist beliefs, but the existence of such beliefs was relevant to the objective seriousness of the offence. 
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 The Victorian Court of Appeal has noted that moral culpability and objective seriousness may both differ 
according to the history and type of organisation joined: Benbrika v R (2010) 247 FLR 1, [555]. 
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 R v Roche (Unreported, Healy DCJ, 1 June 2004); R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 364; R v Benbrika & Ors 
(2009) 222 FLR 433. 
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 R v Elomar & Ors (2010) 264 ALR 759, [63]. 
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In a number of terrorism cases, courts have emphasised the particular 
importance of specific deterrence in protecting the community from this type of 
offender.69 Courts have also underlined the significance of general deterrence in 
sentencing terrorism offenders.70 The assumption is that offending of this type is 
a deliberate choice and therefore capable of suppression through the 
mechanism of general deterrence. For example, in Demirian, the court stated 
that, ‘Unless courts in this country are vigilant in imposing condign sentences 
for such conduct evil-minded persons might seek to emulate this conduct.’71  
Moreover, the extremism, fanaticism, and evil intention in terrorism offending 
are portrayed as part of the offender’s make-up rather than an aspect of her or 
his behaviour. This is reflected in phrases such as ‘deeply fanatical, but 
sincerely held, religious and worldview based on his faith’,72 ‘extremist views’,73 
and ‘intolerant and radical views’.74 Although both terrorism and domestic 
homicide offenders are frequently described as being of ‘good character’, the 
use to be made of this character is different. In domestic homicides, the 
offending is constructed as an isolated deviation from the usual path, rather 
than something associated with the offender’s nature.75 On the other hand, 
courts have emphasised that good character is to be given less weight in 
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 R v Mallah [2005] NSWSC 317 (Unreported, Wood CJ, 21 April 2005), [78]-[82]; R v Lodhi (2006) 199 
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 R v Mallah [2005] NSWSC 317 (Unreported, Wood CJ, 21 April 2005), [78]-[82]; R v Lodhi (2006) 199 
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 R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 364, [49]. 
73
R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 364; R v Sharrouf [2009] NSWSC 1002 (Unreported, Whealy J, 24 September 
2009); R v Elomar & Ors (2010) 264 ALR 759. 
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 R v Elomar & Ors (2010) 264 ALR 759, [139]. 
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 R v Margach [2006] VSC 77 (Unreported, King J, 8 March 2006); R v Hill [2006] VSC 149 (Unreported, 
Hollingworth J, 2 May 2006); R v Shepherd [2006] NSWSC 799 (Unreported, Hoeben J, 11 August 2006); 
R v Ferguson [2007] NSWSC 949 (Unreported, Michael Grove J, 27 August 2007). For historical treatment 
of ‘good breadwinners’ who killed their wives see Strange (2003). In the Israeli context, it has been noted 
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sentencing: First and Agmon-Gonnen (2009), p 162. See also Crocker (2005), p 210. 
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terrorism cases,76 although why that should be the case in terrorism as opposed 
to domestic homicide is not clear. 
The ingrained aspect of ideological motivation might suggest that deterrence is 
less likely to be effective in terrorism cases.77 However, deterrence is still given 
weight by the courts notwithstanding the possibility that it will not actually work, 
as illustrated by the following passage in Lodhi:78 
... [The] obligation of the Court is to denounce terrorism and voice its stern 
disapproval of activities such as those contemplated by the offender here. It 
may be argued that the imposition of stern penalties, in the context of firm 
denunciatory statements, will not in fact deter those whose religious and 
political ideologies are extreme and fanatical. But a stand must be taken. The 
community is owed this protection even if the obstinacy and madness of 
extreme views may mean that the protection is a fragile or uncertain one. In my 
view, the Courts must speak firmly and with conviction in matters of this kind. 
This does not of course mean that general sentencing principles are 
undervalued or that matters favourable to an offender are to be overlooked. It 
does mean, however, that in offences of this kind, as I have said, the principles 
of denunciation and deterrence are to play a substantial role. There is also a 
need to recognise that the imposition of a substantial sentence may have a 
personal impact as a deterrent on this offender so that upon his release he will, 
it is cautiously hoped, be unlikely or less likely to re-offend. In addition to 
general deterrence, the need to deter this man from future offences is a potent 
factor in the sentencing process. 
By contrast, the conduct of offenders in some domestic murder and 
manslaughter cases is minimised by constructing it as the product of tensions 
within the domestic relationship, rather than considering whether it is in fact a 
strategic use of violence rooted in a particular belief system possessed by the 
perpetrator. Not uncommonly, the seriousness of the violence is minimised by 
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 R v Lodhi (2006) 199 FLR 364, [91]; R v Khazal [2009] NSWSC 1015 (Unreported, Latham J, 25 
September 2009), [41]. Porter and Kebbell (2010), p 9 found that only six of 21 convicted terrorists in their 
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 For a critique of the deterrence approach in the context of terrorism, see Ilardi (1999). 
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‘euphemising’79 it as ‘domestic discord’ or ‘marital tension’.80 For example, the 
following description was given in Mills of how the offender’s conduct occurred: 
‘Their mutual resentments appeared to have festered over the years to reach 
their tragic culmination on 10 July 2005.’81 Alternatively, suggestions of previous 
violence are brushed over or ignored altogether.82 
The general failure to recognise the conduct of some domestic homicide 
perpetrators as ideologically motivated reflects the masculinist nature of the 
legal system. To characterise domestic homicide as an extreme manifestation 
of ordinary relationship tensions, to which anyone might be subject, normalises 
such violence, and obscures its deliberate use as a means of control that 
characterises much intimate violence. Minimising the violence inflicted on 
women also protects the state from facing the consequences of failing to deal 
with the violence.83 On the other hand, to recognise that many perpetrators of 
domestic violence make a deliberate choice to use violence because they 
believe they are entitled to would expose the existence of masculinist ideology.  
Even in cases of domestic homicide where there is strong evidence of a desire 
for control over a partner or former partner culminating in homicide, legal 
discourse frames this as emotion84 – usually jealousy85 or anger.86 In the 
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 Romito (2008), pp 43-6. Romito uses the term ‘euphemising’ to describe the process of labelling a 
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 R v Barry [2000] NSWCCA 138 (Unreported, Stein JA, Dunford and Sperling JJ, 13 April 2000) 
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Williams JA, Pincus JA, Cullinane J, 23 November 2000) (previous history of violence referred to as 
‘marital disharmony’); R v Gojanovic (No 2) [2007] VSCA 153 (Unreported, Ashley and Kellam JJA and 
Kaye AJA, 14 August 2007); Parkinson and Behrens (2004), pp 370-5. Cf R v Conway [2005] VSC 205 
(Unreported, Bell J, 10 June 2005) where the violence was characterised as carried out in a ‘state of 
possessive male rage’. 
81
 R v Mills [2008] QCA 146 (Unreported, Keane, Holmes and Fraser JJA, 28 May 2008), [14]. For similar 
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2006), [39]. 
83
 Coukos (1999-2000), p 36. 
84
 R v Culleton [2000] VSC 559 (Unreported, Vincent J, 27 November 2000), [17] (‘outburst of explosive 
violence’); R v Leonboyer [2001] VSCA 149 (Unreported, Phillips CJ, Charles and Callaway JJA, 7 
September 2001), [125]. 
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 R v Gardner (1989) 42 A Crim R 279; Stingel v R (1990) 171 CLR 312, 329; R v Tjami (2000) LSJS 309, 
[6]; R v Copland [2006] VSC 224 (Unreported, Eames J, 23 June 2006); R v Butler [2007] VSC 185 
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process, what might otherwise be conceptualised as ideological motivation is 
reconstructed as human emotion, which is less susceptible to the influence of 
deterrence.87 While the need for general deterrence in domestic homicides is 
commonly referred to,88 the need for specific deterrence is commonly afforded 
less (or no) weight on the basis that the act is isolated, and the offender is 
unlikely to offend again.89 As noted by Keane JA in Mills, ‘There is room for 
considerable doubt as to the practical efficacy of heavy sentences in deterring 
the kind of crime of passion with which we are presently concerned.’90 
In a rare exception to this trend, in Keir,91 Adams J acknowledged that ‘there 
are some men in the community who consider that marriage gives them the 
right to control the lives and welfare of their wives and to punish them when 
they do not comply with those demands’ and that ‘the assertion of such a right 
should be treated as rendering culpability all the greater’. Justice Adams made 
these observations in the context of imposing a 24 year sentence for murder, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
(Unreported, Curtain J, 1 June 2007); R v Andrew [2008] VSC 138 (Unreported, Forrest J, 1 May 2008) 
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 R v Tjami (2000) LSJS 309; R v Lynch [2002] NSWSC 1140 (Unreported, Whealy J, 20 November 
2002), [23]; R v Joseph [2003] NSWSC 1080 (Unreported, Greg James J, 21 November 2003); R v Brown 
[2004] NSWSC 194 (Unreported, Hulme J, 6 February 2004); R v Margach [2006] VSC 77 (Unreported, 
King J, 8 March 2006), [26]; R v Ferguson [2007] NSWSC 949 (Unreported, Michael Grove J, 27 August 
2007), [23]. By contrast, in R v Conway [2005] VSC 205 (Unreported, Bell J, 10 June 2005), Bell J referred 
to a state of ‘possessive male rage’ [8]. 
87
 Sherman hypothesises that police inaction in domestic violence may be due to the perception that 
deterrence will not work against ‘emotional’ crime: Sherman (1992), pp 43-4. 
88
 R v Baggott [2000] QCA 153 (Unreported, McMurdo P, McPherson JA, Mackenzie J, 3 May 2000), p 8; 
R v Hurley [2001] NSWSC 1007 (Unreported, David Levine J, 2 November 2001); R v Badanjak [2004] 
NSWCCA 395 (Unreported, Wood CJ, McClellan AJA and Smart AJ, 25 October 2004), [31]; Schubring; 
ex parte Attorney-General [2005] 1 Qd R 515, 524; R v Lem [2005] SASC 405 (Unreported, Doyle CJ, 
Bleby and Gray JJ, 28 October 2005); R v Hill [2006] VSC 149 (Unreported, Hollingworth J, 2 May 2006), 
[39]; R v Verdins; R v Buckley; R v Vo (2007) 16 VR 269, [93]; R v Gojanovic (No 2) [2007] VSCA 153 
(Unreported, Ashley and Kellam JJA and Kaye AJA, 14 August 2007), [40]; R v Boyle [2008] VSC 71 
(Unreported, Forrest J, 18 March 2008); R v Robinson [2010] VSC 10 (Unreported, Whelan J, 29 January 
2010), [45]-[46]. 
89
 R v Olig [2000] NSWSC 1246 (Unreported, Adams J, 21 December 2000); R v Goodwin [2001] VSC 519 
(Unreported, Coldrey J, 21 December 2001); R v Nicol [2005] NSWSC 547 (Unreported, Hulme J, 27 May 
2005); R v Hill [2006] VSC 149 (Unreported, Hollingworth J, 2 May 2006), [41]; R v Zammit [2008] NSWSC 
317 (Unreported, Howie J, 9 April 2008); Cf R v Verdins; R v Buckley; R v Vo (2007) 16 VR 269, [93]; R v 
Butler [2007] VSC 185 (Unreported, Curtain J, 1 June 2007); R v Galante [2008] NSWSC 319 
(Unreported, Adams J, 11 April 2008). 
90
 R v Mills [2008] QCA 146 (Unreported, Keane, Holmes and Fraser JJA, 28 May 2008), [29]. 
91
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[2004] NSWSC 1164 (Unreported, MW Campbell AJ, 13 December 2004). 
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notably higher than most of the sentences for domestic murder imposed in my 
sample.92  
The danger of exposing masculinist behaviour in the way Adams J did in Keir93 
is that the group of men who ‘consider that marriage gives the right to control 
the lives and welfare of their wives’ is not a small fringe-group, but a significant 
proportion of men in the Australian community.94 Recognising the pervasive 
nature of masculinist ideology would undermine the myth of gender equality that 
permeates Australian law and society, as well as the traditional liberal premise 
that the family is a safe haven. 
 
Ideological Motivation and the Need for Punishment and 
Denunciation 
 
The need to ensure that the offender is adequately punished, and the need for 
denunciation of her or his conduct, are both recognised purposes of 
sentencing.95  The weight to be given to denunciation and punishment will be 
directly proportionate to the offender’s culpability for the crime he or she has 
committed. In this regard, the court’s construction of the fault element – the 
mental element required to establish criminal responsibility – takes on particular 
significance. For example, a person who inflicts violence with the intention to kill 
will be more culpable, and therefore more deserving of punishment and 
denunciation, than one who kills with the intention to cause some lesser form of 
harm. Premeditation of an offence also increases the offender’s culpability.96 
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As noted in Chapter 2.2, although motive is not usually required to establish 
criminal responsibility, it may help to prove the fault element by providing a 
reason for the conduct.97 In this way, the obscuring of ideological motivation in 
domestic homicides is directly related to the construction of the requisite legal 
intention for the crime, and particularly whether the intention exists to cause 
death or grievous bodily harm. An offender constructed as ideologically-
motivated is more likely to be perceived to have deliberately acted with the 
intention to kill than an offender constructed as acting spontaneously in the heat 
of the moment.98 
When a person is convicted of murder, the jury must have been satisfied in 
each case that the accused acted with any of the intention to kill, the intention to 
inflict serious harm, or reckless indifference to the probability of causing death, 
in descending order of seriousness.99 In the Northern Territory, reckless 
indifference to life means a conviction for manslaughter rather than murder.100 
Sometimes the jury verdict will indicate a finding as to intention, but where it is 
left open on the verdict, it is the judge on sentence who determines which of 
these intentions the jury must have concluded was held by the accused. For 
example, a verdict of guilty of murder might indicate that the offender acted with 
either of the intention to kill or the intention to cause grievous bodily harm. The 
intention to kill, indicative of greater culpability, will be associated with a more 
severe sentence. 
In some domestic homicide cases, the deconstructive process reveals the 
judge’s construction of a less serious intention in circumstances where other 
‘facts’ of the case are indicative of an intention to kill. This ‘downgrading’ of 
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intention is consistent with characterisation of the conduct of domestic homicide 
offenders as personally rather than ideologically motivated. It is also likely to 
reduce the perceived need for punishment and denunciation in the imposition of 
sentence. 
This argument is illustrated by two case examples.101 In 2002, the NSW 
Supreme Court sentenced Kevin Lynch for the malicious wounding with intent to 
cause grievous bodily harm of his former partner Elizabeth Lynch, and the 
manslaughter of her new boyfriend Jason Phelps. As the basis for the plea to 
manslaughter was provocation, there could legally have been a finding of 
intention to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm, however Whealy J found that 
the accused only had the latter intention.102 That finding was in spite of the fact 
that he had simmered angrily over the victims’ relationship for some weeks prior 
to the event, broken into the house where they were staying carrying two 
knives, stabbed them both, and only desisted when hit over the head several 
times by Phelps’ sister. The judge noted that once Phelps’ sister had struck him 
over the head with the hatstand:103 
[He] must have come to his senses and realised what he had done. He did not 
display any further aggression towards either Christine Henry [Phelps’ sister] or 
her mother but left the premises quickly and in fact rang the emergency 
services ambulance to report the stabbing.  
Although this could easily be interpreted as a situation in which the accused 
was committed to killing the victims and was only stopped by an act of self-
defence, Lynch was in effect given credit for ‘coming to his senses’ and ceasing 
the violence as though he had done so voluntarily. 
In Vu,104 the offender was convicted of the murder of his former de facto 
partner, whom he had assaulted and raped on a number of occasions. She had 
left him, taken out an apprehended violence order (which he had breached on a 
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number of occasions) and taken steps to hide her address from him; she was in 
fact in the process of moving again when he broke into her house and beat her 
to death. The sentencing judge stated:105  
I do not think that the offender went to the deceased's home with the express 
intention of injuring her, but he must have known that if he went there violence 
would probably follow. He was well aware from his recent confrontations that he 
was likely to lose his temper. He knew that if he did so he would not stop short 
of beating up the deceased. The way in which he entered the deceased’s 
premises shows that he did not expect her to let him in. He must have known 
that there would be some kind of difficulty. 
In this case, despite the obvious indicators of premeditation and previous 
episodes of violence, the offender’s conduct was constructed essentially as the 
product of negligence, in failing to recognise his propensity for violence when in 
the presence of the victim. 
In terrorism cases, the need for punishment and denunciation is seen as 
particularly important.106 Some of the domestic homicide cases also make 
reference to the relevance of these factors,107 however, drawing upon the 
‘emotional’ context of the crime, there is a common theme of the offender 
having expressed remorse for his actions,108 which has the effect of reducing 
the need for punishment and denunciation to be factored into sentence. 
                                                          
105
 R v Vu [2005] NSWSC 271 (Unreported, Barr J, 1 April 2005), [19]. 
106
 R v Roche [2005] WASCA 4 (Unreported, Murray ACJ, Templeman and McKechnie JJ, 14 January 
2005); Lodhi v R (2007) 179 A Crim R 470, [79], [86]; R v Touma [2008] NSWSC 1475 (Unreported, 
Whealy J, 24 October 2008), [80]; R v Mulahalilovic [2009] NSWSC 1010 (Unreported, Whealy J, 30 
January 2009), [45]; R v Sharrouf [2009] NSWSC 1002 (Unreported, Whealy J, 24 September 2009, [60]; 
R v Elomar & Ors (2010) 264 ALR 759, [78]-[79]. 
107
 R v Bond [2001] NSWSC 1059 (Unreported, James J, 7 December 2000); R v Joseph [2003] NSWSC 
1080 (Unreported, Greg James J, 21 November 2003); R v Badanjak [2004] NSWCCA 395 (Unreported, 
Wood CJ, McClellan AJA and Smart AJ, 25 October 2004), [31]; R v Yasso [2005] VSC 75 (Unreported, 
Hollingworth J, 21 March 2005); R v Lem [2005] SASC 405 (Unreported, Doyle CJ, Bleby and Gray JJ, 28 
October 2005), [64]; DPP v Rhodes [2007] VSC 55 (Unreported, Curtain J, 8 March 2007); R v Butler 
[2007] VSC 185 (Unreported, Curtain J, 1 June 2007); R v Boyle [2008] VSC 71 (Unreported, Forrest J, 18 
March 2008); R v Robinson [2010] VSC 10 (Unreported, Whelan J, 29 January 2010), [45]-[46]. 
108
 R v Hawkins [2001] NSWSC 420 (Unreported, O’Keefe J, 24 May 2001); R v Hurley [2001] NSWSC 
1007 (Unreported, David Levine J, 2 November 2001); R v Hunt [2002] NSWSC 66 (Unreported, Dowd J, 
19 February 2002); R v Lynch [2002] NSWSC 1140 (Unreported, Whealy J, 20 November 2002); R v 
Newling [2005] VSC 54 (Unreported, Teague J, 8 March 2005); R v Margach [2006] VSC 77 (Unreported, 
King J, 8 March 2006); R v Shepherd [2006] NSWSC 799 (Unreported, Hoeben J, 11 August 2006); R v 
Andrew [2008] VSC 138 (Unreported, Forrest J, 1 May 2008); R v Mills [2008] QCA 146 (Unreported, 
Keane, Holmes and Fraser JJA, 28 May 2008); R v Foster [2009] VSC 124 (Unreported, Osborn J, 2 April 
2009). 
248 
 
Because the existence of ideological motivation is obscured, whether or not an 
offender has taken steps to disavow himself of ideological beliefs is not a 
relevant factor on sentence, as it is in terrorism sentencing.109  
 
Ideological Motivation and the Need to Hold the Offender 
Accountable and Recognise Harm to the Victim and the Community 
 
Two further principles of sentencing are the need to hold the offender 
accountable for her or his actions, and the need to recognise harm caused to 
the victim and the community as a result of the offending.110 Where the victim is 
perceived as in some way responsible for the harm committed against her or 
him, the significance of these considerations is reduced. In domestic homicide 
cases, this is pertinent in relation to the operation of the partial defence of 
provocation. 
As discussed in Chapter 2.2, the motivation of terrorism offenders, as 
constructed in contemporary sentencing decisions, is antithetical to the ‘ordinary 
way of thinking’.111 The notion of jihad, and the goal of punishing the ‘infidels’ or 
reacting against the liberal excesses of the West, are completely foreign to 
common understandings that underpin judicial decision-making.112 By contrast, 
motivations of rage, despair or jealousy as constructed in the domestic 
homicide cases, resonate strongly within the legal system. In its most overt 
form, this allows perpetrators of domestic homicide to rely on a defence of 
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provocation, in circumstances where they have allegedly been ‘provoked’ to kill 
by the behaviour of their intimate partners.113  
The test for provocation is whether the killing took place following provocative 
conduct, as a result of which the defendant suffered a ‘sudden loss of self-
control’ in circumstances where an ordinary person might have lost control and 
reacted in the same way.114 The ordinary person, so the law stipulates, does not 
share any of the characteristics of the accused except age, for the purposes of 
determining whether the response was that of an ordinary person.115 
Characteristics such as gender can only be taken into account in determining 
the gravity of the provocation. However, a moment’s reflection on the response 
of the ordinary man versus the ordinary woman brings into stark relief the 
gendered nature of the ‘ordinary person’.116 In fact, the High Court in Stingel 
acknowledged that the sexes may well have different thresholds of self-
control.117 However, as a matter of ‘equality before the law’, the lower threshold 
standard – that is, the male standard – is applied to all persons, although this 
operates to the detriment of women and the benefit of men because it is most 
commonly availed of by men who have killed their female partners.  
The defence of provocation traditionally allowed a man to escape responsibility 
for murder where he found his wife in bed with another man and killed her lover, 
and thus focused on male conceptions of sexual jealousy, anger, revenge and 
proprietary interest in his spouse.118 A violent response was considered a 
legitimate means of protecting the wronged husband’s honour, a clear example 
of ideology in operation. It was only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
that provocation came to be perceived as a concession to the ‘understandable’ 
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rage provoked by adultery rather than a deliberate (and justified) decision to 
avenge one’s honour. The focus turned more to the state of mind of the 
offender and whether the killing was a result of a ‘loss of self-control’ than 
whether the circumstances meant that the killing was justified.119 However, the 
idea that a lethal response is understandable in response to certain types of 
conduct by the victim continues to underpin the provocation defence. 
The law of provocation continued to evolve so that it came to apply to the killing 
of the man’s spouse as well as her lover, and further to situations where the 
accused did not physically witness the act of adultery, but was told about it 
either by his wife or a third party.120 Despite judicial proclamation that ‘mere 
words’ could never amount to provocation,121 caveats have been applied to 
make the limitation less than absolute, and recent cases suggest that it no 
longer applies.122 Of the 60 or so men who kill their intimate partners in 
Australia each year, it is estimated that about 50 of them kill as a result of 
jealousy, their partner leaving, adultery, or taunts.123 
The availability of the partial defence of provocation provides an incentive for 
offenders to construct their conduct as based on jealousy or anger; ideological 
motivation is reframed as ordinary human emotion, to make it fit within the 
defence. However, the gendered nature of this ‘ordinary’ human emotion is 
significant in terms of identifying the law’s masculinist influence. A successful 
provocation defence in effect amounts to a statement by the legal system that 
the ‘ordinary person’ could be provoked to kill a partner who left the relationship 
or threatened to leave,124 failed to look after the house or children,125 or insulted 
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his sexual prowess.126 Even where provocation is not available as a defence, it 
can be relied upon as a mitigating factor in sentencing.127 However, it is 
overwhelmingly men, not women, who kill in such circumstances;128 women 
typically have relied on provocation in circumstances more consistent with 
having acted in self-defence.129 It is therefore male interests that are served by 
the continuing operation of the defence of provocation in most jurisdictions, and 
its application in the circumstances described above.  
Through their convictions for manslaughter rather than murder, juries may 
demonstrate a willingness to accept that offenders have been motivated by 
emotion; in other cases, this may reflect the prosecution’s acceptance of a plea 
on this basis.130 Where provocation is raised and the jury convicts of 
manslaughter rather than murder, it means that they must have accepted either 
that the offender was provoked, or that he did not possess the intention to kill or 
cause serious bodily harm. In Baggott,131 for example, the accused was 
involved in a dispute over custody and property with his estranged wife. He was 
tried for murder and convicted by a jury of manslaughter. This was despite the 
fact that he had initially lied to police about the victim coming to his house, and 
the trial judge found that he had invited the victim over as a ‘ruse’ for killing her, 
suggesting premeditation of the killing consistent with both an intention to kill 
and an absence of provocation.132 
                                                          
126
 R v Farfalla [2001] VSC 99 (Unreported, Vincent J, 7 May 2001); R v Butay [2001] VSC 417 
(Unreported, Flatman J, 2 November 2001). Morgan notes that those judges who refuse to allow 
provocation to be left to the jury tend to focus more on the ‘separation’ aspect of the victim’s behaviour 
than comments in relation to the accused’s sexual prowess or related conduct: Morgan (1997), pp 248-9. 
127
 Warner (1996), pp 112-3. However, the decision in Tyne v Tasmania [2005] 15 Tas R 221 suggests 
that simply taking provocation into account on sentence may not result in such a significant sentencing 
discount. Where provocation is available, it has been noted that sentencing has tended to be higher than 
for manslaughter on average, however the lower maximum penalty applicable to manslaughter does lead 
to reduced sentencing: Stewart and Frieberg (2008), paras [8.10.75]-[8.10.76]. 
128
 VLRC (2004), p 29. For a critique of the gendered nature of provocation in the UK see Howe (2002). 
129
 Bradfield (2002), pp 145-6; VLRC (2004), pp 27-30. 
130
 For other cases not cited here see R v Miguel [1994] QCA 512 (Unreported, Fitzgerald P, McPherson 
JA, Derrington J, 25 October 1994); R v Stevens [2008] NSWSC 1370 (Unreported, Hall J, 18 December 
2008) (plea to manslaughter on the basis of provocation accepted, although there was evidence of 
previous violence in the days leading up to the victim’s death and the offender was found to have lied 
about the nature and extent of injuries inflicted on the victim. The more significant provocation was found 
to be the victim’s failure to fulfil her obligations as a mother due to her substance abuse). 
131
 R v Baggott [2000] QCA 153 (Unreported, McMurdo P, McPherson JA, Mackenzie J, 3 May 2000). 
132
 Lees noted in a UK study that provocation was commonly accepted where there was evidence of 
premeditation: Lees (1992). 
252 
 
In Butay,133 the lethal attack upon the victim followed a separation instigated by 
the victim and opposed by the accused. On the day of the attack, the offender 
had gone to the victim’s house in an attempt to persuade her to resume the 
relationship. Although the trial judge was satisfied that there was intention to kill, 
the jury verdict was guilty of manslaughter, indicating an acceptance that the 
attack took place in the context of a loss of self-control, irrespective of 
indications that the killing was the final stage in a series of failed attempts by the 
offender at reconciliation.134 Similarly, in Williams,135 the jury found the offender 
guilty of manslaughter by provocation on the basis that his partner had 
apparently threatened to smash his car windows. However, the offender had a 
history of violence, and subsequently boasted to people of killing the victim and 
dumping her body with legs splayed ‘so that the maggots and ferals would 
decompose her quicker’.  
A successful defence of provocation means that the jury must have accepted 
both that the victim offered provocation by her conduct, and that she did so in 
circumstances where an ordinary person may have reacted in the same way the 
accused did (that is, by killing her). In this way, the law expressly criminalises 
violence by men against their partners, but simultaneously through the 
construction of the offending behaviour and the role of the victim, lawyers, 
judges and juries reinforce subtle messages about acceptable and 
unacceptable male and female behaviour. 
A momentary consideration of how provocation might operate in the terrorism 
context throws the phallocentric operation of the defence into stark relief. In the 
mind of a potential terrorist (taking the Islamist as an example), Western 
nations’ treatment of Muslims (e.g. through involvement in the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, racial profiling in criminal investigations and community 
opposition to mosques and Muslim schools) might well be considered 
provocation ‘excusing’ political action, even to the extent of violence. Such an 
idea would be anathema to most Australians, and would no doubt generate an 
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outcry if argued before a court of law. The idea that a partner’s adultery, 
nagging or exit from a relationship could provoke lethal violence is equally, I 
suggest, anathema to most women. Yet the gendered defence of provocation 
has to date been abolished in only three Australian states, Tasmania, Victoria 
and Western Australia.136 That provocation can successfully be relied upon in 
these circumstances reflects the masculinist ideology underpinning the law. 
 
Ideological Motivation and Prospects of Rehabilitation 
 
An offender’s prospects of rehabilitation are relevant to the sentencing 
exercise.137 A sentence may be structured in a particular way to maximise the 
prospects of the offender’s rehabilitation, or there may be less need for specific 
deterrence if an offender has already been significantly rehabilitated.  
A common feature of the sentencing decisions in terrorism cases to date is the 
finding that the offender has ‘poor prospects of rehabilitation’, usually based on 
the strength of his ideological commitments and his failure to renounce them 
before the court.138 By contrast, courts commonly find that domestic homicide 
perpetrators have reasonable prospects of rehabilitation, notwithstanding the 
presence of other indicators that violence has been used as a strategy to 
exercise control over a partner.139 The different treatment is significant, given 
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that an offender with good prospects of rehabilitation is likely to merit a lesser 
sentence as there will be less need for deterrence, and less need for protection 
of the community. 
For example, in Prasoeur,140 the offender was sentenced for the murder of his 
estranged girlfriend, whom he shot after she ended their relationship. The 
sentencing judge found that there were good prospects of rehabilitation 
notwithstanding that the offender had continued to deny responsibility for the 
killing up until the trial, and had gone so far as to accuse a co-worker of having 
admitted to the murder. 
The case of Miles141 demonstrates how the same behaviour can be 
characterised as part of a spontaneous emotional reaction, and alternately as 
part of an ongoing pattern of violence against female partners. This differential 
characterisation in turn influences how prospects of rehabilitation will be viewed 
by the court. Miles pleaded guilty to murder and escape from lawful custody. He 
had been in prison serving a sentence for the murder of his former girlfriend 
Donna Newland, whom he had killed in 1992 after she left him and commenced 
a new relationship. While in prison, he commenced a new relationship with 
Yolande (Nadine) Michaels. Michaels started to withdraw from the relationship, 
and Miles escaped from custody and went to her house, killing her when he 
found that she was with another man. 
The murder of the first victim, Ms Newland, had been preceded by a barrage of 
letters written to the victim after she left. While in prison, Miles had written a 
number of letters to the second victim Michaels, which are suggestive of a 
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sense of entitlement to her, and a commitment to use violence to achieve his 
objectives:142 
I know you have a lot of confusion, but for fuck sake would you just turn to me, 
tell me everything and trust me. I do things babe, I am not a talker. Just ask 
Donna when I told her to stop playing games with my heart or I would put a hole 
in her heart. If I say I’ll do something, then believe I’ll do it. ... 
I will be interested to hear your response as this feeling of badness is quite 
strong. The horrible thing is I’ve only had this feeling once before and it turned 
out to be true, my worst nightmare. Just like what you’d see on a video.  ... 
If you… leave me… I’m staying alone for the rest of my life I will never trust 
another girl. It happened to me once, I get a girl, we are getting married and shit 
a guy with half my looks and style but a heap of money comes and steals her 
away from me. Anyway you know the story but I was 18 then and didn’t really 
know how to handle them situations. Today I would simply go over take his 
money flog him senseless and take my girl back. But I can’t fucking take it 
again, I really thought you would be my wife, you already said yes fuck ya. You 
can’t go Indian giving on marriage, well I hope you won’t baby, this is my last 
shot to get Nadine back in my arms where she bloody well belongs.  
The sentencing judge found that the threat implicit in the first letter was 
‘rhetorical’ and rejected the suggestion that Miles had killed Michaels on the 
basis that ‘if he couldn’t have her nobody would’. This was directly related to his 
finding that the offender had good prospects of rehabilitation in sentencing him 
to 25 years’ imprisonment for murder. On a Crown appeal against sentence, 
Stein JA agreed with that view. The majority of the Court of Criminal Appeal 
(Carruthers JA, Bergin J), however, found that there was no convincing 
prospect of rehabilitation in upholding the Crown appeal and imposing a life 
sentence.143 The threat was not merely rhetorical, and there was a harmony 
between what was threatened and what the offender actually did to the 
victim.144 Justice Bergin noted the similarities between the killing of Michaels 
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and the previous homicide of Newlands, including that each occurred after the 
victim had decided to distance herself, involved a barrage of letters and phone 
calls, use of a knife, and the claim that jealousy and anger led to the killing.145 
In Chapter 2.2, I discussed the tendency of courts to downplay or minimise a 
history of abuse against the victim, or a former partner, as a feature of 
personalising the motivation of domestic violence offenders.146 The process of 
divorcing a killing from the context of a history of abuse is consistent with 
‘playing down’ the ideological aspect of the attack. By constructing the violence 
as a one-off attack, or as unplanned or unpremeditated, it is easier to attribute it 
to emotional impulses such as anger or jealousy, rather than as indicative of a 
strategy of violence in furtherance of a cause. It also makes it easier for the 
court to find that good prospects of rehabilitation exist, and therefore that there 
is less need for specific deterrence.147 
Again, I suggest that these are aspects of the law that reflect masculinist 
interests. Certainly, it serves the interests of individual male offenders in terms 
of generating less severe penalties than might otherwise be imposed. However, 
constructing masculinist behaviour as an individualised expression of emotion 
also reflects the myth that there is no such thing as masculinist ideology. This 
myth allows that very ideology to flourish, while simultaneously maintaining its 
invisibility.148  
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Ideological Motivation and the Need to Protect the Community 
 
Protection of the community is a relevant consideration on sentence.149 In 
terrorism sentences, the principle is accorded paramount importance.150 There 
is an apparent link between this principle and the presence of ideological 
commitment; since one can never be sure that an ideologically-motivated 
offender will not strike, the protection of the community becomes an especially 
significant consideration.151 By contrast, because domestic homicide, like 
domestic violence generally, is constructed as a feature of a particular 
relationship, where that relationship has ended (for example, due to the victim’s 
death) there is no perceived danger to the general community. 
Unlike in the terrorism cases, in domestic homicide cases there is rarely a 
discussion of risk to the public, or the need for protection of the community from 
the offender.152 On the contrary, where the subject is raised, it is to note that the 
risk posed by the offender is limited to the particular relationship, or to intimate 
partners rather than to the public.153 This overlooks the risk of harm that flows to 
other persons within the life of domestic violence victims, as well as the danger 
to other women with whom the perpetrator may form a relationship.154 
                                                          
149
 Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) s 21A(e); Sentencing Act 1995 (NT) s 5(1)(e); 
Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 9(1)(e); Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 5(1)(e). 
150
 R v Benbrika & Ors (2009) 222 FLR 433, [69]-[85]. 
151
 In Barot v R [2007] EWCA Crim 1119, [37], the court stated in dismissing an appeal against a life 
sentence for conspiracy to murder: ‘A terrorist who is in the grip of idealistic extremism to the extent that, 
over a prolonged period, he has been plotting to commit murder of innocent citizens is likely to pose a 
serious risk for an indefinite period if he is not confined’. 
152
 Cf R v Robinson [2010] VSC 10 (Unreported, Whelan J, 29 January 2010): there was a need to protect 
the community from this ‘serious violent offender’ who had murdered two ex-girlfriends, 40 years apart; 
Spencer v R [2005] NTCA 3 (Unreported, Martin CJ, Thomas and Riley JJ, 29 April 2005). 
153
 Coker (1992), p 76. R v Lever [2001] NSWSC 1131 (Unreported, Bell J, 13 December 2001); R v Toki 
[2003] NSWCCA 125 (Unreported, Levine J, Hidden J, Smart AJ, 13 May 2003), [25]. It has been noted 
that in Israeli cases, divorce of the offender from the victim was identified as a factor decreasing the risk of 
future harm: First and Agmon-Gonnen (2009), p 162. 
154
 For cases evidencing serious violence against multiple partners see: R v Bell [2000] QCA 485 
(Unreported, Williams JA, Pincus JA, Cullinane J, 23 November 2000) (seven previous convictions for 
assault against applicant for restraining order and prior conviction for assault against former partner); R v 
Bond [2001] NSWSC 1059 (Unreported, James J, 7 December 2000) (offender had previously been 
convicted of manslaughter of a woman he viciously assaulted after a date); R v Wilson [2001] QCA 215 
(Unreported, McPherson and Williams JJA, Atkinson J, 1 June 2001) (convicted of wounding with intent to 
disfigure – previous history of violence against victim and other women); Miles v R [2002] NSWCCA 276 
(Unreported, Stein JA, Bergin J, Carruthers JA, 18 July 2002), [51]-[57] (offender had a previous conviction 
for manslaughter of his girlfriend); R v Lynch [2002] NSWSC 1140 (Unreported, Whealy J, 20 November 
2002) (offender not seen as a risk to the community despite two prior convictions for assault, one against 
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Courts in some instances have afforded leniency to perpetrators on the basis 
that otherwise hardship would flow to the family, indicating a privileging of 
sanctity of the family over the protection of women and children.155 Clearly, 
future female partners do not constitute a ‘section of the public’.156 In Keir, the 
risk to future partners was recognised, however this was distinguished from 
danger to the community more broadly, reinforcing the concept of domestic 
violence as an individualised crime:157 
... [It] is probably reasonable to assume that he does not represent a risk to the 
general population when future dangerousness is being considered. His risks 
within intimate relationships must be considered to be reasonably high. The 
history indicates that he became quite obsessed in this particular relationship, 
he may have even developed a degree of morbid jealousy although I cannot 
confirm that. The history however does indicated (sic) that his concerns about 
certain aspects of his wife’s behaviour were unhealthy and probably at an 
extreme. ... 
With his current position of denying the offending behaviour these issues 
cannot sensibly be addressed with him and this obviously has implications for 
resolving problems of the type I have described and this in turn impacts on the 
issue of his future dangerousness. I would not, as noted above, consider him to 
represent a risk to the general community but one would need to say that in the 
context of an intense emotional relationship of an intimate type he potentially 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the victim); R v Sievers [2002] NSWSC 1257 (Unreported, Sully J, 18 December 2002) and R v Sievers 
[2004] NSWCCA 463 (Unreported, Levine, Simpson and Barr JJ, 17 December 2004) (murder conviction 
of partner preceded by a murder conviction for a previous partner 20 years prior); R v Lyon [2006] QCA 
146 (Unreported, Jerrard JA, Fryberg and Douglas JJ, 21 March 2006) (breach of restraining order against 
ex-wife followed by domestic dispute with new partner and grievous bodily harm of ex-wife the following 
day); Norris v Sanderson [2007] NTSC 1 (Unreported, Riley J, 12 January 2007) (previous breach of 
restraining orders and threats against ex-partner); R v Ferguson [2007] NSWSC 949 (Unreported, Michael 
Grove J, 27 August 2007) (conviction for domestic assault 27 years ago but considered to be not relevant 
to sentence); R v Robinson [2010] VSC 10 (Unreported, Whelan J, 29 January 2010) (earlier conviction for 
manslaughter of previous conviction followed by murder of ex-partner). 
155
 Warner (1996), pp 111-2. 
156
 R v Lynch [2002] NSWSC 1140 (Unreported, Whealy J, 20 November 2002), [49]; R v Yasso [2005] 
VSC 75 (Unreported, Hollingworth J, 21 March 2005) (reference to extreme violence in context of 
controlling behaviour had a ‘very personalised nature’); R v Galante [2008] NSWSC 319 (Unreported, 
Adams J, 11 April 2008) (low risk of reoffending as premeditated murder occurred in the context of 
particular domestic situation); R v Mills [2008] QCA 146 (Unreported, Keane, Holmes and Fraser JJA, 28 
May 2008). 
157
 R v Keir [2000] NSWSC 111 (Unreported, Adams J, 29 February 2000), [8]. 
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does represent risk to the other person, particularly if that person chooses to 
leave him at some stage during the course of that relationship.158 
The absence of reference to ‘protection of the community’ in sentencing 
domestic homicide offenders is reflective of the construction of the ‘public’ 
referred to in Chapter 2.3. Where an offender acts violently due to a sense of 
entitlement to ‘his woman’ following separation, or to disobedience by his 
partner, the law generally finds no reason to believe that this same sense of 
entitlement will be carried on by the offender into subsequent relationships.159 If 
women constituted a ‘section of the public’ then protection of the community 
would warrant serious consideration on sentence, and would likely be reflected 
in longer sentences as is the case in sentencing for terrorism offences.  
The absence of community protection as a factor of relevance in domestic 
homicide sentencing is further evidence of the masculinist nature of the law. 
Where public interests are threatened by violence – as in the case of threats of 
terrorism – the law intervenes with heavy sentences for the protection of the 
community. Thus the law imposes condign punishment on those who pose a 
risk to public installations, to buildings, public monuments and transport 
facilities, where men (as well as women) would be potential targets. However, 
where the threat is specifically directed towards women, ‘protection of the 
community’ does not factor into the equation. Violence is constructed as a 
feature of individual (dysfunctional) relationships in which the victim plays a role, 
and is sometimes (as in the provocation cases) accorded responsibility for the 
harm inflicted upon her. There is no recognition of the fact that in many cases, 
the identity and behaviour of the victim is immaterial – any victim with whom the 
offender happened to have a relationship would be treated exactly the same 
due to the offender’s ideological leanings. To that extent, many domestic 
violence victims are in fact interchangeable in the same way as victims of 
terrorism offences. 
                                                          
158
 Note the degendering of violence implicit in this quote by reference to ‘risk to the other person’ rather 
than risk to other women, which is in fact the reality. 
159
 See comments by Adams J in R v Keir [2000] NSWSC 111 (Unreported, Adams J, 29 February 2000), 
[14]. Cf Vella v WA (2007) 33 WAR 411, [92] per Wheeler JA. 
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It might of course be suggested that the treatment of ideological motivation as 
an aggravating feature in terrorism cases serves not only patriarchal interests 
but the interests of all persons who may be affected by a terrorist attack, given 
the indiscriminate nature of such violence. However, the difference between 
domestic violence and terrorism is that while men are as likely to be the victims 
of terrorist attacks as women,160 the overwhelming majority of victims in 
domestic homicides are female. In terms of real risk to women, domestic 
homicide poses much more of a threat than terrorism. As Catharine MacKinnon 
notes in relation to the international response to September 11, ‘It is hard to 
avoid the impression that what is called war is what men make against each 
other, and what they do to women is called everyday life’.161  
Conclusion 
 
The differential construction of terrorism and domestic violence in law has real 
consequences for the way that violence is dealt with on sentence. The 
construction of terrorist violence as ideological violence directed against 
governments and the public results in higher penalties than might otherwise be 
warranted by criminal behaviour of a preparatory nature. Conversely, the 
construction of domestic homicide as emotionally-generated, non-ideological 
violence is, I have argued here, reflected in the penalties imposed on offenders 
of this type. This not only reflects the differential construction of violence, but 
also creates an incentive for offenders to frame their conduct in an emotional 
context,162 as this is likely to lead to benefits in terms of reduced sentences. 
In this chapter, I have explored a number of the ways in which this differential 
construction is linked to the treatment of offenders. In relation to terrorism 
offending, the existence of ideological motivation is perceived as an aggravating 
factor, and linked to limited prospects of rehabilitation and a strong need for 
                                                          
160
 Though note that there were approximately three times the number of male victims as female in the 
September 11 attacks (2303: 739): MacKinnon (2006), p 3. 
161
 MacKinnon (2006), p 27. 
162
 As Szasz (1973), p 686 notes, people are punished not for what they do but for how their acts are 
defined. 
261 
 
protection of the community. By contrast, domestic homicide offenders are 
constructed as having good prospects of rehabilitation and presenting little risk 
to members of the public, as their targets – individual women – do not constitute 
a section of the public in legal parlance. 
In the next chapter, I conclude my examination of the application of differential 
constructions of violence by considering the application of the rules of self-
defence. In particular, I examine the legal treatment accorded to women who kill 
abusive partners, and the difficulties they have traditionally encountered in 
relying upon self-defence. This treatment is a further and final example of the 
ways in which the state fails to recognise the ideological commitment to 
violence of many domestic abusers, and accordingly fails to recognise the 
legitimacy of women’s self-defence responses to domestic violence.   
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CHAPTER 3.4 DEFENDING AGAINST TERROR 
 
That was my life. Getting hit, waiting to get hit, recovering; forgetting. Starting all 
over again. There was no time, a beginning or an end. I can’t say how many 
times he beat me. It was one beating; it went on forever. I know for how long: 
seventeen years. One stinking, miserable, gooed lump of days. Daylight and 
darkness. Pain and the fear of it. Darkness and daylight, over and over; world 
without end.1 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I continue the analysis of previous chapters by examining the 
differential construction of violence in the context of the law’s treatment of self-
defence responses. In Chapter 3.3, I examined how the law trivialises domestic 
violence in the sentencing process by constructing it as an outburst of human 
emotion, rather than as part of a strategy rooted in an offender’s masculinist 
ideology.  Here I follow that analysis with an examination of how the law 
responds to women who kill their abusers in self-defence, and compare that to 
the way the state treats its agents who use violence in enforcing its laws.  
Unlike the preceding chapters, in this chapter it is not possible to draw a direct 
comparison between the treatment of terrorism and domestic violence. To date, 
there have been no fatal shootings of suspected terrorists in Australia,2 
although there have been high-profile fatal shootings of suspected terrorists in 
both the United Kingdom and the United States. While I discuss these incidents, 
I also draw upon other instances of defensive responses by police in Australia 
to illustrate how the law differentially constructs violence perpetrated in self-
defence. Police action in the context of a threatened or actual terrorist attack 
may involve particular aspects not involved in an ‘ordinary’ police response. 
                                                          
1
 Doyle (1997), p 206. 
2
 Suspected terrorist Omar Baladjam was shot in Sydney in November 2005 after disobeying an order by 
police to stop, however he was not killed: Les Kennedy and Andrew Clark, ‘Shot man appeared on Home 
and Away’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 9 November 2005,  
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2005/11/08/1131407637642.html>. 
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However, in the sense that terrorism and violence aimed at police are both 
forms of violence directed at the state, the latter provides an interesting 
measure of how police responses to the former would be treated. It is also 
possible to identify similar ‘discursive patterns’ between the responses to 
counter-terrorism shootings in the United Kingdom and United States, and 
responses to police shootings in Australia. 
I suggest that this differential construction of defensive responses is further 
illustrative of the distinction drawn in law between ideological and non-
ideological and public/private violence. Although it is possible to construct 
women who kill in self-defence as de facto agents of the state, defending 
themselves and their families when the state has failed to do so, this is not what 
occurs in the criminal justice process. Such a construction would be at odds 
with the law’s conceptualisation of domestic violence as a feature of individual 
relationship tensions, and also with the victim-blaming tendency of masculinist 
ideology. 
Previous chapters have focused on how the law actively constructs violence in 
different ways, through legislation and judicial pronouncement. However, as 
Foucault notes, silence is also an important aspect of discourse.3 Silence is 
created by the law’s non-intervention in certain areas. A number of 
commentators have in the last couple of decades drawn attention to the 
importance of the process that occurs outside the court-room – decisions made 
about whether to investigate and the process of evidence gathering, and the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion in deciding to proceed with prosecution, or 
whether to accept a plea-bargain.4 These external processes of legal decision-
making, in determining what cases will be brought before courts, and how they 
will be presented, play a significant role in constructions of violence. When 
decision-makers consistently decline to discuss or interpret an activity as 
criminal, then it is constructed within legal discourse as ‘not a crime’. 
                                                          
3
 ‘There is not one but many silences, and they are an integral part of the strategies that underlie and 
permeate discourses’: Foucault (1990), p 27. 
4
 McBarnet (1983); McConville et al (1991); Dixon (1997); Mack and Roach Anleu (2000); Bronitt and 
Stenning (undated). 
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Many feminist legal scholars have drawn attention to inequalities within the law 
in relation to self-defence and provocation, and their unavailability to women 
who kill their partners following a history of violence.5 These analyses have 
tended to focus on inequality as it manifests itself once a matter goes to trial – 
whether defences are available as a question of law, and how a history of 
domestic violence is treated in sentencing women for murder or manslaughter. 
Less attention has been paid to the process of decision-making that occurs prior 
to a matter coming to court – namely, the decisions to charge and to proceed 
with prosecution. 
In the first part of this chapter, I examine the differential treatment of women 
who kill in self-defence in the context of a history of domestic violence, and 
police officers who take lethal action when confronted with a dangerous attack. 
In the case of the former, the usual course of events is that a prosecution is 
commenced, and the accused may raise self-defence or the partial defence of 
provocation (or where relevant, diminished responsibility) at trial. On the other 
hand, where police have used lethal force in defence of themselves or others, 
or to effect arrest, it is uncommon for any prosecution to take place. Thus two 
different categories of lethal action taken in self-defence follow two different 
paths through the criminal justice process. 
In the second part, I examine the processes by which legal discourse constructs 
the key players in these self-defence scenarios in ways that reflect common 
assumptions about law enforcement, and perpetrators and victims of domestic 
violence. Reliance on these common assumptions both provides legitimacy for, 
and perpetuates, the criminal justice system’s differential treatment of violence. 
Delving into these processes reveals the way in which the domestic violence 
victim who kills in self-defence is constructed as a criminal, while the police 
officer who shoots in self-defence is portrayed as having acted with justification. 
 
                                                          
5
 For example Tolmie (1991); Sheehy et al (1992); Easteal (1993), Chapters 7 and 8. 
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The Differential Treatment of Self-Defence Responses 
 
Australian law, and the English common law in which it has its roots, have long 
recognised a defence for those who kill while defending themselves or others.6 
At common law, self-defence incorporates both subjective and objective 
components: the person acting in self-defence must have believed their conduct 
to be necessary in defence of themselves or another (subjective), and there 
must have been a reasonable basis for that belief (objective).7 The laws of all 
Australian states and territories, while not homogenous, incorporate some 
combination of these elements.8 
Prior to arriving at the stage where a matter comes before a court and the law of 
self-defence potentially comes into play, various formal and informal decisions 
are made that determine whether or not the matter will ever proceed through 
the legal system. These decisions are part of a process whereby cases are 
‘constructed’ through the collection of evidence and determinations about 
whether and what to charge.9 Patterns of decision-making that emerge from this 
process effectively exclude particular categories of case from criminal 
prosecution. 
Criminal charges are usually laid by police officers, and then an independent 
determination is made by the relevant Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to 
carry on or discontinue prosecution.10  
                                                          
6
 For an examination of the law of self-defence in the Australian context see Bronitt and McSherry (2010), 
Chapter 6. 
7
 Zecevic v DPP (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645. 
8
 Bronitt and McSherry (2010), pp 334-7. Victoria adopts the common law test set out in Zecevic for 
offences other than homicide. In the ACT, NSW and NT and at Commonwealth level, the accused must 
have believed that the force was necessary, while in Queensland force must be reasonably necessary, or 
necessary in addition to the requirement of a belief in the necessity of force. In South Australia, the 
accused must genuinely believe the force to be necessary and reasonable, and the conduct must be 
reasonably proportionate to the threat in the circumstances as the accused believed them to be. For self-
defence provisions see Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 10.4; Criminal Code Act 2002 (ACT) s 42; Crimes 
Act 1900 (NSW) s 418; Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) ss 29, 43BD; Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) s 271; 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 15; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 46; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) 
ss 9AC, 9AD, 9AE (for homicide offences); Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA) s 248. 
9
 McConville et al (1991). 
10
 See the various state and territory Prosecution policies, available at:  
<http://www.dpp.act.gov.au/policy.htm> (ACT);  
<http://www.odpp.nsw.gov.au/Guidelines/Guidelines.html> (NSW);  
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Shootings by Law Enforcement Agents 
 
In Australia, there has to date been no fatal shooting of a terrorist suspect. 
However, high-profile shootings of suspected terrorists have occurred in the 
United Kingdom and the United States. The circumstances of the shootings of 
Jean Charles de Menezes and Rigoberto Alpizar are outlined in Annexure H. 
Australia has, however, introduced broad-ranging powers for members of the 
defence force, acting under ‘lawful authority’, to destroy aircraft or vessels when 
deemed necessary to protect life, or designated critical infrastructure.11 These 
laws extend the capacity of the military to lawfully respond well beyond ordinary 
powers of self-defence, necessity or duress.12 In particular, the laws authorise 
the use of lethal force to protect critical infrastructure, not just to prevent death 
or injury. While I do not consider them in detail here, the enactment of these 
laws is consistent with the construction of terrorism as a special crime 
warranting a special response. 
Australia has a significant history of police shootings executed in the line of 
duty.13 McCulloch argues that the state’s power to define terrorism allows it to 
justify certain actions that would otherwise be illegal as legitimate ‘counter-
terrorism’ operations.14 She ascribes the occurrence of police shootings to the 
blurring between police and military personnel functions in specialist terrorism 
response units that are also used in response to situations outside of counter-
terrorism. Unlike police, the military are not bound by a principle of minimum 
use of force, and the concept of an ‘enemy’ is integral to military operations. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
<http://www.nt.gov.au/justice/dpp/html/guidelines.html> (Northern Territory); 
 <http://www.justice.qld.gov.au/files/CourtsAndTribunals/Directors_Prosecution_Guidelines.pdf>  
(Queensland); <http://www.dpp.sa.gov.au/03/ppg.php?s=03> (South Australia);  
<http://www.crownlaw.tas.gov.au/dpp/prosecution_guidelines> (Tasmania); <http://www.opp.vic.gov.au/> 
(Victoria);  
<http://www.dpp.wa.gov.au/content/statement_prosecution_policy2005.pdf> (Western Australia). 
11
 Defence Act 1903 (Cth) Part IIIAAA. For a discussion of these and contrast to other police powers, see 
Bronitt (2007b). 
12
 Bronitt and Stephens (2008); Bronitt (2011), pp 14-5. 
13
 See for example Silvester et al (1995). 
14
 McCulloch (2001), pp 1-22. 
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Prosecutions of police for any crime (even fatal shootings) are rare,15 and those 
that have proceeded have been largely unsuccessful.16 A similar pattern has 
been observed in the United Kingdom.17 This is consistent with the historical 
common law principle that an officer of the state who killed an escaping thief, or 
an outlaw resisting arrest, could rely on a legal justification for doing so and 
would not be prosecuted.18 
Certain types of killing, including deaths occurring in police custody, are subject 
to coronial inquest.19 If the coroner forms the view that there is a prima facie 
case of an indictable offence causing death, he or she must usually refer the 
matter to the relevant DPP.20  A number of coronial cases I examined made 
reference to the need to properly investigate, and where necessary prosecute, 
police for wrongful killings in the same way that would occur with a civilian 
killing.21 In some states and territories, the coroner is also entitled to make a 
finding that a shooting was justified.22 Police shootings, therefore, will be kept 
out of the criminal justice system unless a coroner rules the shooting unjustified, 
or finds that there is evidence that an indictable offence has been committed. 
Since 1990, the Australian Institute of Criminology has collected  data relating to 
deaths in ‘police custody’, which include shootings during incidents in which 
                                                          
15
 Freckelton (2000), pp 148-9. Cases of police prosecutions I discovered in my research included Bedek v 
Brown [2000] FCA 880 (Unreported, Gallop, Whitlam and Madgwick JJ, 26 July 2000) (defendant 
acquitted on direction of judge of attempted murder and attempted infliction of grievous bodily harm); Hill v 
Richman [2001] TASSC 148 (Unreported, Evans J, 20 December 2001) (appeal by officer allowed against 
convictions on assault); Lukatela v Birch [2008] ACTSC 99 (Unreported, Rares J, 30 September 2008) 
(officer pleaded guilty to unlawfully administering injurious substance). 
16
 Bongiorno (1994); O’Loughlin and Billing (2000), pp 75-6. 
17
 McCulloch and Sentas (2006), p 95. 
18
 Green (1975-76), pp 419-20; Horder (1992), pp 6-7. 
19
 Coroners Act 1997 (ACT) s 13(1)(k); Coroners Act 1980 (NSW) ss 13A and 14B; Coroners Act 1993 
(NT) s 15(1)(a); Coroners Act 2003 (Qld), ss 8, 10, 11(2); Coroners Act 2003 (SA) s 21; Coroners Act 1995 
(Tas) ss 3 and 21; Coroners Act 1985 (Vic) ss 3 and 15(2); Coroners Act 1996 (WA) ss 3 and 19. 
20
 Coroners Act 1997 (ACT) s 58; Coroners Act 1980 (NSW) s 19; Coroners Act 1993 (NT) s 35; Coroners 
Act 2003 (Qld) s 48(2)(a); Coroners Act 1995 (Tas) s 30; Coroners Act 1985 (Vic) s 21; Coroners Act 1996 
(WA) s 27. 
21
 See for example Malcolm Bell (Qld Coroners’ Court, 26 May 2006); Thomas Waite, Mieng Huynh, 
James Jacobs, James Gear (Qld Coroners’ Court, 17 March 2008); Clay Hatch (Qld Coroners’ Court, 19 
June 2009). See also the criticisms made by counsel assisting the coroner of the police investigation into 
the shooting of Jedd Malcolm Houghton: Silvester et al (1995), Chapter 11, and the comments in 
Taskforce Victor (1994), p 152. 
22
 State Coroner’s Office (NSW Attorney General’s Department) (2006), p 88. Cf the coroner’s role in 
Victoria: Khan v Keown & West [2001] VSCA 137 (Unreported, Ormiston, Phillips and Batt JJA, 6 
September 2001) per Phillips JA at [15] suggesting that it is beyond the scope of the coroner’s role to 
determine whether killing is ‘justified’. This is also the position in SA: Geoffrey Nicholls (Unreported, SA 
Coroner’s Office, 29 October 2003). 
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police are involved. In particular, they include shootings by police ‘in self-
defence’ when they are attacked following a call-out to an incident.23 Between 
1990 and 2006, 82 people were shot and killed by police in Australia, varying 
between two and six each year after a peak in 1994.24 Ninety percent of fatal 
police shootings for this period were classified as ‘justifiable homicide’, with one 
shooting in 2000 categorised as unlawful homicide, and one in 2002 as 
accidental homicide. ‘Justifiable homicide’ is defined as a homicide occurring 
under circumstances authorised by law, for example a prison officer acting in 
self-defence.25 Since a referral to the relevant prosecuting agency does not 
follow a finding that a shooting by police was justified, it appears that nobody 
was prosecuted in relation to these ‘justifiable homicides’. 
 
Responding to Battered Women who use Lethal Force 
 
In contrast to its treatment of police who kill in the execution of duty, 
traditionally, the law has not readily extended the benefit of its defences to 
women who kill their abusers.26 Until the late nineteenth century, the law 
provided that a woman was the property of her husband,27 and her legal identity 
upon marriage became subsumed within his.28 Women who killed their 
husbands were not considered responsible simply for murder, but for petit 
treason; killing the master was a crime secondary only to killing the king, and 
was punishable by burning at the stake.29 Neither self-defence nor provocation 
was available to those charged with petit treason.30  
                                                          
23
 Dalton (1998), p 2. 
24
 Joudo and Curnow (2008), pp 77-81. Six shootings were classified as ‘other’. Although p 103 of the 
Report indicates that the unlawful homicide by police shooting occurred in NSW, it does not appear in the 
NSW State Coroner’s Report for any of the years for which reports are publicly available.  
25
 Joudo and Curnow (2008), p 25. 
26
 See Sheehy et al (1992), p 3.  
27
 So that in fact in the United Kingdom a practice of ‘wife-sale’ operated as an informal alternative to 
separation or divorce, as detailed in Menefee (1981). 
28
 Siegel (1995), p 2122; Graycar and Morgan (2002), pp 91-2. 
29
 Greene (1989); Dolan (1992), p 4 suggests that for female offenders, petit treason was in terms of 
penalty indistinguishable from high treason. In the US context see Schneider (2000), pp 112-5. See the 
case of Elizabeth Herring, 8 Sept 1773, The Proceedings of the Old Bailey Ref: t17730908-6. By contrast, 
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After 1828, when petit treason was abolished in the United Kingdom and the 
applicable charge changed to murder,31 provocation continued to be 
inaccessible. The circumstances of women’s actions frequently did not fit within 
the paradigm conduct for ‘sudden loss of self-control’, the requirement of a 
‘sudden response’ or proportionality between the perceived threat and the force 
used in response.32 Women’s experiences did not fit within a defence that 
evolved as a means of partially excusing a man’s fiery response to finding his 
wife in flagrante delicto, or to another affront to his honour.33 Research has 
consistently shown that the majority of women who kill their partners do so 
following a history of violence perpetrated against them.34 
Feminist agitation eventually produced some recognition of the gendered nature 
of provocation.35 However, a more significant problem is that many women who 
kill violent abusers should be able to rely on self-defence, rather than the partial 
defence of provocation.36 Despite some positive developments,37 the 
requirements of self-defence, like the requirements of provocation, are plagued 
by patriarchal meanings and a lack of understanding of women’s experiences.38 
                                                                                                                                                                          
a husband who murdered his wife was guilty only of murder, due to the absence of subjection due from the 
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One of the traditional requirements of self-defence (as for provocation) was the 
immediacy of the threat to which the accused was responding.39 This had the 
effect of making it difficult for women to rely on self-defence where there was a 
lapse of time, even short, between the making of the threat or the assault, and 
the response.40 Other requirements that female murder accused have had 
difficulty in meeting include the exhaustion of all avenues of peaceful resolution 
(including a duty to retreat); the requirements that the response be ‘necessary’ 
and ‘proportionate’ to the threat, and the stipulation that an accused’s 
perception of danger of death or grievous bodily harm be reasonable.41 
Although there are isolated examples of decisions not to prosecute,42 it is 
impossible to analyse what proportion of women who kill in the context of a 
history of abuse are ultimately prosecuted. There is little publicly available data 
recording crimes that are not investigated, or that are investigated but do not 
proceed to prosecution.43 Killings by civilians, whether in self-defence or not, 
are rarely the subject of coronial inquiry (unless the person responsible for the 
homicide goes on to kill themselves).44  
It is possible, however, to identify cases that have proceeded to prosecution 
despite circumstances strongly indicative that the woman was acting in self-
defence.45 In a comprehensive study of spousal homicide cases between 1980 
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and 2000, Rebecca Bradfield noted that women who killed abusive husbands 
were often convicted of manslaughter in circumstances suggesting that they 
were acting in self-defence (and therefore should arguably have been entitled to 
a full acquittal).46 In 65 out of 76 cases where women killed their male partners, 
there was a history of abuse by the ‘victim’ against the accused.47 Women relied 
on self-defence in only one-third of these cases, and more than 70 percent of 
women who had suffered a history of abuse were convicted of manslaughter.48 
Although these women were often given lenient sentences, Bradfield’s analysis 
suggests that leniency was generally a result of compassion or sympathy 
exercised as an aspect of ‘mercy’ meted out by the sentencing judge. There 
was no recognition of the real danger faced by the accused and the legitimacy 
of their responses.49 In those manslaughter cases where a non-custodial 
sentence was imposed, extreme violence by the deceased was generally 
deemphasised in sentencing reasons in preference for a focus on the pathology 
of the accused.50  
I examined cases reported between 2000 and 2008 in which women were 
sentenced for manslaughter or murder for the killing of their partners which 
involved a history of violence committed by the deceased against the 
accused.51 In four of 17 cases,52 it was apparent on the face of the sentencing 
judgment that the accused had a strong self-defence argument available to 
her.53 These four cases were Denney,54 Gazdovic,55 Melrose56 and Russell.57 In 
                                                                                                                                                                          
hands. It was only after her acquittal, and campaigning by her family, that Kevin Smith was eventually 
prosecuted and convicted of domestic violence offences: Belinda Kontominas, ‘She took a gun to kill, but 
jury set her free’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 31 May 2008,  
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/national/she-took-a-gun-to-kill-but-jury-set-her-
free/2008/05/30/1211654312825.html>. 
46
 Bradfield (2002), pp 124-9. 
47
 Bradfield (2002), p 22. 
48
 Bradfield (2002), pp 195-6. Other studies that have found that only a small proportion of women who kill 
intimate partners rely on self-defence include Easteal (1993), p 115 and WALRC (2007), p 271. 
49
 Bradfield (2002), pp 337-44. 
50
 Bradfield (2002), pp 365-70. 
51
 For an explanation of how cases were selected, see Chapter 1.2. 
52
 See Annexure I. 
53
 Although there was violence by the deceased in the other cases, I have limited my discussion to these 
cases as they involved a precipitating act of violence by the deceased shortly prior to the act of self-
defence, in accordance with the traditional operation of self-defence. However, note that in R v Ferguson 
[2008] NSWSC 761 (Unreported, Barr J, 25 July 2008) a threat that ‘You will always be looking over your 
shoulder’ immediately preceded the stabbing of the deceased. 
54
 R v Denney [2000] VSC 323 (Unreported, Coldrey J, 4 August 2000). 
273 
 
Denney, the offender was convicted of manslaughter at trial after the Crown 
rejected an earlier plea of guilty to manslaughter. In the other three cases, the 
accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter. 
In Denney,58 the offender killed her husband following a lengthy history of 
physical, financial and emotional abuse. She had been raped by the deceased 
just prior to the killing, and was in fear for her life. She hid the body and evaded 
detection for 10 years. She was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment fully 
suspended. 
In Gazdovic,59 after a lengthy history of physical and emotional abuse, the 
offender killed her husband immediately after he had threatened to kill her and 
had picked up an axe that he kept in the house. Justice Teague noted that the 
offender had only ‘marginally failed to judge to a nicety’ when to cease her 
actions in self-defence and noted, ‘I cannot think of a homicide case where the 
level of moral culpability could be rated as low as here.’60 The Crown did not 
ask for a custodial sentence, and Gazdovic was sentenced to a two-year good 
behaviour bond. 
In Melrose,61 the Crown accepted a plea of guilty to manslaughter on the basis 
of unlawful and dangerous act. There was a long history of physical abuse, and 
of the deceased following the offender when she attempted to leave the 
relationship. On the evening in question, the deceased had physically attacked 
the offender, who went home and armed herself with a knife. When the 
deceased returned home and physically and verbally abused her, she stabbed 
him once, fatally, in the shoulder. Melrose was sentenced to a good behaviour 
order for four years with conditions in relation to psychiatric treatment. 
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In Russell,62 Cherie Russell was sentenced to a head sentence of six years with 
a non-parole period of three years for the manslaughter of her partner Jeffrey 
Cook. She was originally charged with murder. Russell and Cook had been in a 
de facto relationship characterised by violence, especially when Cook was 
drunk. On 18 May 2005, an argument broke out while the two were drinking. 
The evidence was that Cook hit Russell once and then threatened to ‘kill her 
stone dead’. She picked up a knife and he challenged her to stab him, which 
she did. He died of blood loss. 
Russell had had a car accident in 2001 which had left her with brain damage. 
She had a very low IQ and poor memory skills. There was a history of violence 
against her, with the police attending on a number of occasions in 2004, as well 
as violence against her by previous partners. There was also a history of 
serious violence by Cook against former partners and he was noted by the 
police as a ‘high risk’ domestic violence offender.  
My aim in examining these cases is not to question whether or not the facts as 
presented in coronial or court decisions reflect the ‘truth’. Foucault’s work 
exposes the fallacy of relying on any concept of truth independent of the 
discursive context in which knowledge is constructed.63 Rather I examine the 
different ways in which truth is constructed as the ‘facts’ in these two categories 
of case.  
In doing so, I argue that whether or not a person is prosecuted is based on the 
differential construction of ‘the facts’, which draws upon common 
understandings and assumptions about particular types of violence and the 
people who use violence. These discursive mechanisms both reflect and 
perpetuate structural and procedural differences in the way that different types 
of killings are treated. 
In the following section, I interrogate the recorded facts of those matters that 
have proceeded to prosecution, and compare the facts in those matters with 
those outlined in the terrorism shootings and other defensive responses by 
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police. By identifying similar features between the two types of cases, I am then 
able to explore the way in which the violence perpetrated by the ‘victim’ and the 
responses to the violence are differentially constructed to justify the different 
outcomes. 
 
How Self-Defence Responses are Constructed within Legal 
Processes 
 
A key strategy utilised by Howe, following on from Foucault, is attempting to 
separate the processes of knowledge construction from the hegemonic forces 
that control their operation. This is done not by seeking ‘the truth’ (which is 
impossible to find) but by problematising commonly-accepted truths.64 As in 
previous chapters, I am not seeking the ‘real facts’ of these cases, but to 
conceptualise the violence in terms of ‘linguistic facts’ – that is, as violence that 
is produced within a context of cultural productions and references.65  
Within the sources outlined above, I identified general trends or patterns in the 
treatment of different self-defence responses within the Australian legal system. 
These differences in part reflect the different structural processes through which 
particular homicides are constructed as justified or not justified. When police kill, 
their actions are constructed within the system as ‘justified’, while victims of 
domestic violence who kill are generally prosecuted, constructing their actions 
as (at least potentially) criminal. In this respect, the coronial and criminal justice 
processes themselves are part of the discursive process that constructs 
violence. 
As noted in previous chapters, discourse both reflects and creates relationships 
of power.66 In a coronial inquest, the purpose of the coroner’s findings is to 
explain why the actions of the police officer who killed were justifiable, so that 
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there is an explanation for why the ‘usual’ process of criminal prosecution is not 
followed. By contrast, when a judge provides reasons for sentence in relation to 
a woman who kills her abuser, the criminal justice process has already been 
engaged and is drawing to its logical conclusion – that of measuring the 
seriousness of the offence that has already been proved either by way of a jury 
verdict or a guilty plea. Thus the differential truth constructions reflect these 
different procedural avenues for dealing with certain types of killing.  
However, at the same time, they support and reinforce the process by providing 
a justification for the differential treatment. If police officers are usually justified 
in killing suspects, then it is right that they not be exposed to criminal 
prosecution. Conversely, if abused women are constructed as being criminally 
liable, rather than having acted in self-defence, it is only fair that they be 
subjected to criminal justice. 
Reg Graycar, Rosemary Hunter, Kathy Mack and Sharon Roach Anleu have 
written about the common understandings and assumptions that operate 
concerning women and violence in the legal system.67 Just as judicial decision-
making reflects judges’ ‘knowledge’ about people’s (and in particular women’s) 
lives, decisions made outside the judicial system (e.g. the decision to 
prosecute) also reflect knowledge of ‘ordinary human experience’ that does not 
necessarily represent the experiences of women.68 Common understandings 
about domestic violence include that it is a product of ‘relationship conflict’; that 
violence can be stopped by separation; that women are (at least partly) 
responsible for violence against them; and that men and women both perpetrate 
domestic violence.69 These common understandings bear upon decisions that 
are made about whether or not a woman who kills her abusive partner should 
be prosecuted. 
By contrast, police officers benefit from a perception that any lethal force they 
use must have been justified, due to the danger they face in their ordinary 
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duties.70 The state has a monopoly on the use of legitimate force,71 and as 
agents of the state, police carry the mark of state legitimacy in respect of their 
actions, regardless of the motivations of the individual officers involved.72 This 
common conception of the police officer as protector of the community is 
reflected in the construction of the police officer in the coronial process as 
‘simply doing her or his job’. 
To understand how these common assumptions operate in practice, I examine 
three aspects of the two categories of cases. The coronial and sentencing 
decisions examined illustrate how these factors are treated in different ways 
depending on the category of case, and operate to construct the killing as 
justified or not, depending on the category it falls within. Broadly, these factors 
are as follows: 
 Legal discourse differentially constructs the ‘danger’ that those who kill in 
self-defence are responding to: while police who shoot in self-defence 
are described as facing a ‘real threat’, the threat posed by abusers to the 
women who kill them is minimised or ignored; 
 Police are generally constructed as ‘witnesses of truth’ while a woman’s 
credibility as a witness is influenced by stereotypes of women as 
untruthful, and by the degree to which the accused conforms to the 
image of the ‘ideal victim’; and 
 The perceived availability of other options for women who kill provides an 
outlet for explaining why their conduct was not justified, while for police 
who kill, the availability of alternatives to lethal shooting does not 
preclude their conduct being presented as justified. 
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The Existence of a ‘Real Threat’ 
 
The way in which the danger faced by the person who acts with lethal violence 
is constructed is integral to whether or not her or his actions will ultimately be 
characterised as justified. In this regard, the construction of terrorism as 
ideological and directed at intimidation or coercion of the government or the 
public, as outlined in Chapters 2.1 to 2.3, is significant. If the violence that police 
are responding to is motivated by a commitment to a fundamentalist cause, that 
will be relevant to consideration of whether violence carried out by the police in 
response is justified. A person committed to carrying out a violent act in pursuit 
of a cause is likely to pose a ‘real danger’ requiring a swift and serious 
response. Similar themes are evident in the police shooting cases. Coroners in 
their decisions paint a picture of police acting under pressure and in difficult 
circumstances, attempting to manage threats to public safety posed by 
dangerous, and sometimes irrational, persons. On the other hand, the ‘battered 
women’ cases further illustrate the characterisation of domestic violence as a 
‘personal’ and ‘private’ problem as illustrated in Chapters 2.2 and 2.3. 
The construction of a ‘real threat’ is evident in the discourse used in relation to 
the de Menezes and Alpizar shootings, despite the fact that both these 
‘suspected terrorists’ were ultimately proven to be innocent bystanders with no 
terrorist affiliations or aspirations.73 Prior terrorist attacks and a general state of 
alarm are woven into the discussion about the shootings in a way that sets the 
scene for justifying the killings. Both the Alpizar and de Menezes reports make 
reference to previous terrorist attacks having occurred, and use that to construct 
a context for the killings, not only in terms of the additional pressures that the 
threat of an attack placed on officers, but also on their responsibility to act in 
defence of themselves and members of the public. For example, the authors of 
the Independent Police Complaints Commission report into the shooting at 
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Stockwell Tube Station emphasised the need to take into account the 
dangerous situation faced by police:74 
Any assessment of the strategy adopted, how it was applied that morning and 
how individuals performed and reacted must be measured against the 
background. There is always a danger of assessing judgements with the benefit 
of hindsight and with the precious luxury of time for a measured consideration 
of possible options. That the Metropolitan Police force was facing operational 
problems never before encountered is plain and the constant pressures placed 
on individuals, over a period of more than two weeks, has been recognised. 
Similarly, it was considered to be factually and legally irrelevant that Alpizar 
actually had no bomb when he was shot, or that he was suffering from bipolar 
disorder. It was also considered irrelevant that Alpizar’s wife, Anne Buechner, 
had called out and said that her husband was sick; there was no evidence the 
marshals had heard her, and even if they did, it would not alleviate their 
responsibility to deal quickly and decisively with the issue.75  
In a post-September 11th and Madrid bombing world, the air marshals were 
faced with a man on an American Airlines flight clutching a backpack on his 
chest, claiming to have a bomb and threatening to detonate it while heading 
back toward the aircraft. Under these circumstances, there simply is no room 
for delay for the purposes of conducting the type of investigation that hindsight 
offers.76 
In allowing the social context of the terrorism responses to be taken into 
account, the threat of terrorist attack becomes palpable, making a lethal 
response justifiable.  
Similarly, in all but one of the police-shooting coronial cases examined, the 
coroner made reference either to the nature of the threat faced by police, or to 
the fact that the shooting was justified in the circumstances.77 In three cases, 
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coroners made reference to it being ‘unfair’ to judge the police officer’s actions 
without consideration of the threat faced, or stated that ‘no fair-minded person’ 
could deny that the officer was acting in self-defence.78 The recourse to 
concepts of fairness is a discursive manoeuvre that has the effect of placing the 
issue of self-defence beyond challenge. 
Legal discourse regarding women who kill in response to violence against them 
does not provide women with the same advantage of reference to social 
context. The construction of domestic violence as a private crime, rather than a 
crime directed against a section of the public, means that women who respond 
to such violence are seen as acting in a personal capacity only, and not reacting 
against a broader threat to women as a ‘section of the public’. Legislation 
introduced in Victoria allows evidence of a history of violence in the relationship, 
and the dynamics of the violent relationship generally, to be led in determining 
whether an accused who raises the issue of past domestic violence believed it 
necessary to act in self-defence and whether there were reasonable grounds for 
that belief.79 For the most part, however, evidentiary rules make it difficult for 
women to adduce evidence of past acts of violence against them, and 
particularly to introduce evidence of the dynamics of violent relationships 
generally.80 
Social discourse about self-defence for women focuses on the threat of 
‘stranger assault’ and the need for things such as personal alarms and 
improved lighting.81 This ignores the reality that the most common form of 
violence against women is that perpetrated by men who are known to them, 
usually family members or intimate partners.82 Because domestic violence is 
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constructed as private abuse, the devastating effects of domestic violence on 
women generally are minimised in the law’s official version of events,83 making 
it more difficult for women to demonstrate that they were responding to a real 
and present danger.84 
Not only does legal discourse exclude the broader social context of domestic 
violence, the process by which cases are constructed in court often makes it 
difficult for women to present the ‘tensions’ involved in an abusive relationship 
in a meaningful way. Although a history of abuse is relevant and admissible to 
an argument of self-defence,85 the way that the Crown constructs its case and 
the rules of evidence mean that abusive relationships are often broken down 
into a series of discrete incidents, depriving them of their meaning.86 Situations 
of ongoing abuse, as reflected in the opening excerpt to this chapter,87 can be 
especially difficult to present in terms of discrete events. 
A victim of domestic violence is uniquely placed to be able to judge the level of 
threat posed to her by the most recent instance of violence. Women who are 
victims of ongoing abuse develop an ability to predict possible triggers for a 
violent situation. On the basis of past abuse, a victim may well know how 
severe an impending attack is likely to be.88 Yet the rules that determine what 
evidence is admissible mean that it will be difficult for a victim to explain this 
enhanced form of understanding to the court.89 
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In each of the four domestic homicide cases outlined above, the facts were 
constructed in such a way as to minimise the danger to the accused,90 cast 
doubt upon her version of events, or downplay the threat posed by the ‘victim’ 
by mention of his ‘redeeming qualities’. For example, in Denney, where the 
accused shot her husband who had assaulted and raped her, threatened to kill 
her and prevented her from seeing friends and family, Coldrey J stated:91  
... It should not be concluded from what I say that John Denney lacked any 
redeeming features. The evidence before the court is of a hard worker, a man 
who generally got on well with his work mates and a father who related well to 
his children. Indeed, somewhat paradoxically, you told the investigating police 
that you loved John, but you did not like the things that he did. 
In other words, John Denney’s actions may not always have been meritorious, 
but that did not make him a person who deserved to die.92 
Another discursive tool that is sometimes used to minimise the threat of harm 
faced by women in situations of domestic violence is to describe the situation as 
one of ‘matrimonial discord’ or ‘domestic discord’.93 In this way, what might 
otherwise be described as real and tangible harm justifying a self-defence 
response is repackaged as the significantly less harmful ‘domestic discord’. The 
result of this discursive manoeuvre is that a lethal response is interpreted as 
excessive or disproportionate. 
The use of ‘battered woman syndrome’ evolved as a means of attempting to 
address some of the difficulties in presenting evidence of the realities of 
domestic abuse to courts. In Australia, evidence of ‘battered woman syndrome’ 
is admissible to prove both that the accused believed her actions were 
necessary in self-defence, and that the belief was held on reasonable 
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grounds.94 Even in cases where women are successfully able to utilise ‘battered 
woman syndrome’ in their defence, the facts are constructed in such a way as 
to downplay the existence of a threat and to blame the response instead on the 
woman’s pathological misinterpretation of the signs of danger. Thus self-
defence is not successful because the woman ‘reasonably believed’ she was in 
danger based on her past experiences. It succeeds because previous instances 
of abuse have created in her a state of ‘learned helplessness’, in which she 
mistakenly believes that she has no other option but to kill her abuser.95  
‘Battered woman syndrome’ has been roundly criticised for its pathologising 
effect, and for failing to recognise the reality of the danger faced by women, 
despite the fact that it has resulted in some individual positive outcomes.96 
Presentation of BWS evidence has also led to concerns about the construction 
of the ‘reasonable battered woman’, whose example must be met by abused 
women in order to allow them successfully to rely on self-defence.97  
‘Battered woman syndrome’ has also been described as a manifestation of so-
called ‘victim feminism’, which focuses on women’s victimisation but ignores 
their agency as demonstrated through separating from a violent partner (or 
attempting to), other steps to manage violence on a daily basis, and ultimately, 
defensive violence.98  
Given the state’s continuing failure to address the problem of domestic 
violence,99 a construction of women who kill their abusers as ‘agents’ who take 
necessary action to defend themselves and their families from continuing 
violence is available to courts and those who make decisions within the criminal 
justice process. However, the construction of women’s agency as pathology – 
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through labelling it ‘battered woman syndrome’ – minimises the threat that such 
agency poses to masculinist interests. Through this ‘strategy of recuperation’, 
legal discourse provides a measure of mercy to victims of domestic violence, 
while simultaneously failing to recognise the legitimacy of their actions. 
The way that ‘battered woman syndrome’ operates is further illustrative of the 
law’s construction of domestic violence as a less serious form of violence, and 
one that does not justify a violent response (although an accused may be 
excused if she is able to rely on her defective state of mind). 
 
The Construction of the ‘Victim’ 
 
Integral to the construction of cases in coronial and criminal courts is the identity 
of the ‘narrator’ – the person who claims to have been the ‘victim’ of an attack 
and to have responded in self-defence. While it appears that police witnesses 
are generally accepted as witnesses of truth, the same cannot be said for 
women who kill their abusers. Despite research demonstrating that many police 
are prepared to lie to protect their colleagues,100 police were generally accepted 
as witnesses of truth in the coronial cases examined, even in circumstances 
where their version of events was inconsistent with other evidence.101 
The law has traditionally been reluctant to rely on the uncorroborated testimony 
of a single woman,102 based on the cherished male assumption that women 
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have a tendency to lie.103 More than twenty years ago, a NSW Parliamentarian 
made the following remark:104 
Judges have commonly warned juries against the dangers of conviction of rape 
on the uncorroborated evidence of a woman. That there might be a rule of law 
or practice to this effect is unacceptable. No doubt members of the police force 
would be justifiably upset if Parliament were to legislate a warning against the 
dangers of convicting on the uncorroborated evidence of a police officer. 
Perhaps that historical reluctance factors into the decision-making process in 
determining whether or not the accused has faced a real threat of danger. In 
situations where women kill their abusers, it usually takes place behind closed 
doors and out of public sight, meaning that the only witness to the killing and the 
preceding violence will often be the ‘accused’ herself. A history of violence may 
have been actively concealed from other parties, meaning that there is no 
corroboration of the woman’s version of events.105 In two of the ‘domestic 
homicide’ cases studied, the courts made reference to the fact that the 
deceased was not available to give his version of events,106 however there was 
no similar reference made in any of the coronial cases involving shootings by 
police officers, and the absence of corroboration of police evidence did not 
prevent police actions being declared justified.107 
The difficulties women face in having their stories of previous violence believed 
are exacerbated by the way in which such cases are divorced from their social 
context, as described above. As noted above, the context of actual and 
impending terrorist attack is factored into the consideration of police responses. 
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Similarly, the fact of widespread domestic violence committed by men against 
women should add strength and credibility to a woman’s claim that she has 
been the victim of domestic violence.108 However, the context of a ‘real threat’ 
that is present in cases where law enforcement agents act against suspected 
terrorists is absent from cases involving self-defence responses by victims of 
domestic violence. Each individual accused is required to prove that she has 
been a victim of abuse, in the absence of an understanding of the widespread 
nature of such violence, and working against assumptions that women 
frequently lie about the perpetration of abuse. 
Even where courts have been prepared to allow women to rely on self-defence 
in abuse cases, they have typically been reluctant to rely on the testimony of the 
woman herself, preferring instead to rely on expert testimony in relation to 
‘battered woman syndrome’ or other mental impairment that the woman 
suffered from at the time.109 In such circumstances, the woman in question may 
be exonerated, but it will be on the basis that she was suffering from the mental 
defect of ‘learned helplessness’ rather than because she was responding in a 
rational and comprehensible way to a real threat. 
The victim who is killed is also constructed differently within the two types of 
cases. In cases involving women who kill their abusers, courts still commonly 
focus on the harm caused by the killing and the consequences of the accused’s 
actions in taking a human life.110 The quote from Denney’s case above indicates 
the court’s emphasis on the ‘redeeming qualities’ of the victim, despite his 
violent past. Although the doctrine of coverture, in which the legal identity of a 
woman was subsumed within that of her husband upon marriage, was 
abolished in the United Kingdom and United States in the late nineteenth 
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century, the law and legal philosophy have continued well into the twentieth 
century to reinforce the concept that a woman’s position within the marriage 
relationship is secondary to her husband’s.111 Within this legal construct, a 
woman who kills her partner commits the crime of killing her superior in the 
marriage relationship. 
In relation to police shootings, Goldsmith notes that the public is more likely to 
be sympathetic to police in circumstances where the victim of lethal action is 
identified as ‘other’ within the community:112 
The ‘stranger’ or ‘outsider’ in our communities often eludes the kind of common 
sympathy between fellow citizens that helps keep police use of force within 
limits. Fear of the ‘otherness’ of the indigenous, the homeless, the mentally ill 
and other visible ‘threats’, fuelled by concerns for personal security and 
community orderliness, makes violence by police towards those groups more 
acceptable as well as predictable. 
In the United Kingdom, a trend towards more militaristic styles of policing has 
resulted in an increased focus on identifying risk types and the ‘other’, 
incorporating racial profiling.113 
The media also plays a role in the public construction of victims of police 
shootings. The construction of the victim is as a ‘criminal’ within the paradigm of 
‘good guys versus bad guys’, de-emphasising or obscuring alternative 
constructions of the victim.114 
The construction of the players in homicide cases is a key factor in whether the 
homicide is ultimately considered to be justified. The construction of the police 
officer who shoots and the victim respectively as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ supports the 
construction of such shootings as justifiable homicide. On the other hand, 
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constructions of ‘victim’ and ‘accused’ in domestic homicides where women kill 
their abusers are much more complex, and reflect common assumptions about 
such violence, in particular that women are partly responsible for violence 
against them, and that they could have taken other steps to leave. The second 
of these aspects is addressed in more detail in the final section of this chapter. 
 
The Availability of Other Options 
 
The final aspect for consideration that illustrates the differential factual 
construction in these cases relates to the availability of options other than lethal 
force. In relation to terrorism responses, it is arguable that key requirements of 
self-defence, such as imminence and lack of other available options, have been 
replaced by an ‘anticipatory security paradigm’ with prevention as the key focus, 
reflected most clearly in shoot-to-kill policies such as Operation Kratos in the 
United Kingdom.115 
In the police shooting cases, the requirement that self-defence be reasonably 
necessary is apparently not interpreted to require that the perpetrator have no 
other option before using lethal force. In most of the Victorian cases referred to 
in this chapter, coronial findings indicated that police had, by the operational 
choices they made, effectively placed themselves in a position where they had 
little option but to use lethal force.116 The coroner who presided over these 
hearings indicated that it seems if police believed they were acting in self-
defence, it didn’t matter from their perspective if the lethal action could have 
been avoided.117 However, charges were laid in relation to only two of these 
incidents, and ultimately charges against seven of the 11 officers involved were 
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dropped; the three that went to trial resulted in acquittals.118 These were the first 
prosecutions for police shootings in Australia.119 
In my analysis of available coronial reports relating to police shootings,120 of 25 
reported inquiries into police shootings, there were 12 cases in which police had 
made errors of judgment,121 the coroner found that the operation should have 
been conducted differently,122 or there was evidence inconsistent with police 
versions of events.123 Yet in only two cases was the police officer referred for 
prosecution; in one case the indictment was quashed due to a procedural defect 
and disciplinary charges were also subsequently dropped against him,124 and in 
the other, the magistrate discharged the officer at committal.125 
 In the cases involving women who kill their abusive partners, however, the 
reasonableness element will often require them to demonstrate that no other 
option (including retreat from the home) was available to them.126 Judges and 
juries may make decisions based on common assumptions about women’s 
behaviour – particularly the idea that they could and should have left a violent 
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relationship127 - but this fails to recognise the practical realities that mean these 
‘alternative options’ are effectively unavailable to many women.128 
The reality of the situation for many battered women may well be that it is a 
case of ‘kill or be killed’. In the United States, it has been determined that the 
state bears no responsibility to women for abuse inflicted in private.129 In such 
circumstances, abused women effectively take on the role of their own law 
enforcer, and potentially also the law enforcer for children and other family 
members who may be at risk. 
In one NSW coronial case, the coroner took into account in ruling the shooting 
justified that police had been hindered by the failure of commanding officers to 
provide back-up and support, which they had a right to expect.130 To take this 
into account is in keeping with the theme of allowing the reasonableness of 
response to be considered against the broader context in which a defendant’s 
actions occur.131 However, the willingness to consider context in relation to 
reasonableness does not always translate to the situation of women who kill 
their abusive partners.132 The fact that police could or should have been called 
to respond to the violent behaviour of the victim rather than the perpetrator 
‘taking the law into her own hands’ may be held against her133 notwithstanding 
evidence that police have systematically failed to respond effectively to 
domestic violence.134 It is certainly no bar to prosecution that in a particular 
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case police have been called previously but have been unsuccessful in stopping 
the ‘victim’s’ violent behaviour.135 
Although imminence of threat is no longer an express requirement of self-
defence, it is still relevant to an assessment of the reasonableness of the 
accused’s response. Kaufman argues that there is a political rather than a moral 
rationale to the imminence requirement, based on the state’s monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force – in other words, a person can only defend themselves 
with violence when there is no time to call the authorities for protection.136  
Although Kaufman is wary of allowing a relaxation of the imminence 
requirement in relation to battered women, she does note that there is some 
capacity to take into account the ‘effectiveness’ of state response in determining 
whether the imminence requirement should operate. Similarly, it is arguable that 
the state’s failure to respond to a particular domestic violence problem is 
relevant to an assessment of whether the actions of a woman who kills in self-
defence were reasonable. A reworking of self-defence law might also factor in 
the different responses that might be expected from different categories of 
people. For example, more allowance might be made for a victim of long-term 
violence than for a trained law enforcement agent in terms of the 
reasonableness of a defensive response.137 
Conclusion 
 
It is not my objective to argue that all instances of women who kill their abusers 
are straight-forward cases of self-defence and that all police shootings are 
unjustified. Instances where people shoot to kill are many and varied, and will 
range from killings that are justified in self-defence to those that are the product 
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of negligence, recklessness or malice. What the theory of case construction 
teaches us is that whether or not killings are justified is not simply a case of 
sifting through the objective facts; rather, cases are constructed as justified or 
not through a complex process of decision-making, and the application of 
common assumptions about different types of violence. 
As is the case with legislation, the administration of the civil orders regime, and 
sentencing of terrorism and domestic violence offenders discussed in previous 
chapters, discursive mechanisms are at play in the construction of ‘the facts’ in 
cases involving self-defence responses to different types of violence. These 
discursive mechanisms play an important role in constructing certain types of 
killings as justified and others as unjustified. Discourse both reflects and 
reinforces the power relations that determine that certain types of killing will be 
prosecuted in the criminal justice system but not others. By constructing police 
killings as ‘justified’ and killings by abused women as ‘unjustified’ the structural 
processes that routinely direct lethal killings through different avenues are 
reinforced. This occurs in a way that works directly to the disadvantage of 
abused women, who are routinely prosecuted in situations where they kill 
following a history of abuse. 
This is not to suggest that these processes take place without exception. There 
have been four instances in Australia where police have been prosecuted (at 
least initially) for fatal shootings, and at least one instance of a woman who 
killed her abusive husband not being prosecuted.138 However, these ‘aberrant’ 
cases do not defeat the argument that systemic forces are at play. On the 
contrary, the existence of inconsistencies in the system serves to strengthen it 
and reinforce the appearance that the system is in fact neutral and unbiased 
simply because it is able to generate these ‘exceptions that prove the rule’. 
The treatment afforded to women who use lethal violence to defend themselves 
and their families is a further illustration of the legal construction of domestic 
violence as a ‘private’ crime reflecting tensions within dysfunctional 
relationships. Conceptualising the violence in this way makes it more difficult for 
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a domestic violence victim to demonstrate that her use of violence was 
‘necessary’ in order to protect herself. If the social context of domestic violence 
as a systematically-perpetrated gendered crime were taken into account, the 
outcomes for individual women may be significantly different. This chapter 
constitutes a final illustration that the way in which legal and other discourses 
construct crime has very real consequences for individual victims of violence.  
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CHAPTER 4 THE WAY FORWARD 
 
If you want to see the true face of war, go to the amateur porn Web site 
NowThatsFuckedUp.com. For almost a year, American soldiers stationed in 
Iraq and Afghanistan have been taking photographs of dead bodies, many of 
them horribly mutilated or blown to pieces, and sending them to Web site 
administrator Chris Wilson. In return for letting him post these images, Wilson 
gives the soldiers free access to his site. American soldiers have been using 
the pictures of disfigured Iraqi corpses as currency to buy pornography. ... 
Wilson, a 27-year-old Web entrepreneur living in Florida, created the Web site a 
year ago, asked fans to contribute pictures of their wives and girlfriends, and 
posted footage and photographs bearing titles such as “wife working cock” and 
“ass fucking my wife on the stairs.” The site was a big hit with soldiers stationed 
overseas; about a third of his customers, or more than fifty thousand people, 
work in the military. Wilson says soldiers began e-mailing him, thanking him for 
keeping up their morale and “bringing a little piece of the States to them.” ... 
One of the pictures on Wilson's site depicts a woman whose right leg has been 
torn off by a land mine, and a medical worker is holding the mangled stump up 
to the camera. The woman's vagina is visible under the hem of her skirt. The 
caption for this picture reads: “Nice pussy - bad foot.”1 
In this thesis, I have developed the idea that terrorism and domestic violence, 
contrary to common understandings, share important elements in common. I 
have sought to problematise the idea that domestic violence is motivated by 
emotion or passion generated by the tension of individual relationships. First, I 
have argued in Chapter 2.2 that some perpetrators of domestic violence share a 
masculinist ideology that places domestic violence squarely within the definition 
of a crime committed with the intention to advance a political, religious or 
ideological cause. Secondly, I have argued in Chapter 2.3 that a reworking of 
the concept ‘public’ from a feminist perspective means that domestic violence 
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can be reconstructed as a crime committed against ‘a section of the public’ due 
to its gendered nature. 
I have chosen to begin this concluding chapter with an extract from a news item 
about ‘gore-for-porn’ trade involving members of the United States military, 
because it illustrates the complex interplay between terrorism, violence against 
women and masculinist ideology. Although it is easy (and consistent with 
contemporary social and legal discourse) to see domestic violence and 
terrorism as two separate and entirely unrelated things, both are underpinned 
by the masculinist ideology that underlies most forms of discourse. Although it is 
impossible to ‘know’ anything outside of its discursive construction, considering 
domestic violence and terrorism in the context of each other paves the way for a 
fuller appreciation of both. 
In this concluding chapter, I draw together key themes explored in previous 
chapters, and outline possible avenues of further investigation in relation to 
dealing with terrorism and domestic violence. I use the news item quoted above 
as a unifying thread in relation to each key point. I include here also a 
fictionalised reconstruction of the reasons for sentence passed on James 
Ramage for the manslaughter of Julie Ramage.2 The sentence imposed was 11 
years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of eight years. As a result of 
Getting Away with Murder, written by domestic violence campaigner Phil 
Cleary,3 we have access to a range of ‘alternative facts’ that are not available in 
most homicide cases, which is why I have chosen to use this case as the 
subject of a feminist rewriting. It is possible to utilise these facts to reconstruct 
Ramage’s actions not as those of an ‘ordinary man’ driven by frustrated passion 
to kill the woman he loved, but as the actions of a man whose commitment to 
masculinist ideology was carried to its brutal conclusion in the homicide of his 
former wife. 
                                                          
2
 The reasons for sentence delivered by Osborn J are reported at R v Ramage [2004] VSC 508 
(Unreported, Osborn J, 9 December 2004). While Ramage was convicted of and sentenced for 
manslaughter, I have reconstructed the decision in terms of a rejection of the defence of provocation and a 
conviction for murder, utilising both facts given in evidence at trial and facts extracted from Cleary’s book.  
3
 Cleary (2005). 
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In drawing together themes from the various chapters with a view to possible 
ways forward, I keep in mind the observation made of Foucault’s work that 
scepticism should not be read as pessimism; recognition of the need to 
constantly monitor and critique normalising institutions is itself an expression of 
hope, and the possibility for change.4 
The Problematisation of Woman-Hating Speech 
 
As discussed in Chapter 3.1, the use of ‘us and them’ language is common in 
terrorism discourse, and often features in popular and legal discussions of 
terrorism. References to ‘infidel’, ‘unbelievers’, ‘kuffar’ and ‘Westerners’ by 
terrorists clearly set them apart from their targets, and reinforce the idea that a 
terrorist crime is a strike against all of Western society. Since terrorism is 
defined as a crime committed with the intention to intimidate or coerce the 
government, or the public, this use of language serves to construct the terrorist 
in opposition to her or his victims, who stand within the construct of the public, 
while the terrorist stands outside it. 
Social discourse is replete with the same sorts of ‘us and them’ language in a 
gendered context. Gendered epithets such as ‘slut’, ‘whore’, ‘bitch’ and ‘cunt’, 
jokes about and references to women’s bodies and sexuality, and pervasive 
associations of women with weakness and inferiority, all serve to create women 
as the ‘them’ to the ‘us’ of the user. However, the use of gendered hate speech 
is so commonplace as to be rendered invisible as gendered hate speech. 
The ‘gore-for-porn’ scandal referred to at the beginning of this chapter 
generated controversy due to the graphic portrayal of victims of the conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, coupled with the use of dehumanising and derogatory 
language to describe the victims.5 The language used evidenced contempt, 
hatred and racism toward the victims of those conflicts. However, what went 
                                                          
4
 McLaren (2002), pp 41-5. 
5
 Some reactions to the material are described in the article: ‘US soldiers sell porn photos of mutilated Iraqi 
women with joke captions’, The Insider (online), 27 Sept 2005,  
<http://www.theinsider.org/news/article.asp?id=1569>. 
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unremarked was the language used to describe the women in the ‘porn’ 
pictures, which could be accessed for free as ‘reward’ for posting the ‘gore’ 
images. The description of an image as ‘wife working cock’ or ‘ass fucking my 
wife’ bespeaks a complete disrespect for, and objectification of, the woman the 
subject of the photo, and of women generally. These descriptions are, of 
course, mild in comparison to the terminology often used to describe women in 
pornography.6 Yet in the media, these terms are simply invisible as woman-
hating speech. 
Hate speech against women needs to be made visible. Notwithstanding 
postmodern scepticism in relation to the power of law to effect change, at the 
most basic level one way to achieve this would be to ensure that all Australian 
states and territories amend existing hate speech and hate crime laws to 
include gender as a prohibited ground.7 Currently, only Tasmania does so, and 
only in a civil law context.8 This would at least allow a platform for the legal 
recognition of gendered hate speech. 
Beyond legal reform, however, there needs to be social discussion and 
awareness about the use of woman-hating language. Recently, in several 
countries around the world, including Canada, the United States and Australia, 
there has been an attempt to ‘reclaim’ the word ‘slut’ through the organisation of 
‘slut walks’ protesting the admonition of Canadian students by a police officer to 
avoid sexual assault by not dressing as sluts.9 Although drawing attention to 
obvious victim-blaming by authority figures is important, it is questionable 
whether words that have at their core such misogynist understandings of 
women and their sexuality are really capable of being reclaimed.10 In the same 
way that racist and homophobic language now generates public outrage (at 
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 Flood and Hamilton (2003), p 32. 
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 As Barnett notes, the law does have the potential to shape public opinion: Barnett (1998), pp 36-8. 
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 Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) s 16 and see overview of hate speech provisions in Annexure A. 
9
 ‘London gets its Slut Walk’, The Australian (online), 12 June 2011, 
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 Gail Dines and Wendy J Murphy, ‘Slutwalk is not sexual liberation’, The Guardian (UK) (online), 8 May 
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least on the surface),11 we need to draw attention to gendered hate-speech as 
and when it occurs. 
Pornography has always been a key area for disagreement among feminists. 
Without delving into the merits of the arguments on either side, I suggest that a 
discourse that focuses on incitement to, and instruction in, violence has 
advantages over the current discourse of morality that surrounds the regulation 
of pornography. Conceptions of morality are replete with phallocentric 
influences, and can only serve to protect the production of images that suit 
masculinist sexual interests. While these same influences will be present in any 
discourse, taking the MacKinnon/Dworkin approach of focusing on the harm 
caused by pornography12 has the benefit of placing the violence and 
objectification involved in some pornography squarely in focus. 
An incitement to violence approach also focuses attention on the effects of 
pornography. The consequences of pornography viewing are a matter for 
debate, however there is a body of evidence, discussed in Chapter 3.1, to 
suggest that pornography has harmful consequences for women involved in the 
making of pornography, and for women who are subjected to ‘acting out’ of 
pornographic fantasies by their male partners. Beyond this however, the role of 
pornography as ‘instruction’ in sexual relationships between men and women 
needs to be examined. The work that pornography does in this sense is 
illustrated by the testimonies of women such as RMM, cited at the beginning of 
Chapter 3.1, that pornography is used ‘like a textbook’ in the perpetration of 
sexual abuse against intimate partners.13 
If the things that were done by men to women in pornography were done 
systematically by members of one racial group against another racial group, 
and photographed, would that be acceptable? Or would that be decried as 
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 See for example ‘Stephanie Rice in trouble over homophobic tweet’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 6 
Sept 2010, <http://www.smh.com.au/sport/swimming/stephanie-rice-in-trouble-over-homophobic-tweet-
20100906-14wb9.html> (homophobia); Chris Barrett, ‘Inglis wants league to cast out Johns’, Sydney 
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 Ordinance to amend Minneapolis Code of Ordinances 7, chs. 139, 141 (1982) (passed 30 December 
1983; vetoed 5 January 1984) s 1(2): Dworkin and MacKinnon (1988), p 138. 
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racist, and advocating racially-based violence? If the answer to the last question 
is ‘yes’, and I suggest that it is, then hate speech laws have potential in terms of 
at least allowing for the recognition of the harm caused by pornography and 
other forms of gendered hate speech. The emerging recognition given to racist 
and homophobic hate speech is a positive development, however steps need to 
be taken to ensure that gendered hate speech is stripped of its cloak of 
invisibility. 
Preventative Measures 
 
In Chapter 3.2, I compared the legislative provisions relating to the making of 
control orders for those suspected of terrorist activity, and protection orders 
available in situations where domestic violence has occurred or is at risk of 
occurring. I outlined a number of aspects of these orders that demonstrate the 
‘privatisation’ and trivialisation of domestic violence. 
One of the main problems with the privatisation of domestic violence is that it 
ignores the threat that domestic abusers pose to women generally, particularly 
women with whom they are in an intimate relationship. The perception that 
violence is a feature of individual dysfunctional relationships, evidenced for 
example in findings that those who kill their partners are not at risk of 
reoffending, significantly downplays the threat that such men pose to 
subsequent partners. In this regard, the state persistently fails in fulfilling its ‘... 
most basic (task) ... to protect its citizens against violence’.14 
The popularity of the ‘gore-for-porn’ website described above is illuminating in 
demonstrating how masculinist ideology constitutes a shared belief system. 
Notwithstanding the ready availability of pornography on the internet, a site 
specialising in photographs sent by men of them having sex with their intimate 
partners proved particularly popular amongst members of the US military. What 
is it about the viewing of another man engaged in sexual activity with his wife or 
girlfriend (presumably without her knowledge) that is especially erotic or 
                                                          
14
 Dulles (1957), p 715. 
303 
 
stimulating? The site’s popularity would seem to suggest a shared camaraderie 
over the objectification of a woman, similar to that exhibited in male bonding 
rituals that involve the shared degradation of an individual woman.15 
Importantly, masculinist ideology is not about the objectification or denigration of 
one woman, but of women as a group. To conceptualise domestic violence as a 
problem associated with an individual victim or relationship overlooks the role of 
masculinist ideology altogether. 
One change that would be consistent with the recognition of the public aspect of 
domestic violence would be to mandate notification of entry into a subsequent 
relationship by serious perpetrators of domestic violence. In a number of states 
and territories, legislation requires convicted child sex offenders to be placed on 
a register, and to notify authorities of changes of name, appearance, address, 
employment, vehicle and of any travel plans, with failure to do so constituting an 
offence.16 Similarly, men convicted of serious domestic violence offences could 
be placed on a register requiring them to notify authorities of personal details, 
and also of entry into any new intimate relationship.17 Legislation could include 
a requirement that a new partner then be advised by authorities of the fact of 
the offender’s prior convictions. While this would not of course have the result 
that all such relationships would be terminated, it would ensure that women in 
danger from domestic violence perpetrators were warned of the threat at the 
earliest possible stage.18 
Recognising the similarities between terrorism and domestic violence as forms 
of violence based in ideological belief would allow a reconceptualisation of how 
protection orders may indeed operate to fulfil their objective of ‘preventing 
harm’. By treating domestic violence as an ideological crime, perpetrators come 
to constitute a threat to women as a group defined by gender, rather than 
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simply to individual women. Such a reconceptualisation would potentially 
increase the willingness of police to apply for protection orders, have 
consequences for the conditions imposed on such orders, and improve police 
and judicial responses to breaches. 
The Use of Ideology in Sentencing 
 
Not all domestic homicides are the result of ideological motivation. In my 
analysis of cases where men killed their intimate partners between 2000 and 
2008, there were cases where, at least on the basis of the facts contained in the 
judgments, the killing did appear to be the product of ‘relationship tensions’ or a 
spontaneous outburst of emotion. However, a significant number of cases, as 
outlined in Chapter 3.3, did indicate a masculinist ideological disposition on the 
part of the offender, as evidenced by factors such as the previous use of 
violence in the relationship, and the use of force for strategic purposes. 
Ideological motivation could also be evidenced by the possession of material 
that glorifies and celebrates the use of violence against women. In many of the 
terrorism cases referred to in Chapters 2.2 and 3.3, the existence of motivation 
to advance the cause of jihad was supported by evidence of offenders’ 
possession of ideological propaganda. This included material extolling the 
virtues of martyrdom and violent jihad, and celebrating victories against foreign 
forces in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The same kind of dehumanising 
effect is present in the image referred to above of a dead Iraqi woman, with a 
simultaneous mocking of her death and denigrating reference to her sexuality. 
The possession of material that is violent and dehumanising towards women in 
a domestic violence case would be one piece of evidence among others that 
could be used to demonstrate the existence of masculinist ideology. 
As noted by Szasz, people are punished based not on what they do, but how 
their actions are defined.19 Where a domestic homicide, or any act of domestic 
violence, is motivated by ideology, that needs to be recognised and reflected in 
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both the sentence itself and the reasons for sentence. The present ongoing 
failure to recognise the existence of masculinist ideology, as I have argued in 
this thesis, is reflective of the law’s masculinist nature. Although such influences 
operate at a different level to the role played by individual decision-makers, 
individuals can and do exercise their own discretion in particular cases. Indeed, 
the potential for the use of ‘resistant discourses’20 to disrupt accepted ways of 
speaking about things lies in the use of such discourses by individuals.  
For prosecutors and judges to recognise the existence of masculinist ideology 
in their submissions and reasons for sentence therefore opens up the possibility 
for a broader recognition of the role played by ideological belief in serious 
domestic violence. Examples of this already exist.21 Moreover, this can assist in 
recognising perpetrators of domestic violence as ‘other’ and distinguishing them 
from men as a broader social group by declaring explicitly that most men, 
notwithstanding the existence of ordinary frustrations and tensions within their 
intimate relationships, do not commit violence. Those who believe in the 
legitimacy of such violence against women, and utilise it as a means of control, 
are therefore ‘other’ and stand outside the paradigm of the ‘ordinary person’. 
As discussed in Chapter 3.3, a number of feminist commentators have drawn 
attention to the way in which the partial defence of provocation operates to 
excuse men’s violence against women, and to disadvantage women. The 
abolition of provocation in Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia is in part 
the product of an ongoing struggle by feminists to engage with law, and draw 
attention to its gendered application in particular contexts. Although it is as yet 
too early to determine whether the abolition of provocation will be to women’s 
advantage, it is arguable that removing an excuse commonly allowed to men for 
the killing of their intimate partners can only be regarded as a positive step.22 
In the following section, I reconstruct the reasons for sentence in the Julie 
Ramage manslaughter case from a feminist perspective, drawing upon 
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alternative facts available in the book written about her death by Phil Cleary.23 
In doing so, I attempt to illustrate the way that alternative facts can be utilised to 
construct a picture of offending behaviour very different to that presented by the 
sentencing judge. This ‘alternative picture’ is one consistent with control-based 
and feminist understandings of domestic violence perpetration. Rewriting 
judicial decisions from a feminist perspective has potential as a means of 
utilising ‘resistant discourse’ to expose and undermine the power of masculinist 
ideology.24 
Although the feminist rewriting in this case includes the imposition of a harsher 
penalty than was imposed by the sentencing judge, it is important to note that a 
reconceptualisation of domestic violence in line with the analysis presented 
here is not suggested with a view to increasing penalties automatically for 
domestic violence perpetrators, though that may well be a consequence in 
individual cases. Rather, this analysis seeks to open up new ways of 
conceptualising the actions of perpetrators that may have implications for 
sentencing both those engaged in terrorism and perpetrators of domestic 
violence.  
R V RAMAGE 
 
James Ramage, you have been convicted by a jury of the murder of Julie 
Ramage at Balwyn on 21 July 2003. 
Your counsel attempted to argue a provocation defence on your behalf, 
however I refused to allow that defence to go to the jury. I will say more about 
that in due course. 
You and the deceased married in 1980 when she was 19 years old and you 
were 20. You had two children together, a son Matthew, now aged 19, and a 
daughter Samantha, aged 15. 
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It is clear that the deceased was unhappy in the relationship in the two years 
prior to her death. The evidence indicates that she found your behaviour 
controlling and oppressive. You had also previously been violent towards her.25 
There was an incident in 1991 when you headbutted her and broke her nose. 
You broke glasses and had an explosive temper.26 There were also other 
instances of physical violence towards the deceased,27 your daughter 
Samantha, and also your previous business partner.28 It is apparent from these 
instances that you were a person who used violence as a punishment when you 
were angry or felt that you had not gotten your way about something. 
The deceased had, during the course of the relationship, also confided in 
friends about your tendency towards sado-masochistic sex, constant demands 
for sex and that sexual intercourse with you felt like ‘rape’.29 
There was evidence before the court of the extent of your controlling behaviour 
in the relationship. The evidence of your cleaning lady was that the deceased 
would keep money hidden in the house to pay her extra, but made her promise 
not to tell you because you would ‘go mad’ if you find out she was paying her 
more.30 You also sought to isolate the deceased from her family and friends, 
preventing her from attending important family celebrations.31 You controlled 
aspects of her behaviour such as what she ate and what she wore.32 It is 
apparent that you used physical, economic and social abuse as a mechanism to 
control the behaviour of the deceased in the relationship. 
In 2003, the deceased moved out of the house you shared together while you 
were away on a business trip and told you that the relationship was over. It is 
clear that you were unable to accept the deceased’s decision to separate from 
you. Despite her decision, you continued to make attempts to reconcile with the 
deceased, including contacting her, obtaining counselling and asking her to 
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attend with you, and seeking advice from friends, especially the deceased’s 
friends, as to how you could win her back.33 
It is equally clear that the deceased benefited from the separation and indeed at 
the time of her death had established a new relationship that had brought her 
some happiness.34 
It is apparent the deceased was afraid of you and in fact had told a number of 
people that you would kill her if you found out about her new relationship.35 She 
had previously fled from you in 1987 when she was pregnant, fearing that you 
were going to kill her.36  
Unfortunately, you were unable to accept that your wife had moved on and 
established a new relationship, and spoke to family and friends with some 
obsession, seeking to find out about the new relationship and how serious it 
was. 
On 21 June 2003, you had invited the deceased over to the house to see new 
renovations you had done. You stated in your interview that you still entertained 
your hope that the relationship could be re-established, notwithstanding the 
deceased’s indications to you that the relationship was over and your 
knowledge that she had embarked upon a new relationship. 
In your Record of Interview, you gave a version of events of what took place 
after the deceased visited the home. You said that the deceased dismissed the 
renovations as being of no significance; that you pleaded with her to return; and 
that she said, ‘You don’t get it do you? I’m over you. I should have left you 10 
years ago’. 
You said that she questioned whether your daughter wanted to visit you as 
much as she had. You said that you then raised the issue of her new partner 
and she said that it was none of your business. You asked how serious the 
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relationship was and she said that she had had sleepovers and screwed up her 
face and said that sex with you repulsed her and said or implied that sex with 
her new partner was much better.37 
It was at this point that you say you ‘lost control’ and after striking two heavy 
blows to the deceased’s head, she fell to the floor at which point you strangled 
her until she was no longer breathing.  
I rejected your counsel’s argument that provocation should be left to the jury. If I 
accepted that events had indeed unfolded as you said they did, I still would not 
accept that such conduct on the part of the deceased is capable of 
characterisation as ‘provocative conduct’ of the kind that might cause the 
ordinary person to lose self-control. Every day all over Australia, relationships 
disintegrate and couples separate. There is no way that being informed of an 
intention to leave a relationship, particularly in circumstances where you already 
knew that was the deceased’s wish, could be viewed in any way as provocative. 
Nor could comments about the deceased’s new lover’s sexual prowess, if in fact 
such comments had been made, amount to provocation. The ordinary person is 
expected to act with a minimum level of self-control to comments that might be 
regarded as insulting or hurtful. 
In any case, I reject the version of events described by you in your Record of 
Interview. Friends of the deceased gave evidence that she rarely swore, and 
that it would not have been in her nature to abuse you.38 A counsellor who saw 
you both six days before this incident gave evidence that the deceased did not 
do or say anything provocative during the counselling session, but instead was 
open and civilised.39 Indeed, the evidence points to the conclusion that the 
deceased had in fact taken pains to ensure that she dealt with you in relation to 
the separation in a thoughtful and compassionate way. The idea that the 
deceased, who was familiar with your violent tendencies and had expressed 
fear to her friends about the possibility of you killing her, would speak to you 
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scornfully in the manner you have said, when she was alone with you in the 
house, is simply fanciful. 
I note that you were significantly larger and stronger than the deceased.40 I note 
also that it is not possible to tell how many blows were delivered to Julie. In your 
interview, you said that she did not resist for long, however the bruises on her 
neck and left wrist and third knuckle of her right hand indicate that she struggled 
to dislodge your grip on her neck.41 
Evidence was called from a range of psychologists and counsellors who saw 
you immediately prior to or subsequent to the killing. Their view was that you 
were at the time of the killing in a state of extreme obsessive anxiety and that 
you were desperately seeking to reassert control over the relationship with your 
wife.42 I consider this evidence consistent with the view expressed above that 
you were in fact a controlling person who used violence and other mechanisms 
strategically to control the behaviour of your partner, and that you believed you 
were entitled to do so as she was your wife. 
Despite your attempts to portray the killing of the deceased as unpremeditated, 
there were a number of features of the killing that bespeak premeditation. On 
the morning of the killing, the builder conducting your renovations, Graeme 
McIntosh, arrived and found a note asking him to call you. You said that Julie 
was coming around and you would rather he not be there when she arrived. 
You later called and asked him to leave before 12, rejecting your offer to wait 
around the corner until she had left.43 I note the evidence that prior to the killing, 
you had cut a two-foot length of rope from a roll in the garage.44 The rope was 
found alongside items of your clothing and tea towels used to clean up the 
deceased’s blood, buried near her body.45 Although it is not clear how the rope 
was used in the offence, I accept the Crown’s submission that its presence at 
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the burial site indicates that it was used in the commission of the crime, and that 
it was cut prior to the deceased visiting the house. 
I note also that on the answers in your Record of Interview, it took less than an 
hour and a half for you to dig the two holes in which the deceased and other 
items were buried, for you to place the deceased and those items in the holes 
and cover them up. The unlikelihood of a person unaccustomed to physical 
labour being able to complete this in such a short period of time is strongly 
suggestive of the holes having been dug at an earlier point in time.46 
After killing the deceased, you engaged in a series of detailed actions by way of 
covering up what you had done. You cleaned the scene of the crime with 
detergent. You moved the cars around – your car had previously been outside 
so you moved it into the garage to allow you to place the deceased’s body and 
belongings inside it.47 You made a series of phone calls (including to the 
deceased’s phone) to give the impression you did not know of her whereabouts; 
you moved her car to a nearby carpark; you drove to a remote location and 
roughly buried the deceased’s body and her belongings separately. You then 
returned to Melbourne, attended an appointment to order some granite 
benchtops where you were calm and collected; showered and dressed, and 
took your son out to dinner and answered a call from your daughter, all the 
while giving the impression you had no idea where the deceased was.48 
I find these actions to be inconsistent with a person who had suddenly lost self-
control and reacted on the spur of the moment. The calm and calculated nature 
of your actions in attempting to cover up what you had done is consistent with 
the actions of a person who was in control of what he was doing and took steps 
to attempt to ensure the killing could not be attributed to him. It is also 
consistent with the characterisation of your conduct in killing the deceased as 
planned and premeditated. 
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I find beyond reasonable doubt that you invited the deceased to the house that 
day with the intention of giving her one last opportunity to reconcile with you, but 
with the intention that if she refused, you would punish her by taking her life. 
Some evidence has been put before me attempting to demonstrate that you are 
remorseful for your actions. Although it is clear that you have regret for the 
consequences of your actions, it is not clear to me that you have any genuine 
remorse for killing the deceased, in circumstances when she had begun a new 
life and had much to look forward to.49 
Dr Walton’s evidence on sentence was that you were unlikely in general terms 
to reoffend.50 However, I do not accept that this is the case. Through your prior 
behaviour towards the deceased, and particularly your actions on 21 June 
2003, you exhibited a capacity to take actions of an extreme and violent nature 
in order to regain control over a situation you felt was rapidly spiralling out of 
control. There is no basis upon which I could be satisfied that, given the same 
circumstances again, you would not act in the same way. Therefore, the 
protection of the community, and in particular of women with whom you might 
subsequently form an intimate relationship, remains an important consideration 
upon sentence. 
James Ramage, for the murder of Julie Ramage I sentence you to 20 years’ 
imprisonment with a non-parole period of 15 years. 
Reconceptualising the Actions of Women who Kill in Self-Defence 
 
In Chapter 3.4, I examined the treatment of women who kill their abusive 
partners in self-defence in the legal system, in the context of how police who kill 
in defence of themselves or the public are dealt with. In particular, I considered 
the critiques of feminist scholars of self-defence and how women have 
traditionally had difficulty fitting their experiences within its legal parameters 
without relying on the problematic notion of ‘battered woman syndrome’ that 
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constructs their response as one based on a pathological reaction to the 
violence inflicted upon them. 
In 2005, Victoria introduced provisions specifically to deal with defensive 
responses to ongoing domestic violence, with the intention of making it easier 
for women who kill in self-defence to introduce evidence of a history of 
violence.51 Such developments are positive, and should be implemented in all 
jurisdictions.  
However, police and prosecutorial discretion also has a role to play in 
developing a response to defensive homicides that properly reflects the 
domestic violence background to many such killings. It is important to keep in 
mind Foucault’s notion of ‘resistant discourse’, which always carries the 
potential to undermine and ultimately fracture the dominant discourses that 
produce power.52 The Victorian DPP’s decision to ‘buck the trend’ in non-
prosecution of police in the 1980s is a powerful example of resistant discourse 
at play. Likewise, brave decisions to not prosecute battered women who have 
clearly responded in self-defence may provide the catalyst for more systemic 
changes in the way those who kill in self-defence are treated. 
As discussed in Chapter 3.4, the current process of subjecting police shootings 
to coronial inquiry, and other defensive responses to the criminal justice system, 
has the effect of creating two parallel systems of justice. Police must and do 
operate in difficult situations, making split-second decisions with serious 
consequences about the best way to protect themselves and members of the 
public from danger.  
However, women who live in abusive relationships are also faced with the same 
kinds of decisions, albeit without the imprimatur of state authority, and usually 
                                                          
51
 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 9AH, introduced by the Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005. The Crimes (Homicide) 
Act 2005 (Vic) also introduced s 9AD, which provides a partial defence of ‘defensive homicide’. For 
discussion of the legislation see Hale et al (2006). In Queensland, a partial defence of killing in an abusive 
relationship, reducing a conviction from murder to manslaughter, was introduced in 2010: Criminal Code 
(Abusive Domestic Relationship Defence and Another Matter) Amendment Act 2010 (Qld) s 3 (introducing 
s 304B to the Criminal Code). 
52
 McNay (1992), Chapter 4. 
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without access to the same kinds of weapons and violence response training as 
police.  
That was my life. Getting hit, waiting to get hit, recovering; forgetting. Starting all 
over again. There was no time, a beginning or an end. I can’t say how many 
times he beat me. It was one beating; it went on forever. I know for how long: 
seventeen years.53 
Moreover, given their past experiences with the abuser, victims of domestic 
violence may be uniquely placed to appreciate the significance of a particular 
turn of phrase or action by the perpetrator, and the threat it represents. The 
justice response to defensive violence needs to give more import to this kind of 
‘insider’ knowledge and the role it plays in making decisions about what actions 
to take in self-defence. 
As reflected in the gore-for-porn story above, terrorists and those associated 
with them are dehumanised and made ‘other’ in social, legal and political 
discourse. This makes it easier to portray lethal action against suspected 
terrorists (and as explored in Chapter 3.4, against others perceived as 
constituting a threat to the state) as trivial, or even humorous. By contrast, 
domestic violence perpetrators are not perceived as constituting a ‘real threat’ 
to the women they are violent towards, let alone to the community in general, 
and therefore women who kill in self-defence, while sometimes treated 
sympathetically, are condemned within our legal system with little 
understanding of the power inequalities and dynamics of control that precipitate 
such killings. 
Removal of the provocation defence in those jurisdictions where it is still 
available would, it is hoped, have advantages for women. Although there is 
always the possibility that removing the intermediate option of provocation 
would result in more murder convictions, the alternative is that more women 
who kill in circumstances suggestive of self-defence would in fact rely upon self-
defence rather than the partial defence of provocation. This would also be 
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 Doyle (1997), p 206. 
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facilitated by the introduction of provisions similar to those in Victoria making it 
easier for women to adduce evidence of a history of domestic violence. 
Concluding Thoughts 
 
At the beginning of my thesis, I posed the following question asked by 
Catharine MacKinnon: 
... (When) will opposition to terrorism include the daily terrorism against women 
as women that goes on day after day, worldwide? … Why does the whole world 
turn on a dime into a concerted force to face down the one, while to address the 
other squarely and urgently is unthinkable?54  
The answer to the first question, at the conclusion of the analysis undertaken 
here, can only be: who knows? In relation to the second question, hopefully my 
analysis has offered some possible answers, which are associated with how 
social and legal discourse differentially constructs the two types of violence 
MacKinnon is comparing. 
Drawing upon the arguments advanced in this thesis, I would answer 
MacKinnon’s second question as follows. We take such drastic steps to address 
terrorism because we see terrorism as a threat to the state. We see terrorism as 
a threat to society – to us. We see terrorists as committed ideologues who 
believe that violence is legitimate in the pursuit of their cause and will stop at 
nothing to achieve their ends. 
We do not perceive domestic violence in the same way. We perceive domestic 
violence as a threat to individual women, or perhaps also to men, but not to 
society, and certainly not to the state. We see domestic violence as inevitable, 
because it is based in human emotion and a spontaneous outburst of passion. 
We conceive of domestic violence perpetrators as individual, frustrated men, 
not as members of a group with a common set of beliefs and understandings. 
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We do not perceive masculinist ideology at all, because it is invisible within our 
society. 
We see these things not solely, but largely, because that is how they are 
constructed in social and legal discourse, and those discourses represent the 
way in which we hear about violence and the way we speak about it and 
understand it. But this is not to say that these constructions are the only way in 
which to speak about violence. The concept of ‘resistant discourse’ always 
exists as a means of offering new and disruptive ways of speaking about 
violence against women.  
It is in disrupting these taken-for-granted discursive patterns and offering up 
new ways of speaking about and understanding violence, that we create the 
potential for a new understanding of domestic violence – as ‘terrorism against 
women as women’. The events of 9/11 were horrifying, and have had an impact 
on modern society which is likely to reverberate for many years to come. The 
challenge for those engaged in addressing the problem of violence against 
women is to generate the same profound outrage and impetus for action in the 
context of ‘Women’s September 11’.55 
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 MacKinnon (2006). 
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ANNEXURE A: SUMMARY TABLE OF HATE SPEECH/HATE CRIME LEGISLATION 
 
Jurisdiction Civil provisions Criminal provisions Hate crimes Explanatory 
Memorandum – 
Reference to 
Gender/Sex? 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
Discrimination Act 1991 
s 66: It is unlawful for a 
person, by a public act, 
to incite hatred towards, 
serious contempt for, or 
severe ridicule of, a 
person or group of 
people on the ground of 
any of the following 
characteristics of the 
person or members of 
the group: 
(a) race; 
(b) sexuality; 
(c) gender identity; 
(d) HIV/AIDS status 
 
Exception for: a public 
act, done reasonably 
and honestly, for 
academic, 
artistic, scientific or 
research purposes or for 
other purposes in 
the public interest, 
S 67: Intentionally 
carries out an act - 
reckless about whether 
the act is a public act -
the act is a threatening 
act - reckless about 
whether the act incites 
hatred towards, serious 
contempt for, or severe 
ridicule of, a person or 
group of people on the 
ground of 
race/sexuality/gender 
identity/HIV/AIDS status. 
(50 pu) 
 
Dictionary: ‘sexuality’ 
means heterosexuality, 
homosexuality or 
bisexuality 
 
No relevant provisions EM to the Sexuality 
Discrimination Act 2004 
Amt 2.7 (amending ss 
66 and 67): notes that 
the existing provisions in 
relation to racial 
vilification and serious 
racial vilification (ss 66 
and 67) are expanded to 
include vilification on the 
basis of sexuality, 
transsexuality, or 
HIV/AIDS status.  
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Jurisdiction Civil provisions Criminal provisions Hate crimes Explanatory 
Memorandum – 
Reference to 
Gender/Sex? 
including discussion or 
debate about and 
presentations of any 
matter. 
 
S 65: ‘Public act’ 
includes any 
communication to the 
public; any conduct 
observable by the 
public; and 
distribution/disseminat-
ion of any matter to the 
public 
New South Wales 
Anti Discrimination Act 
1977 
S 20C: 
It is unlawful for a 
person, by a public act, 
to incite hatred towards, 
serious contempt for, or 
severe ridicule of, a 
person or group of 
persons on the ground 
of the: 
race of the person or 
members of the group. 
 
Same conduct 
prohibited on the 
grounds of: 
S 20D:  
(1  public act, incite hatred 
towards, serious 
contempt for, or severe 
ridicule of, a person or 
group of persons on the 
ground of the race of the 
person or members of 
the group by means 
which include: 
(a)  threatening physical 
harm towards, or 
towards any property of, 
the person or group of 
persons, or 
NSW 
Crimes (Sentencing 
Procedure) Act 1999 s 
21A(2)(h): 
The aggravating factors 
to be taken into account 
in determining the 
appropriate sentence for 
an offence are as 
follows: ... 
(h)  the offence was 
motivated by hatred for 
or prejudice against a 
group of people to which 
the offender believed 
EM to Transgender 
(Anti-Discrimination and 
Other Acts Amendment) 
Bill: purpose as noted in 
Overview section is to 
make discrimination and 
vilification on 
transgender grounds 
unlawful (introduction of 
s 38S) 
 
EM to the Crimes 
(Sentencing Procedure) 
Amendment (Standard 
Minimum Sentencing) 
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Jurisdiction Civil provisions Criminal provisions Hate crimes Explanatory 
Memorandum – 
Reference to 
Gender/Sex? 
 
Transgender identity (s 
38S) 
 
Homosexuality (s 49ZT) 
 
HIV/AIDS status (s 
49ZXB) 
 
Exceptions for a public 
act, done reasonably 
and in good faith, for 
academic, artistic, 
scientific, research or 
other purposes in the 
public interest, or for 
religious discussion 
(except in the case of 
racial vilification) 
(b)  inciting others to 
threaten physical harm 
towards, or towards any 
property of, the person 
or group of persons. 
Maximum penalty:  
50 pu/6m (individual); 
100pu (corporation). 
Requires consent of AG. 
 
Same conduct 
prohibited on the 
grounds of: 
 
Transgender identity (s 
38T) 
Max penalty: 10 pu/6m 
(individual)/100pu 
(corporation). Requires 
consent of AG. 
 
Homosexuality (s 
49ZTA) 
Max penalty: 10 pu/6m 
(individual)/100pu 
(corporation). Requires 
consent of AG. 
 
the victim belonged 
(such as people of a 
particular religion, racial 
or ethnic origin, 
language, sexual 
orientation or age, or 
having a particular 
disability) ... 
Act 2002: “a new section 
that sets out specific 
aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances 
that are to be taken into 
account by sentencing 
courts in determining the 
appropriate sentence for 
an offence, if those 
circumstances are 
relevant and known to 
the court.” No 
references to 
gender/sex included. 
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Jurisdiction Civil provisions Criminal provisions Hate crimes Explanatory 
Memorandum – 
Reference to 
Gender/Sex? 
HIV/AIDS status (s 
49ZXC) 
Max penalty: 10 pu/6m 
(individual)/100pu 
(corporation). Requires 
consent of AG. 
 
Northern Territory 
Anti Discrimination Act 
1992 
No specific hate speech 
provisions – general 
anti-discrimination 
provisions. 
 
S 19: prohibition on 
discrimination on the 
basis of (a) race; (b) 
sex; (c) sexuality; (d) 
age; (e) marital status; 
(f) pregnancy; (g) 
parenthood; (h) 
breastfeeding; (j) 
impairment;  (k) trade 
union or employer 
association activity; (m) 
religious belief or 
activity; (n) political 
opinion, affiliation or 
activity; (p) irrelevant 
medical record; (q) 
irrelevant criminal 
No criminal provisions Sentencing Act 1995 
(NT) s 6A(e): it is an 
aggravating factor for 
sentencing where the 
offence was motivated 
by hate against a ‘group 
of people’ 
EM to the Justice 
Legislation Amendment 
(Group Criminal 
Activities) Act 2006: 
Allows courts in 
imposing sentence to 
have further guidance 
as to the various matters 
that are commonly part 
of group crime that may 
be considered as 
aggravating factors and 
to add a new guideline 
of harm done to the 
broader community. No 
references to sex or 
gender. 
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Jurisdiction Civil provisions Criminal provisions Hate crimes Explanatory 
Memorandum – 
Reference to 
Gender/Sex? 
record; (r) association 
with a person who has, 
or is believed to have, 
an attribute referred to in 
this section. 
 
Queensland 
Anti Discrimination Act 
1991 
S 124A: by a public act, 
incite hatred towards, 
serious contempt for, or 
severe ridicule of, a 
person or group 
of persons on the 
ground of the race, 
religion, sexuality or 
gender identity of the 
person or members of 
the group. 
 
Exception for: a public 
act, done reasonably 
and in good faith, for 
academic, artistic, 
scientific or research 
purposes or for 
other purposes in the 
public interest, including 
public discussion or 
debate about, and 
expositions of, any act 
S 131A: by a public act, 
knowingly or recklessly 
incite hatred towards, 
serious contempt for, or 
severe ridicule of, a 
person or group of 
persons on the ground 
of the race, religion, 
sexuality or gender 
identity of the person or 
members of the group in 
a way that includes— 
(a) threatening physical 
harm towards, or 
towards any 
property of, the person 
or group of persons; or 
(b) inciting others to 
threaten physical harm 
towards, or towards any 
property of, the person 
or group of persons. 
Max penalty: 70pu/6m 
No relevant provisions EM to the Discrimination 
Law Amendment Bill 
(original s 124A referred 
only to racial and 
religious vilification): 
Makes clear that 
“sexuality” is a reference 
to the gay and lesbian 
community, while 
“gender identity” is for 
the protection of 
transgender and 
intersex people 
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Jurisdiction Civil provisions Criminal provisions Hate crimes Explanatory 
Memorandum – 
Reference to 
Gender/Sex? 
or matter (individual)/350 pu 
(corporation). Requires 
consent of Crown 
law/AG. 
South Australia 
Racial Vilification Act 
1996 
S 6: Court may award 
damages against person 
convicted of an offence 
against s 4 (up to 
$40,000) to an individual 
the offence was directed 
at or an organisation 
formed to further the 
interests of the group. 
 
S 73 Civil Liability Act 
1936: An ‘act of racial 
victimisation’ that results 
in detriment is 
actionable as a tort – 
“act of racial 
victimisation” means a 
public act inciting 
hatred, serious 
contempt or severe 
ridicule of a person or 
group of persons on the 
ground of their race but 
does not 
include— 
S 4: A person must not, 
by a public act, incite 
hatred towards, serious 
contempt for, or 
severe ridicule of, a 
person or group of 
persons on the ground 
of their race by— 
(a) threatening physical 
harm to the person, or 
members of the group, 
or to 
property of the person or 
members of the group; 
or 
inciting others to 
threaten physical harm 
to the person, or 
members of the 
group, or to property of 
the person or members 
of the group. 
Max penalty: $5,000/3 y 
(individual)/$25,000 
(body corporate). 
No relevant provisions Act contains no 
references to gender or 
sex 
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Jurisdiction Civil provisions Criminal provisions Hate crimes Explanatory 
Memorandum – 
Reference to 
Gender/Sex? 
(a) publication of a fair 
report of the act of 
another person; or 
(b) publication of 
material in 
circumstances in which 
the publication would be 
subject to a defence of 
absolute privilege in 
proceedings for 
defamation; or 
(c) a reasonable act, 
done in good faith, for 
academic, artistic, 
scientific or 
research purposes or for 
other purposes in the 
public interest (including 
reasonable public 
discussion, debate or 
expositions) 
Requires consent of 
DPP. 
Tasmania 
Anti Discrimination Act 
1998 
S 17: (1) A person must 
not engage in any 
conduct which offends, 
humiliates, intimidates, 
insults or ridicules 
another person on the 
basis of an attribute 
referred to in 
No criminal provisions No relevant provisions  
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Jurisdiction Civil provisions Criminal provisions Hate crimes Explanatory 
Memorandum – 
Reference to 
Gender/Sex? 
section 16(e), (f), 
(fa),(g), (h), (i) or (j) in 
circumstances in which 
a reasonable person, 
having regard to all the 
circumstances, would 
have anticipated that the 
other person would be 
offended, humiliated, 
intimidated, insulted or 
ridiculed.  
S 16 (grounds of 
discrimination): race; 
age; sexual orientation; 
lawful sexual activity; 
gender; marital  status; 
relationship status; 
pregnancy; 
breastfeeding; parental 
status; family 
responsibilities; 
disability; industrial 
activity; political belief or 
affiliation; political 
activity; religious belief 
or affiliation; religious 
activity; irrelevant 
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Jurisdiction Civil provisions Criminal provisions Hate crimes Explanatory 
Memorandum – 
Reference to 
Gender/Sex? 
criminal record; 
irrelevant medical 
record; association with 
a person who has, or is 
believed to have, any of 
these attributes 
S 19: A person, by a 
public act, must not 
incite hatred towards, 
serious contempt for, or 
severe ridicule of, a 
person or a group of 
persons on the ground 
of (a) the race of the 
person or any member 
of the group; or (b) any 
disability of the person 
or any member of the 
group; or (c) the sexual 
orientation or lawful 
sexual activity of the 
person or any member 
of the group; or (d) the 
religious belief or 
affiliation or religious 
activity of the person or 
any member of the 
group. 
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Jurisdiction Civil provisions Criminal provisions Hate crimes Explanatory 
Memorandum – 
Reference to 
Gender/Sex? 
Victoria 
Racial and Religious 
Tolerance Act 2001 
S 7: conduct that incites 
hatred against, serious 
contempt for, or 
revulsion or severe 
ridicule of, that other 
person or class of 
persons (on ground of 
race) 
 
s 8: same conduct 
unlawful on basis of 
religious belief or activity 
s 9: (1) In determining 
whether a person has 
contravened 
section 7 or 8, the 
person's motive in 
engaging in any conduct 
is irrelevant. 
(2) In determining 
whether a person has 
contravened 
section 7 or 8, it is 
irrelevant whether or not 
the race or religious 
belief or activity of 
another person or class 
of persons is the only or 
dominant ground for the 
S 24: must not on the 
ground of race 
intentionally engage in 
conduct that the 
offender 
knows is likely— 
(a) to incite hatred 
against that other 
person or 
class of persons; and 
(b) to threaten, or incite 
others to threaten, 
physical harm towards 
that other person or 
class of persons or the 
property of that other 
person or class of 
persons. 
 
S 24(2): A person (the 
offender) must not, on 
the ground of the race of 
another person or class 
of persons, intentionally 
engage in conduct that 
the offender knows is 
likely to incite serious 
contempt for, or 
revulsion or severe 
Sentencing Act 1991 s 
5(2): In sentencing an 
offender the court must 
have regard to -  
(daaa) whether the 
offence was motivated 
(wholly or partly) by 
hatred for or prejudice 
against a group of 
people with common 
characteristics with 
which the victim was 
associated or with 
which the offender 
believed the victim was 
associated ... 
 
 
Sentencing Advisory 
Council recommended it 
be left to courts to 
identify and develop the 
groups to which 
aggravating factors 
should apply: 
Sentencing Advisory 
Council (2009), para 
E.4. 
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Jurisdiction Civil provisions Criminal provisions Hate crimes Explanatory 
Memorandum – 
Reference to 
Gender/Sex? 
conduct, so long as it is 
a substantial ground. 
S 11: person does not 
contravene section 7 or 
8 if the person 
establishes that the 
person's conduct was 
engaged in reasonably 
and in good faith— 
(a) in the performance, 
exhibition or distribution 
of an artistic work; or 
(b) in the course of any 
statement, publication, 
discussion or debate 
made or held, or any 
other conduct engaged 
in, for— 
(i) any genuine 
academic, artistic, 
religious or scientific 
purpose; or 
(ii) any purpose that is in 
the public Interest. 
S 12: (1) A person does 
not contravene section 7 
or 8 if the person 
establishes that the 
person engaged in the 
ridicule of, that other 
person or class of 
persons. 
Max penalty: 6m/60pu 
for individual; 300 pu for 
body corporate. 
Prosecution requires 
consent of DPP. 
S 25: same offence for 
religious vilification 
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Jurisdiction Civil provisions Criminal provisions Hate crimes Explanatory 
Memorandum – 
Reference to 
Gender/Sex? 
conduct in 
circumstances that may 
reasonably be taken to 
indicate that the parties 
to the conduct desire it 
to be heard or seen only 
by themselves. 
(2) Subsection (1) does 
not apply in relation to 
conduct in any 
circumstances in which 
the parties to the 
conduct ought 
reasonably to expect 
that it may be heard or 
seen by someone else. 
Western Australia 
Criminal Code Act 
Compilation 1913 
No civil provisions S 77: Conduct intended 
to incite racial animosity 
or racist harassment – 
14 yrs. 
S 78: Conduct likely to 
incite racial animosity or 
racist harassment- 5 yrs 
S 79: Possession of 
material for 
dissemination with intent 
to incite racial animosity 
or racist harassment – 
14 yrs 
S 80I (circumstances of 
racial aggravation 
means): immediately 
before or during or 
immediately after the 
commission of the 
offence, the offender 
demonstrates 
hostility towards the 
victim based, in whole or 
part, on 
the victim being a 
member of a racial 
No references to sex or 
gender in legislation 
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Jurisdiction Civil provisions Criminal provisions Hate crimes Explanatory 
Memorandum – 
Reference to 
Gender/Sex? 
s 80: Possession of 
material for 
dissemination if material 
likely to incite racial 
animosity or racist 
harassment – 5 yrs 
s 80A: Conduct intended 
to racially harass – 5 yrs 
s 80B: Conduct likely to 
racially harass – 3 yrs 
s 80C: Possession of 
material for display with 
intent to racially harass 
– 5 yrs 
s 80D: Possession of 
material for display if 
material likely to 
racially harass – 3 yrs 
Defences for s 78, 80 
and 80B and 80D for 
conduct engaged in 
reasonably and in good 
faith in performance of 
an artistic work, 
academic purposes etc. 
S 80H: Prosecution ss 
77-80 requires consent 
of DPP. 
group; or 
(b) the offence is 
motivated, in whole or 
part, by hostility 
towards persons as 
members of a racial 
group. [Circumstances 
of aggravation for 
assaults, AOABH – 
relates to increased 
penalties] 
Federal Ss 18B-18F: prohibits No criminal provisions. No relevant provisions No provisions relating to 
331 
 
Jurisdiction Civil provisions Criminal provisions Hate crimes Explanatory 
Memorandum – 
Reference to 
Gender/Sex? 
Racial Discrimination 
Act 1975 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sex Discrimination Act 
1984  
an act done other than 
in private that is 
reasonably likely in all 
circumstances to offend, 
insult, humiliate or 
intimidate another based 
on race, colour or 
national or ethnic origin.  
 
 
Does not contain 
comparable provisions 
to RDA. Prohibits 
‘sexual harassment’ in 
the context of 
employment, education 
and the provision of 
services, 
accommodation or land 
dealings: Division 3 
Note that the original 
Racial Hatred Bill 1994 
proposed three criminal 
offences but these were 
strongly opposed by the 
Opposition on the basis 
that they would restrict 
free speech. 
hate speech or hate 
crime on the basis of 
sex/gender 
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ANNEXURE B: LEGISLATION RELATING TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROTECTION ORDERS 
 NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS NT ACT  
Relevant 
legislation 
Crimes 
(Domestic 
and 
Personal 
Violence) 
Act 2007 
Family 
Violence 
Protection 
Act 2008 
Domestic 
and Family 
Violence 
Protection 
Act 1989 
Intervention 
Orders 
(Prevention 
of Abuse) 
Act 2009  
Restraining 
Orders Act 
1997 
Family 
Violence 
Act 2004 
 
Justices 
Act 1959 
(second 
reference in 
each box) 
Domestic 
and Family 
Violence 
Act 2007 
Domestic 
Violence 
and 
Protection 
Orders Act 
2008 
Commence
ment 
10 March 
2008 
Sections 1, 
2 and 224 
on 24 
September 
2008: 
section 
3(1); 
sections 3–
223, 
233–272 on 
8 
December 
2008: 
Special 
Gazette 
(No. 339) 4 
December 
2008 
page 1; ss 
225–232 
Sections 1-
2: 5 May 
1989 
Remaining 
provisions: 
21 August 
1989 
Most 
provisions 
in force at 9 
December 
2011 
 
ss 1 and 2: 
28 Aug 
1997; 
Other 
provisions: 
15 Sep 
1997 (s 2 
and 
Gazette 12 
Sep 1997 p 
5149) 
30 March 
2005 
 
24 July 
1958 
1 July 2008 30 March 
2009 
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 NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS NT ACT  
not yet 
commenc-
ed. 
Purpose/pr
eamble 
S 9: a. to 
ensure the 
safety and 
protection 
of all 
persons, 
including 
children, 
who 
experience 
or witness 
domestic 
violence, 
and  
b. to reduce 
and prevent 
violence by 
a person 
against 
another 
person 
where a 
domestic 
relationship 
exists 
between 
those 
persons, 
and  
Preamble: 
family 
violence is 
a 
fundament-
al violation 
of human 
rights – 
recognises 
that family 
violence is 
committed 
predomin-
antly by 
men 
against 
women, 
children 
and other 
vulnerable 
persons. 
Section 1: 
purpose is 
to 
maximise 
safety of 
children 
and adults 
who have 
S 3A: To 
provide for 
the safety 
or 
protection 
of a person 
in the case 
of DV 
committed 
in one of a 
number of 
specified 
relation-
ships – 
spousal, 
intimate 
personal, 
family or 
informal 
carer 
S 5: To 
assist in 
preventing 
domestic 
and non-
domestic 
abuse, and 
the 
exposure of 
children to 
the effects 
of domestic 
and non-
domestic 
abuse by 
providing 
for: 
intervention 
orders; 
associated 
orders re 
problem 
gambling 
and 
tenancy 
agreements 
and the 
registration 
of foreign 
None 
specified 
Long title: 
‘to provide 
for an 
integrated 
criminal 
justice 
response to 
family 
violence 
which 
promotes 
the safety 
of people 
affected by 
family 
violence’ 
Preamble: 
The 
Legislative 
Assembly 
enacts this 
Act 
because it 
recognises: 
(a) 
domestic 
violence is 
unaccept- 
able 
behaviour 
that society 
does not 
condone; 
and 
(b) 
domestic 
violence 
has: 
(i) negative 
and long-
lasting 
consequen-
ces for 
victims and 
others 
S 6: The 
objects of 
this Act 
include— 
(a) to 
prevent 
violence 
between 
family 
members 
and others 
who 
are in a 
domestic 
relationship 
recognising 
that 
domestic 
violence is 
a particular 
form of 
interperson
al violence 
that 
needs a 
greater 
level of 
protective 
response; 
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c. to enact 
provisions 
that are 
consistent 
with certain 
principles 
underlying 
the 
Declaration 
on the 
Elimination 
of Violence 
against 
Women, 
and  
d. to enact 
provisions 
that are 
consistent 
with the 
United 
Nations 
Convention 
on the 
Rights of 
the Child. 
Parliament 
recognises 
that 
domestic 
violence is 
predomin-
experienc-
ed FV; 
reduce 
incidence 
of FV; 
make 
perpetrator
s account-
able 
intervention 
orders; to 
provide 
special 
police 
powers of 
arrest, 
detention 
and search 
re 
intervention 
orders and 
to further 
protect 
persons 
suffering or 
witnessing 
domestic or 
non-
domestic 
abuse by 
providing 
special 
arrange- 
ments for 
witnesses 
and 
imposing 
limitations 
on 
publishing 
reports 
exposed to 
it; and 
(ii) negative 
consequen-
ces for the 
community, 
the 
workplace 
and the 
economy. 
S 3: 
Objects of 
Act: (a) to 
ensure the 
safety and 
protection 
of all 
persons, 
including 
children, 
who 
experience 
or are 
exposed to 
domestic 
violence; 
and 
(b) to 
ensure 
people who 
commit 
domestic 
and 
(b) to 
facilitate 
the safety 
and 
protection 
of people 
who fear or 
experience 
violence by  
— 
(i) providing 
a legally 
enforceable 
mechanism 
to prevent 
violent 
conduct; 
and 
(ii) allowing 
for the 
resolution 
of conflict 
without the 
need to 
resort to 
adjudicat-
ion. 
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antly 
perpetrated 
by men 
against 
women and 
children. 
about 
proceed-
ings for 
orders. 
S 10 
(principles): 
the 
following 
must be 
recognised 
(inter alia): 
abuse 
occurs in all 
areas of 
society, 
regardless 
of socio-
economic 
status, 
health, age, 
culture, 
gender, 
sexuality, 
ability, 
ethnicity 
and 
religion. 
violence 
accept 
Responsibil
-ity for their 
conduct; 
and 
(c) to 
reduce and 
prevent 
domestic 
violence. 
Type of 
order 
S 16: 
Apprehend-
ed 
domestic 
violence 
Family 
violence 
intervention 
order/family 
violence 
S 13: 
‘Domestic 
violence 
order’ – can 
be a 
S6: 
Intervention 
order 
Part 2: 
Violence 
restraining 
order – can 
be interim 
Ss 14-16: 
family 
violence 
order 
‘Police 
Court of 
Summary 
Jurisdiction 
Domestic 
Violence 
Ss 10 and 
11: 
Domestic 
violence 
order 
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order 
(ADVO) 
safety 
notice 
(interim 
order 
where 
FVIO is not 
in place). 
Interim 
FVIO also 
available 
pending 
final 
determinat-
ion (Pt 4, 
Div 2). 
Family 
Violence 
Safety 
Notice 
(FVSN) can 
be made by 
police. 
protection 
order/temp-
orary 
protection 
order – for 
protection 
of 
‘aggrieved 
person’ 
against 
respondent 
or final – 
interim 
orders 
become 
final if 
respondent 
consents or 
does not 
object. 
Part 3: 
misconduct 
restraining 
orders (not 
for persons 
in a 
domestic 
and family 
relationship 
family 
violence 
order’ can 
be made by 
police 
officer if 
satisfied 
family 
violence 
offence has 
occurred/ 
likely to 
occur 
 
Justices 
Act: 
Restraining 
orders 
Order (CSJ 
DVO). 
S 35: 
interim 
order can 
be made at 
any time 
during 
proceeding
s for a 
DVO. 
S 41: police 
DVO if 
urgent 
circumstan-
ces so not 
practicable 
to apply for 
CSJ DVO; 
necessary 
to ensure 
safety; and 
CSJ DVO 
might 
reasonably 
have been 
made had it 
been 
practicable 
to apply. 
(restrains 
respondent 
from 
engaging in 
DV – can 
be final, 
interim or 
emergency) 
and 
personal 
protection 
order 
(restrains 
respondent 
from 
engaging in 
personal 
violence - 
can be final 
or interim). 
Personal 
protection 
order can 
be a 
workplace 
order 
restraining 
personal 
violence in 
the 
workplace. 
S 36: 
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interim 
orders 
become 
final orders 
if no 
objection or 
if 
respondent 
objects, 
Magistrate 
determines. 
S 43: 
consent 
orders with 
consent of 
both parties 
Definition of 
‘family 
violence’ or 
‘domestic 
violence’ 
S 4: 
‘personal 
violence 
offence’ 
defined to 
include a 
range of 
criminal 
offences 
under the 
Crimes Act, 
and also 
the offence 
under s 13 
of stalking 
or 
S 5: Family 
violence: 
(a) 
behaviour 
towards a 
family 
member of 
that person 
that— 
(i) is 
physically 
or sexually 
abusive; or 
(ii) is 
emotionally 
or 
S 11: 
‘Domestic 
violence’: 
specified 
acts 
committed 
by one 
member of 
a domestic 
relationship 
including 
wilful injury, 
wilful 
damage, 
intimidation 
or 
S 8(8) 
‘Domestic 
abuse’ is 
an act of 
abuse 
committed 
by persons 
who are 
married; 
domestic 
partners; in 
an intimate 
personal 
relationship
; children/ 
step-
S 3: ‘Act of 
abuse’ 
encompass
-es family 
and 
domestic 
violence 
and 
personal 
violence. 
S 6: ‘Family 
and 
domestic 
violence’: 
acts 
committed 
S 7: 
assault, 
intimidation
threats, 
economic 
abuse, 
emotional 
abuse, 
stalking, 
contravent-
ion of PO 
S 5: 
‘Domestic 
violence’- 
act against 
someone 
with whom 
person is in 
a domestic 
relationship 
– includes 
physical 
harm, 
damage to 
property 
including 
pets, 
S 13: 
‘domestic 
violence’: 
includes 
specified 
acts 
towards a 
‘relevant 
person’ 
including 
physical/ 
personal 
injury; 
damage to 
property; a 
domestic 
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intimidation 
with 
intention to 
cause the 
other 
person to 
fear 
physical or 
mental 
harm. 
S11: 
‘Domestic 
violence 
offence’ 
means a 
personal 
violence 
offence 
committed 
against a 
person with 
whom the 
respondent 
has or had 
a domestic 
relationship 
psycholog-
ically 
abusive; or 
(iii) is 
economic-
ally 
abusive; or 
(iv) is 
threatening; 
or 
(v) is 
coercive; or 
(vi) in any 
other way 
controls or 
dominates 
the family 
member 
and causes 
that 
family 
member to 
feel fear for 
the safety 
or 
wellbeing of 
that family 
member or 
another 
person; or 
(b) 
behaviour 
harassment 
indecent 
behaviour, 
or a threat 
to commit 
any of 
those acts  
children; 
siblings; 
otherwise 
related; 
carers. 
S 8(1) and 
(2): act of 
abuse 
includes 
resulting in 
physical 
injury, 
emotional 
or 
psycholog-
ical harm; 
unreason-
able and 
non-
consensual 
denial of 
financial, 
social or 
personal 
autonomy; 
damage to 
property. 
 
against a 
person with 
whom 
respondent 
is in a 
domestic 
and family 
relationship 
physical 
injury, 
kidnapping, 
pursuing 
with intent 
to 
intimidate, 
damaging 
property, 
ongoing 
behaviour 
that is 
intimidating
offensive or 
emotionally 
abusive, 
threats 
intimidation
stalking, 
economic 
abuse, 
attempts/ 
threat.  
 
violence 
offence; 
threat to do 
any of the 
above; 
harassing 
or offensive 
behaviour; 
animal 
violence 
offence 
directed at 
pets. 
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by a person 
that causes 
a child to 
hear or 
witness, or 
otherwise 
be exposed 
to 
the effects 
of, 
behaviour 
referred to 
in 
paragraph 
(a). 
Other forms 
of abuse 
defined 
S 44 of the 
Crimes Act 
(one of the 
offences 
listed 
above) 
prohibits 
failing to 
provide a 
wife/ 
servant/ 
apprentice 
with 
necessary 
food, 
clothing 
and 
S 6: 
Economic 
abuse: 
Behaviour 
that is 
coercive, 
deceptive 
or 
unreason-
ably 
controls 
and denies 
financial 
autonomy 
or 
withholds 
or 
None S 8(4): 
Emotional 
or 
psychologic
al harm: 
includes 
mental 
illness, 
nervous 
shock, 
distress, 
anxiety or 
fear that is 
more than 
trivial 
S 8(5): 
unreason-
S 6: 
Personal 
violence: 
personal 
injury, 
kidnapping, 
pursuing, 
threats, 
against a 
person not 
in a family 
and 
domestic 
relationship 
‘Domestic 
and family 
violence’ 
S 8: 
Economic 
abuse: 
pursuing a 
course of 
conduct 
(made up 
of one or 
more 
actions, 
such as 
coercing a 
partner to 
relinquish 
control over 
assets or 
income) 
S 6: 
intimidation 
includes 
any 
conduct 
that has the 
effect of 
unreasonab
-ly 
controlling 
the person 
or causes 
mental 
harm. 
S 8: 
‘economic 
abuse’: 
S 14: 
Personal 
violence 
against an 
‘aggrieved 
person’ (not 
including 
DV): 
causes 
injury or 
damage to 
property; 
threats to 
above; is 
harassing 
or 
offensive. 
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lodging. 
S 7: 
intimidation 
includes 
conduct 
amounting 
to 
harassment 
or 
molestation
. 
threatens to 
withhold 
financial 
support for 
reasonable 
living 
expenses.  
S 7: 
Emotional 
or 
psychologic
al abuse: 
behaviour 
that  
torments, 
harasses, 
intimidates 
or is 
offensive 
 
able and 
non-
consensual 
denial of 
autonomy 
includes 
exercising 
an 
unreason-
able level 
of control 
and 
domination 
over daily 
life (other 
exs given). 
 
includes 
acting in a 
way that is 
emotionally 
abusive. 
with the 
intent to 
unreason-
ably control 
or 
intimidate 
the spouse 
or partner 
or cause 
them 
mental 
harm, 
apprehen-
sion or fear. 
S 9: 
Emotional 
abuse: 
pursuing a 
course of 
conduct 
that the 
person 
knows, or 
ought to 
know, is 
likely to 
have the 
effect of 
unreason-
ably 
controlling 
or 
coercing 
the person 
to 
relinquish 
control over 
assets/inco
me; 
unreasonab
ly disposing 
of property 
without 
consent; 
unreason-
ably 
preventing 
person 
from 
participat-
ing in 
decisions 
over 
household 
expenditure
; 
withholding 
money 
reasonably 
necessary 
for 
mainten-
ance of 
person/ 
S 50: 
Personal 
violence in 
the 
workplace: 
injury, 
damage to 
property, 
offensive or 
harassing 
behaviour 
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intimidating
or causing 
mental 
harm, 
apprehens-
ion or fear 
in, the 
spouse or 
partner 
child. 
Who the 
order 
protects 
S 3: 
‘protected 
person’ is a 
person in 
whose 
favour an 
order is 
made – S 
15: a 
person with 
whom deft 
has or has 
had a 
‘domestic 
relationship
’ (for an 
apprehend-
ed DVO) 
S 5: 
includes 
intimate 
relation-
ships, 
S 8: Family 
member: 
includes a 
person who 
has had an 
intimate 
personal 
relationship 
with the 
other 
person, as 
well as 
relative, 
child, 
partner. 
‘Domestic 
partner’ s 9:  
includes 
where 
people are 
members of 
a couple 
and provide 
S 15: 
Aggrieved 
person: 
spouse/ 
intimate 
relationship
/family 
relationship
/informal 
carer, or 
their 
associate 
S 7: any 
person 
against 
whom it is 
suspected 
respondent 
will commit 
an act of 
abuse; or 
any child 
who may 
hear or 
witness or 
be exposed 
to effects of 
an act of 
abuse. 
*Note that 
proceed-
ings 
relating to 
intervention 
against 
‘Violence 
restraining 
orders’: 
Those in a 
family or 
domestic 
relationship 
– includes 
partners, 
relatives, 
children 
who 
normally 
reside with 
the other 
person, 
those in a 
‘personal 
relationship
’ i.e. 
personal 
relationship 
of a 
S 7: Those 
in a family 
relationship
which 
includes 
married 
persons 
and those 
in a 
significant 
relationship 
but not 
other family 
members 
 
S 9: those 
in a 
domestic 
relationship 
includes 
family 
relationship
; intimate 
personal 
relationship
; person 
who 
respondent 
regularly 
lives 
with/lived 
with; caring 
and 
guardian 
relationship 
S 11: 
intimate 
personal 
S 15: For 
DV, a 
‘relevant 
person’ is a 
partner or 
former 
partner, 
relative, 
child of 
partner/ 
former 
partner; 
parent of 
child of 
respondent; 
or someone 
in an 
intimate 
relationship 
(does not 
require 
cohabitat-
ion). 
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relatives, 
people 
living in 
residential 
facilities, 
carer 
relation-
ships 
S 18: 
personal 
violence 
order can 
be made in 
favour of 
any person 
personal or 
financial 
commit-
ment  
domestic 
abuse as 
far as 
practicable 
must be 
dealt with 
as a matter 
of priority (s 
9). 
domestic 
nature 
where lives 
are so 
intertwined 
their 
actions 
affect each 
other; other 
persons not 
in a 
‘domestic 
and family 
relationship
’ 
relationship 
includes 
persons 
dating 
taking into 
account 
intimacy in 
relationship
; length of 
relationship 
etc. 
S 13: a 
‘protected 
person’ 
must be in 
a domestic 
relationship 
with 
respondent 
‘Aggrieved 
person’ for 
DV and 
PPO 
orders: 
person 
against 
whom the 
DV or 
personal 
violence 
has been 
directed or 
is likely to 
be directed: 
Dictionary 
Who can 
apply 
S 48: 
person 
seeking 
protection 
or police 
officer – 
only a 
police 
officer for a 
child or a 
provisional 
order 
S 27 and 
Part 3 Div 2 
- FVSN: 
police 
applies to 
sgt – taken 
to be an 
application 
for a FVIO. 
FVIO s 45: 
police 
officer or 
affected 
family 
S 14: 
Aggrieved 
person, 
someone 
authorised 
by them or 
police 
officer.  
S 18: police 
officer may 
issue 
interim 
intervention 
order if 
there are 
grounds for 
issuing the 
order and 
respondent 
is present. 
S 20: 
S 18 
(telephone 
applications
): 
‘authorised 
person’ (i.e. 
police or 
prescribed 
person) or 
a person 
seeking to 
be 
protected if 
S 15: police 
officer, 
affected 
person or 
affected 
child.  
For 
restraint 
orders: S 
106B: a 
police 
officer, a 
person 
S 28: 
adult/young 
person in 
domestic 
relationship 
with 
respondent; 
person 
acting on 
their behalf; 
police 
officer. 
S 29: 
S 18: non-
emergency 
protection 
orders – 
aggrieved 
person and 
police 
officer (and 
leaves 
intact other 
rights e.g. 
of parents). 
S 68: for 
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49: police 
officer must 
make an 
application 
if 
reasonable 
suspicion 
DV has 
occurred or 
is likely to 
occur 
member (or 
someone 
on behalf of 
child). 
S 75: 
where 
applicant is 
an officer, 
court can 
grant FVIO 
even 
without 
consent of 
affected 
family 
member 
(but limit as 
to 
conditions 
that may 
apply) 
Application 
for an 
intervention 
order may 
be made by 
police 
officer; 
person 
against 
whom it is 
alleged 
respondent 
may 
commit an 
act of 
abuse or 
suitable 
representat
-ive; or a 
child who 
may hear 
or witness 
introduced 
to the 
Magistrate 
by an 
authorised 
person 
S 25 
(VROs): a 
person 
seeking to 
be 
protected 
or an 
authorised 
person – 
likewise S 
38 for a 
misconduct 
restraining 
order (can 
also be 
made by a 
police 
officer on 
behalf of 
the public 
generally) 
against 
whom the 
behaviour 
is directed 
or a parent/ 
guardian or 
a person 
granted 
leave. 
S 106DA: a 
police 
officer for a 
telephone 
interim 
restraint 
order if 
reasonable 
grounds for 
believing 
respondent 
has 
intimidated 
another 
person and 
intimidation 
is likely to 
continue 
and give 
rise to an 
assault and 
it is not 
practicable 
Police 
officer must 
make 
application 
for child if 
DV has 
been 
committed 
or is likely 
to be 
committed 
and child 
has been or 
is likely to 
be 
adversely 
affected 
emergency 
orders, only 
police. 
‘Aggrieved 
person’ def. 
in 
Dictionary 
as person 
who has 
been the 
subject or 
is likely to 
be of DV or 
personal 
violence. 
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to 
immediate-
ly apply for 
a restraint 
order 
because of 
the time 
and place 
at which 
the 
intimidation 
occurred. 
Criteria for 
granting 
S 16(1): if 
the person 
who 
has/had a 
domestic 
relationship 
with the 
respondent 
has 
reasonable 
grounds to 
fear and in 
fact fears 
the 
commission 
of a 
personal 
violence 
offence 
(actual fear 
Part 3 Div 2 
– FVSN: 
can be 
granted if a 
FVIO/ 
Family Law 
Act orders 
are not in 
place; if 
officer 
believes on 
reasonable 
grounds the 
order is 
necessary 
to ensure 
safety of 
affected 
family 
member/pr
S 20: if 
respondent 
has 
committed 
an act of 
DV and two 
are in a 
domestic 
relationship 
and it is 
likely 
another act 
of DV will 
be 
committed/ 
if act is a 
threat it is 
likely threat 
will be 
carried out.  
S 6: It is 
reasonable 
to suspect 
the 
respondent 
will, without 
intervention 
commit an 
act of 
abuse 
against a 
person; and 
the issuing 
of the order 
is 
appropriate 
in the 
circumstan-
ces. 
S 11A: 
respondent 
has 
committed 
an act of 
abuse and 
likely to do 
so again; or 
person 
applying 
reasonably 
fears that 
respondent 
will commit 
an act of 
abuse and 
it is 
appropriate 
in all the 
circumstan-
S 16: that 
person has 
committed 
family 
violence 
and may 
again 
commit 
family 
violence. 
Restraining 
orders: S 
106B: 
justices are 
satisfied on 
balance of 
probabilitie
s that a 
person has 
caused 
S 18: 
reasonable 
grounds for 
protected 
person to 
fear the 
commission 
of DV 
against 
them by 
respondent. 
S 29: 
interim 
orders of 
both types 
– 
necessary 
to ensure 
safety of an 
aggrieved 
person/ 
child of 
aggrieved 
person or 
prevent 
substantial 
damage to 
property of 
aggrieved 
person. 
S 46: for 
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not 
required 
where 
person has 
been 
subject to a 
personal 
violence 
offence and 
there is a 
reasonable 
likelihood 
the person 
will be 
subjected 
to a further 
personal 
violence 
offence) 
eserve 
property 
S 74: FVIO 
(final 
order): if 
satisfied on 
balance of 
probs that 
respondent 
has 
committed 
family 
violence 
and is likely 
to do so 
again 
S 39A: 
temporary 
protection 
orders if an 
act of DV 
has been 
committed 
ces 
S 34: 
misconduct 
restraining 
orders: if 
respondent 
is likely to 
behave in a 
manner 
that could 
reasonably 
be 
expected to 
be 
intimidating 
or offensive 
and would 
in fact 
intimidate 
or offend; 
damage 
property; or 
behave in a 
manner 
likely to 
breach the 
peace, and 
order is 
appropriate 
in all the 
circumstan-
ces 
personal 
injury or 
damage to 
property 
and unless 
restrained 
person is 
likely to 
again do 
so; or a 
person has 
threatened 
to cause 
injury or 
damage 
and unless 
restrained 
is likely to 
carry out 
that threat; 
or a person 
has 
behaved in 
a 
provocative 
or offensive 
manner, 
behaviour 
is likely to 
lead to a 
breach of 
peace and 
DV order, 
that 
respondent 
has 
committed 
an act of 
DV; for 
PPO, that 
respondent 
has 
committed 
personal 
violence 
and may 
engage in 
personal 
violence if 
the order is 
not made. 
S 69: 
emergency 
order – 
judicial 
officer can 
make if 
there are 
reasonable 
grounds to 
believe 
respondent 
would 
cause 
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unless 
restrained 
is likely 
again to 
behave in a 
similar 
manner; or 
that  a 
person has 
stalked the 
person for 
whose 
benefit 
application 
is made or 
a third 
person. 
S 106D: 
interim 
restraint 
orders – 
need not be 
satisfied of 
any of 
these 
things. 
S 
106DA(4): 
for 
telephone 
interim RO- 
if 
injury or 
substantial 
damage to 
property of 
aggrieved 
person or 
child, the 
aggrieved 
person is a 
‘relevant 
person’ and 
it is not 
practicable 
to arrest 
and it is 
outside 
sitting 
hours of 
court 
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magistrate 
considers 
there is 
sufficient 
cause – 
need not be 
satisfied of 
matters 
above. 
Period of 
order 
SS 79 and 
32: for as 
long as 
necessary 
to ensure 
safety of 
protected 
person 
(default is 
12 mths). 
Provisional 
order lasts 
for 28 days 
or until 
replaced by 
ADVO or 
removed 
S 97: court 
may specify 
period of 
final order 
(no limit 
specified) 
S 34A: 2 
years or 
longer if 
special 
circumstan-
ces exist 
S 11: Order 
is ongoing 
until 
revoked 
S 16: 2 
years or 
other 
specified 
period 
S 37 
(miscond-
uct 
restraining 
order): 1 yr 
or other 
specified 
period 
Ss 14 and 
19: such 
period as 
court 
considers 
necessary 
– PFVO in 
force for up 
to 12 mths 
or longer as 
extended 
by court 
Restraining 
orders: S 
106B(6): 
such period 
as justices 
consider 
necessary 
to protect 
the person 
for whose 
benefit the 
S 27: 
period 
specified in 
order 
S 37: 
interim 
orders – 2 
yrs 
S 55: up to 
2 years or 
longer if 
special or 
exceptional 
circumstan
ce (DV 
order). 
S 56: up to 
1 yr (PPO). 
S 77: 
emergency 
orders – 
earliest of 
COB 2nd 
day after 
order was 
made, 
order is 
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order is 
made or 
until a 
revoking 
order is 
made. 
revoked or 
interim or 
final order 
is made. 
Considerat-
ions 
S 17: court 
must 
consider 
personal 
safety of 
protected 
person and 
any child 
S 36: if 
FVSN has 
an 
exclusion 
condition, 
must 
consider 
accommod-
ation needs 
of 
respondent 
and take 
reasonable 
steps to 
ensure 
access to 
temporary 
accommod-
ation. 
S 80: safety 
of affected 
family 
member 
and 
children is 
paramount 
S 25(5): 
need to 
protect the 
aggrieved 
and any 
named 
person and 
welfare of 
child of the 
aggrieved 
are 
paramount. 
S 25(6): 
court may 
consider 
accommod
ation needs 
of all 
parties; 
effect of 
orders on 
child of 
aggrieved; 
any 
custody 
orders in 
S 10: 
Principles 
for 
intervention
: abuse 
occurs in all 
areas of 
society, 
regardless 
of SES, 
health, age, 
culture, 
gender, 
sexuality, 
ability, 
ethnicity 
and 
religion; 
abuse may 
involve 
overt or 
subtle 
exploitation 
of power 
imbalances 
and 
S 12: (first 
four are 
paramount)
: 
(a) the 
need to 
ensure that 
the person 
seeking to 
be 
protected is 
protected 
from acts of 
abuse; 
(b) the 
need to 
prevent 
behaviour 
that could 
reasonably 
be 
expected to 
cause fear 
that the 
person 
seeking to 
S 18: safety 
and 
interests of 
the person 
for whose 
benefit the 
order is 
sought and 
any 
affected 
child to be 
of 
paramount 
importance; 
must 
consider 
whether 
contact 
between 
the person 
for whose 
benefit the 
order is 
sought, or 
the person 
against 
S 19: safety 
and 
protection 
of protected 
person is 
paramount. 
Also any 
family law 
orders in 
force in 
relation to 
respondent; 
accommod
ation needs 
of protected 
person; 
respondent’
s criminal 
record and 
previous 
conduct 
and any 
other 
conduct 
court 
considers 
S 7: 
paramount 
considerat-
ion is: 
(a) for a 
domestic 
violence 
order—the 
need to 
ensure that 
the 
aggrieved 
person, and 
any child at 
risk of 
exposure to 
domestic 
violence, is 
protected 
from 
domestic 
violence; 
and 
(b) for a 
personal 
protection 
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considerat-
ion 
S 82: in 
making an 
exclusion 
order must 
consider all 
circumstan
ces 
including 
desirability 
of 
minimising 
disruption 
and 
ensuring 
continuity 
of employ-
ment etc of 
protected 
person. 
S 91: in 
deciding 
about 
contact with 
child must 
take into 
account 
whether 
that would 
jeopardise 
the safety 
place. 
S 46C: 
court must 
consider 
whether 
contact 
between 
aggrieved/ 
respondent 
and child is 
relevant or 
the 
existence 
of relevant 
family court 
orders 
isolated 
incidents or 
patterns; 
primary 
importance 
to prevent 
abuse and 
prevent 
children 
from 
exposure; 
as far as 
practicable, 
intervention 
should be 
designed to 
encouraged 
D’s to 
accept 
responsibil-
ity and take 
steps to 
avoid 
committing 
abuse; 
minimise 
disruption 
to protected 
persons 
and any 
child living 
with them; 
be 
protected 
will have 
committed 
against him 
or her an 
act 
of abuse; 
(ba) the 
need to 
ensure that 
children are 
not 
exposed to 
acts 
of family 
and 
domestic 
violence; 
(c) the 
wellbeing of 
children 
who are 
likely to be 
affected 
by the 
respondent’
s behaviour 
or the 
operation of 
the 
proposed 
whom the 
FVO is to 
be made, 
and any 
child who is 
a member 
of the 
family of 
either of 
those 
persons is 
relevant to 
the making 
of the FVO; 
must 
consider 
any 
relevant 
Family 
Court order 
of which 
the court 
has been 
informed. 
 
S 
106B(4AAB
): the 
protection 
and welfare 
of the 
person for 
relevant. 
S 20: court 
must 
presume 
protection 
of protected 
person and 
child are 
best served 
by them 
living in the 
home 
(where 
there is a 
child) 
order (other 
than a 
workplace 
order)—the 
need to 
ensure that 
the 
aggrieved 
person is 
protected 
from 
personal 
violence; 
and 
(c) for a 
workplace 
order—the 
need to 
ensure that 
employees 
and 
other 
people at 
the 
workplace 
are 
protected 
from 
personal 
violence at 
the 
workplace. 
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of a 
protected 
person or 
child 
allow 
training, 
education, 
and 
employ-
ment of 
protected 
person and 
any child to 
continue 
order; 
(d) the 
accommod
ation needs 
of the 
respondent 
and the 
person 
seeking to 
be 
protected; 
(da) the 
past history 
of the 
respondent 
and the 
person 
seeking 
to be 
protected 
with 
respect to 
applications 
under this 
Act, 
whether in 
relation to 
the same 
act or 
persons as 
are 
before the 
whose 
benefit the 
order is 
sought is of 
paramount 
importance; 
and must 
consider 
whether 
access 
between 
the person 
for whose 
benefit the 
order is 
sought or 
the person 
against 
whom the 
order is 
sought and 
any child 
who is a 
member of 
the family 
of either is 
relevant; 
and must 
consider 
any 
relevant 
family 
Order must 
be least 
restrictive 
of liberty of 
respondent 
as will still 
achieve 
paramount 
considerat-
ion. 
S 47: the 
principles 
and 
purpose of 
the Act, 
accommod-
ation needs 
of 
aggrieved 
person and 
any child; 
any 
hardship to 
respondent; 
financial 
means of 
respondent 
if proposed 
to require 
not dealing 
with 
personal 
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court or 
not; 
 (e) 
hardship 
that may be 
caused to 
the 
respondent 
if the 
order is 
made; 
(f) any 
family 
orders; 
(g) other 
current 
legal 
proceed-
ings 
involving 
the 
respondent 
or the 
person 
seeking to 
be 
protected; 
(h) any 
criminal 
record of 
the 
respondent; 
contact 
order. 
S 106B(5): 
re ouster 
order, must 
consider 
the effect 
on the 
accommod-
ation of the 
persons 
affected 
and on any 
children 
and the 
need for 
suitable 
arrange-
ments to be 
made to 
allow the 
respondent 
to take 
possession 
of personal 
property. 
property; 
contact 
between 
parties and 
child and 
any family 
contact 
orders; 
previous 
violence or 
contravent-
ion 
S 71: for 
emergency 
order must 
consider 
any contact 
between 
parties and 
child and 
any family 
contact 
orders. 
352 
 
 NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS NT ACT  
(i) any 
previous 
similar 
behaviour 
of the 
respondent 
whether in 
relation to 
the person 
seeking to 
be 
protected 
or 
otherwise; 
and 
(j) other 
matters the 
court 
considers 
relevant. 
S 35(1): 
similar 
considerat-
ions as 
above for 
misconduct 
restraining 
orders 
Conditions 
available 
S 35: such 
conditions 
as appear 
necessary 
S 81: any 
conditions 
that appear 
necessary 
S 17: 
respondent 
must be of 
good 
S 12: 
prohibit 
from being 
on 
S 13: such 
restraints 
as the court 
considers 
S 16: such 
conditions 
as 
necessary 
S 21: such 
restraints 
as 
necessary 
S 35: may 
prohibit 
respondent 
from being 
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or desirable 
to ensure 
the safety 
and 
protection 
of the 
protected 
person and 
any 
children, 
including 
restricting 
approaches 
to person, 
access to 
premises, 
restricting 
approaches 
within 12 
hrs of 
consuming 
alcohol, 
possession 
of firearms 
and 
interference 
with 
property (all 
contain 
conditions 
prohibiting 
assault, 
or desirable 
in the 
circumstan-
ces, inc an 
order to 
respondent 
to stay 
away from 
protected 
person, or 
excluding 
respondent 
from 
protected 
person’s 
residence 
S 93: if 
court 
considers 
that contact 
with 
respondent 
could 
jeopardise 
safety of 
protected 
person or 
child must 
make an 
order 
prohibiting 
contact with 
behaviour 
and not 
commit 
acts of DV 
and comply 
with any 
other 
orders the 
court 
makes 
S 25: any 
other 
conditions 
the court 
considers 
necessary 
in the 
circumstan-
ces and 
desirable in 
the 
interests of 
the 
aggrieved, 
any named 
person and 
respondent. 
Includes 
prohibiting 
contact/ 
Approach-
ing 
premises; 
prohibit 
from 
approach-
ing, 
contacting, 
etc; prohibit 
from 
damaging 
property; 
surrender 
weapons or 
articles 
used in an 
act of 
abuse; 
impose any 
other 
require-
ment to 
take 
specified 
action 
appropriate 
to prevent 
an act of 
abuse 
including 
prohibiting 
being in a 
place or 
contact, or 
requiring 
respondent 
not to use 
property. 
S 14: 
subject to 
exceptions, 
every VRO 
contains a 
restraint 
prohibiting 
respondent 
from 
possessing 
firearms or 
licence. 
S 36 
(miscon-
duct 
restraining 
orders): 
such 
restraints 
or desirable 
to prevent 
commission 
of FV 
including 
vacate 
premises 
and not 
possess 
firearms 
Restraining 
orders: S 
106B: such 
restraints 
as 
necessary 
or desirable 
to prevent 
the person 
from acting 
in a manner 
specified 
(as above). 
S 
106B(4B): 
may 
include an 
order to 
vacate 
premises; 
an order 
prohibiting 
or desirable 
to prevent 
commission 
of DV 
against PP; 
also such 
obligations 
as 
necessary 
or desirable 
to ensure 
respondent 
accepts 
responsibil-
ity for 
violence 
and 
encourages 
respondent 
to change 
behaviour 
  
S 22: may 
require 
respondent 
to vacate 
premises 
occupied 
by 
protected 
person 
S 24: may 
on 
premises 
where 
aggrieved 
person 
lives/works 
(only if 
necessary 
to ensure 
safety of 
aggrieved 
person). 
S 40: 
firearms 
licence 
suspended 
automatic-
ally unless 
a PPO 
respondent 
applies and 
court is 
satisfied 
not 
necessary 
(s 80 same 
for 
emergency 
orders).  
S 57: 
licence is 
cancelled if 
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intimidation
harassment 
etc). 
child. 
S 95: may 
suspend or 
revoke 
firearms 
authority 
residence. as 
appropriate 
to prevent 
behaviour 
that is 
intimidating
/likely to 
damage 
property/ 
likely to 
breach 
peace. 
or 
restricting 
possession 
of firearms; 
prohibiting 
stalking. 
include a 
rehabilitatio
n order if D 
is a suitable 
person and 
consents. 
final order 
is made. 
S 48: such 
conditions 
as 
necessary 
or desirable 
(other than 
workplace 
order) 
including 
respondent 
not to be on 
premises 
where 
aggrieved 
person 
lives/works, 
or being 
within a 
particular 
distance of 
aggrieved 
person; 
prohibit 
contact; 
prohibit 
damaging 
property. 
S 54: 
workplace 
orders – 
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such 
conditions 
as 
necessary 
or desirable 
including 
that 
respondent
not be at 
workplace. 
S 76: 
emergency 
orders – 
may 
prohibit 
respondent 
from being 
where 
aggrieved 
person 
lives only if 
necessary 
to ensure 
safety of 
aggrieved 
person 
Consequen
ces of 
failure to 
comply 
S 14: 2 yrs 
imp/50 pu – 
unless 
court 
otherwise 
orders (and 
S 37: 
failure to 
comply with 
FVSN – 2 
years/240 
pu/both. 
S 80: if at 
least 2 
breaches of 
order not 
less than 3 
yrs prior 2 
S 31: 
Failure to 
comply with 
intervention 
program 
order - 
S 61: 
breach of 
VRO/police 
order – 2 
yrs and/or 
$6,000; 
S 35: first 
offence: 
fine not 
exceeding 
20 penalty 
units or 12 
S 120: 
offence to 
contravene 
– strict 
liability. 
S 121: 
S 90: 
failure to 
comply with 
protection 
order – 500 
pu/5 yrs or 
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gives 
reasons) 
must be 
imp for a 
breach that 
is an act of 
violence 
S 123: 
failure to 
comply with 
FVIO – 2 
years/240 
pu/both 
yrs; 
otherwise 
40 pu/1 yr 
$1,250 and 
expiation 
fee of $160; 
any other 
term of 
order – 2 
yrs 
breach of 
misconduct 
restraining 
order - 
$1,000 
S 62: 
defence if 
person was 
using a 
family 
dispute 
resolution 
process 
mths 
imprison-
ment; 
second 
offence: 
fine not 
exceeding 
30 penalty 
units or 18 
mths 
imprison-
ment; third 
offence: 
fine not 
exceeding 
40 penalty 
units or 2 
yrs 
imprison-
ment; 
fourth or 
subsequent 
offence: 
imprison-
ment for a 
term not 
exceeding 
5 years 
 
S 106I: for 
contravent-
ion or 
penalty 400 
pu/2 years 
imp; court 
must record 
conviction 
and 
sentence 
for at least 
7 days if 
previous 
contraven-
tion of DVO 
(unless 
there was 
no harm to 
protected 
person) 
both 
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failure to 
comply with 
order, liable 
on 
summary 
conviction 
to fine not 
exceeding 
10 pu/6 
mths imp.  
Provisions 
available to 
non-
partners 
Yes, 
‘domestic 
relation-
ship’ 
extends to 
relatives, 
members of 
a 
household/ 
residential 
facility and 
those in a 
caring 
relationship 
S 18: Act 
also 
provides for 
‘Apprehen-
ded 
Personal 
Violence 
Orders’ in 
All 
provisions 
relate to 
‘affected 
family 
members’ 
which 
includes 
partners 
and other 
relatives 
Ss 11-12: 
extends to 
spouses, 
those in an 
intimate 
relationship 
(dated and 
lives 
enmeshed 
to the 
extent 
actions of 
one affect 
the other); 
family 
relationship 
(relatives); 
informal 
caring 
relationship 
Children 
can only be 
Yes, 
applies to 
all acts of 
abuse both 
domestic 
and non-
domestic 
Same 
provisions 
available 
regardless 
of type of 
relationship 
Provisions 
apply only 
to violence 
committed 
against a 
spouse or 
partner. 
General 
restraining 
orders are 
available 
under the 
Justices 
Act 1959 
Yes, to 
other family 
members 
and those 
in a 
‘domestic 
relation-
ship’ but 
not to non-
family 
relation-
ships 
Yes, DV 
orders are 
available to 
‘relevant 
persons’ 
which 
includes 
relatives. 
PPOs are 
available to 
any 
‘aggrieved 
person’ 
who has 
been the 
subject of 
violence. 
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similar 
terms 
available to 
those not in 
a domestic 
relationship
. 
aggrieved 
person/ 
respondent 
if spouse/ 
intimate 
relationship
/informal 
carer 
Other 
relevant 
provisions 
S 38: any 
order made 
to protect 
an adult 
must also 
include a 
child with 
whom the 
adult has a 
domestic 
relationship 
unless 
there are 
good 
reasons for 
doing so 
Part 3 – 
Police 
Protection 
before 
Court: 
allows an 
officer who 
intends to 
make an 
application 
for a 
FVIO/FVSN 
to direct the 
person to 
stay in a 
place or go 
to a place 
for up to 6 
hours (can 
be 
extended) 
where s/he 
believes it 
is 
S 23: if 
order is 
made, 
Weapons 
Act applies 
to persons 
who would 
otherwise 
be exempt 
under s 2 of 
that Act. 
S67: if 
officer 
reasonably 
suspects a 
person is 
aggrieved, 
there is a 
duty to 
investigate. 
If satisfied 
they are 
aggrieved 
and there is 
S 13: May 
require 
assess-
ment for 
intervention 
program 
(defined s 3 
as including 
supervised 
treatment 
or rehab; 
behaviour 
manage-
ment; 
access to 
support 
services 
designed to 
address 
behavioural 
problems. 
S 8(1)(i): 
court must 
explain to 
both parties 
that 
counselling 
is available 
and refer 
parties to 
counselling 
where 
appropriate 
S 62C: 
police 
officer who 
enters 
premises 
on 
suspicion of 
DV must 
make 
application 
for RO or 
record 
S 13: 
makes 
provision 
for 
counselling 
S 
106DA(3): 
police 
officer 
making 
application 
for 
telephone 
interim RO 
may detain 
person 
using such 
force as 
necessary 
and 
reasonable 
for as long 
as 
reasonably 
SS 60 and 
61: clerk 
may 
vary/revoke 
DVO if both 
parties 
consent 
S 124A: 
creates an 
offence if a 
person 
believes on 
reasonable 
grounds 
another 
person has 
caused or 
is likely to 
cause 
(serious 
physical) 
harm to a 
person they 
are in a 
S25: for 
protection 
orders if 
registrar 
believes 
more 
effectively 
dealt with 
by 
mediation, 
can refer 
parties to 
that. 
S 75: for 
emergency 
order, 
respondent 
can be 
detained for 
up to 4 
hours while 
order is 
made. 
S 83: if 
359 
 
 NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS NT ACT  
necessary 
to ensure 
the safety 
of a person 
or their 
property. 
Part 5 – 
allows the 
court to 
make 
orders for 
respondent 
to attend 
counselling 
to make 
him more 
account-
able for 
violence 
and 
encourage 
behaviour 
change. 
Court must 
usually 
make an 
order 
requiring 
assess-
ment for 
counselling 
and 
sufficient 
reason to 
take action, 
may apply 
for a 
protection 
order. 
S 69: police 
officer who 
reasonably 
suspects 
DV has 
been 
committed 
and a 
person is in 
danger of 
personal 
injury or 
property 
damage 
may take 
respondent 
into 
custody 
using force 
that is 
reasonable 
and 
necessary. 
S 71: police 
officer who 
reasons. 
S 62F: 
police 
officer may 
detain a 
person 
while police 
order/ 
telephone 
application 
is being 
made. 
necessary 
to obtain 
order. 
S 
106DA(14) 
Before a 
telephone 
interim RO 
expires 
police 
officer must 
apply for a 
restraint 
order or 
report to 
the 
magistrate 
who made 
the order 
why an 
application 
is not being 
made. 
S 106F: 
Justices 
may 
remand 
respondent 
in custody 
during 
adjourn-
ment, 
domestic 
relationship 
with or life 
or safety of 
another 
person is 
under 
serious or 
imminent 
threat and 
fails to 
report it – 
penalty 200 
pu (defence 
of 
reasonable 
excuse). 
On receipt 
of such a 
report, PO 
must take 
reasonable 
steps to 
ensure 
report is 
investigat-
ed. 
police 
officer 
believes on 
reasonable 
grounds 
physical 
injury may 
be caused 
if 
emergency 
order is not 
applied for 
and it is not 
practicable 
to arrest 
respondent, 
officer must 
record 
reasons for 
not 
applying for 
emergency 
order.  
S 90: court 
may 
recommend 
respondent, 
aggrieved 
person or 
other 
relevant 
person to 
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respondent 
must be 
assessed 
as eligible 
except if 
specified 
circumstan-
ces apply. 
If assessed 
as eligible, 
court must 
usually 
make an 
order for 
respondent 
to attend 
counselling. 
takes a 
person into 
custody 
must apply 
for a 
protection 
order. 
S 81: court 
to be 
closed 
during 
proceed-
ings 
taking into 
account 
protection 
and welfare 
of person 
for whose 
benefit 
order is 
sought of 
paramount 
importance 
and also 
any 
previous 
violence by 
respondent. 
attend 
counselling, 
mediation, 
training, 
etc. 
Reporting S 104: A 
report is to 
be tabled in 
Parliament 
within 12 m 
of the end 
of a period 
of three 
years. 
S 40: Chief 
Commiss-
ioner of 
Police and 
Chief 
Magistrate 
must give 
report to 
AG 12 mths 
after 
legislation 
comes into 
effect 
N/A N/A S 30I: 
Minister 
must 
review 
police 
orders 
powers 2 
years after 
they 
commence 
and report 
to 
Parliament 
S 38: 
places 
obligations 
on 
profession-
al groups to 
report to 
police 
where they 
believe or 
suspect on 
reasonable 
grounds 
that family 
violence 
S 124A: 
creates an 
offence if 
person has 
reasonable 
grounds to 
believe 
harm has 
been 
caused or 
is about to 
be caused 
to person in 
domestic 
relationship
N/A 
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involving a 
weapon, 
sexual or 
physical 
violence 
(against 
adults) has 
occurred or 
is likely to 
occur (not 
commenc-
ed as at 
November 
2011) 
or life or 
safety is 
under 
imminent 
threat and 
fails to 
report it 
Relation-
ship with 
Family Law 
Act 
S 42: 
Applicant 
must inform 
the court of 
any 
relevant 
parenting 
order. 
Court must 
have 
regard to 
any 
parenting 
order in 
place in 
deciding 
whether to 
make an 
S 57(1)(g): 
Permits 
variation of 
Family Law 
Act orders 
if 
inconsistent 
with an 
interim 
order. 
S 87: re 
orders 
relating to 
property, 
FLA orders 
prevail. 
S 90: court 
has power 
S 46C: 
Court must 
take into 
account 
family law 
orders in 
deciding 
whether to 
make 
protection 
order 
S 10(2): 
must take 
into 
account 
any 
relevant 
Family Law 
Act order.  
S 16: 
intervention 
order 
invalid to 
extent of 
inonsist-
ency with 
Family Law 
Act order 
referred to 
S 65: if 
court does 
not have 
jurisdiction 
to vary a 
family 
order, 
cannot 
make a RO 
that 
conflicts 
with a 
family 
order. 
S 66: 
applicant 
must inform 
the court of 
S 18: court 
must 
consider 
the issue of 
contact 
between 
the 
applicant 
and the 
subject of 
the FVO 
and any 
child; and 
must 
consider 
any FCA 
orders of 
which it is 
S 90: 
applicant 
must inform 
issuing 
authority of 
any family 
law orders 
existing/ 
pending. 
Police must 
make 
reasonable 
inquiries 
about 
family 
orders 
before 
granting 
S 31: for 
interim 
orders must 
consider 
whether 
contact 
between 
aggrieved 
person/ 
respondent 
and any 
child is 
relevant to 
making of 
order or to 
family 
contact 
orders (but 
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order under s 
68R Family 
Law Act to 
vary, 
suspend or 
revoke the 
FLA orders 
to the 
extent of 
inconsist-
ency. 
But s 176: s 
68Q Family 
Law Act – 
FC can 
declare 
FVIO 
invalid to 
extent of 
inconsist-
ency with 
FLA orders 
in s 68R 
(though 
court may 
vary the 
Family Law 
Act order) 
any family 
order they 
are aware 
of 
informed 
S 
106B(4AA): 
application 
must 
include 
information 
of any 
relevant 
family 
contact 
order or 
pending 
application 
of which 
applicant is 
aware. 
S 106GE: 
restraint 
orders are 
subject to 
any 
declaration 
made 
under s 
68S Family 
Law Act 
1975.  
 
 
police DVO if does not 
do so, does 
not 
invalidate 
order). 
S 47: for 
final orders 
same and 
also s 71 
(emergency 
orders) 
Evidentiary 
Provisions 
S 16: 
criteria for 
S 65 and 
66: court 
S 84: court 
may inform 
S 28: Court 
is to decide 
S 26: 
applicant 
S 16: 
standard 
S 18: 
criteria for 
S 16: if 
magistrate 
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granting 
must be 
satisfied on 
balance of 
probabilit-
ies 
may take 
evidence 
as it sees fit 
and may 
allow 
evidence 
by affidavit 
or written 
statement. 
S 70: 
protected 
witness 
(includes 
affected 
family 
member) 
cannot be 
personally 
cross-
examined 
without 
their 
consent 
S 73: 
allows 
expert 
evidence 
about 
family 
violence 
itself as it 
thinks fit 
and is not 
bound by 
rules of 
evidence 
questions 
of fact on 
balance of 
probabilit-
ies. 
S 29: court 
may order 
special 
arrange-
ments for 
taking 
evidence of 
a person 
against 
whom it is 
alleged an 
act or 
abuse has 
been or 
might be 
committed 
may 
choose 
whether to 
have first 
hearing in 
absence of 
respondent. 
S 27(2) 
hearings to 
be in 
closed 
court. 
S 44A: 
rules of 
evidence 
do not 
apply. 
S 44C: 
respondent 
cannot 
cross-
examine 
family 
member 
directly. 
for making 
order is 
balance of 
probabilit-
ies 
granting 
must be 
satisfied on 
balance of 
probs even 
if protected 
person 
denies or 
does not 
give 
evidence. 
S 106: 
court may 
close court 
for 
vulnerable 
witness. 
Pt 4.1 Div 
4: special 
provisions 
for 
evidence 
by children 
and 
vulnerable 
witnesses. 
S 114: 
unrepresen
ted 
respondent 
cannot 
cross-
is required 
to be 
satisfied of 
something, 
standard is 
the balance 
of probabil-
ities 
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examine 
protected 
person 
directly 
Legal 
assistance 
for 
applicants 
N/A S 72: If 
respondent 
is legally 
represent-
ed, court 
can order 
Victoria 
Legal Aid to 
give legal 
assistance 
to applicant 
who is a 
protected 
witness for 
the 
purposes of 
cross-
examinat-
ion by 
respond-
ent’s legal 
represent-
ative 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Consent by 
applicant to 
breach 
N/A s 57/ s 
96(1)(e): 
Respond-
ent is 
informed 
N/A S 17: court 
must 
endeavour 
to explain 
that 
S 8(1)(f): 
court must 
explain that 
order must 
be varied or 
N/A N/A N/A 
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that order is 
a civil order 
and 
affected 
family 
member 
cannot give 
permission 
to breach 
protected 
person 
cannot give 
permission 
for 
contravent-
ion of 
order. 
 
cancelled if 
parties 
intend to 
resume 
contact. 
S 46(4): 
court must 
grant leave 
to continue 
application 
by 
respondent 
to 
cancel/vary 
order if 
there is 
evidence 
the person 
protected 
by the 
order has 
persistently 
invited or 
encouraged 
respondent 
to breach 
the order 
(hearing is 
in absence 
of that 
person) 
Consequen S 14(7): a S 125: N/A S31(3): a N/A N/A N/A S 85: court 
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-ce of 
permitting 
breach by 
applicant 
person 
cannot be 
liable for 
aiding or 
abetting a 
breach if 
they are a 
person 
protected 
by the 
order 
protected 
person not 
guilty of 
aiding, 
abetting, 
counselling 
or 
procuring 
commission 
of an 
offence 
contrary to 
s 52 
Magistrates 
Court Act 
by 
encourag-
ing or 
allowing 
non-
compliance 
with FVIO 
or FVSN 
person is 
not guilty of 
aiding, 
abetting etc 
an offence 
if the 
person is a 
person 
protected 
by the 
intervention 
order and 
the conduct 
did not 
constitute 
contravent-
ion of the 
order in 
respect of 
another 
person 
protected 
must 
explain to 
aggrieved 
person if 
present that 
they may 
commit an 
offence if 
they 
aid/abet a 
breach 
Entry, 
search and 
detention 
powers 
S 89: 
Police 
officer may 
direct 
person to 
remain at a 
place while 
application 
for PO is 
S 157: 
officer may 
enter where 
reasonably 
believes  a 
person has 
assaulted 
or 
threatened 
S 609 
Police 
Powers and 
Responsib-
ilities Act: 
police 
officer may 
enter on 
premises if 
S 34: If 
police 
officer 
proposes to 
issue an 
interim 
order, may 
require 
person to 
S 30A-30C: 
police may 
make 
police order 
in nature of 
VRO in 
situation of 
urgency if 
satisfied an 
S 11: may 
arrest 
without 
warrant 
where 
reasonably 
suspects 
committed 
FV (allows 
S 84: if 
police 
officer 
reasonably 
believes 
grounds 
exist for 
making a 
DVO and it 
N/A 
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made. Law 
Enforceme
nt (Powers 
and 
Responsibil
ities) Act 
2002 allows 
police to 
enter 
premises if 
reasonably 
believes 
DV offence 
occurring/ 
occurred 
and invited 
by an 
occupier 
onto 
premises 
a family 
member, or 
is in breach 
of a 
FVIO/FVSN 
– no 
warrant 
required 
and may 
use 
reasonable 
force 
reasonably 
suspects 
DV offence 
occurring or 
has 
occurred. 
S 67: police 
officer 
obliged to 
investigate 
where 
reasonably 
believes 
person may 
be an 
‘aggrieved 
person’ and 
if so, may 
apply for a 
PO 
remain at a 
particular 
place for as 
long as 
necessary 
and if 
failure to 
comply 
may arrest 
and detain 
for up to 2 
hrs or 
longer 
period 
approved 
by court 
S 35: If 
police 
officer 
believes on 
reasonable 
grounds 
that (in 
conjunction 
with serving 
an 
intervention 
order) it is 
necessary 
to arrest 
and detain 
for a short 
act of 
family and 
domestic 
violence 
has 
occurred 
and is likely 
to occur 
again, or if 
officer 
reasonably 
fears or 
believes 
person 
reasonably 
fears they 
will be 
subjected 
to such an 
act; and 
making a 
police order 
is 
necessary 
to ensure 
safety of 
the person. 
May 
include 
restraints 
considered 
appropriate 
detention to 
enable 
police to 
carry out a 
safety 
audit) 
Restraining 
orders: S 
106I: where 
police 
officer has 
reasonable 
cause to 
suspect 
person has 
contravene-
ed RO may 
arrest and 
detain 
without 
warrant. 
S 106L: 
police 
officer may 
enter 
premises 
for such 
period as 
necessary 
to prevent a 
breach of 
peace and 
is 
necessary 
to remove 
person to 
prevent 
imminent 
risk of 
harm/ 
damage, 
can take 
person into 
custody 
and detain 
for up to 4 
hours 
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period to 
prevent 
immediate 
commission 
of abuse, 
may do so 
for up to 6 
hrs or 
longer 
period 
approved 
by court. 
S 36: may 
arrest and 
detain if 
reason to 
suspect 
person has 
contraven-
ed an 
intervention 
order 
S 37: 
powers to 
enter or 
search for a 
weapon or 
article 
required to 
be 
surrender-
ed under 
to prevent 
an act of 
family and 
domestic 
violence or 
to prevent a 
person 
behaving in 
a manner 
that could 
reasonably 
cause fear 
of such an 
act. Order 
must be the 
least 
restrictive 
that will still 
ensure 
protection 
of other 
person. 
S 62A: 
police to 
investigate 
if 
reasonably 
suspect 
person has 
committed 
an act of 
domestic 
may arrest 
without 
warrant to 
facilitate 
making of a 
RO at 
request of a 
person who 
resides on 
premises or 
if reason to 
believe a 
person may 
be under 
threat/ 
attack or 
has 
recently 
been. 
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order and family 
violence 
which is a 
criminal 
offence or 
has put the 
safety of a 
person at 
risk 
S 62B: 
power of 
entry 
without 
warrant 
where 
reasonably 
suspects 
an act is 
being 
committed 
or has been 
committed 
Relation-
ship with 
criminal law 
S 39: court 
must make 
an order if 
a person is 
found guilty 
of a 
domestic 
violence 
offence. 
S 14: if 
S 155: 
FVIO can 
be granted 
even 
though 
person has 
been 
charged 
with 
offence 
S 30: court 
may make 
order on 
own 
initiative if 
respondent 
is convicted 
of DV 
offences 
N/A S 63A: 
court must 
make a RO 
for the life 
of the 
person 
committing 
a ‘violent 
personal 
offence’ 
N/A S 45: if 
person 
convicted 
of offence 
involving 
DV, DVO 
may be 
made if 
court is 
satisfied a 
S 113: 
magistrate 
may make 
protection 
order if 
person has 
been 
charged or 
convicted 
arising out 
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police 
reasonably 
suspect 
breach 
must 
initiate 
prosecution 
or record 
reasons for 
not doing 
so 
arising out 
of same 
conduct 
(specified 
offences in 
the 
section). 
S 63B: in 
sentencing 
for a violent 
personal 
offence 
where 
respondent 
is in a 
domestic 
and family 
relationship 
with a 
victim or a 
restraining 
order was 
in place, 
court must 
take that 
into 
account in 
assessing 
serious-
ness. 
S 63C: 
court may 
make a RO 
even 
though 
CSJ DVO 
could be 
made. 
S 86: DVO 
may be 
made even 
if person 
has been 
charged in 
relation to 
same 
conduct. 
S 87: 
making of 
DVO does 
not affect 
civil or 
criminal 
liability of 
respondent 
of same 
conduct. 
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person has 
been 
charged 
with an 
offence out 
of same 
conduct. 
Restrictions 
on 
publication 
S 45: 
restriction 
on 
publication 
of name of 
child; 
provision 
for a court 
to make 
orders 
restricting 
publication 
of name of 
protected 
person who 
is not a 
child 
S 166: 
identifying 
particulars 
must not be 
published 
unless 
court 
orders. S 
169: 
Exception if 
publication 
is in the 
public 
interest 
(e.g. to 
raise 
awareness 
of family 
violence) 
S 82: 
offence to 
publish 
anything 
identifying 
an 
aggrieved, 
respondent 
or named 
person 
S 33: 
person 
must not 
publish a 
report 
about 
proceed-
ings under 
this Act or 
an order 
registered 
under the 
Act if it 
identifies 
any person 
involved in 
the 
proceed-
ings (not 
the 
respondent
) 
S 70: 
prohibits 
publishing 
information 
that would 
reveal the 
where-
abouts of 
any party to 
the 
proceeding 
S 32: court 
may make 
order in the 
interests of 
the 
administrat-
ion of 
justice 
 
S 106K: 
where it 
appears to 
justices that 
it is in the 
administrat-
ion of 
justice 
desirable 
may 
prohibit 
publication 
of the name 
of any party 
or witness 
S 26: court 
may order 
no 
publication 
of personal 
details of 
protected 
person 
/witness if it 
would 
expose 
them to 
harm. 
S 123: 
offence to 
publish 
details 
identifying 
child 
S 124: 
offence to 
publish 
details of 
person if 
court has 
S 111: 
offence to 
publish 
account of 
proceed-
ings that 
identifies a 
party to 
proceeding 
372 
 
 NSW VIC QLD SA WA TAS NT ACT  
prohibited it 
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ANNEXURE F: TABLE OF MURDER/MANSLAUGHTER PROVISIONS AND PENALTIES (AUSTRALIA) 
 
Jurisdiction Offence Fault element Provision Maximum penalty 
ACT Murder (a) intending to cause 
the death of any 
person; or 
(b) with reckless 
indifference to the 
probability of causing 
the death of any 
person; or 
(c) intending to cause 
serious harm to any 
person. 
Crimes Act 1900 s 12 Life imprisonment 
 Manslaughter Unlawful homicide 
that is not murder 
Crimes Act 1900 s 15 20 yrs 
 Manslaughter – 
aggravated offence 
when committed 
against pregnant 
woman 
 Crimes Act 1900 ss 
15 and 48A 
26 yrs 
NSW Murder Done or omitted with 
reckless indifference 
to human life, or with 
intent to kill or inflict 
grievous bodily harm 
upon some person, or 
done in an attempt to 
Crimes Act 1900 s 
19A (murder defined s 
18) 
Life imprisonment 
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Jurisdiction Offence Fault element Provision Maximum penalty 
commit, or during or 
immediately after the 
commission, by the 
accused, or some 
accomplice with him 
or her, of a crime 
punishable by 
imprisonment for life 
or for 25 years. 
 Manslaughter Every other homicide Crimes Act 1900 s 24 
(manslaughter 
defined s 18) 
25 yrs (provision for 
discharge if judge 
considers nominal 
punishment would be 
sufficient) 
Northern Territory Murder The person intends to 
cause the death of, or 
serious harm to, that 
or any other person 
by that conduct. 
Criminal Code Act 
1983 s 157 (murder 
defined s 156) 
Life imprisonment 
(mandatory) 
 Manslaughter The person is 
reckless or negligent 
as to causing the 
death of that or any 
other person by the 
conduct 
Criminal Code Act  
1983 s 161 
(manslaughter 
defined s 160) 
Life imprisonment 
Queensland Murder (a) if the offender 
intends to cause the 
death of the person 
killed or that of some 
Criminal Code Act 
1899 s 305 (murder 
defined s 302) 
Life imprisonment 
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Jurisdiction Offence Fault element Provision Maximum penalty 
other person or if the 
offender intends to do 
to the person killed or 
to some other person 
some grievous bodily 
harm; 
(b) if death is caused 
by means of an act 
done in the 
prosecution of an 
unlawful purpose, 
which act is of such 
a nature as to be 
likely to endanger 
human life; 
(c) if the offender 
intends to do grievous 
bodily harm to 
some person for the 
purpose of facilitating 
the commission of a 
crime which is such 
that the offender may 
be arrested without 
warrant, or for the 
purpose of facilitating 
the flight of an 
offender who has 
committed or 
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Jurisdiction Offence Fault element Provision Maximum penalty 
attempted to commit 
any such crime; 
(d) if death is caused 
by administering any 
stupefying or 
overpowering thing for 
either of the purposes 
mentioned in 
paragraph (c); 
(e) if death is caused 
by wilfully stopping 
the breath of any 
person for either of 
such purposes. 
 
 Manslaughter Such circumstances 
as do not constitute 
murder        
Criminal Code Act 
1899 s 310 
(manslaughter 
defined s 303) 
Life imprisonment 
South Australia  Murder Not defined but 
Includes committing 
an intentional act of 
violence while acting 
in the course or 
furtherance of a major 
indictable offence 
punishable by 
imprisonment for ten 
years or more 
Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 
1935 s 11 
 
Life imprisonment 
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Jurisdiction Offence Fault element Provision Maximum penalty 
 Manslaughter Not defined Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act 
1935 s 13 
Life imprisonment 
Tasmania Murder (a) with an intention to 
cause the death of 
any person, whether 
of the person killed or 
not; (b) with an 
intention to cause to 
any person, whether 
the person killed or 
not, bodily harm 
which the offender 
knew to be likely to 
cause death in the 
circumstances, 
although he had no 
wish to cause death; 
(c) by means of any 
unlawful act or 
omission which the 
offender knew, or 
ought to have known, 
to be likely to cause 
death in the 
circumstances, 
although he had no 
wish to cause death 
or bodily harm to any 
Criminal Code Act 
1924 s 158 (murder 
defined s 157) 
Term of defendant’s 
natural life 
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Jurisdiction Offence Fault element Provision Maximum penalty 
person; (d) with an 
intention to inflict 
grievous bodily harm 
for the purpose of 
facilitating the 
commission of any of 
the crimes hereinafter 
mentioned or the flight 
of the offender upon 
the commission, or 
attempted 
commission, thereof; 
(e) by means of 
administering any 
stupefying thing for 
either of the purposes 
mentioned in 
paragraph (d); or (f) 
by wilfully stopping 
the breath of any 
person by any means 
for either of such 
purposes as 
aforesaid–although, in 
the cases mentioned 
in paragraphs (d), (e) 
and (f), the offender 
did not intend to 
cause death, and did 
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Jurisdiction Offence Fault element Provision Maximum penalty 
not know that death 
was likely to ensue. 
 Manslaughter Culpable homicide not 
amounting to murder 
Criminal Code Act 
1924 (manslaughter 
defined s 159) 
No penalty specified 
Victoria Murder Not defined 
 
Separate offence for 
unintentionally 
causing the death of 
another through 
violence done in the 
course of furtherance 
of a crime 
Crimes Act 1958 s 3 
 
 
S 3A 
Life imprisonment or 
such other term as 
fixed by the court 
 Manslaughter Not defined Crimes Act 1958 s 5 20 yrs 
Western Australia Murder (a) the person intends 
to cause the death of 
the person killed 
or another person; or 
(b) the person intends 
to cause a bodily 
injury of such a nature 
as to endanger, or be 
likely to endanger, the 
life of the person 
killed or another 
person; or 
(c) the death is 
caused by means of 
Criminal Code Act 
Compilation Act 1913 
s 279 
Life imprisonment 
mandatory unless it 
would be unjust and 
person would not be a 
threat to community 
when released – then 
20 yrs 
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Jurisdiction Offence Fault element Provision Maximum penalty 
an act done in the 
prosecution of an 
unlawful purpose, 
which act is of such a 
nature as to be likely 
to endanger human 
life 
 Manslaughter Such circumstances 
as not to constitute 
murder 
Criminal Code Act 
Compilation Act 1913 
s 280 
20 yrs 
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ANNEXURE G: TABLE OF TERRORISM OFFENCES  
Provision of the 
Commonwealth Criminal 
Code 
Offence Introduced by Penalty 
S 101.1 Engaging in a terrorist act Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002 
Life imprisonment 
S 101.2(1) Providing or receiving 
training in connection with 
a terrorist act – knowledge 
of connection 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002, am. Anti-
Terrorism Act 2005 
25 yrs 
S 101.2(2) Providing or receiving 
training in connection with 
a terrorist act – reckless as 
to connection 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002, am. Anti-
Terrorism Act 2005 
15 yrs 
S 101.4(1) Possessing things 
connected with terrorist 
acts – knowledge as to 
connection 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002, am. Anti-
Terrorism Act 2005 
15 yrs 
S 101.4(2) Possessing things 
connected with terrorist 
acts – reckless as to 
connection 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002, am. Anti-
Terrorism Act 2005 
10 yrs 
S 101.5(1) Collecting or making 
documents likely to 
facilitate terrorist acts – 
knowledge as to 
connection 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002, am. Anti-
Terrorism Act 2005 
15 yrs 
S 101.5(2) Collecting or making Security Legislation 10 yrs 
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Provision of the 
Commonwealth Criminal 
Code 
Offence Introduced by Penalty 
documents likely to 
facilitate terrorist acts – 
reckless as to connection 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002, am. Anti-
Terrorism Act 2005 
S 101.6(1) Doing an act in preparation 
for a terrorist act 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002, am. Anti-
Terrorism Act 2005 
Life imprisonment 
S 102.2(1) Directing the activities of a 
terrorist organisation – 
knowledge as to the fact it 
is a terrorist organisation 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002 
25 yrs 
S 102.2(2) Directing the activities of a 
terrorist organisation – 
recklessness as to the fact 
it is a terrorist organisation 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002 
15 yrs 
S 102.3(1) Membership of a terrorist 
organisation 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002, am. Criminal 
Code Amendment 
(Hizballah) Act 2003 and 
Criminal Code Amendment 
(Hamas and Lashka-e-
Tayabba) Act 2003; Anti-
Terrorism Act 2004 
10 yrs 
S 102.4(1) Recruiting for a terrorist 
organisation – knowledge 
as to the fact it is a terrorist 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002 
25 yrs 
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Provision of the 
Commonwealth Criminal 
Code 
Offence Introduced by Penalty 
organisation 
S 102.4(2) Recruiting for a terrorist 
organisation – 
recklessness as to the fact 
it is a terrorist organisation 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002 
15 yrs 
S 102.5(1) Training a terrorist 
organisation or receiving 
training from a terrorist 
organisation – 
recklessness as to whether 
it is a terrorist organisation 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002, am. Anti-
Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 
25 yrs 
S 102.5(2) Training a terrorist 
organisation or receiving 
training from a terrorist 
organisation – organisation 
is specified as a terrorist 
organisation by regulation 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002, am. Anti-
Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 
25 yrs 
S 102.6(1) Getting funds to, from or 
for a terrorist organisation 
– knowledge as to the fact 
it is a terrorist organisation 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002, am. Anti-
Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 
25 yrs 
S 102.6(2) Getting funds to, from or 
for a terrorist organisation 
– recklessness as to the 
fact it is a terrorist 
organisation 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002, am. Anti-
Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 
15 yrs 
S 102.7(1) Providing support to a Security Legislation 25 yrs 
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Provision of the 
Commonwealth Criminal 
Code 
Offence Introduced by Penalty 
terrorist organisation – 
knowledge as to the fact it 
is a terrorist organisation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002 
S 102.7(2) Providing support to a 
terrorist organisation – 
recklessness as to the fact 
it is a terrorist organisation 
Security Legislation 
Amendment (Terrorism) 
Act 2002 
15 yrs 
S 102.8(1) Associating with terrorist 
organisations - associating 
on two or more occasions 
Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 
2004, am. Anti-Terrorism 
Act (No 2) 2005 
3 yrs 
S 102.8(2) Associating with terrorist 
organisations – previous 
conviction 
Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 
2004, am. Anti-Terrorism 
Act (No 2) 2005 
3 yrs 
S 103.1(1) Financing terrorism – 
provides or collects funds 
reckless as to whether they 
will be used to facilitate or 
engage in a terrorist act 
Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism Act 
2002, am. Anti-Terrorism 
Act 2005 and Anti-
Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 
Life imprisonment 
S 103.2(2) Financing a terrorist – 
makes funds available to 
another person or collects 
funds for/on behalf of 
another person reckless as 
to whether the other 
person will use the funds to 
engage in or facilitate a 
terrorist act 
Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 
2005 
Life imprisonment 
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ANNEXURE H: FATAL SHOOTINGS OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 
The shooting of Jean-Charles de Menezes 
 
The shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes occurred at Stockwell Tube Station 
on 22 July 2005, following one successful bombing and an attempted bombing 
that occurred in London the previous day. De Menezes lived in the same 
building as one of the suspects police had identified; upon leaving his building 
on the morning of 22 July 2005 he was mistakenly identified as one of the 
persons of interest and followed to Stockwell tube station, where he entered the 
station and boarded a train.  
When the weapons team arrived, one of the operatives identified de Menezes 
as the suspect. As de Menezes stood up, an operative (identified as ‘Ivor’) 
grabbed him and pinned his arms behind his back; while he was in a prone 
state, each of two members of the weapons team (operatives identified as 
‘Charlie 12’ and ‘Charlie 2’) discharged a firearm into his head. In total, de 
Menezes suffered seven shots to the head and one to the shoulder.1  
The first report into the incident by the Independent Police Crime Commission 
(IPCC), known as ‘Stockwell One’, revealed that police in counter-terrorism 
operations had been instructed to ‘shoot to kill’, as it was feared that any 
terrorist confronted by authorities would immediately detonate any explosive 
device on their person – a policy known as Operation Kratos.2  
After the shooting, it was discovered that de Menezes had no explosive devices 
on his person, nor was he linked in any way to the attempted bombings of 21 
July 2005. It was revealed that key errors had been made in identification and 
reporting of de Menezes’ movements. There were other breakdowns in 
communication also, with operatives believing that they had been ordered to 
                                                          
1
 ‘Police shot Brazilian eight times’, BBC News, 25 July 2005, 
 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4713753.stm> (viewed 19 November 2008). 
2
 See Peter Kennison and Amanda Loumansky, ‘Shoot to kill – understanding Police use of force in 
combating suicide terrorism’ (2007) 47 Crime Law and Social Change 151. 
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prevent de Menezes entering the Stockwell tube station ‘at any cost’ despite no 
authorisation of lethal force having been given by the head of the operation. 
There were also a number of aspects of conduct of the police following the 
shooting that indicated an attempt to reconstruct the events leading up to the 
shooting.3 
On 14 March 2006, the IPCC released Stockwell One to the Metropolitan 
Police, and on 17 July 2006, the Crown Prosecution Service announced that the 
only charge that would be laid in the matter was a corporate charge against the 
Metropolitan Police for breach of health and safety laws. The charge was 
contested and a verdict of guilty handed down in November 2007, with an 
unusual ‘rider’ by the jury that no personal responsibility was to attach to 
Clarissa Dick, the leader of the operation. Only one officer, who was suspected 
of altering a surveillance log after the fact, was recommended to face 
disciplinary charges. 
In late 2008, a coronial inquest was held into the incident. The jury’s verdict was 
returned on 12 December 2008.4 By a majority they handed down an ‘open 
verdict’ as the coroner, Sir Michael Wright, had earlier ruled that ‘unlawful killing’ 
was not open to them as a verdict; thus the only other available option was 
‘lawful killing’. In relation to specific questions asked of the jury, they found 
unanimously that the officer known as ‘Charlie 12’ had not shouted ‘armed 
police’ at de Menezes prior to shooting, as he had claimed. They also found that 
de Menezes had not moved toward officer ‘Charlie 12’ before he was grabbed 
in a bear hug by the officer ‘Ivor’ as police had claimed. The jury also made 
findings in relation to failings of the Metropolitan police that had contributed to 
de Menezes’ death.  
 
 
                                                          
3
 Stockwell One, [17.20], p. 87. 
4
 The transcript of the jury’s verdict and answers to questions is available at: <http: 
stockwellinquest.org.uk/hearing_transcripts/index.htm> (viewed 13 December 2008). 
395 
 
The Shooting of Rigoberto Alpizar 
 
On 7 December 2005, Rigoberto Alpizar was on board a plane at Miami 
International Airport that was en route to Florida.5 He was travelling with his 
wife. While the plane was still on the runway, Alpizar had an argument with his 
wife and announced that he was leaving. Other passengers and two air 
marshals travelling on the plane heard him say that he had a bomb on him. 
Alpizar’s wife followed him down the aisle of the plane, calling out that he was 
sick. 
Alpizar dismounted from the plane and stood on the runway. He was challenged 
by the two air marshals repeatedly and told to place his hands in the air. Alpizar 
was heard to state again that he had a bomb and made a movement to place 
his hand in the bag he was carrying. At that point, he was fatally shot by the two 
air marshals.  
It was later revealed that Alpizar had suffered from bipolar disorder and that 
while on the trip with his wife from which he was returning had ceased taking his 
medication and been acting strangely. The Miami-Dade State Attorney’s office 
released its report on 23 May 2006, finding that the shooting by the two 
marshals had been justified and that no charges would be laid.  
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
5
 An outline of the facts of the shooting is provided in Office of the State Attorney (Miami-Dade State 
Attorney’s office) (2006). 
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ANNEXURE I: CASES INVOLVING SELF-DEFENCE RESPONSES BY FEMALE 
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R v Weatherall [2006] NSWSC 486 (Unreported, Patten AJ, 18 May 2006) 
R v Yeoman [2003] NSWSC 194 (Unreported, Buddin J, 21 March 2003) 
  
397 
 
ANNEXURE J: CORONIAL CASES 
 
Malcolm Bell (Queensland Coroners’ Court, 26 May 2006) 
Luke Donaghey (Unreported, SA Coroner’s Court, 15 September 2000) 
Clay Hatch (Qld Coroners’ Court, 19 June 2009)  
Warren I’Anson (Unreported, ACT Coroner’s Court, 26 February 1999) 
Robert Jongman [2007] NTMC 080 (3 December 2007) 
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Batt JJA, 6 September 2001) 
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ANNEXURE K: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AFP  Australian Federal Police 
AG  Attorney-General 
COAG Coalition of Australian Governments 
DPP  Director of Public Prosecutions 
DV  Domestic Violence 
FBI  Federal Bureau of Investigation (US) 
FV  Family Violence 
IPCC  Independent Police Crime Commission 
NTMC  Northern Territory Magistrates Court 
PADV  Partnerships against Domestic Violence 
PO  Protection Order 
RC  Refused Classification 
TASCD Tasmanian Coronial Division 
VRO  Violence Restraining Order 
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